

THE LEBANESE CRISIS

*Issued under the auspices of the
Indian School of International Studies*

P. V. 83

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THE LEBANESE CRISIS, 1958

A DOCUMENTARY STUDY

Selected, Edited and Introduced

by

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BOMBAY • CALCUTTA • NEW DELHI • MADRAS
LUCKNOW • LONDON • NEW YORK

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New Delhi

PRINTED IN INDIA

BY G. G. PATHARE AT THE POPULAR PRESS (BOM.) PRIVATE
LTD., 35C, TARDEO ROAD, BOMBAY 34, AND PUBLISHED BY
P. S. JAYASINGHE, ASIA PUBLISHING HOUSE, BOMBAY 1

Preface

THE Lebanese Crisis of 1958 can now perhaps be treated as a transient episode of history. President Sham'un who became the object of a violent controversy at that time has since gone into political eclipse. The much debated Eisenhower Doctrine is now virtually forgotten. President Nasser's United Arab Republic is no more than a shadow of its previous self. In Lebanon itself the rebels of yesterday are the custodians of law and order today. In short, the more immediate causes of the crisis of 1958 have subsided, or else disappeared. In a broader context, however, the events of 1958 represent an unprecedented high-water mark of Arab political upheavals in modern times. Viewed thus, the crisis mirrors not only the tensions of the Lebanese society but the vast inner conflicts of Arab nationalism and the sharp rivalries of big powers in the area.

The present book is an attempt to reconstruct the story of the crisis and its local, regional and international ramifications with the help of relevant documents. The coverage of events is not intended to be comprehensive; but care has been taken to illustrate the respective viewpoints of the individuals, groups and countries directly or indirectly concerned with the happenings in Lebanon in 1958.

Mr. K. R. Singh helped me in the selection of documents included in this study; and Mr. R. K. Srivastava assisted me at the proof-reading stage. I take this opportunity to record my obligation to them.

M. S. AGWANI

New Delhi

10 February 1965

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ABBREVIATIONS

- GAOR* : United Nations General Assembly, Official Records
- SCOR* : United Nations Security Council, Official Records
- S.W.B.* : Summary of World Broadcasts
- UAR* : United Arab Republic
- UNF* : United National Front (also referred to in some documents as the National Union Front)
- UNOGIL* : United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon
- US* : United States of America
- USSR* : Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

Arabic terms and names occurring in introductions to chapters, documents translated from Arabic, French and Italian, and headings of documents have been transliterated. The rest have been left as in the original.

1. Genesis of the Crisis

INTRODUCTION

EVER since the Arab conquest of the Fertile Crescent in the seventh century A.D. Mount Lebanon has served as a haven for the dissident, the non-conformist and the persecuted. For centuries the settlers there mostly consisted of Maronite Christians and Druze Muslims. During the Ottoman rule in the nineteenth century the outbreak of a bloody war between the two groups tempted France to intervene on behalf of the Maronites. France indeed succeeded in setting up an autonomous régime in the predominantly Christian Mount Lebanon under the nominal control of Constantinople. After the First World War, and as a result of the Peace Settlement, the area came under direct French rule. In 1920, the French added to the former autonomous administrative unit of Mount Lebanon the predominantly Muslim coastal strip from Tripoli to Tyre in the West and the Biqā' valley in the East. Thus was brought into being the modern State of Lebanon with an area of 4,062 square miles.

The new State was a fantastic mosaic of religions, sects, feudal aristocracies, merchant princes and tribes. According to the first census—and so far the last—held in Lebanon in 1932, the Christians had a slight edge over the Muslims. The two groups were further divided into numerous exclusive sects. The French administration, wedded to an exaggerated notion of "the liberty of conscience" first gave constitutional recognition to sectional rights and, then, doggedly applied it to all the spheres of State activity until confessionalism was firmly entrenched in the politics of Lebanon.

As the young country advanced toward political independence her leaders began to search for a new and more lasting basis of national unity than the anti-imperialism of the previous decades. This was at last found in the National Pact of 1943 which envisaged that (i) the Christians would not look to the West for "protection," (ii) the Muslims would not aspire for merger with the neighbouring Arab States, (iii) Lebanon was to co-operate with all the Arab States but not to take sides in Arab disputes, and (iv) political and administrative offices would be equitably distributed among the recognized confessional

groups. Lebanese politicians of all shades found a basis for partnership and co-operation in this Pact. The Pact also enabled Lebanon to maintain friendly relations with the neighbouring countries—a condition as vital to the economic survival of Lebanon as the equilibrium between national cohesion and confessional factionalism has been to her political existence. For nearly sixty-five per cent of her total national income is derived from transit trade, insurance and other commercial transactions with the adjoining countries. The Pact, therefore, served as a sound frame of reference for the policy-makers of Lebanon. But the harmony thus obtained was of a very precarious nature. It depended on factors which Lebanon could not fully control. Two such factors which upset the political balance in Lebanon were: the sudden eruption of international rivalries in the Arab East in the mid-fifties; and the upsurge of Arab nationalism sparked by the Suez crisis. The former fructified into the Baghdad Pact and President Nasser's arms deal with the Soviet bloc. The latter transformed the fading dream of Arab Unity into a vigorous living ideal.

The echoes of this upsurge could be heard in all the nooks and corners of the Arab world. But in Lebanon it assumed a special significance. Large sections of the Christians saw in this development a threat to the independent existence of the State of Lebanon and to their prominent role in government and society. Their age-old fear of being submerged into a predominantly Muslim Arab world was considerably strengthened. Some of them indeed got panicky and found in President Sham'un a sympathizer and a leader. The first outward expression of this panic appeared in the course of the Arab Summit at Beirut in November 1956 when Sham'un made common cause with Iraq in resisting the proposal to sever diplomatic ties with Britain and France in view of the latter's armed attack on Egypt. A large majority of the Lebanese Muslims interpreted Sham'un's action as a gesture of hostility toward Nasser and Arab nationalism. Premier 'Abdullah Yafi' and Sa'ib Salami resigned from the Cabinet in protest. Undeterred by this reaction and backed by his zealous supporters, President Sham'un went a step further and accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The Eisenhower Doctrine was based on the American view that the Anglo-French débâcle in West Asia in 1956 had created a "power vacuum" there; and that unless the US stepped in to fill it the area would remain exposed to covert or overt Communist aggression. This view was, however, not shared by majority of the Arab States in early

1957 when Congressman James Richards was sent round by President Eisenhower to popularize the Doctrine. Only Iraq and Lebanon agreed with the American approach and welcomed the economic and military aid and the pledge of armed support which it offered.

In Lebanon, President Sham'un's opponents interpreted this move as a breach of the National Pact; and felt the urge to unite, to organize, and to act against this policy. All that they needed was leadership. And this was already partly provided by Sa'ib Salām and 'Abdullah Yafi' who were alienated from the President in November 1956. By April 1957 critics of Sham'un's policy, representing various shades of right, left and middle-of-the-road, formed a common organization called the United National Front (UNF).

While tension in Lebanon was mounting rumour went round that President Sham'un wanted to amend the Constitution to facilitate his re-election. The President did not care to contradict it. Since the final decision in this regard rested with the next Parliament the struggle between the government and the UNF now centered on the parliamentary elections scheduled to be held in June 1957. The Front's demand that elections should be conducted by neutral caretaker government led to a serious clash between the police and the opposition on 30 May resulting in five dead and several others wounded.

The elections assured a two-thirds majority to the government. The UNF, which could secure only 8 out of the 66 seats, promptly charged that the elections were rigged; but failed to substantiate the charge. The phenomenon of *en masse* defeat of a group of prominent leaders in a country like Lebanon where leadership goes with traditional status and social and economic influence and where leaders are assured of a more or less rigid following, however, roused the suspicion that some extraordinary means had been employed to humble the opposition in the elections.

After elections, breach between the government and the opposition widened considerably. In the fall of 1957 a group of "non-aligned" politicians which designated itself as the "third Force" tried to reconcile the two. It believed that President Sham'un's equivocation on the issue of renewal of his term was the chief cause of the crisis in Lebanon; but failed to persuade the President to dispel it to the satisfaction of his critics. The new cabinet, on the contrary, made an ominous start by securing emergency powers of arrest and censorship from Parliament. In foreign affairs the government proceeded, in the face of strong criti-

cism by the opposition, to form pro-Western alliance with Saudi Arabia and Iran. Alienation between the government and the opposition now appeared to be complete.

The merger of Egypt and Syria in February 1958 lent a new and explosive dimension to the mounting crisis in Lebanon. Egyptian radio and press had already been directing vehement criticism at Sham'un's pro-Western foreign policy for some time. President Nasser maintained that the Egypto-Syrian Union, named as the United Arab Republic (UAR), was "the nucleus of an all-embracing Arab unity." Self-styled Lebanese delegations which poured into Damascus to celebrate the birth of the UAR were galvanized by the example of Egypt and Syria and began to chant the chorus of Arab unity. Some of the opposition leaders also joined in. 'Ādil 'Usayrān, the speaker of Lebanese Parliament, declared that "Lebanon will march with the Arab caravan" and that "anyone who thinks of working for interests other than those of the Arabs will have no room in Lebanon."¹ Apparently, these views were not wholly endorsed by other opposition leaders such as Sā'ib Salām, Kamāl Junblāt, 'Abdullah Yāfi and Henri Far'un. But their deep hostility toward President Sham'un impelled them to lean on the UAR for moral and material support. The government, in turn, branded them as Nasser's agents and traitors. The Patriarch of the Maronite Church while emphasizing the importance of Lebanon's existence as a sovereign and independent State heartily welcomed the creation of the UAR and laconically disapproved of Sham'un's anti-Nasser policies.

A. THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

1. *Extract from President Eisenhower's message to the Congress, 5 January 1957*²

I

The Middle East has abruptly reached a new and critical stage in its long and important history. In past decades many of the countries in that area were not fully self-governing. Other nations exercised considerable authority in the area and the security of the region was largely

¹ *The Egyptian Gazette* (Cairo), 5 March 1958.

² *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, 1957 ed. Paul E. Zinner (New York, 1958), 195-204.

built around their power. But since the First World War there has been a steady evolution toward self-government and independence. This development the United States has welcomed and has encouraged. Our country supports without reservation the full sovereignty and independence of each and every nation of the Middle East.

The evolution to independence has in the main been a peaceful process. But the area has been often troubled. Persistent cross-currents of distrust and fear with raids back and forth across national boundaries have brought about a high degree of instability in much of the Middle East. Just recently there have been hostilities involving Western European nations that once exercised much influence in the area. Also the relatively large attack by Israel in October has intensified the basic differences between that nation and its Arab neighbors. All this instability has been heightened and, at times, manipulated by International Communism.

II

Russia's rulers have long sought to dominate the Middle East. That was true of the Czars and it is true of the Bolsheviks. The reasons are not hard to find. They do not affect Russia's security, for no one plans to use the Middle East as a base for aggression against Russia. Never for a moment has the United States entertained such a thought.

The Soviet Union has nothing whatsoever to fear from the United States in the Middle East, or anywhere else in the world, so long as its rulers do not themselves first resort to aggression.

That statement I make solemnly and emphatically.

Neither does Russia's desire to dominate the Middle East spring from its own economic interest in the area. Russia does not appreciably use or depend upon the Suez Canal. In 1955 Soviet traffic through the Canal represented only about three fourths of 1 per cent of the total. The Soviets have no need for, and could provide no market for, the petroleum resources which constitute the principal natural wealth of the area. Indeed, the Soviet Union is a substantial exporter of petroleum products.

The reason for Russia's interest in the Middle East is solely that of power politics. Considering her announced purpose of Communizing the world, it is easy to understand her hope of dominating the Middle East.

This region has always been the crossroads of the continents of the Eastern Hemisphere. The Suez Canal enables the nations of Asia and Europe to carry on the commerce that is essential if these countries are to maintain well-rounded and prosperous economies. The Middle East provides a gateway between Eurasia and Africa.

It contains about two thirds of the presently known oil deposits of the world and it normally supplies the petroleum needs of many nations of Europe, Asia and Africa. The nations of Europe are peculiarly dependent upon this supply, and this dependency relates to transportation as well as to production. This has been vividly demonstrated since the closing of the Suez Canal and some of the pipelines. Alternate ways of transportation and, indeed, alternate sources of power can, if necessary, be developed. But these cannot be considered as early prospects.

These things stress the immense importance of the Middle East. If the nations of that area should lose their independence, if they were dominated by alien forces hostile to freedom, that would be both a tragedy for the area and for many other free nations whose economic life would be subject to near strangulation. Western Europe would be endangered just as though there had been no Marshall Plan, no North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The free nations of Asia and Africa, too, would be placed in serious jeopardy. And the countries of the Middle East would lose the market upon which their economies depend. All this would have the most adverse, if not disastrous, effect upon our own nation's economic life and political prospects.

Then there are other factors, which transcend the material. The Middle East is the birthplace of three great religions—Moslem, Christian and Hebrew. Mecca and Jerusalem are more than places on the map. They symbolize religions which teach that the spirit has supremacy over matter and that the individual has a dignity and rights of which no despotic government can rightfully deprive him. It would be intolerable if the holy places of the Middle East should be subjected to a rule that glorifies atheistic materialism.

International Communism, of course, seeks to mask its purposes of domination by expressions of good will and by superficially attractive offers of political, economic and military aid. But any free nation, which is the subject of Soviet enticement, ought, in elementary wisdom, to look behind the mask.

Remember Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In 1939 the Soviet Union entered into mutual assistance pacts with these then independent coun-

tries; and the Soviet Foreign Minister, addressing the Extraordinary Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet in October 1939, solemnly and publicly declared that "we stand for the scrupulous and punctilious observance of the pacts on the basis of complete reciprocity, and we declare that all the nonsensical talk about the Sovietization of the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocatures." Yet in 1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union.

Soviet control of the satellite nations of Eastern Europe has been forcibly maintained in spite of solemn promises of a contrary intent, made during World War II.

Stalin's death brought hope that this pattern would change. And we read the pledge of the Warsaw Treaty of 1955 that the Soviet Union would follow in satellite countries "the principles of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs." But we have just seen the subjugation of Hungary by naked armed force. In the aftermath of this Hungarian tragedy, world respect for and belief in Soviet promises have sunk to a new low. International Communism needs and seeks a recognizable success.

Thus, we have these simple and indisputable facts.

1. The Middle East, which has always been coveted by Russia, would today be prized more than ever by International Communism.
2. The Soviet rulers continue to show that they do not scruple to use any means to gain their ends.
3. The free nations of the Mid East need, and for the most part want, added strength to assure their continued independence.

III

Our thoughts naturally turn to the United Nations as a protector of small nations. Its charter gives it primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Our country has given the United Nations its full support in relation to the hostilities in Hungary and in Egypt. The United Nations was able to bring about a cease-fire and withdrawal of hostile forces from Egypt because it was dealing with governments and peoples who had a decent respect for the opinions of mankind as reflected in the United Nations General Assembly. But in the case of Hungary, the situation was different. The Soviet Union vetoed action by the Security Council to require the withdrawal

of Soviet armed forces from Hungary. And it has shown callous indifference to the recommendations, even the censure, of the General Assembly. The United Nations can always be helpful, but it cannot be a wholly dependable protector of freedom when the ambitions of the Soviet Union are involved.

IV

Under all the circumstances I have laid before you, a greater responsibility now devolves upon the United States. We have shown, so that none can doubt, our dedication to the principle that force shall not be used internationally for any aggressive purpose and that the integrity and independence of the nations of the Middle East should be inviolate. Seldom in history has a nation's dedication to principle been tested as severely as ours during recent weeks.

There is general recognition in the Middle East, as elsewhere, that the United States does not seek either political or economic domination over any other people. Our desire is a world environment of freedom, not servitude. On the other hand many, if not all, of the nations of the Middle East are aware of the danger that stems from International Communism and welcome closer cooperation with the United States to realize for themselves the United Nations goals of independence, economic well-being and spiritual growth.

If the Middle East is to continue its geographic role of uniting rather than separating East and West; if its vast economic resources are to serve the well-being of the peoples there, as well as that of others; and if its cultures and religions and their shrines are to be preserved for the uplifting of the spirits of the peoples, then the United States must make more evident its willingness to support the independence of the freedom-loving nations of the area.

V

Under these circumstances I deem it necessary to seek the cooperation of the Congress. Only with that cooperation can we give the reassurance needed to deter aggression, to give courage and confidence to those who are dedicated to freedom and thus prevent a chain of events which would gravely endanger all of the free world.

There have been several Executive declarations made by the United

States in relation to the Middle East. There is the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, followed by the Presidential assurance of October 31, 1950, to the King of Saudi Arabia. There is the Presidential Declaration of April 9, 1956, that the United States will within constitutional means oppose any aggression in the area. There is our Declaration of November 29, 1956, that a threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan or Turkey would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity.

Nevertheless, weaknesses in the present situation and the increased danger from International Communism, convince me that basic United States policy should now find expression in joint action by the Congress and the Executive. Furthermore, our joint resolve should be so couched as to make it apparent that if need be our words will be backed by action.

VI

It is nothing new for the President and the Congress to join to recognize that the national integrity of other free nations is directly related to our own security.

We have joined to create and support the security system of the United Nations. We have reinforced the collective security system of the United Nations by a series of collective defense arrangements. Today we have security treaties with 42 other nations which recognize that their, and our, peace and security are intertwined. We have joined to take decisive action in relation to Greece and Turkey and in relation to Taiwan.

Thus, the United States through the joint action of the President and the Congress, or, in the case of treaties, the Senate, has manifested in many endangered areas its purpose to support free and independent governments—and peace—against external menace, notably the menace of International Communism. Thereby we have helped to maintain peace and security during a period of great danger. It is now essential that the United States should manifest through joint action of the President and the Congress our determination to assist those nations of the Mid East area which desire that assistance.

The action which I propose would have the following features.

It would, first of all, authorize the United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the

Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

It would, in the second place, authorize the Executive to undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desires such aid.

It would, in the third place, authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.

These measures would have to be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States, including the Charter of the United Nations and with any action or recommendations of the United Nations. They would also, if armed attack occurs, be subject to the overriding authority of the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the Charter.

The present proposal would, in the fourth place, authorize the President to employ, for economic and defensive military purposes, sums available under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, without regard to existing limitations.

The legislation now requested should not include the authorization or appropriation of funds because I believe that, under the conditions I suggest, presently appropriated funds will be adequate for the balance of the present fiscal year ending June 30. I shall, however, seek in subsequent legislation the authorization of \$200,000,000 to be available during each of the fiscal years 1958 and 1959 for discretionary use in the area, in addition to the other mutual security programs for the area hereafter provided for by the Congress.

VII

This program will not solve all the problems of the Middle East. Neither does it represent the totality of our policies for the area. There are the problems of Palestine and relations between Israel and the Arab States, and the future of the Arab refugees. There is the problem of the future status of the Suez Canal. These difficulties are aggravated by International Communism, but they would exist quite apart from that threat. It is not the purpose of the legislation I propose to deal directly with these problems. The United Nations is actively concerning

itself with all these matters, and we are supporting the United Nations. The United States has made clear, notably by Secretary Dulles' address of August 26, 1955, that we are willing to do much to assist the United Nations in solving the basic problems of Palestine.

The proposed legislation is primarily designed to deal with the possibility of Communist aggression, direct and indirect. There is imperative need that any lack of power in the area should be made good, not by external or alien force, but by the increased vigor and security of the independent nations of the area.

Experience shows that indirect aggression rarely if ever succeeds where there is reasonable security against direct aggression; where the government possesses loyal security forces, and where economic conditions are such as not to make Communism seem an attractive alternative. The program I suggest deals with all three aspects of this matter and thus with the problem of indirect aggression.

It is my hope and belief that if our purpose be proclaimed, as proposed by the requested legislation, that very fact will serve to halt any contemplated aggression. We shall have heartened the patriots who are dedicated to the independence of their nations. They will not feel that they stand alone, under the menace of great power. And I should add that patriotism is, throughout this area, a powerful sentiment. It is true that fear sometimes perverts true patriotism into fanaticism and to the acceptance of dangerous enticements from without. But if that fear can be allayed, then the climate will be more favorable to the attainment of worthy national ambitions.

And as I have indicated, it will also be necessary for us to contribute economically to strengthen those countries, or groups of countries, which have governments manifestly dedicated to the preservation of independence and resistance to subversion. Such measures will provide the greatest insurance against Communist inroads. Words alone are not enough.

VIII

Let me refer again to the requested authority to employ the armed forces of the United States to assist to defend the territorial integrity and the political independence of any nation in the area against Communist armed aggression. Such authority would not be exercised except at the desire of the nation attacked. Beyond this it is my profound hope

that this authority would never have to be exercised at all.

Nothing is more necessary to assure this than our policy with respect to the defense of the area be promptly and clearly determined and declared. Thus the United Nations and all friendly governments, and indeed governments which are not friendly, will know where we stand.

If, contrary to my hope and expectation, a situation arose which called for the military application of the policy which I ask the Congress to join me in proclaiming, I would of course maintain hour-by-hour contact with the Congress if it were in session. And if the Congress were not in session, and if the situation had grave implications, I would, of course, at once call the Congress into special session.

In the situation now existing, the greatest risk, as is often the case, is that ambitious despots may miscalculate. If power-hungry Communists should either falsely or correctly estimate that the Middle East is inadequately defended, they might be tempted to use open measures of armed attack. If so, that would start a chain of circumstances which would almost surely involve the United States in military action. I am convinced that the best insurance against this dangerous contingency is to make clear now our readiness to cooperate fully and freely with our friends of the Middle East in ways consonant with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. I intend promptly to send a special mission to the Middle East to explain the cooperation we are prepared to give.

IX

The policy which I outline involves certain burdens and indeed risks for the United States. Those who covet the area will not like what is proposed. Already, they are grossly distorting our purpose. However, before this Americans have seen our nation's vital interests and human freedom in jeopardy, and their fortitude and resolution have been equal to the crisis, regardless of hostile distortion of our words, motives and actions.

Indeed, the sacrifices of the American people in the cause of freedom have, even since the close of World War II, been measured in many billions of dollars and in thousands of the precious lives of our youth. These sacrifices, by which great areas of the world have been preserved to freedom, must not be thrown away.

In those momentous periods of the past, the President and the Con-

gress have united, without partisanship, to serve the vital interests of the United States and of the free world.

The occasion has come for us to manifest again our national unity in support of freedom and to show our deep respect for the rights and independence of every nation—however great, however small. We seek not violence, but peace. To this purpose we must now devote our energies, our determination, ourselves.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE

January 5, 1957

2. *Extract from joint statement on the talks between President Nasser, King Sa'ud, King Husain, and Sabrī al-'Asali, Cairo, 19 January 1957.*³

At 09.00 this morning the second meeting of the conference of the Arab leaders was held. Yesterday's meeting lasted till 01.00 after midnight. At these meetings the Arab leaders discussed the international situation in general and the issues of concern to the Arab States in particular.

The Eisenhower plan was also discussed. Each State attending the conference made its own remarks on the plan. All agreed on not recognising the vacuum theory. It was agreed that Arab nationalism was the only principle of which account could be taken in their countries, and that their countries could not become spheres of influence for any foreign Power. It was also agreed that HM King Saud should express their views in this respect during HM's visit to Washington. A letter was received from HM King Ahmed of the Yemen expressing his full solidarity with the States attending the conference.

3. *Extracts from the communiqué on the talks between President Nasser, President Quwwatli, King Sa'ud, and King Husain, Cairo, 27 February 1957.*⁴

During the period 25th Rajab 1376 A.H., equivalent to 25th February 1957, and 27th Rajab 1376 A.H., equivalent to 27th February 1957, meetings were held between HM King Saud ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, HM Husain I, King of the Hashi-

³ S.W.B. Part IV, 21 January 1957, 2-3.

⁴ S.W.B. Part IV, 1 March 1957, 1-2.

Emirate Kingdom of Jordan, HE President Shukri al-Quwwatli, President of the Republic of Syria, President Gamal Abd al-Nasir, President of the Egyptian Republic, and the members of their respective Governments.

These meetings were the fourth in the series of meetings which they hold from time to time to consider the world situation and discuss matters of interest to the Arab world bearing on their life, development, progress and security.

Those in conference reviewed the laudable efforts of HM King Saud ibn Abd al-Aziz during his visit to the USA and what His Majesty put forward to responsible US officials about Arab views regarding the problems of the Middle East and other matters discussed. HM King Saud informed the conference of what he had told the US President, especially, about Arab rights and Arab causes, including the recent aggression against Egypt, the consequences of that aggression, Egypt's right to sovereignty over the Suez Canal and the serious consequences of Israel's defiance of the UN resolutions which provide for unconditional withdrawal behind the armistice lines from the Gaza strip and the Gulf of Aqaba, without allowing Israel to benefit in any way from its role in the tripartite aggression.

Those in conference affirm that their countries are anxious to play their part in the international community and to contribute to the fostering of international relations on bases which promote peace, justice and prosperity and which safeguard the sovereignty and interests of these countries.

The Arab States represented at the conference, which have become stronger as a result of their peoples' increased consciousness, and more convinced of the righteousness of their aims and the deep-rooted nature of these aspirations, hereby affirm their earlier declaration that they are resolved to spare the Arab nation the evils of the cold war and its conflicts, and to adhere to the policy of active neutrality, thus safeguarding the national interests of these countries. They also affirm that the defence of the Arab world should come from the Arab nation itself and should be guided by the real requirements of Arab security, without recourse to foreign pacts.

Those in conference are of the opinion that their liberal policy, which emanates from their belief in the rights of their nation to a free and independent life, and which springs from their Arab nationalism which has demonstrated itself to the entire world as a reality, makes them

more united in their efforts to achieve the aspirations of the Arab nation to freedom, unity and progress.

4. *Joint resolution of Congress, 9 March 1957.*⁵

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

That the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East desiring such assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

SEC. 2. The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance. Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism. *Provided*, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States.

SEC. 3. The President is hereby authorized to use during the balance of fiscal year 1957 for economic and military assistance under this joint resolution not to exceed \$200,000,000 from any appropriation now available for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, in accord with the provisions of such Act: *Provided*, That, whenever the President determines it to be important to the security of the United States, such use may be under the authority of section 401 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended (except that the provisions of section 105 (a) thereof shall not be waived), and without regard to the provisions of section 105 of the Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1957: *Provided further*, That obligations incurred in carrying out the purposes of the first sentence of section 2 of this joint resolution shall be paid only out of appropriations for military assistance, and obligations incurred in carrying out the purposes of the first section of this joint resolution shall be paid only of appropriations

⁵ *Department of State Bulletin*, 36 (25 March 1957), 481.

other than those for military assistance. This authorization is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to the use of such appropriations. None of the additional authorization contained in this section shall be used until fifteen days after the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives and, when military assistance is involved, the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives have been furnished a report showing the object of the proposed use, the country for the benefit of which such use is intended, and the particular appropriation or appropriations for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, from which the funds are proposed to be derived: *Provided*, That funds available under this section during the balance of fiscal year 1957 shall, in the case of any such report submitted during the last fifteen days of the fiscal year, remain available for use under this section for the purposes stated in such report for a period of twenty days following the date of submission of such report. Nothing contained in this joint resolution shall be construed as itself authorizing the appropriation of additional funds for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the first section or of the first sentence of section 2 of this joint resolution.

SEC. 4. The President should continue to furnish facilities and military assistance, within the provisions of applicable law and established policies, to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, with a view to maintaining the truce in that region.

SEC. 5. The President shall within the months of January and July of each year report to the Congress his action hereunder.

SEC. 6. This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise except that it may be terminated earlier by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress.

5. Communiqué on the talks between Mr. Richards and the Government of Lebanon, Beirut, 16 March 1957.⁶

On his visit to Lebanon from 14 to 16 March 1957 as Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, Ambassador James P. Richards discussed

⁶ *Department of State Bulletin*, 36 (6 May 1957), 725-26.

with the Government of Lebanon President Eisenhower's proposals for the Middle East and the application of these proposals to Lebanon. This exchange of views has shown that the Governments of Lebanon and the United States share the following purposes:

1. In their relations with each other and with other nations, they are guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and by respect for the sovereign equality, rights and legitimate interests of all nations. They are interested in the establishment of a cooperative relationship between themselves based on trust and confidence and on complete respect for each other's independence and sovereignty and without any interference in each other's internal affairs.

2. They are determined to defend the political independence and territorial integrity of their respective nations and the right of each to choose its own form of government and to develop in freedom its own social and cultural life.

3. They oppose any form of intervention or interference in the internal affairs of one state by another.

4. They consider that international communism is incompatible with national independence and constitutes a cause of permanent trouble for world peace and security.

5. They are dedicated to the social and economic progress of their peoples and to this end welcome opportunities to enter into mutually beneficial and cultural relationships, on the basis of complete respect for each other's sovereignty and independence.

6. They are of the opinion that both nations should work, through the United Nations and by all other peaceful means, toward just solutions of the various problems which create tension within the area. The Government of Lebanon considers that the proposals of the President of the United States are helpful in furthering the purposes set forth above and has so informed Ambassador Richards, who has welcomed on behalf of the President of the United States this understanding of the broad identity of interest which exists between the two nations. The Government of Lebanon and the special Mission of Ambassador Richards have examined various activities that might be undertaken in accordance with the proposals of the President of the United States. They have decided in principle that projects in the fields of workers' housing, rural electrification, village water supply, irrigation, flood control, highway construction and airport development would best contribute to the needs of Lebanon. These will be in addition to

other United States aid projects already in effect or currently planned. Ambassador Richards has agreed further in principle that the United States Government shall provide the Government of Lebanon certain equipment needed to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces. This is in addition to a recent grant of military equipment for the same purpose.

The two Governments will immediately initiate such legal and technical steps as may be required to give effect to these projects. The two states intend further to develop cooperation between themselves to serve their common interests.

6. Communiqué on the talks between President Sham'un and King Sa'ud, Riyādh, 26 March 1957.⁷

President Camille Chamoun of the Lebanon made a State visit to King Saud of Saudi Arabia. The King and the President discussed all affairs of interest to their countries in an atmosphere of Arab fraternity and mutual confidence and understanding. They found that their two countries clearly agree in their policy on the following basic aims and principles:

- (1) Respect for the independence of every Arab State and the strengthening of its sovereignty and freedom.
- (2) Support for the Arab peoples who have not yet obtained their complete independence in their struggle to achieve such independence.
- (3) Close co-operation between the Arab countries and, work to unify their viewpoints so that they become complementary to one another, benefit from one another, and face international events as one.
- (4) Resistance to any form of intervention by any State in the policy of any Arab State or in its internal affairs, but with full compliance with the commitments provided for by the Arab League Charter and the collective security pact.
- (5) Contribution to the consolidation of world peace in accordance with the Arab League Charter and the UN Charter.

As a result of the exchange of views on the occasion of this visit, King Saud and President Chamoun found that their two countries are agreed on the necessity of the following matters:

- (a) To make effective efforts to remove any differences between the Arab countries.

⁷ *S.W.B. Part IV*, 28 March 1957, 3-4.

- (b) To make every effort to realise for the Arabs their full rights in Palestine.
- (c) To support the brotherly Algerian people in their struggle to exercise their rights of independence and sovereignty.
- (d) To support the Arabs of the southern Arabian peninsula in their struggle for independence and freedom.
- (e) Complete co-operation so that Saudi Arabia may regain her rights in the Buraimi oasis and areas in dispute.
- (f) To emphasise that the waters of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Tiran Straits are pure Arab territorial waters.
- (g) To stand by Egypt in the Suez Canal question.
- (h) Co-operation in combating Communist doctrines and every subversive activity in their countries inconsistent with the ideals and spiritual values of the Arab peoples and in combating imperialist and Zionist propaganda.
- (i) An immediate start on the drafting of a payments agreement and the promotion of economic, trade and cultural relations between Saudi Arabia and the Lebanon.

King Saud and President Chamoun have agreed to remain in constant touch and to consult each other continuously to realise the aims, principles and plans mentioned in this communique.

7. Exchange of notes constituting an agreement on military assistance between the United States and Lebanon, 3 and 6 June 1957.⁸

I

The American Ambassador to the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1659

Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to recent conversations between representatives of our two Governments, as a result of which the Government of the United States has agreed to make available to the Government of the Lebanon such military assistance as the Government of the Lebanon may request and the Government of the United States may

⁸ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 284; 156, 158.

The agreement came into force on 6 June by the exchange of the said notes.

authorize in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon.

It is the understanding of the Government of the United States that the Government of the Lebanon will accept and use the equipment, materials and services and other assistance furnished by the Government of the United States hereunder subject to, and in accordance with, paragraphs one, two, three, four and five of the Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Lebanon effected by an exchange of notes signed at Beirut March 6 and 23, 1953.

If this understanding is acceptable to Your Excellency's Government, I propose that this note and Your Excellency's note in reply shall constitute an Agreement between our two Governments, effective on the date of Your Excellency's reply, and shall continue in force until one year after the receipt by either party of written notice of the other party to terminate it, except that the provisions of the second paragraph of this Agreement shall remain in force unless otherwise mutually agreed upon by our two Governments.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

DONALD R. HEATH

Beirut, June 3, 1957

His Excellency Charles Malik
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Beirut

II

The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American
Ambassador

REPUBLIQUE LIBANAISE

MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES ET DES LIBANAIS D'OUTRE-MER

Le Ministre

10113/1

Beirut, June 6, 1957

Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 1659 dated June 3, 1957, the contents of which are as follows:

[See note I]

I wish to inform you that the Lebanese Government is in agreement with the provisions of your letter which shall constitute together with this note in reply an Agreement between our two Governments.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

CHARLES MALIK
Minister of Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Mr. Donald R. Heath
Ambassador of the United States of America
Beirut

8. Soviet note to the Foreign Minister of Lebanon, 11 June 1957^o

The Soviet government has been informed about the remarks regarding Soviet-Lebanese relations made to U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko by Mr. Najjar, Lebanese Minister in Moscow, on behalf of the Lebanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Malik. It has also been informed about similar pronouncements made by Mr. Malik during his conversations with the Soviet Ambassador in Beirut.

Mr. Malik's remarks are simply astounding. On the one hand, the Lebanese Foreign Minister expresses satisfaction with the good relations established between the Lebanon and the Soviet Union, and makes declarations about the Lebanese government's desire to foster friendliness in these relations and "make them stronger than ever." On the other hand, the Minister equivocally tries to ascribe to the Soviet Union some involvement in the activity of those Lebanese internal forces which are coming out against the policy of the present Lebanese government, which has acceded to the so-called Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine.

What is more, Mr. Malik has found it possible to approach the Soviet government with a request to "exert a containing influence" on those persons in the Lebanon who, he says, are "engaged in agitation" against the policy of the Lebanese government. Moreover, the Minister said: "As to those who are engaged in agitation against us within the Lebanon, we, naturally, know how to deal with them."

Discussion of questions related to the situation in the Lebanon was

^o *Soviet News* (London), 12 June 1957, 201-2.

not what the Soviet officials wanted or want, inasmuch as the discussion of such issues would mean interference in the home affairs of the Lebanon. The appeal of the Lebanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Malik, to "exert a containing influence" on those national forces which are coming out in the Lebanon against the notorious "Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine," is therefore groundless. The facts show that opposition to this "doctrine" is by no means caused by the attitude of foreign countries towards it, but by what this "doctrine" means for the Middle East states from the point of view of their national interests.

As for relations between the Soviet Union and the Lebanon, it is known that the Soviet Union wishes to maintain good and friendly relations with all Arab states, including the Lebanon. The Soviet people have longstanding traditional friendly relations with the people of the Lebanon. The Soviet people highly value this friendship and understand full well the aspirations of the Lebanese people, as well as the peoples of other Arab states fighting for their national independence and the consolidation of their national sovereignty.

The Soviet Union was one of the first to recognise the independence of the Lebanon and has invariably supported the just demands of the Lebanon which had the purpose of consolidating her national independence and doing away with the consequences of colonialism. The Soviet people know that the Lebanese people also have friendly feelings for them.

This constitutes a broad and solid foundation for the possible future development of friendly co-operation between the U.S.S.R. and the Lebanon, co-operation based on equality, respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, peaceful co-existence and development of economic contacts, with due consideration given to mutual benefit, and without any political strings attached. A good prerequisite for the development of sincere and friendly relations between the two countries is the mutual desire of the Soviet and the Lebanese peoples to consolidate peace and the community of their interests in the struggle against all forms of colonialism.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly proved in deeds its friendly and favourable attitude towards the Arab states which have thrown off the fetters of colonialism. Its consistent and crystal clear policy, particularly during the Suez crisis, has greatly helped in the re-establishment and maintenance of peace in the Middle East, has helped to ensure the sovereign rights and independence of the Arab nations.

This is precisely why the Soviet Union has never concealed, nor does it now conceal, its opposition to the "Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine," which is aimed at re-establishing the régime of colonial domination in the Middle East under the aegis of the United States.

Even the sponsors of this "doctrine" do not conceal that it has the purpose of placing the Arab states in a position of dependence on and subordination to certain western states, and with this in view strives to divide the Arab nations, to sow distrust and suspicion among them, to pitch them against one another, to create quarrels among them and thus to put them again, one by one, into the fetters of colonial slavery. For the same purpose the colonialists use methods of military-colonialist despotism and police terror to suppress the striving of the peoples for independent development and national independence.

Meanwhile, new proofs are becoming available every day that the "Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine" is being used as a means to turn the territories of the Middle East countries into a military-strategic *place d'armes* directed against the Soviet Union and the other peace-loving states, a situation which is fraught with serious dangers for the countries of that area above all.

It is completely natural that the Soviet Union considers it to be its duty to make its voice heard regarding the dangers which the "Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine" entails above all for the cause of peace.

Of course, this does not involve the question of relations between this or that country and the United States or other western powers. The Soviet Union itself stands for the development of good, friendly relations with the United States of America and other western powers, mindful that such relations would promote the easing of international tension and the consolidation of world peace.

Desirous of maintaining friendly relations with the Lebanon in the future as well, the Soviet Union in no way strives to complicate the Lebanon's or any other Arab-state's relations with the United States or the other western powers. But relations between independent states in our times cannot be based—if we abide by the principles of the United Nations—on the colonial domination of some countries by others, as was the case in the past or as is now being attempted through the implementation of the "Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine."

In view of the remarks made by Mr. Malik regarding the internal situation in the Lebanon, it ought to be mentioned that the Soviet Union strictly abides by the policy of non-interference in the home affairs

of other countries and holds that the activity of national civic organisations of the Lebanon is exclusively a domestic affair of the Lebanese people. If these organisations come out against the foreign policy now pursued by the Lebanese Government the reason for this should by no means be sought in the peaceable, friendly policy of the Soviet Union towards the Lebanon.

The present foreign policy of the Lebanese Government obviously does not enjoy the support within the Lebanon which the Lebanese government would like to see. But what has the Soviet Union got to do with this?

9. Reply by the Foreign Secretary of Lebanon to the Soviet Note of 11 June 1957, 24 June 1957.¹⁰

The Lebanese Government has examined the remarks submitted by Soviet Ambassador, M. Kiktev, to the Secretary-General of Foreign Affairs, on 11 June 1957.

The government wish to remind, that during a visit paid on the 20th April 1957 to M. Gromyko, Foreign Secretary of USSR, the Minister plenipotentiary of Lebanon in Moscow solemnly declared the intention of the Lebanese Government to retain good relations with Soviet Union and to strengthen them in future; he expressed the hope, that the Soviet Government would show the same determination. This determination would have induced the Soviet Government to put an end to the criticism of Lebanon by the Soviet Press, and not to encourage any longer the campaign of systematic disparagement which is directed against the Lebanese Government, and the perpetrators of which are friends of USSR and draw inspiration for their acts from international Communism.

During a conversation which took place in Beirut between the Lebanese Foreign Minister and the Ambassador of Soviet Union on the development of economic and cultural relations between the two countries, the Foreign Minister tackled the problem of political relations between the two countries, hoping that the fact of having it out, in a frank and cordial atmosphere, after the conversations in Moscow, would lead to a better understanding. The Ambassador had expressed the hope that this conversation might be continued during next visit and

¹⁰ *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, vol. 36 (Documents) 1957, 151-53. (Translated from the French).

the Minister told him that he had also the same wish. But before further conversations were held, the Ambassador submitted to the Secretary-General of Foreign Affairs the remarks mentioned above, and the Tass Agency was distributing the text of these remarks to the entire press of Beirut.

The Lebanese Government regret to have to make the following remarks:

1. The publication of the Soviet note at the very moment when it was handed over to the Lebanese Government without any preliminary consultation with the latter and without its consent does violence to the rules of diplomacy and can be explained away only in terms of an eagerness to carry on propaganda prejudicial to the development of friendly relations between the two countries.

2. The tone of the Soviet note is not in harmony with the spirit conformed to by all those states which base their reciprocal relations on mutual respect.

3. The note goes beyond what has been said during the previous conversations; it attacks the Eisenhower Doctrine which has never formed the subject of conversation between the Soviet and Lebanese Governments. This betrays the intention of Moscow to shift its attacks against the Eisenhower Doctrine from general to the particular sphere of Soviet-Lebanese relations and to interfere in the Lebanese foreign policy. Lebanon always refrains in the notes that it submits to foreign governments from making any criticism of international agreements concluded by them and consequently it cannot but demand from other governments that they should behave towards Lebanon exactly in the same manner.

4. The Lebanese Government would like to point out in this connection that while laying down its foreign policy it abides by its own constitutional, democratic and free régime. Its policy enjoys the general backing of Parliament which is freely elected by the people and which freely expresses its will.

5. The Lebanese Government has decided in favour of a policy of cooperation with all the friendly states; it is firmly determined to develop these relations, taking as its guide the principle of mutual respect for the sovereignty of every one. But, this cooperation, however far it may be spread, is not directed against anybody; nor does it imply any hostile or aggressive intention. It will not give any preference to any friendly state over other friendly states.

6. The Lebanese Government is firmly determined, in the use of its rights of sovereignty, not to tolerate the intervention of any foreign State in the affairs of the Lebanese people or any attempt at putting pressure upon a group of this people. It has never asked and will never ask the Soviet Union to serve as an intermediary between itself and certain Lebanese citizens with a view to inducing them to back up its policy. It has only asked the USSR not to use her official influence to encourage certain Lebanese elements to oppose the policy which the government lays down and which determines the fate of the country.

7. The Soviet Note declares that the Lebanese foreign policy is not backed up by the Lebanese people as the government would have wished for. This statement is unfounded. Moreover, and above all, it constitutes an intolerable interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon. Relations between the government and the people and the latter's support, whether given or refused to the former, are questions which only concern Lebanon and no other state.

8. The Lebanese Government note with satisfaction the intention of the Soviet Government (expressed in her note) to maintain friendly relations with Lebanon and other Arab States, her wish to see that such relations may develop between all the countries including the United States of America, and her adherence to the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and of respect for their sovereignty and independence. However, the Lebanese Government declare that it is difficult to reconcile these assertions with the remarks submitted to it on 11 June 1957.

10. *Summary of statement by Mr. Charles Malik, the Foreign Minister of Lebanon, in the Chamber of Deputies, 26 November 1957.*¹¹

The Lebanese Foreign Minister, Dr. Charles Malik, expressed his hope this evening that before long ballistic weapons would be included in the war materials which the Lebanon received from the USA. Dr. Malik was speaking in the Chamber of Deputies this evening about the Lebanon's foreign policy. Dr. Malik devoted most of his speech to explaining American-Lebanese relations and to defending those relations. Speaking of American military aid to the Lebanon, Dr. Malik said that he could assert, as a result of his recent contacts in Washington, that there was no defence apparatus which the Lebanon might need

¹¹ S.W.B. Part IV, 28 November 1957, 10-11.

and could use which could not be obtained. He said: "The US Government has this year provided us with considerable military aid and it is prepared to consider with interest all requests we make and to meet them as far as it can. The American Government will also enable the Lebanon to obtain what it needs from other countries if the USA cannot provide the Lebanon with it. I can go further and say that among the questions we are very much interested in is that the Lebanon's defence organisation should be modern in the full sense of the meaning. We hope that before long ballistic weapons will be included in Lebanese war materials."

Summarising the results of his talks with American officials, Dr. Charles Malik said that America had promised to fulfil its financial obligations and commitments towards the projects agreed upon by the American and Lebanese Governments. America was also fully prepared to realise any new projects prepared by the Lebanese government and to study such projects technically and fully. The USA had officially promised to reconsider the 50-50 basis in sharing the expenses of the projects with a view to amending it to the utmost limit of economic co-operation. Dr. Malik added that it could be said in general that the aid which the Lebanon would receive from the American Government had become provisionally unlimited in regard to sums and figures.

Dr. Charles Malik said: "The USA has made special efforts to enable us to dispose of the Lebanese apple crop; I have information which permits me to assert that the demand for Lebanese apples will exceed what we can offer. American circles have shown a similar interest in regard to the disposal of other Lebanese produce such as citrus products, oil, tobacco and olives."

Dr. Malik said that relations between the Lebanon and the USA had become stronger as a result of the visit of James Richards, President Eisenhower's special envoy, and the issue of the American-Lebanese joint communique of 16.3.57. He added that some members of the foreign affairs committee had put forward a number of interpellations about the aims of the communique. Despite the fact that he had previously given assurances, he had had discussions with America and received a letter from John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State, saying: "As you know, relations between our two countries do not involve any arrangements by which the Lebanon would be asked to come to the help of the USA in case of war between the USA and another country. These relations also do not involve any commitments which

would provide that the Lebanon should co-operate with the USA in solving certain problems affecting the Middle East. These relations are based on the principles of the UN Charter and on our desire to see the Lebanon preserve its independence and national sovereignty and to oppose all direct and indirect aggression against it." Dulles referred in his message to the resolutions adopted by the US Congress, and statements by President Eisenhower and himself about the grant of economic aid, the opposing of aggression and resort to force.

Dr. Malik replied to Dulles's letter with a note in which he reiterated these points and said: "I am glad to state that in case of any aggression against the Lebanon the USA will oppose that aggression, if asked to do so by the Lebanon, in accordance with general American policy which calls for the resistance to any aggression in the Middle East. Moreover, the Lebanon is fully determined to preserve its solidarity with the other Arab States and to buttress this solidarity in all matters affecting Arab rights and legitimate aspirations, especially in regard to the Palestine question. The Lebanon will always carry out its commitments under the Arab League Charter and the Arab collective security pact. We know full well that in some trends of American policy there are currents which do not agree with the interests of the Arabs. The USA for its part knows that in our foreign policy there are some currents which do not agree with its interests. And as we do not accept any attempt by the USA to persuade us to amend these currents, we cannot be asked to try to persuade the USA to amend its policy in the Middle East in respect to all matters, so that we may agree to co-operate with it."

He added: "The Lebanese Government is confident of two points, namely that the political and economic co-operation existing at present between it and the USA does not affect the Lebanon's sovereignty and independence in any way whatsoever. On the contrary, this co-operation buttresses and strengthens our independence and sovereignty; and secondly, that the aid we receive from the USA is no less important and effective than any aid received by any other Arab State from any Power. On the contrary, I can provide definite proof that from the point of view of proportional values, spirit of co-operation, direct political results and long-term implications the aid we receive is more useful for the present and more safe for the future beyond all comparison and measurement."

11. *Summary of communiqué on the talks between President Sham'un and the Shah of Iran, Beirut, 23 December 1957.*¹²

The Lebanese and Iranian sides affirm their determination to oppose any foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of their countries, preserve their independence and maintain the free traditions upon which their respective systems are based. They also proclaim their desire to foster peace in the Middle East region, to whose problems they attach great importance. They affirm that the problems of this region should be tackled on the basis of right and justice. The Lebanese and Iranian sides emphasise their loyalty to the principles of the UN Charter, especially to those principles which are designed to foster peace and justice and promote co-operation among nations. They also proclaim their determination to preserve the bonds of historic friendship linking their two countries in all spheres, to strengthen these bonds, to promote their economic and trade relations, and to increase cultural exchanges in accordance with the cultural agreement concluded between them.

The Lebanese President, Camille Sham'un, thanked the Shah of Iran for Iran's support of Arab problems in general and the Palestine problem in particular. Sham'un expressed the Lebanon's great interest in Arab problems in general and the Palestine problem in particular, and the Shah expressed very great interest in this matter and a deep understanding of this subject. President Sham'un and the Shah of Iran expressed the hope that the Middle East countries would promote co-operation among themselves in the interests of world peace and the social and economic progress of their peoples. They resolved that in future there would be mutual and permanent consultations between the two countries to foster bonds of friendship and co-operation between them.

B. THE ISSUE OF PRESIDENT SHAM'UN'S RE-ELECTION

1. *Manifesto of the United National Front issued on 1 April 1957.*¹³

The course of international events, particularly those which have lately taken place in a part of the Arab world, has created in this re-

¹² *S.W.B. Part IV*, 30 December 1957, 15.

¹³ *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, vol. 36 (Documents) 1957, 139-42. (Translated from the French).

gion a persistent state of tension which, extending beyond the framework of political relations between the States, has affected groups and individuals and distorted many standards and criteria.

This situation could not fail to have its repercussions in Lebanon.

In fact, Lebanon is perhaps, in the heart of the Arab world, a country most sensitive to the development of such events because of its geographical situation due to which political currents of every origin and every direction meet and cross there. This sensitiveness is also due to the fact that Lebanon is composed of several communities. These communities, while co-operating within an independent Lebanese Fatherland, are constantly solicited by elements which meet or oppose one another according to their interests and ambitions. The ominous signs of this danger have appeared in fact in Lebanon. Pernicious rumours of obscure origin have affected the good faith of a part of the Nation. A small number of interested persons feed and exploit them. They have caused damage to the edifice of the nation and have nearly shaken the foundations on which the National Pact was based and on which the independent State of Lebanon was established in 1943.

On the other hand, it appeared that the policy of Lebanon has deviated from the clear course which had been outlined as soon as Lebanon became independent.

This policy has adopted or is allowed to adopt postures. It has also contributed to keep conflicts alive or to raise problems which have together induced a great part of the nation to wonder whether the real objects it has in view do not lie in serving individual interests and in allowing activities which should not be carried on in our country or in which Lebanon should not participate.

It also appeared that the method of administering the internal affairs of the country is aiming lately at keeping public opinion occupied with the thought of imaginary dangers and at making false charges against those who are working for the public weal. It helps in diverting public attention either from what may be hatched in the background in order to realize the objects referred to above; or from the moral, administrative and financial collapse toward which the State apparatus is leading; or from scandals, which take place in the Administration. The perpetrators and beneficiaries of these scandals are neither prosecuted nor

punished by the authorities which sometimes even refuse to take any action against them.

If the situation is not put right, it will most probably worsen and thus any attempt to ward off dangers will become more difficult. The result will be that the efforts made by the Lebanese people to consolidate their Fatherland and State will be crippled. In course of time the ties which bind Lebanon to countries of this part of the world and to the whole world will get loose and a wave of suspicion and prejudice will be roused against us. It may be prejudicial to our national existence and may deprive us of the confidence of our brothers and neighbours and that of other nations.

For all these reasons, we, Lebanese citizens, Christians and Muslims, are determined to set up a National Front, designed to observe the course of events and to act incessantly and through all the legal channels, with a view to straightening out the situation. We mean to achieve this end by disclosing the truth, by restoring peace to the uneasy minds, by reunifying all the sections of the Lebanese people, by going back to a frank policy in our relations with the Arab countries and with any other country, and by inspiring the state apparatus with selfless work. We wish that our country may face its destiny with faith and steadfastness and may pursue its mission with a view to ensuring the material needs and the moral progress of the Nation in its own interest as well as in the interest of the region to which it belongs.

Consequently, we proclaim the following fundamental principles, on which our action is based and which we propose to comply with. At the same time, we call on the Lebanese people to adopt and promote them through words and deeds:

1. to safeguard and defend the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon under all circumstances and by all means,

2. to consider the National Pact, unanimously adopted by the Lebanese people in 1943, as the most effective means to ensure understanding, harmony and co-operation between the different elements and communities of the nation,

3. to remind people that Lebanon belongs to all its sons without distinction and that the Lebanese State respects all the religions and protects them,

4. to ensure justice between the religious communities which form the Lebanese people so that each community may respect one another's rights, and so that none should have the upper hand over the others.

To combat religious discords and political parochialism and eradicate all their manifestations. To put a stop, once and for all, to the propagation of the confessional spirit and its exploitation by politicians,

5. to lay emphasis on the fact that as an Arab State, Lebanon must closely and sincerely co-operate with the Arab brother States, and consequently to endeavour constantly to dispel the confusion and hesitation which characterize the present Arab policy of Lebanon, and co-operate with all the States on the basis of these principles and those of the Charter of the United Nations,

6. to recall that Syria is Lebanon's sister and a borderland; and that, to a very large extent, Lebanon's independence and the prosperity and security of its people depend on Syria's independence, prosperity and security,

7. to recall that Palestine is part and parcel of the Arab world and that Zionism in general and the artificial State of Israel in particular constitute a grave danger to Lebanon which can only grow worse in course of time,

8. to lay emphasis on the necessity for Lebanon to fulfil sincerely its mission in the Arab world, so that with the confidence inspired by its policy it may be a factor of reconciliation and rapprochement and the promoter of the realization of the aims of the Pact of the League of Arab States and of the Treaty of Collective Security,

9. to adhere to the principle of neutrality in dealing with foreign States. This principle has been proclaimed ever since Lebanon became independent, and it implies that all the States should be treated on an equal footing, without granting any privilege to any of them.

[Censored]

11. One should not accept aid of any kind which is likely to set limits on the freedom of Lebanon in pursuing her foreign policy or to affect her independence and sovereignty.

12. One should put a stop to the infiltration of subversive principles and movements and resist any attempt of this kind by imperialists and Zionists.

13. One should safeguard the democratic, republican and parliamentary régime by adhering to its spirit and its letter because it is the best system of government for the country. Consequently, one should combat any attempt at preponderance and domination made by the executive or by any other power.

14. One should urge that the national representation should be extended to a maximum and that the parcelling of constituencies should be done in such a way as to prevent the intervention of authorities for personal ends and to guarantee the freedom of the electors.

We are convinced, that the Lebanese people will adopt these fundamental principles and will take them as a constant guide.

The meaning of these principles has sometimes been perverted in the citizens' minds. . . . The principles must be fortified again in the minds of the people and should penetrate deeply into the hearts so that they may guide us under the present difficult circumstances and may constitute a solid barrier against the partisans of division and those who spread suspicions and pessimism whatever may be their aims, ambitions or motives.

While calling on the Lebanese people to adopt these principles inspired by Lebanon's interest alone, we pray to God, that He may assist us in our task in the service of the country, and may unite our fellow country-men around these principles, so that Lebanon may live free, independent, powerful and respected.

Signed: Ahmad al-As'ad, Ilyās Ba'qlinī, Hasan Buhsalī, Amin Bayhum, Philippe Taqlā, 'Abdallah al-Hājj, Sabrī Hamādah, Ilyās Khūrī, Fu'ād Khūrī, Edmond Rabbat, Sa'ib Salām, Fu'ād 'Ammūn, Husain 'Uwaynī, Hamid Franjiyah, Nasīm Majdalānī and 'Abdallah Yafi.

2. *United National Front's memorandum to the President of Lebanon, 1 April 1957*¹⁴

Dear Mr. President,

In view of the gravity of the internal situation and of the confusion prevailing in the minds of people as a result of the persistence of the authorities in ignoring the wishes of the people expressed many times and through different means,

In view of the gravity of the decisions, which Lebanon is called upon to take in the field of foreign policy, as a result of the decisive developments in the situation prevailing in the countries of the Arab East and because of the necessity of a close understanding between the people and its representatives in this particularly delicate phase,

¹⁴ *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, vol. 36 (Documents) 1957, 137-39 (Translated from the French).

In view of the necessity of sticking to the Pact of 1943 which provides the basis of every internal and external policy of Lebanon,

In view of the fact that in all circumstances sound solutions can only emanate from an authority enjoying the confidence of the people whom it governs and in whose name it decides the fate of the country,

It has become necessary to lay down laws and to prepare the ground, so that the next legislative elections may allow the people to express themselves freely and clearly.

Having realized that your excellency has become lately the real *orientateur* of the policies of Lebanon and the person responsible for their pros and cons, and being aware of the fact that it is in your power alone to fulfil the people's aspirations, we submit to you the following demands:

1. Immediate ending of the state of emergency and of censorship of the press. These two measures have no longer any justification in view of the proximity of the elections.

2. Adoption of the project elaborated by the preceding government and fixing the number of deputies at 88.

3. Institution of polling by *Caza*.

4. Constitution of a neutral government, none of whose members shall be a candidate in the elections, to preside over the next elections to the legislature.

5. Not to conclude treaties or agreements or to tie the country by external bonds, before the elections have taken place in an atmosphere of true freedom and honesty and before a responsible government has emerged from this parliament.

We must notify you that in case all these demands should not be given effect to, we shall have apprehensions regarding the basis of the elections and we shall be compelled to take such practical measures as required in the interest of the country.

Signed: Ahmad al-As'ad, Sabrī Hamādah, 'Abdallah Yafi, Sa'ib Salām, Husain 'Uwayni, Hamīd Franjiyah, Ilyās al Khūrī, Philippe Taqlā, Fu'ād Khūrī, Kamāl Junblat, Fu'ād 'Ammūn, 'Abdallah al-Hājj, Anwar Khatīb, 'Ali Bazzi, Amīn Bayhum, Ilyās Ba'qlini, Edmond Rabbat, Nasīm Majdalānī, Taqī ad-Dīn Sulh, Hasan Buhsālī, Edmond Na'im and Frid Jabrān.

3. *United National Front's policy statement, 3 July 1957*¹⁵

With the end of the elections in the *Muhāfazāt* of northern Lebanon the fourth and last phase of one of the gravest political and moral crises that Lebanon has passed through since its independence has come to an end. The Lebanese public has now the right—after the different communities that compose it have been threatened with the most appalling attempts to divide them—to know certain truths about the preparation for and consequences of the tragedy which has just taken place. The United National Front and its allies make it a point to disclose to those who still do not know it, the shady side of the drama that they have just lived through. The UNF leaves it to every Lebanese to appreciate in good faith these facts and to see for himself their effects on the day-to-day events of the nation's life. Only those who have been blinded by passion will persist in ignoring these facts.

Fortunately for this country of believers, the majority of its citizens have resisted those who wanted to divide it and have maintained a unity without which no nation can survive.

Public opinion could ascertain the truth of the accusations made by members of the UNF during their press conferences and on other occasions, concerning pressures, threats, promises and the use of all the means at the disposal of the State calculated to disregard the wishes of the electors and to falsify the polling results.

Among the different means which have been used, let us mention the arbitrary dividing-up of constituencies contrary to all logic and to the geographical and demographic realities of regions; the improper narrowing of people's representation; the privilege of official support granted to certain lists of candidates; the distribution of licences for carrying arms to partisans of governmental candidates; special amnesties granted to some outlaws; the misuse of government officials to exert pressure on the voters and threaten their liberties; the dispatch of security forces invested with the mission of deceiving the people and with the power to arrest persons belonging to the opposition; threats against government servants and transfers and dismissals of some of them; pressures exercised against weak candidates in the elections with a view to compelling them to withdraw in favour of the governmental candidates; and the pressure exercised on *mukhitārs* and members of

¹⁵ *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, vol. 36 (Documents) 1957, 159-61 (Translated from the French).

municipal corporations to send dispatches approving the policy of the authorities.

As a result of such a conduct officials have been instrumental in provoking bloody incidents in Beirut, in the North and in the South. Within ten days Lebanon had fifty deaths; dozens of its citizens have been injured; hundreds of its youngmen have been arrested and thrown into prisons and stables where they are meted out treatment contrary to the most elementary legal rules and all humanitarian principles.

All these acts and many others that preceded or happened during the elections continue to be perpetrated today and are even accentuated by the preventive detention of journalists and other citizens and by the very arbitrary interpretation of legal rules by the authorities in order to justify their decision to produce these persons before the tribunals.

All these irregularities which we have described have resulted in the election of a Parliament conforming to the wishes of the ruling party but which is far from being representative of the will of the majority of the people of Lebanon. Everybody knows that the President of the Republic, contrary to all the provisions of the Constitution which make him an arbitrator between citizens irrespective of their parties, ambitions, political views or religion, directly interfered with the elections.

It is for these reasons that the UNF and its allies judge that it is their duty toward the country to proclaim the truths before the Lebanese and foreign public opinion, and to expose openly this violation of the spirit and the letter of the Constitution. The Front has entrusted a group of its members with the task of drawing legal inferences from this general situation, particularly that concerning the violation of the provisions of the Constitution which specify and limit the powers and responsibilities of the President of the Republic. It is in the light of the recommendations of this group that the National Front will decide on its line of action with regard to this important question.

The UNF declares at the same time that with the help of God and the people, Lebanon is embarking on a fight destined to rehabilitate it, save its honour, safeguard its Constitution, liberties and the parliamentary régime, and protect its independence, sovereignty and unity on the basis of the National Pact. Toward that end, the Front appeals to all the people of Lebanon to co-operate with it in the fight for freedom and dignity of everyone of them, asks them to be ready to carry out the decisions which it will take in agreement with parties, organi-

zers and national leaders so that Lebanon may live as an independent, sovereign and free Fatherland. Long live Lebanon!

The United National Front

4. *Manifesto issued by a group of 'non-aligned' politicians, 2 October 1957*¹⁶

We are witnessing a political struggle which in the beginning might have disguised itself in the shape of a conflict over the foreign policy of Lebanon but which is, at the moment, only a pretext for settling old accounts. The situation which has developed is of concern not only to the protagonists of the struggle but to every citizen of Lebanon. The signatories to the present appeal believe in a foreign policy based on the necessity of safeguarding the fundamental relations of Lebanon with the West and at the same time, to protect her natural ties with the Arab countries. The immediate prospects are, however, alarming. What a destiny awaits Lebanon, if the administration and justice get corrupted and a rot starts in both of them! How can one afford to look with equanimity at the future while before our very eyes we see the crumbling of the prestige of those who have been charged with the responsibility of keeping internal order and of maintaining public security? There is no doubt at all about the fact that one of the principal causes of the critical situation in which the country has been plunged lies in the equivocation with regard to the renewal of the presidential term.

A renewal shall be an attack on the Constitution itself and will go against the very aims which its framers had laid down.

Responsible Lebanese people, to whatever views they may belong, do not seem to be sufficiently aware of the consequences of their acts. Distracted from their essential obligations, they are only aggravating the confusion prevailing in public opinion and posing a danger to public order. We see them showing scant respect for the laws and lowering the prestige of the authorities; and yet no coherent action is undertaken to resolve the economic and social problems. In this way they become the best agents of that Communism and subversion which they actually pretend to combat. The matters having come to this sorry state of affairs, Lebanon perhaps encounters more serious danger than any which can stem from a foreign threat. The time has come for all the

¹⁶ *Orient Moderno*, 37 (October (1957)), 636-37 (Translated from the Italian).

people of Lebanon to co-ordinate their efforts with a view to putting an end to this situation. Conscious of this necessity and of the national obligation that devolves on every citizen of Lebanon today, the signatories to the present manifesto have decided to constitute themselves in a preparatory committee with a view to studying all the suitable means to resolve the present crisis. The committee will take into account the current public opinion while taking decisions or initiating action. It is confident, of course, that in its initiatives it can count on the support of all the citizens.

(The manifesto was signed by Gabriel al-Murr, Pierre Jumayyil, Bahij Taqī ad-Dīn, George Naqqāsh, Yūsuf Hitti, Ghassān Tuwaynī and Joseph Sālim).

5. *Policy statement of the "Third Force," 17 December 1957¹⁷*

On the 17th of December, the Preparatory Committee of the "Third Force"¹⁸ held a press conference at Beirut in the course of which Bahij Taqī ad-Dīn read the following declaration:

We have called this Press Conference to make the public aware of the acute crisis that has just now overtaken Lebanon. It has appeared necessary to us to communicate the results of our meeting with the President of the Republic and to draw from them certain conclusions. We had certainly not overstepped the bounds of truth when in our first manifesto of the 2nd October we had declared that the main cause of the crisis lay in the controversy regarding the Presidential question. Our aim therefore has to be to dispel doubts regarding the eventuality of a revision of the constitution and of the renewal of the term of the Head of the State. With this end in view our delegation waited on the President of the Republic on the 30th of December. After reminding President Sham'ūn that he himself had opposed any revision of the constitution aiming at the perpetuation of the Presidential rule, we asked him to put an end to the rumours set afloat by Ministers and Deputies who were said to be supported by him. In our opinion a declaration by the Head of the State condemning every idea of renewal (of term) alone could put an end to the crisis.

The declaration of the President is notable. After having declared

¹⁷ *Orient Moderno*, 38 (February 1958) 138-39 (Translated from the Italian).

¹⁸ This was how the new political alignment made in October 1957 called.

that he had not changed his view regarding the inadvisability of the revision of the Constitution, he added that even then it would be necessary for him to review his attitude if a successor for the continuation of his policies was not assured.

Such a reply shows without any shadow of doubt that the idea of renewal of the rule has entered into the head of the President and he will employ every possible means to realize it. And this is what makes it unacceptable to us. We re-affirm, first of all, that the policy of Lebanon is not the work of one man. Ever since Lebanon attained independence it has been defined and followed. It is unthinkable that one man, even if he may be the Head of the State, can proclaim today that the policy of the country is linked with his personal power and that it would cease to function when he ceases to function. The President of the Republic has come to doubt the possibility of finding a man capable of guaranteeing a national policy and in fact asks the people of Lebanon to acknowledge him as indispensable. In this way the Head of the State ceases to be the instrument of carrying out a policy; he himself becomes the creator of that policy and puts himself up as the sole judge of its application.

It is necessary to declare firmly that in the reply of the President there is a lack of confidence in the nation which is an unacceptable proposition because the nation under question has never been accused of lacking in men of calibre and capacity. The duty of the Head of the State—any head of state—is to handover his powers to his successor at the end of his term. It is not for him to select his successor or to put him up. In a constitutional régime based on the principle of the sovereignty of the people he cannot have even the right to pronounce himself against the candidature of any citizen. As regards the claim advanced by some persons that the President of the Republic, by making public his decision to retire, might run the risk of losing his real authority toward the end of the period of his rule, it is quite evident on what principles such arguments are based. Every legal rule has an end. Otherwise we will have to admit that every president of Lebanon when nearing the end of his term would automatically run the risk of a revision of the constitution. Neither can we accept the excuse that every opposition to the renewal of the presidential term favours the activities of the subversive elements and of the foreign agents. We affirm, on the other hand, that the safest means of avoiding disorder is to spare Lebanon the crisis which helps the actions of the suspected elements. We also

believe that the best safeguard against anarchy is the establishment of a strong and stable authority which would be capable of following a policy which assures Lebanon its role of a mediator.

It is evident that the condition placed by the President of the Republic contains within itself the cause of its own negation. It represents the negation of the very fundamental democratic principles of our régime and an open distrust of the will of the people. It is an established fact that the idea of renewal of the presidential term would guide all activities and we would find ourselves constantly engaged in an electoral fight. All the power and the entire administrative machinery of the state would be mobilized toward that end. This would result in the decline of the prestige of authority and of faith in justice.

Anarchy has invaded the public services, officers have been mobilized, and the resources of the state are fully exhausted. Every morning the newspapers are full of scandals in which public figures are involved. The control of power is completely gone out of the hands of those in whom power resides. Instability is extending to the entire country. Laws are violated, and authority is ridiculed. Cases are falsified. The responsible element, divided within itself, has arrived at a point where it finds itself completely lost. These responsible people do not know how to stem the rot. The country is getting away from them because she has lost confidence in them.

Such are the conditions to which we have been brought by them. Today, it is seen that these very persons in power are destroying the structure of the state by undermining immunity of the functionaries with the sole aim of advancing the cause of the supporters of the renewal of the presidential term and of putting their own henchmen in the services. It is not possible to avoid a bitter reference in this connection to the way in which the first government of the present régime had undermined the immunity of the functionaries in order to introduce in the administration hundreds of its own supporters under whose weight public finances were squandered and are depleted.

In such a state of affairs it was found necessary to start a national movement with the aim of safeguarding the institutions and of protecting Lebanon from the dangers that threaten its very existence. We address ourselves once again very solemnly to President Sham'un himself and tell him that it is primarily his responsibility not to aggravate the crisis and to put an end to the alarming divisions which are seen among the people of Lebanon. Moreover, we address ourselves to the legisla-

tive power and request it to discharge its elementary duty of protecting the Constitution from every attack inspired by motives which President Sham'un himself has defined as purely personal.

In any case the final word rests with the nation. We can only hope that those who wield responsibility are fully seized of the gravity of the situation which may force the people to impose their own will.

6. *Statement issued by 82 opposition leaders, 27 March 1958*¹⁰

The signatories to this statement who represent different opinions and trends in Lebanon, in a meeting held at the residence of Henri Far'un on 27 March 1958, call for action to check the present developments which may endanger the unity of Lebanon.

They find that the rulers whose duty is to safeguard the unity of Lebanon intend to impair the destiny of Lebanon and its independence in the hope of exploiting this to justify their personal policy.

The President is still determined to amend the Constitution in order to renew his term.

If a government deteriorates to the extent that it loses decorum and control and does not inspire satisfaction and confidence in public mind, the situation confronts Lebanon with the biggest possible danger apart from the fact that it is also a crime against national unity.

Hence, firstly, the signatories consider that the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon were not and will never be the subject of discussion or debate and that the Lebanese people adhere to the National Pact which has sanctified national unity since 1943.

Secondly, the signatories resolve to unify their efforts and combine their forces to resist the renewal of the presidential term which constitutes a challenge to the will of the people and endangers the future of the homeland.

The signatories, while announcing their determination to adhere to Lebanon as a sovereign and independent entity, to the National Pact, and to the strengthening of brotherhood with all the Arab countries, warn the rulers against the consequence of their excesses.

They declare that any attempt to renew the term of the President will justify the people in asserting their will with all the means at their disposal.

(The 82 signatories included leaders of the United National Front, the Third Force and other political groups).

¹⁰ *Al-Hayat*, 28 March 1958, 4 (Translated from the Arabic).

7. *Summary of statements by opposition parties, 16 April 1958²⁰*

The Lebanese Najjadah Party has issued a statement declaring that any attempt to amend the constitution with a view to re-electing Camille Sham'un as President of the Republic will be opposed with a strength never witnessed by the country before. The statement says that the country's organizations, parties and press have declared against amending the constitution to permit the re-election. The statement denounces the government's arming of its supporters to carry out terrorist activities against the citizens, and says that the arming of these supporters and the increase in the gendarmerie forces will be of no avail, because the brave army is alert to all (? hidden designs) and will not be an instrument for the realization of anybody's greed.

The statement goes on to say: We oppose the re-election because when Sham'un assumed office in 1952 the country had no strings or commitments preventing it from preserving good neighbourly relations with the sister Arab States and in particular with Syria. Soon, however, the Lebanon found itself pushed into America's lap. All good relations between itself and its neighbours were forgotten. The responsible officials adopted the attitude of onlookers towards every plot hatched against the safety of the Arab liberated countries and towards the birth of the United Arab Republic. Official Lebanon began to follow the steps of those who direct its policy from outside the Arab countries.

The Lebanese National Organization Party also issued a statement denouncing the arming of the Government's supporters, who fired on a number of citizens before the eyes and within hearing of the security men themselves. The statement said that the State was losing respect. Its existence in this case meant that the Lebanese could not be sure of the safety of their lives or property as long as the Government followed such a policy.

The Arab Liberation Party and the Popular Front in Tripoli also issued a statement demanding an end to the abnormal conditions prevailing in the country and warned against the seriousness of the situation after the government has been exploited for the attainment of some aims which are very far from the people's interests.

The statement said that the recent bloody incidents were the result of the policy of intrigues and that no one knew where this policy would lead the Lebanon. The statement added that in the towns arms are dis-

²⁰ *S.W.B. Part IV*, 18 April 1958, 3.

tributed and bullets fired, while the Government does nothing but hatch plots against the citizens and murder them in the name of the law and under the pretext of preserving respect for the State.

The statement added that the State loses all justification for its existence when it becomes a party to the dispute. We must expect a bitter incident every day. The country will be lost if the prevailing conditions continue. The statement then expressed Tripoli's denunciation of the recent incidents at Ash-Shuf and its readiness to contribute with all that is demanded of it by its duty towards the future of the Lebanon.

C. IMPACT OF THE UNION OF EGYPT AND SYRIA

1. *Statement by Mr. Charles Malik, the Foreign Minister of Lebanon, 11 February 1958*²¹

[At 11.00 hours today the parliamentary foreign affairs committee held a meeting in the presence of Dr. Charles Malik, Minister of Foreign and Expatriates Affairs. During this meeting His Excellency made the following statement regarding the proclamation of unity between Egypt and Syria].

To understand the attitude of the Lebanon towards the recent event, we must consider the interactions taking place at high level between the constructive foreign policy of the Lebanon and the (two words indistinct) desired for the world in the next quarter of a century. We must examine the secret relationship which links together three events and which connects them to the very essence of Lebanese political activity.

The first event is the engagement of the two great world camps in an unprecedented war, a scientific war which has laboratories as its fields.

The second event is the feeling entertained by small countries—among which, if not in their forefront, is the Lebanon—that they have to shoulder a responsibility which might exceed the responsibilities shouldered by the great Powers, to search for means to unite the world—means which do not reach the extent of (? ambition), but which do reach the extent of rallying together the (? ruling) good will in order to establish a world based on justice, freedom, and a high standard for the people.

The third event is the establishment of unification between two States in (? this) part of the world—namely, Syria and Egypt—which, despite superficial, secondary, and transient disputes, are linked to the Lebanon

²¹ S.W.B. Part IV, 14 February 1958, 3-4.

by deep, live, sincere, and honourable bonds which cannot be (two words indistinct).

For the first time, I permit myself to tell you that after a long, tiring, serious, and responsible political activity in which the Lebanese character participated generously, the Lebanon's policy has succeeded in occupying its position in the historic action which these small States are carrying out.

The Lebanon, which adopts and which will continue to adopt towards all events an attitude of (? open-mindedness) and understanding, at all times easing tension and always strengthening the side of good and invariably being loving, declares:

(1) The present scientific war which heralds mankind's invasion of outer space should be understood as, and be in fact, a war against the unknown and against evil, with all its gains going to the service of free and loving mankind.

(2) The action of certain small Powers, including the Lebanon, should be strengthened in order that it may impose its goodness on the solutions desired for the world, which are necessarily thought of by (? selected) individuals and groups in both camps.

(3) We pray to God that the unification declared between Egypt and Syria will bring about an increase in the living standard of the peoples of the two countries, and that it may augur well for all the parties bound by the eternal bond of life and death which links the Lebanon with all the countries it loves and serves, whether these countries be called Syria and Egypt or the United Arab Republic, or called Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, the Sudan, and the Yemen.

While the Lebanon—which continues to exist and intends to continue to exist for ever as a nation (Arabic: ummah) with a standard, a sovereignty, an independence, and a message—will continue to play its international role, it will not allow itself to abstain from participation in everything that is good and that affects its partners in the bond of life and death.

2. *Extract from address by Rashid Karāmi on meeting President Nasser, 27 February 1958*²²

... We in the Lebanon believe that the Lebanon is of the Arabs and for the Arabs. The Lebanese people, O President, believe in your prin-

²² S.W.B. Part IV, 1 March 1958, 1.

ciples and mission, and are following your footsteps and example. Should the appearance not conform with the truth this is because of the glittering nature of the appearance which often hides the truth which is bound to become evident ultimately. The truth is that the Lebanese are painfully keeping silent because they are aware of their responsibilities and appreciate the circumstances through which the Arab nation is passing. You can rest assured, O President, that when the hour strikes we will all leap up as one man to hoist the banner to which all the Arabs will rally—this is the banner which we wish to fly above us all and (indistinct word) all of us. If not we would rather all die for its sake.

3. *Extract from address by President Nasser, 2 March 1958*²³

Fellow-countrymen from Lebanon,

I wish to tell you that we reciprocate your sentiments, your affection and brotherliness.

This morning I had the pleasure of meeting a delegation of the free people of Lebanon; now I am meeting another. I have also met a number of Lebanese delegations during the past few days. But today I have the pleasure of meeting you for the first time here with Emir El-Badr, Crown-Prince of Yemen, at my side. On this occasion, I wish to say that Yemen was the first country to join this union after the formation of the United Arab Republic was officially proclaimed, Imam Ahmed, King of Yemen, immediately sent a message saying that union is strength and that Arab brotherliness compelled him to be the first to join the United Arab Republic in a federal union. He was thus putting into words the aims of the Arab people, the aims we called for, the aims for which our forefathers had struggled. He was the first one to express his desire for union and therefore the first to participate in the institution of an all-embracing Arab unity.

Fellow-countrymen,

We welcome Yemen into our union and we feel that this unity which springs from the heart of the Arab Nation and from its will is the strength we aim at achieving and the nucleus of the all-embracing unity we hope to see accomplished soon in every Arab country.

May God be our Guide.

²³ *Nasser's Speeches and Press-Interviews, 1958* (Information Department, Cairo), 78.

4. *Summary of Correspondence between Pierre Jumayyil and Patriarch Paul Ma'ûshi, 2 and 4 March 1958*²⁴

On 2nd March 1958 the President of the Lebanese "*Kata'ib*" (Phalanges) Party, Pierre Jumayyil, addressed an open letter to the Maronite Patriarch, Paul Ma'ûshi, requesting him to clarify the attitude of the Patriarchate *vis-a-vis* the political problems of the Arabs. In his letter Pierre Jumayyil put into bold relief the intense propaganda to which for some time past Lebanon had been subjected and which aimed at arousing the masses with a view to inducing the country to accede to Arab unions or federations. In his letter Pierre Jumayyil said: "We are convinced that the Patriarchate is firmly dedicated to its secular mission of defending the liberty, the independence and the sovereignty of Lebanon. . . . Taking into consideration the motives that might have induced the Patriarch to remain, uptil now, above polemics of any kind, we request you to put an end to the equivocation from which only the enemies of Lebanon stand to gain."

On 4 March 1958 the Patriarch, Paul Ma'ûshi wrote the following letter in reply to Pierre Jumayyil's:

"We do not want to hide the fact that the internal situation is a cause of uneasiness to us. There exist corruption in the services of the state, an atmosphere of insecurity, the hardening of unreasonable positions on matters of principle and polemics which assume the form of personal invective and discord among religious ranks. We are worried about the emergence of some amongst us who do not set a limit to their ambitions. We are worried about their unbridled materialism. We deplore all this and pray to God to liberate us from this hard trial. From the core of our hearts we invite all the people of Lebanon, to whatever view point or faith they may belong; we invite all of them without distinction, to renounce every kind of hatred and every kind of rancour; we invite them to forgive each other's faults and errors in a reciprocal manner, to reconcile and to sacrifice themselves for the common good; we invite them to renew their faith in the independence of Lebanon, in a free and sovereign Lebanon and to collaborate in the spirit and the framework of the National Pact.

"We love our Arab brothers as we love ourselves. As in the past, so now, we put ourselves at their disposal; we bless their political, social, economic and spiritual strivings. We piously wish for the complete suc-

²⁴ *Oriente Moderno*, 38 (March 1958) 220-21 (Translated from the Italian)

cess of every unity and accord that they may forge amongst themselves. We have absolute faith in Lebanon, in its independence, in its sovereignty and in its liberty. We do not permit of anything that may compromise or negate that independence, anything that may attack the sovereignty of Lebanon, anything that may put limits to its liberty. We are convinced that the collaboration established on the basis of equality and of mutual respect between Lebanon and the West will be of benefit to Lebanon on economic, social and cultural planes as well. We see, too, in such a collaboration every advantage for the Arabs. It is in such an atmosphere that Lebanon can serve the Arabs and hold out a guarantee of their rights. Such a collaboration is much more useful than any action that may end up in the breaking of relations between Lebanon and the West. We have faith in an independent, free and sovereign Lebanon (i) for, it is an end in itself; (ii) for, Lebanon is rich in values that can be safeguarded and which can be enjoyed actively only through its independence; (iii) for, a sovereign, independent and free Lebanon, by virtue of its sovereignty, independence and freedom, is more useful to the Arabs than if it were to lose its independence and become weak. To our Arab brethren, wherever they may be, we say that for the good of Lebanon and for the good of the Arabs, the independence of Lebanon has to be preserved and strengthened. With a feeling of profound love we say to them: Let us not reconcile ourselves to any unity or union which accepts anything that may weaken the sovereignty and the independence of Lebanon."

5 *Extracts from statement by Patriarch Paul Ma'ûshi, 9 March 1958*²⁵

Our religion requires us to put virtue in a sublime place and to view with feelings of fraternity our fellow-citizens, whoever they may be, because we are the sons of one homeland.

Common interest and religious and patriotic feelings require us to reach an understanding with them, because it is not easy in this narrow part of the world for the Lebanon to distinguish between its fate and that of its neighbours and brothers: if good comes to them from the Almighty, this will promote the welfare of the Lebanon, and if events bring oppression to them, the Lebanon will not escape such oppression.

My dear sons, I have a letter from President Jamal Abd an-Nasir,

²⁵ S.W.B. Part IV, 12 March 1958, 2-3.

the President of the United Arab Republic, and from an old friend of the Lebanon President Shukri al-Ouwatli, saying that the Lebanon in its present status is a structure with complete sovereignty and independence which will not be touched. Can we withhold from these brothers a feeling harmonizing with their feelings? These brothers want only one thing from the Lebanon, and that is that it is not a centre for plots and intrigues against them.

6. *Extracts from statement by Mr. Sa'ib Salām, the opposition leader, to the Middle East News Agency, 10 March 1958²⁰*

The era of kings and dictatorial régimes is gone for ever as a result of the modern Arab renaissance. The era of absolute leadership has no place in this popular current unless such leaderships fully adapt themselves to unified Arab interests and Arab sentiments from the Atlantic to the Arab gulf, which have unanimously protested against this plot. 'Royal plots are continuing and will not cease. If President Abd an-Nasir continues to nationalize plots, he will achieve the nationalization of oil money.

If we in the Lebanon oppose the present régime and those in power we oppose, before all else, their deviation in foreign policy and we seek to destroy plots for which the Lebanon has become a centre. We are aware that King Sa'ud engineered the plots of 30th May during the last elections. He also engineered plots which resulted in rigging the Lebanese elections, the plot of Al-Maraghi and Husayn Khayri in Beirut, the imperialist coup d'état carried out by King Husayn in Jordan, and other plots in which circumstances permitted him to become involved directly or indirectly.

We are aware of the huge monthly salaries which King Sa'ud pays from oil money to those who oppose liberated Arab moves. We are aware that King Sa'ud makes a huge monthly payment to Adib ash-Shish'kli, to Queen Zayn and to his supporters in the Lebanon.

The recent plot was not so much directed against President Abd an-Nasir as against the Arab nation in order to shatter its hopes, aspirations, and progress towards freedom, strength and glory. After the discovery of this plot, I expect that certain people in Saudi Arabia will move to put an end to King Sa'ud and his actions, and then fully co-operate with the United liberated Arab States. I also expect that the upsurge of

²⁰ S.W.B. Part IV, 12 March 1958, 4.

the Saudi people will lead to ending the era of plots. I reiterate that it would be a mistake to believe that the Saudi people do not exist.

As for imperialism, I have a final word which I must say to its masters, namely, that it is high time that they realize that Arab liberation under the leadership of President Abd an-Nasir is too strong to be harmed by aggression, intrigues, or plots.

7. Extract from statement by Prime Minister Sāmī as-Sulh in the Chamber of Deputies, 25 March 1958²⁷

The brave and modern Arab movement has resulted in the formation of blessed unions. These are the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria, the United Arab States of this Republic and the Yemen, and the Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan. The Lebanon was the first to recognize the United Arab Republic and the Arab Federation upon their establishment. In doing so, the Lebanon feels that it has set a high example regarding the possibility of the existence of love, peace, solidarity and harmony among people, even if they differ in religion, creed and belief and are of different communities.

Because of its cherished relations with its expatriate sons, and because of its desire to serve the cause of Arabism and to establish lasting peace among Arabs and others, the Lebanon should be a friend to all. Its attitude in regard to the sister Arab States is an attitude of love and fraternity imposed by the principles of brotherhood, neighbourliness, honour, and common interests.

The Lebanon was not, and will never be, a stage for plots against any of the Arab States. No, indeed not, because this is loathsome not only to the honour of fraternity, but also harms the Lebanon's political and economic interests, and deprives it of the beauty of its existence which is based on the continuance of sincere (? co-operation with others).

Therefore, the Government welcomes these Arab unions and the Arab leaders who have achieved them, wishing them every success in serving their own peoples, in raising their standard of living, and in serving world peace and civilization. On behalf of the Lebanon, this Government extends the hand of fraternity to these unions and also to other Arab States. The Lebanon extends this hand with a spirit of devotion and love, hoping that the bonds of co-operation, mutual support, and good-neighbourliness will be strengthened. It also hopes that true

²⁷ S.W.B. Part IV, 27 March 1958, 9-10.

Arab co-operation will prevail throughout all relations between the Lebanon and these Arab States.

As regards organizing its relations with Arab countries, the government intends to be a friend to all, and unbiased towards any group in relation to other groups. It calls for understanding, amity, and fraternity. As soon as possible the government will formulate a full programme for the various problems pending between the Lebanon and the Arab countries; as well as problems which have arisen in the international sphere as a result of the recent unions, with a view to starting negotiation to solve all these problems in a spirit of understanding and fraternity.

The Government does not place any limits on our potential co-operation with the Arab States, based on our independence and freedom. We fully appreciate the decisive moment in the history of the Near East and the history of the Arabs in which we are now living. Furthermore, the Government is determined to shoulder its full responsibilities at this delicate moment.

You can be sure that the Government will not let a single day, or even an hour, pass without studying with full responsibility what is taking place and what is due to take place in the Arab world and the Near East. (Few words indistinct) ... what is being done in the service of the Lebanese and the Arab cause. It is the duty of the government to you and to the Lebanon to study all the possibilities and to form an opinion on them. It will continue to do this tirelessly.

The Lebanon lives first of all by itself, secondly by its free and honourable dealings with the Arab world, thirdly by participating in contributing to civilization, and fourthly by approving all that is right in the world. The government looks forward to, and is anxious to see, a co-operative and creative Arab future. The Lebanon will co-operate sincerely in the new Arab life.

The Government appeals to your gracious Chamber and to all Lebanese citizens—in their various inclinations, groups, parties, and communities—to set aside their political objectives and get rid of the causes of differences and disputes, in order to preserve the national unity and repel any harm that might reach the Lebanese ranks. In this way the Lebanon will remain strong and dignified, and will thus be able to play a creative role in its affairs and in the affairs of its Arab brethren. Our Government is certain that the Lebanese appreciate the seriousness of passing events, and the delicate stage through which we are passing. If

hopes that the people will help it by responding to its appeal for the implementation of this policy which, truly, deeply and realistically, expresses its wishes and aspirations for complete independence and sincere co-operation with the sister Arab countries.

8. *Summary of statement by Mr. 'Adil 'Usayrān, Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, after his meeting with President Nasser, 28 March 1958*²⁸

Usayran said: "I discussed Arab problems with President Jamal Abd an-Nasir. I found that this man is a wise leader who wishes every good for all the Arab countries, strives to help the Arab countries achieve complete liberation and independence, does not in any way contemplate forcing any Arab country to unite with him, and does not wish his name to be thrust into the domestic affairs of any Arab country."

Usayran added that President Jamal Abd an-Nasir had assured him that he was as anxious as the Lebanese themselves to preserve the Lebanon's independence and that he was also anxious to safeguard national unity in the Lebanon. The President of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies went on to say that in the speeches which he had delivered in the Syrian region President Jamal Abd an-Nasir had declared that no Arab weapons could possibly be used to kill Arabs, that no Arab army could possibly fight against Arab peoples, and that it was the duty of all sincere Arabs to safeguard the Lebanon. Usayran affirmed that he was fully convinced the President Jamal Abd an-Nasir loved the Lebanon and the Lebanese people, was seeking every good for free Lebanon, and desired that relations between the Lebanon and the United Arab Republic should be improved.

Usayran said: "President Jamal Abd an-Nasir is a wise and reasonable man. He thinks of the events of the near and distant future and views them in a realistic manner. He works devotedly, sincerely and assiduously to assist all Arabs. His heart bears nothing but good will to all Arabs. Simultaneously, he is an enemy of imperialism and fights it everywhere. President Jamal Abd an-Nasir wishes matters to be founded on a sound basis. When he considers policy he views the matters under discussion from a constructive angle and considers that policy is a social structure for the benefit of the peoples and their future."

Usayran said that the establishment of the United Arab Republic was

²⁸ S.W.B. Part IV, 31 March 1958; 4.

strength for the Arabs, and that after the establishment of this Republic the Lebanon had begun to think constructively about improving its relations with this Republic. He added that following the establishment of the United Arab Republic it had become necessary to reconsider the existing economic agreement between this Republic and the Lebanon.

9. *Summary of statement by President Sham'un on the occasion of Ramadhān celebrations, 20 April 1958²⁹*

President Sham'un said: "Our policy, as has already been clearly defined in the various ministerial declarations read out in Parliament by the President of the Council, Sāmi-as-Sulh, is neat and clear. I have personally participated in the drawing up of these declarations and I stand by every word and every letter of mine. . . .

"Our internal policy aims at, before everything else, the affirmation of justice for all. I do not believe that it is possible to find even a single person of good faith who can assert that the authorities, in spite of the violent political rivalries between parties, has ever intervened in this particular field in favour of one section of the population against the other. On the economic plane our policy has always had for its aim the raising of the standard of life of our population and of augmenting the national wealth and production."

After referring to the results obtained in the area of public works and agricultural production, the President touched on the problem of internal security: "The objective of our domestic policy is to strengthen the security of the citizens. On this point the authorities have been subjected to violent criticism. But the strangest thing is that the most violent criticism has come exactly from those people who are directly or indirectly responsible for the attacks on public order and security."

After this, dealing with foreign policy the President of the Republic indicated the following main directives: (1) Total independence of Lebanon. (2) Total and effective solidarity with the Arab world of which Lebanon forms an integral part. In this area Lebanon must work for the resolving of various differences among diverse Arab countries and try to obtain among these countries a sincere collaboration irrespective of the form of government adopted by their free choice, federation or union. (3) Co-operation on the basis of complete equality with the countries of the West and friends. The President concluded his speech with an appeal for unity and solidarity. He said:

²⁹ *Oriente Moderno*, 38 (May 1958) 396-97. (Translated from the Italian).

"The struggle for the Arab cause is a mission and an article of faith. I had never thought that it could one day become for some people in Lebanon a source of income, an instrument for cheap popularity and a stage on which the actors and buffoons would have their dance."

10. *Summary of statement by Mr. 'Adil 'Usayrān, Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, to the Middle East News Agency, 22 April 1958*³⁰

Cairo: Adil Usayran has declared that it is in the Lebanon's interest to join the United Arab States. He said: "I demand even more than this: the day will come when everything will be achieved." Usayran made this statement in a special interview with *MENA*. It is recalled that he visited Cairo last Saturday to spend the holiday there.

Speaking about relations between the United Arab Republic and the Lebanon, Usayran said that these relations should be those of full brotherhood, affection, and mutual support between the two countries. He said that the establishment of the United Arab Republic was one of the objectives and dreams of the Lebanese people. This dream has come true, he said: the Arabs see in the United Arab Republic a prosperous and smiling future.

He went on to say that (? the Lebanese people) wish to reciprocate love for love, sincerity for sincerity, and unity in general policy and constructive work with the people of the United Arab Republic for the good of Arab nationalism and the Arab nation. He said that this is the opinion of Lebanese of all tendencies and communities.

Usayran said that it is in the Lebanon's interest to join the United Arab States. He said: "I demand even more than this: the day will come when everything will be achieved."

Asked about reports that the responsible authorities in the Lebanon have sought the help of the US Sixth Fleet to protect the status quo in the Lebanon, the President of the Chamber of Deputies said that he denounces this categorically and unequivocally, because the Lebanon has not been exposed to any threat from any State. He added that when a misunderstanding takes place between it and any sister Arab State, the Lebanon is ready to do its utmost to remove this estrangement which separates it from its Arab brethren. He went on to say that if the Lebanon is threatened by any foreign State, the first thing it will do

³⁰ *S.W.B. Part IV*, 24 April 1958, 6.

is to think of its Arab brethren, because it considers its fate and theirs as one and its future and theirs as one.

Asked about the repeated tendency to amend the Constitution preliminary to renewing the presidency of President Camille Sham'un for another term, Usayran said that the question of electing the President of the Republic is still under discussion by all the parliamentary blocs. He added that no bloc has yet defined its clear inclination or its final opinion on the person it will nominate for the presidency; amendment of the Constitution is thus premature. He said that he will announce his opinion on this question during the next month, when the question becomes clearer.

In conclusion, Usayran said that he came to Cairo for rest and to spend the holiday there because the atmosphere in Cairo was very satisfying to him.

2. Outbreak of the Civil War

INTRODUCTION

OVER the days, weeks and months, sporadic clashes coupled with exchange of recriminations and allegations of extra-territorial loyalty between the government and the opposition created an atmosphere wherein issues of purely national concern got inextricably mixed up with the wider issues of international politics. Lebanon, it appeared, was inexorably heading toward a civil war. There was the further danger that it could degenerate into a religious war. For, after all, the broad division in Lebanon was in practice, if not in principle, on a religious basis. The para-military Muslim Najjādah Party had made a tactical alliance with the UNF; the Christian Phalanges Party had formed common cause with President Sham'un. But the polarization of forces did not strictly follow the confessional division. The opposition contained eminent Christians such as Fu'ād 'Ammūn, Henri Far'un, Nasīm Majdalāni, Bishāra al-Khūrī, Hamīd Faranjiyyah and Charles Hilū. The Maronite Patriarch, Paul Ma'ūshī, was firmly opposed to any policy which might impair relations between different communities in Lebanon or estrange the neighbouring Arab countries. Similarly, in the other camp, too, President Sham'un's staunch supporter and Prime Minister, Samī as-Sulh, was a Muslim; and his pro-western foreign policy was openly backed by at least two Muslim monarchs: King Sa'ūd and the Shāh of Iran. Besides, both sides contained some odd allies. The opposition was supported by the Communist Party of Lebanon which did not see eye to eye with it on any issue other than fighting the Eisenhower Doctrine. The government, on the other hand, was actively aided by the semi-fascist *Parti Populaire Sociale* (PPS)¹ which did not agree with it on any issue except opposition to Nasser.

Against this backdrop of frayed tempers, mounting tensions and mutually-hostile political alignments, occurred, on 8 May 1958, the assassi-

¹ The PPS believes that the people inhabiting the Fertile Crescent constitute the "Syrian race"; and seeks to unite them into a single state. The PPS was intensely angered by the merger of Syria and Egypt and, therefore, made an alliance with President Sham'un although it was opposed, in principle, to the concept of an independent and sovereign Lebanon.

nation of an opposition newspaper editor, Nasib Matni. Already during previous weeks, several acts of individual and collective violence had been committed by one side or other, in Mount Lebanon, the Biqā' Valley and the coastal strip; and the aura of civil war was much in the air. In the event, the opposition categorically held the government responsible for Matni's murder and called for a nation-wide strike and war against the latter. Soon after, hostilities flared up all over the country. Barricades were raised across highways, streets and lanes and trenches dug around rival strongholds in villages, towns, and valleys. Commerce and industry came to a standstill and tourists disappeared from the country.

The Government held the view that the UAR had instigated the rebellion through its radio and press, and through giving moral and material aid to the opposition. The opposition, on its part, never categorically denied that it was receiving arms from across the frontier but firmly maintained that it was not subservient to any external power.

A further dimension was added to the civil strife by the attitude of the Army. General Fu'ād Shihāb, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, apparently declined to suppress the rebels though he allowed the 10,000-strong armed force to act as a fire brigade, a mediator and an insulator between the two warring camps. The government then decided to call the security police to deal with the situation. This small force in combination with a considerable number of PPS and Phalangist volunteers was ostensibly inadequate to wipe out the rebels, though it succeeded in holding its own.

1. *Statement by Prime Minister Sāmī as-Sulh on the assassination of Mr. Nasib Matni, 9 May 1958²*

Dear citizens, the government is grieved at seeing the family of the Lebanese press, which we love and respect, suffer the loss of one of its luminaries, namely the great loss of the late Nasib al-Matni, who was assassinated by sinful and oppressive hands which will inevitably be brought to justice. We are confident that the competent judicial and administrative authorities will reveal the secrets of this abominable crime—I mean the sinister ones who committed it. They deserve hard treatment and severe punishment.

Noble people, some opportunists have chosen to exploit this painful

² S.W.B. Part IV, 12 May 1958, 13.

incident to achieve private aims which are at variance with the feelings of sorrow and grief. But your alert consciousness has been and still is too strong to be deceived by the falsehoods of the opportunists and the deceit of the exploiters. Thanks be to God, you are mature and sensible people who know how to choose your course and how to place your confidence and support. This government which you entrusted with your fate and supported with your confidence is your sincere and faithful servant. It is determined to shoulder its obligations and discharge its duties, without cowardice or hesitation or reluctance.

Dear people, your government which works for the protection of your country and your safety and stability (word indistinct), your interests and your fate, will maintain its firm stand in the face of the rioters and subversives. It knows what purposes they are serving and what goal they are seeking. The Government will abandon the trust you laid upon its shoulders and the confidence you bestowed upon it only if you generally and comprehensively decide to withdraw this confidence and trust.

Lebanese, proceed with God's blessings on your way to good work and to good constructive activity! May God help you and the sincere and loyal workers! Long live the Lebanon!

2. *Statements by the United National Front on the assassination of Mr. Nasib Matni, 10 May 1958*³

(a) Our call for a peaceful strike throughout the Lebanon genuinely expresses the feelings of the Lebanese people, who denounce the wave of terror and crime, violations of public freedom and conspiracy against the constitution. The rulers, who have been, and are still, the cause of calamity in this peaceful country, have refused to do anything but create confusion and sow dissension. Reaction to such provocations has been intense. Bloody clashes eventually occurred in Tripoli; the inhabitants occupied certain positions and set fire to vehicles belonging to the gendarmerie.

The situation has developed so far that it is fraught with great danger. The people of Harmal rose and set fire to Government House and the headquarters of the judiciary. Numerous areas have followed the example of Tripoli and Harmal in gaining victory for the people's cause.

More than at any time before the people of Beirut are called upon

³ *S.W.B. Part IV, 12 May 1958, 11.*

today to continue their strike in conjunction with their brothers until public demands are completely fulfilled.

(b) Compatriots: Events which are still developing gravely in Tripoli and the north have merged into a drastic fact: namely that the arms distributed by the higher authorities among members of their civilian mercenary gangs have become a tool in their hands for treachery. They lie in wait for unarmed citizens, to shoot innocent people so that the lives of tens of people are lost and hundreds wounded. Fourteen persons have so far been killed and 116 wounded.

The development of these incidents and the accompanying criminal and mean activities clearly show the intentions of the chief responsible person, who has stained the country with blood to realize his ambitions for renewal.

These activities lead us to ask you to continue your strike in denunciation of the killing of innocent people by treacherous shooting, and in defence of your country's independence, your dignity, and the freedom of your sons and brothers.

Compatriots: The higher authorities hoped to open the door of the battle with blood, thus challenging the will of the whole people. We accepted the challenge with determination.

Compatriots: You are now in the midst of the battle—the battle of freedom, dignity, and fate, the battle of the Lebanon. Keep, all of you, in a single rank against the mean attempt predetermined by the chief responsible person who has neither conscience, restraint, nationalism nor religion. Continue your strike in support of the virtuous blood which has been shed and the innocent souls which have been destroyed.

Keep solidarity with your free people in defence of your freedom and the lives of your sons and of your future. We are at the crossroads and we have chosen the road of freedom. The unjust must fail; darkness must be dispelled; the day of victory is not far off.

3. *Summary of statement by Mr. Charles Malik, the Foreign Minister of Lebanon, at a press conference accusing the UAR of intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon, 13 May 1958¹*

Beirut: Foreign Minister Dr. Charles Malik stated at a press conference this evening that the United Arab Republic's interference in Lebanon's internal affairs was directly responsible for the present dis-

¹ S.W.B. Part IV, 15 May 1958, 11-12.

turbances. He said that 24 persons, all foreigners, had been arrested in Beirut in the past two days and that many of them carried identity cards showing that they had been or still were in the Syrian army. A number of these persons were inquiring about the streets leading to the residences of Lebanese leaders.

Dr. Malik quoted other examples of foreign interference, including the arrest of the former Belgian Minister to Syria and the present Consul-General in Damascus. He said that the Consul-General had been arrested while smuggling a large quantity of weapons and ammunition into the Lebanon. The Belgian Consul-General, whose name was given as Louis De San, was also carrying papers containing instructions to unknown persons with the purpose of carrying out murder and other terrorist activities.

The Lebanese Foreign Minister went on to say that as an act of retaliation for the arrest of the Consul-General, about 500 armed persons crossed the Lebanese borders and attacked the customs post at Al-Masna, where De San had been arrested. They occupied part of the post, burned cars and killed six officials who were carrying out their duties. Dr. Malik added that the attackers did not withdraw from Lebanese territory until the Lebanese Army was summoned.

The Lebanese Foreign Minister said that the authorities had intercepted a boat which was carrying weapons, ammunition and 11 Palestinians from the Gaza strip. Several thousand Egyptian pounds were found on these persons. He added that 11 other Palestinians from the Gaza strip were arrested today near Tabarja, south of Juneh, after five Lebanese boats had pursued them for about two hours. Dr. Malik said that 11 other Palestinians from the Gaza strip had been arrested at Barja, near As-Sadiyat south of Beirut, near the President's private residence. He added that two or three boats had been seen near the Lebanese coast and that the Lebanese air force aircraft and coastguard vessels were keeping them under observation.

The Lebanese Foreign Minister said that the Press and broadcasts of the United Arab Republic had launched intensive campaigns against the Lebanon and its Government. After referring once again to the smuggling of weapons into the Lebanon, the Foreign Minister said that these were the latest incidents connected with the secret movement started years ago which aimed at exposing the Lebanon to destruction and changing its independent policy.

The Lebanese Foreign Minister added that a protest had been sent

today to the Government of the United Arab Republic. He said: "I am authorized to state that the Lebanese President and Government are firm and determined to defend the Lebanon's unity, freedom and independence, and that they will not give way or be lenient towards those who wish to destroy the Lebanon."

Dr. Malik concluded by saying: "While we have good intentions towards all, we call on our brethren in the United Arab Republic to refrain from interfering in our internal affairs. We call upon all those with good intentions to understand the circumstances in which the Lebanon (a few words indistinct)."

After reading his press statement, Dr. Malik replied to a number of questions from correspondents. In reply to a question as to whether the Lebanon had requested the withdrawal of the United Arab Republic's Ambassador to the Lebanon he said that he could not reply to that question. The Foreign Minister also declined to reply to a question on whether relations with the United Arab Republic would be severed.

In reply to a question about the identity of those who had attacked the Lebanese customs posts and whether they were Syrians, the Minister said that this matter was being investigated.

The Minister was also asked whether consultations with foreign States, and especially the States of the tripartite declaration, had been held in connection with preserving the prevailing situation in the Middle East. He replied that discussions with several foreign States took place, including the (? State) of the tripartite declaration.

The Foreign Minister was asked whether the question had been referred to the Security Council. To this he replied: "We are studying the problem and we have not decided to refer it to the Security Council." Dr. Malik declined to comment whether the Eisenhower doctrine could be applied in such cases. In conclusion the Lebanese Foreign Minister expressed his belief that Belgium had no connection with the arms smuggling carried out by its Consul-General.

4. *Summary of statement by the United National Front released by Mr. Sa'ib Salām at a press conference, 14 May 1958⁵*

Beirut: the Opposition National Union Front has declared that the present strike will continue until the end. It will not be called off until the President of the Republic relinquishes the presidency and his régime

⁵ S.W.B. Part IV, 16 May 1958, 8-10.

vanishes. The Front made this declaration in a statement it released at a press conference tonight. The ex-Premier and Opposition leader Sa'ib Sallam represented the Front at this conference.

The statement says: "While the National Union Front and the united parties refuse to imitate the President of the Republic and his Foreign Minister in seeking political inspiration and guidance from outside the Lebanon, it warns the citizens against believing falsehoods. It also wishes to reassert what it has often asserted before, that its movement is a purely national and Lebanese one aiming at preserving the Lebanon's structure and independence and the unity of its people."

The statement then continues: "The Lebanon's affairs and interests are its own business and nobody has the right to interfere in them, whether such interference comes from the tripartite declaration or the Western or Eastern fronts. The Lebanon's affairs and interests belong to the Lebanese and the Lebanese only. This is what the Opposition is seeking. We challenge anyone, including the Foreign Minister, to prove otherwise."

The statement adds: "We accuse the Foreign Minister Charles Malik and the President of having deliberately involved outsiders in a purely domestic dispute when the latter summoned on several occasions the Ambassadors of the tripartite declaration countries and deliberated with them individually and together in matters concerning which we have no knowledge, matters which obviously are far from the Lebanon's pure interests."

The statement continues: "If there is anybody who should be accused of conjuring foreign inspiration for his internal policy, such an accusation must be levelled against the responsible man who makes statements which clearly imply that he is anxious to drag foreigners into interfering in the country's affairs; this is what Dr. Malik did in his statement yesterday, a statement which could only mean that it was made for this purpose alone."

Commenting on Dr. Malik's statement, the National Union Front says: "The remarkably strange thing about this statement is that it was issued following a statement by the US Secretary of State accusing the Lebanese national movement of being a phenomenon of Communist interference in the Middle East. Still more strange is that a few hours after Malik's statement, a British Foreign Office spokesman announced that his Government viewed with concern any attempt to depose the Lebanese Government."

The statement then says: "The Opposition did not need these two statements to be aware of the fact that the string of the policy of Lebanese rulers are in fact being pulled by non-Lebanese fingers. However, certain arrogant persons and simpletons in the Lebanon were in need of such proof."

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The statement contends that the setting up or deposing of a government in the Lebanon are purely Lebanese affairs in which no country has the right to interfere unless such a country wishes to prove openly that it is interfering in other people's business and does not respect their sovereignty. The statement then asserts that "the Lebanon has not emerged from the era of an open mandate in order to enter the era of a camouflaged one". It adds: "The least the Foreign Minister, who is officially responsible for the Lebanon's foreign policy, should have done in the circumstances was to protest and object to this blatant interference. Had he done so it would not be necessary for others to undertake this national duty."

Replying to Dr. Malik's statement about the smuggling of arms into the Lebanon, the statement says: "We refrain from discussing details of this case because we are not in a position to appraise the facts, and, unlike the Government, do not make statements while investigations are still in progress. We do not make statements containing distorted information aimed at hiding the truth from the people or prevent them from knowing about it through free media. However, it is our duty to observe here that the arms trade has become semi-official under this régime and is being encouraged by it."

The statement goes on to say: "The incident of the Belgian Consul's car, which the Foreign Minister is trying to use to misguide public opinion, can at most—even if the charge proves to be true—be considered as another of the incidents which take place every day, since the Government supporters have persisted in smuggling and distributing arms. We took every possible step to warn against importing arms from abroad and the arming of groups of people affiliated with the rulers, in particular the dissolved organizations. But our warnings were unheeded and this affair continued and continues now, every hour, and involves the rulers themselves."

The statement then points to Dr. Malik's statement about the arrival of launches carrying armed men and weapons from Gaza. It says: "As for the question of launches which the Minister alleges were carrying 11 Palestinians, rifles and money, reliable information available to us

indicates that these launches which were seized in As-Sadiyat belong to smugglers who bring in money in order to buy narcotics from a person [named]. Everybody knows that he has operated a smuggling point in the said area for the past two years. It is silly indeed that the Foreign Minister should use such flimsy evidence to accuse the United Arab Republic of interference, to arrest some Palestinians and Syrian workers, and to seize two launches that were smuggling drugs and to link these trifling and fabricated incidents together to support his stupid accusations."

The statement then adds: "In regard to finding military identity papers on certain Syrians in the Lebanon, such a thing is normal, since Syrian law provides that every Syrian on military service must carry his army service papers, even if such a man is a Syrian nationalist (qawmi). As regards the attack on Al-Masna post in which five customs officials were killed and the accusation that the United Arab Republic planned and implemented it and the attempt to link it with the case of the arms that were seized—this is all a trick which cannot fool those who know that Al-Masna customs post is adjacent to Lebanese areas over which the Government has lost control. Among these is Dayr al-Asha'ir, the people of which not long ago disarmed 100 men of the gendarmerie."

Sa'ib Sallam has also denied recent reports that discussions are going on between President Sham'un and the Opposition. He said that the Front and the united parties refute these rumours which are spread by the rulers. He asserted that the Opposition's contact with Maj. Gen. Fu'ad Shihab, the commanding general, was in connection with the security situation in the country and had nothing to do with charging him with heading a new government.

5. *Note from the United National Front to the US Ambassador in Beirut, 15 May 1958*⁶

Great was our amazement when we read in the newspapers a summary of a press conference you held at the Embassy, when you declared that the Washington Government would support the Lebanese Government and provide it with aid in order to help it overcome the hardships which it is now encountering as a result of the revolution of the majority of the Lebanese people.

If what is attributed to Your Excellency is true, we protest against

⁶ S.W.B. Part IV, 17 May 1958, 10.

such statements. The Lebanon is an independent and sovereign State which will never consent to any foreign interference, from whatever source, which would tend to turn it into a battlefield where international interests would come into conflict in such a manner as to destroy its economy and imperil its existence.

We presume that you are not unaware that our current national movement is not inspired by any ideological currents imported from outside, but that it is of a purely internal character and has inevitably arisen because of the narrow partisan policy, jeopardizing Lebanese integrity, which the President of the Republic has personally conjured up through his hirelings in the Government and in Parliament.

Our movement has declared its respect for foreign interests. It has never intended to disregard legitimate foreign interests or imperil their safety. Certain regrettable incidents which have occurred during the popular demonstrations cannot but have been inspired by a suspect source.

We are in duty bound to draw Your Excellency's attention to the fact that your Government's blatant interference in the Lebanon's affairs will only arouse against it all those Lebanese elements which oppose the present régime, and will entail other foreign interference, the avoidance of which we have always advocated.

6. Statement by the opposition parties accusing Western Powers of intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon, 15 May 1958¹

The Lebanese Government has pushed the internal question into the international arena. Press comment and responsible official statements in the West show that the Lebanese Government has sought the help of the USA, Britain and France on the basis of the Tripartite Declaration and the Lebanese-American agreement of 16-3-57, and that the Baghdad Pact member States are preparing to offer help. This constitutes interference by foreign Powers in a purely internal Lebanese problem and an infringement of the UN Charter and a disturbance of the peace of the area.

The conference of national parties, organizations and figures in the Lebanon, having followed the progress of this problem in Western circles and their associates, declare the following:

1. The conference strongly protests against this flagrant foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Lebanon.

¹ S.W.B. Part IV, 19 May 1958, 14-15.

2. The conference warns citizens in these critical times against the consequences of this interference which will be the sole factor in the destruction of the unity, independence, sovereignty and entity of the Lebanon and in bringing back to it the foreign occupation from which the people struggled in the past to rid themselves.

3. The conference asserts that this interference, contrary to what is expected by the government, will only lead to an increase in internal tension and break the Lebanese ranks and shatter their unity.

4. The consciences of the Lebanese people are called upon to be vigilant and alert in face of this interference, which will disturb the peace in this region and which will expose our country to the danger of a world war the consequences of which are beyond our imagination. Long live independent and sovereign Lebanon.

7. *Extracts from statement by the government of Lebanon accusing the UAR of intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon, 16 May 1958*⁸

Towards the end of 1956 a conference of Arab Presidents and Kings was held in Beirut to discuss the situation resulting from the triple aggression against sister Egypt. Unanimous resolutions were adopted by this conference. Despite this, however, certain persons with their own ends in mind spread reports that the Lebanon's attitude during the conference was neither sound nor consistent with the situation at the time. This false interpretation created an artificial atmosphere of suspicion about the Lebanon's attitude to Arab problems and resulted in the resignation of certain responsible persons. The form which these resignations assumed gave rise to differences in viewpoints and division of public opinion.

Since that day, we have sensed a tense internal atmosphere in the country. Every Government which subsequently assumed power worked to restore confidence and prevent further dissension, believing that the only way to preserve solidarity and fraternity among various factions in the country was to base policy on the principles of the National Charter, agreed upon by the Lebanese people, which provide for wise and vigilant internal and external policies, free from all traces of defiance, excess and the imposition of the will of one faction on another.

It is regrettable that a greedy spirit possessed certain persons who

⁸ S.W.B. Part IV, 19 May 1958, 10-13.

sought to distort the truth about ensuing events—even those events for which they themselves are responsible—in order to increase tension and sow further dissension. In order to achieve this end, they did not hesitate to mislead the public with statements and leaflets which were cited by tendentious propaganda abroad, and implicate a well-known Arab State in a way which served only the greedy and the fractious. This is because sincere people are fully aware that the interests of the Arab cause are not served by interference in Lebanese internal affairs with regard to matters dealing with its special structure. What we and all sincere Lebanese hope for is that a sister State should enjoy great love and respect by all, and not be monopolised by one faction alone or exploited by some for personal ends or to cause anxiety in the hearts of others.

According to a pre-arranged plan, leaflets and statements were issued by certain organizations and groups in the Lebanon, containing an open call to attack the government authorities. We sincerely believed that the duty of these national groups and their realization of the results of such incitement required them to consider the consequences and refrain from pursuing this call any further. However, it was discovered that these elements were continuing their activities. This led to painful incidents, the most prominent of which occurred in Tripoli, Beirut and Mawqi al-Masna in recent days. . . .

The Shuf incidents—the most outstanding incident in Shuf was the attempt to attack Bayt ad-Din Palace and occupy it. It was learnt from official reports that on 12th May telephone communications between Bayt ad-Din, Mukhtarrah, Nuha, (? Amasur), Ayn Bhalba, Alayh, Baruk and Beirut were cut, and that certain armed gangs intended to attack government property and blow up bridges. There was firing and armed men were seen with weapons and machine-guns. Unknown persons tried to block the road between Damur and Bayt ad-Din with stones and to blow up the bridge between Ayn Dara and Safa. About 300 armed men gathered near Bayt ad-Din under cover of darkness and attempted to occupy the hills in the south-eastern part of the town. They used the vacant bishopric of Bayt ad-Din as a centre for their operations. A concentrated attack was launched on Bayt ad-Din under cover of small-arms and machine-gun fire. The palace garrison, which consisted of fewer than 40 soldiers, replied.

The mutineers managed to infiltrate into Bayt ad-Din town. Advance units reached the church of Bayt ad-Din, which is in the neighbour-

hood of Bayt ad-Din Palace. The garrison resisted, inflicting casualties among them. At that moment (indistinct word), aircraft flew over. After circling to observe, the aircraft straffed the mutineers' positions. Some mutineers withdrew to the town and resumed firing. They occupied certain quarters of Bayt ad-Din and reached the vicinity of the Church of (? An-Nasr).

The gendarmerie command had earlier dispatched two infantry companies—one from Beirut and the other from Biq—in the direction of Bayt ad-Din. The gendarmerie force halted at a spot between Sarnabra and Um Akir and tried to surround the mutineers. The mutineers then withdrew from the houses of Bayt ad-Din and the bishopric. They were pursued into the hills by the palace garrison. A clash took place between the gendarmerie and the withdrawing mutineers, some of whom took refuge in the villages of Sultaniyah and Ayn al-Wazir where they were followed and dispersed by the gendarmerie. At nightfall the force stopped its pursuit and took up positions. During the clash Yusuf Hamad Bu Karrum from the Shuf farm was arrested. A rifle and 35 rounds found on him were seized, in addition to a pistol with some rounds, defensive and offensive hand-grenades, and a teargas bomb. Those killed among the mutineers included Yusuf Ali Abd ar-Rahman Ali, whose brother was wounded. Both of these men were of Syrian nationality. Three wounded persons were found in a Beirut hospital. . . . No casualties occurred among the soldiers. . . .

The government asserts that investigations have shown beyond any doubt that a large number of Syrian mutineers and subversive elements had infiltrated into the Lebanon for this purpose. For this reason the government finds it its duty to expose the plots that are being hatched not only against this country but—let us say it frankly—against Arabism itself. The collapse they sought in the Lebanon, and which they still seek, would have been a collapse for the entire Arab force. They may or may not know this, but in either case catastrophe would be the result. The first aim of our enemies is to build a wall between the Lebanese themselves and between the Lebanese and their brethren in the Arab countries.

The charter for which the Lebanese shed their blood and which was the basis of their independence and sovereignty after a long struggle—this charter is not as some tend to think a means for the accomplishment of personal benefits, but is a basis for patriotism and Arab interest. Certain people staged incidents in collaboration with elements

seeking to sow sedition, cause destruction and incite riots—elements which harm the Lebanon and the Arabs and work to undermine the principles of independence, freedom, right, justice, peace of mind, harmony and peace in a framework of pure Arabism upon which this country is founded.

Yes, we say this frankly and without fear. There are elements and hands which extend into our country from beyond our border with the aim of harming the good which the Lebanon enjoys and causing fear, trouble and terror in the peaceful and happy land of the Lebanon. Had these hands been foreign, it would have been an easy matter. However, they are the hands of our kith and kin whom we would have liked to see spared for a bitter clash with our enemies—the enemies of freedom.

Hundreds of times the Lebanon has expressed its determination to remain a free, independent and sovereign State. It has proved the sincerity of its candid desire to remain the faithful brother of every Arab country, particularly the country with which it is linked by ties of kinship and common fate, and observe mutual dignity and respect. What has this country committed against its brethren? Has not the attitude of the Lebanese government and people been one of defending the rights and fate of brethren everywhere? The Lebanon has not done this in return for favours, but because its sons of various groups and creeds believe that the Lebanon's defence of the entity of the Arab States is a defence of each of them, and because there can be no honourable existence for the Arabs unless the sanctity of each Arab country is preserved.

Has the Lebanon met with anything but estrangement, boycott and injury and defiance on the part of some of its brethren? The Lebanon has endured all this with perseverance, tolerance and conciliation. At no time have we wished that our borders with sister Syria and our relations with sister Egypt, both before and after their unity, should have been anything but open borders and good relations across and through which the fruits of common efforts for sublime life could move between the two sides. We never thought that the day would come when arms and subversive agents would pour across the border to commit assassination and terrorism.

The government does not hesitate to remind the public of the merciful treatment which our brethren, the Palestinians, have enjoyed from us since their evacuation from their dear homes. The Lebanon opened its arms to them, making every effort for and giving all possible help to

them. The Lebanon has been generous to the refugees to the extent that it has not distinguished between refugees and Lebanese. This is a privilege which other refugees have not enjoyed in other countries.

In return for this, the Lebanon had hoped that the refugees would reciprocate this hospitality with a spirit of cordiality, sincerity and peace, thus refraining from harming the Lebanon by becoming involved in riots staged and provoked by certain persons. The government declares that should certain refugees persist in taking part in such activities, it is determined to reconsider its attitude towards them in the light of the security of the State. The government sincerely hopes that it will not be forced to take such action. Since Lebanese blood has been shed because of unhealthy aims, it is our duty to act in the highest interests of the country.

On the evening of Monday 13th May a boat from the Egyptian-controlled Gaza strip fell into the hands of the Lebanese coast guard near Damur town. Aboard were 11 Egyptian and Palestinian agents of destruction and crime, as well as a large sum of money and arms and ammunition to be used by them and their colleagues in the Lebanon for subversion, destruction and assassination. I tell you, gentlemen, they were intent upon destruction and assassination, as well as spreading anarchy in the Lebanon. We have sufficient proof of this.

After midnight on the night of 11th-12th May customs officials at Masna detained a car driven by the former Belgian Minister in Damascus and present Consul-General. In the car was a large quantity of arms and ammunition and important information and instructions from the organizers in Damascus to the agents in Beirut. The government deems it its duty to inform the honourable people of the text of these instructions. . . . Nobody in the Lebanon believed that arms sent in this unique way accompanied by these frank instructions could be a matter of innocent trade. We know that Syrian customs officials at the border contacted the Lebanese customs immediately after discovery of the smuggled arms and demanded the release of the car and those in it so that the Consul-General could return to Syrian territory.

As we stated earlier, a large group of armed men, most of whom were Syrians, attacked customs, police and public security posts at Masna. Preliminary investigations showed that the attackers had come from Syrian territory and thus managed to carry out their work in the south without the knowledge of the Lebanese authorities. Moreover, the day before yesterday the armed forces confiscated about 100 rifles with

Egyptian army markings which had been sent to mutineers in Tripoli.

These important events, coupled with other similar events which the Government cannot now reveal, constitute new links in a long chain of incidents to which the Lebanon has been exposed and which have continued for more than two years. The Lebanon ignored these incidents in order to contribute to understanding among its sons and their brethren of the Syrian and Egyptian regions, and to substitute harmony for altercations and discord. The Government recalls these incidents in the hope that it will awaken consciences and the sense of responsibility which binds various factions and groups in the Lebanon who should place the interests of the Lebanon and the Arabs above all others.

It is the duty of the Government to inform the Lebanese public of certain activities of the Deuxieme Bureau in the Lebanon. For over two years it has collaborated with certain Lebanese elements with devious aims and Palestinian refugees whose special circumstances have been exploited by the Deuxieme Bureau, which has incited and provoked them. These provocations include acts of bomb-throwing in the Lebanon. They also include the events of 30th May 1957 in which Syrian and Egyptian elements took part, the incident of the Egyptian Military Attache in whose car arms were found which were to be distributed among rioting elements . . . and several other terrorist acts, such as sabotage, threats and the distribution of leaflets inciting to sedition. All these actions clearly indicate that official and unofficial quarters in Syria and Egypt aimed at spreading terror and fear in the Lebanon and carrying out sabotage with a view to undermining the Lebanon.

These actions, however, are not the only evidence of ill-intentions by United Arab Republic quarters. Official broadcasts and press campaigns against the régime in the Lebanon have lately aimed at sowing sedition and have called upon the Lebanese people to oppose the present régime and revolt against the government.

The Lebanese Government is determined fully to undertake its responsibilities in the face of disturbances by rioters. It calls upon the Lebanese people to support it to rid the Lebanon of evil elements and to consolidate the nation against those working against the interests of our dear homeland. The government will not abandon its holy duty of defending this nation. It considers such defence essential to the public interests. It is fully convinced that by foiling the designs of those working against this country it is upholding peace and stability in this dear part of the Arab homeland.

8. *Statement by the opposition parties refuting the charges made by the government on 16 May 1958, 17 May 1958^o*

The Government was forced to publish in the press the statement it intended to deliver at the Chamber of Deputies' meeting which lacked the necessary quorum, after the ruling circles had lost the people's confidence in all areas where the Arab people of Lebanon rose; and after most of the deputies absented themselves in response to the present serious situation in the Lebanon, and in compliance with the consciences in revolt which no longer have confidence in the oppressive government machinery.

What the Government's statement contained did not add to what was included in the statements made by the Lebanese Foreign Minister yesterday, which were refuted by the national organizations in the country.

Neither the United Arab Republic nor the Palestinian refugees have any connection with the internal dispute in the Lebanon today. From the Lebanon and the land of the Lebanon intrigues and plots were directed against the United Arab Republic. The dispute in the Lebanon is an internal matter which concerns the Lebanon, and in which the Government stands alone on one side and the people on the other.

Infringements upon the constitution, the sanctity of law, public freedoms, and the innocent souls of the citizens—because of the policy of alignment and the plans for intrigue, assassination, and terrorism pursued by the officials in authority—all these matters combined are the true cause for the overwhelming wrath of the people; and this the Government statement ignored.

Sound rule cannot be based on the force of arms, violence, the seeking of the help of the imperialist Powers, and the invitation of these Powers to interfere to force the people to give way to what they do not like. The true government emanates from the will of the people alone. The people have lost confidence in their rulers. Those rulers having lost the confidence of the people, have no alternative but to leave the seat of government.

The Lebanese people have heard that the Western imperialist Powers began preparations for holding manoeuvres in the eastern Mediterranean, believing that by such manoeuvres they can affect the morale and struggle of the people for the accomplishment of their national aims.

^o S.W.B. *Part IV*, 19 May 1958, 15-16.

In spite of all these internal and external manoeuvres, the hatchers of these plots must fully realize that the people were not taken in by such intimidation and threats in the past. The hatchers of these plots will find the Lebanese people ever more solid in resisting this interference to the end, seeking to enforce a solution which respects their wishes and preserves for the Lebanon its unity, entity and independence. The engineers of these plots will find the people of the Lebanon much stronger than at any time in the past.

9. *Summary of statement by Mr. Sa'ib Salām, the opposition leader, explaining the causes of unrest in Lebanon, 17 May 1958*¹⁰

In a statement to a foreign journalist, the former Lebanese Premier, Sa'ib Sallam has said: "The Lebanese people will not submit and will continue their struggle."

Asked how he would describe the present situation, he replied: "The situation has passed through three regrettable stages and is developing daily. It began in the form of popular opposition to foil the conspiracy hatched by the President against the Constitution with the aim of renewing his term for another six years. However, suppression, oppression and terrorism and criminal acts committed by the President and his clique transformed the battle into a peaceful popular uprising which took shape of a general strike in all Lebanese provinces in order to preserve the sanctity of the Constitution and national unity.

"The President did not respect the will of the people, but resorted to steel and fire, thus transforming this peaceful political struggle into a bloody revolution in which the people have been forced to defend themselves and their principles in the face of instigation, aggression and murder. Hundreds have been killed and wounded in Beirut and elsewhere.

"The President, Foreign Minister Charles Malik and their clique were not satisfied with their methods aimed at dominating the majority of the people, who opposed their stupid policy. They turned to more serious and shrewder methods. They are now attempting to deal the heart of national unity a mortal blow by inciting communal disputes and civil war.

"We are convinced that the vigilant Lebanese people, who have defeated previous conspiracies by Sham'un, Malik and their former supporters, will now defeat these evil conspiracies. The revolution of the

¹⁰ S.W.B. Part IV, 19 May 1958, 17.

people will remain purely nationalist. There is no room for communal exploitation. We are all true Lebanese working in the interests of the Lebanon alone. Today we do our utmost to resist this evil conspiracy and prevent civil war. By God's will and with the help of sincere citizens of all groups and communities, we shall succeed. We will not allow Sham'un to sacrifice the Lebanon, its security, structure, and peaceful existence for the sake of his position and personal ambition."

10. *Appeal by the opposition parties to the Lebanese army, gendarmerie and people, 18 May 1958*¹¹

To the officers and men of the Lebanese army: O patriotic officers and men, our country is passing through a decisive and critical stage of its history. The epoch of the butchers headed by the tyrant Sham'un is at its last gasp. Your brethren and sons of your people are placing their hopes on you. They believe you are above shedding the blood of the innocent. We, as well as you, feel sorry to see the blood of the sons of our people shed for nothing except the selfishness of the ruling clique, personal and imperialist interests, and the selling of our country to the Eisenhower and other abominable imperialist plans. We have full confidence in your sincerity in preserving the integrity of our valiant army and saving it from the tribulations and the opposition of imperialism, Zionism and aggression. This demands that you withdraw completely from Sham'un and the clique of plotting rulers, sympathize with the movement of your proud Lebanese people, remain in your barracks, and refuse to strike at the people. The noble attitude of your Commander, Fu'ad Shihab, places him above giving you orders of this sort. May the Lebanon and the army of the Lebanon live in consolidated unity!

To the officers and men of the gendarmerie: In the name of all classes of the Lebanese people, and in order to prevent the shedding of blood, we request the officers and men of the gendarmerie to keep to their barracks and refuse all orders issued to them contrary to this request. Simon Zuwayn, the Commander of the gendarmerie, sits in his chair and does not feel the pain of your wives, children, and families. You alone are the ones receiving the blows and enduring the suffering while he keeps to his office, not caring about you. All that interests him is to receive the orders of Sham'un and his clique and issue them to you, ignoring

¹¹ *S.W.B. Part IV*, 20 May 1958, 5-6.

the fact that these orders are nothing but a realization of the aims of the imperialists and their lackeys and a violation of the people's rights, interests, dignity, and freedom. Your blood is more precious than that of Sham'un and Sham'un's gang. So save your blood. Sham'un and his gang alone are the ones responsible for the blood shed by you and by the sons of your people. The national parties, organizations, and leader cannot be blamed at all. Keep to your barracks and save your blood and the blood of the sons of your people.

To all people of the Lebanon: Noble compatriots and dutiful sons of the Lebanon, the hour of deliverance is drawing near. It is nearer than you may imagine. Sham'un and his clique are preparing to leave. All we have to do is to remain firm in our stand—to remain firm for few days or hours. The era of oppression and corruption has ended. The era of the imperialist hirelings has come to an end. The Eisenhower doctrine and the other enemy plans have come to an end. The threats of the imperialist Powers will not frighten us. The Sixth or Tenth Fleet and all the fleets will not be able to humiliate us and force us to kneel before the imperialists and their hirelings, the butchers and criminals. Half a million soldiers of NATO could not defeat the Algerian people in four years. Our people are of the same calibre as the Algerian people. Our people will not climb down or weaken. Let us continue with our comprehensive strike. Let us continue with our great struggle until victory. The price we are paying is only a small price compared to the dignity, freedom, and glory which we all shall enjoy soon. Victory can be the result of one hour's patience. We shall have patience.

11. *President Sham'un's statement to the press, 21 May 1958*¹²

The Lebanon is undergoing a difficult ordeal. It is a test of our maturity. It is a test which will determine if we are real men who can withstand pressure, no matter how strong it may be, and remain free. I can declare to you now that we shall withstand the pressure, no matter how strong it may be, and we shall remain free.

The issue at present is not the Government. The issue at present is not this person or that. It is not this high post or that in the country. The present issue is the issue of the existence of the Lebanon as a free

¹² *S.W.B. Part IV*, 23 May 1958, 10.

country in the Near East in which Muslims and Christians live in peace and harmony—a country capable of determining its life and fate freely and independently.

We believe that a Near East country such as this is not only worth living for, but also worth dying for. This country is a country of freedom—freedom of thought, freedom of expression, freedom of conscience and freedom of economic activity. All our national institutions are based on and imbued with this spirit of freedom. We want to preserve these institutions as a heritage for our children. This is because we believe that unless life is free with the deepest and most responsible (mas'uliyah) sense of freedom, it is not worth living. Yet, if our opponents, whether internal or external, accomplish what they want of us, we shall lose this precious freedom, which is our most priceless heritage.

The United Arab Republic is still strongly interfering in our internal affairs, with the aim of effecting a radical change in our basic political policy. It seems that our love of freedom and insistence upon remaining a free people do not suit it. The United Arab Republic wants our national policy to be in accord with its policy, or parallel to it. This is a thing which we cannot do. This is because our basic course and friendships are deep, and we cannot change with ease.

Our political life and trends do not harm the United Arab Republic. This is all that the United Arab Republic can reasonably ask of us. However, we are determined not to be subservient to its policy or basic trend. In other words, we are determined to remain independent.

The facts of this strong interference which I mentioned are now being submitted to the judgment of world public opinion.

We fully realize that this battle is not ours alone. It is the battle of small people everywhere to preserve their freedom and security. It is the battle for true freedom—social freedom, personal freedom, freedom of thought and spiritual freedom in the Near East.

For this reason, we pass through these critical days knowing that the eyes of the Middle East—indeed, the eyes of the entire world—are upon us. We pray to God Almighty that there will be nothing in our actions or statements which will make us unworthy of associating with free men.

If the Lebanon wins—and we are certain that it will—and if our basic freedoms weather this ordeal—and we are certain that this will be the case—then not only will our children bless our memory, but the

sons of those who are trying to destroy us will do likewise. Perhaps it is the wish of Providence that we should wage this battle on their behalf, since they are yet unable to enter it. Thus on doomsday we will be judged as having replaced evil with good. If it is possible to replace evil with good, then it will be the greatest reward to the Lebanese people for their present ordeal.

12. *Statement by the opposition parties criticizing the government's attempt to internationalize the internal problems of Lebanon, 22 May 1958*¹³

Officials in the Lebanon insist on covering up their failure to rule and their responsibility for bloody clashes by accusing the United Arab Republic of incidents refuted by facts and events. This clique has been instructed to internationalize the domestic crisis and justify foreign interference and the landing of foreign forces on Lebanese soil, thereby converting the Lebanon into a base for a cold war in this region and subsequently a battlefield for a bloody and destructive war. Lebanese officials are encouraged to pursue this plan of the Western capitals and the Baghdad Pact, which since its inception has evoked the hostility of the Lebanese people, who are determined to remain neutral between the two camps in order to dedicate themselves to organizing their internal affairs far removed from imperialist plots and intrigues.

The President's statement at his press conference for foreign correspondents has confirmed the fears of the Lebanese public that Lebanese leaders are inclined towards the Baghdad Pact, the Eisenhower doctrine, and the policy of military pacts and international blocs, and are using Lebanese policy to promote these pacts and blocs, which have been repudiated by the Arab people of the Lebanon since 1954, since their acceptance would involve the Lebanon in international matters in which it has no interest whatsoever. This is the very basis of the internal crisis which the President's statement could not distort.

Having realized the seriousness of the plan to internationalize the crisis, the conference of national parties, organizations and parties in the Lebanon declares that foreign interference would do away with the Lebanon's sovereignty and independence and convert the country into a second Korea in which nothing would be spared. The Lebanese gov-

¹³ S.W.B. Part IV, 24 May 1958, 10-11.

ernment's invocation of the arbitration of the Arab League, paralyzed as it is by the Baghdad Pact and its aggressive purposes, will be futile in relaxing the acuteness of the internal tension. On the contrary it will only aggravate it. The Lebanese officials' resort to arbitration by the Security Council on a Lebanese internal question confirms the ruler's determination to internationalize this problem and deceive world opinion in order to evade their responsibility and pave the way for overt foreign interference.

The conference of parties denounces the fact that the President and his Government resorted to foreign (indistinct word) to solve an internal question instead of seeking the will of the Arab Lebanese people, from whom they draw all their powers and their presence in office, and being concerned with sparing the blood of the Lebanese people and bringing them peace of mind, whatever personal sacrifices are required. The Lebanon's entity, independence and existence are not the concern of one individual. The fate of the national community cannot be bound to this individual, bearing also in mind that the situation sought by the President who, according to the Constitution cannot be held responsible, is a challenge to the provisions of the Constitution and parliamentary rule and a deviation from the prudence expected of the President of the Republic, particularly when crises arise. Such behaviour degrades the Presidency to the level of party disputes, which a President is supposed to avoid.

The interference of the Western Powers and the Baghdad Pact Powers in this internal Lebanese crisis is regarded as the cause of the actual insurrection in this case. It must be reaffirmed that the foreigner in the Lebanon is only a guest. The Lebanon is an independent country in which no foreign State can claim any right, interfere in its affairs, or force it into line with its international goals and aims. The Arab people in the Lebanon have proved their hospitality and honest co-operation, and therefore should not be embarrassed.

The conference of parties appeals to national hearts in the Lebanon to close their ranks, the policy of sectarian division having failed, to work collectively to avoid the danger of foreign interference which can by itself do away with the Lebanon, its independence, entity and freedom, and to endeavour to recover from this internal crisis with the same national spirit shown in 1943.

The statement was signed by Husayn al-Uwayni, president of the parties' conference, and Habib, conference secretary.

13. *Summary of statement by Mr. Sa'ib Sallam, the opposition leader, denying that the opposition had connections with the UAR, 22 May 1958*¹⁴

Asked at his press conference last night whether the United Arab Republic had any connection with the opposition movement in the Lebanon, Sa'ib Sallam replied: "I have answered this question many times before. I repeat that the United Arab Republic has nothing to do with our movement."

Replying to another question, Sallam declared that sectarianism is not advocated by the national movement in the Lebanon. It is only an illusion which Camille Sham'un has implanted in people's minds. Sallam added that it is the people who always win, particularly when they are fighting tyrants: "Camille Sham'un is a tyrant, unfit for the Presidency", he asserted.

Sallam then picked up the publication 'Magazine' and pointed to a photograph of the Amir Majid Arslan riding in an armoured car. He remarked: "This is an example of the Ministers with whom Camille Sham'un co-operates. Here is a photo of Na'im Mughabghab, who is one of Sham'un's deputies. See how he is armed. He is another highwayman." Sa'ib Sallam went on to say that a gendarmerie captain, Abd al-Karim az-Zayn, resigned because he saw cars of certain Ministers being loaded with arms at gendarmerie headquarters for distribution among the Ministers' supporters. When asked to name these Ministers, he mentioned the Minister of National Education, Clovis al-Khazin, and Vice-President Na'im Mughabghab.

Questioned whether the Opposition knew anything about explosions which had taken place, Sallam answered that "Syrian Nationalists" were responsible for explosions in Beirut.

Asked whether the Lebanese felt a Communist threat, Sa'ib Sallam answered: "A Communist threat does not exist in the Lebanon. We only feel threatened by the 'Syrian Nationalist' gang. Some time ago 15 members of this gang disguised as soldiers were (? arrested) while trying to assault me in my residence.

Asked about the story of boats sent to the Lebanon, he replied: "These boats were loaded with hashish and were under the command of Abdullah al-Ghafri, an agent of Camille Sham'un." Sa'ib Sallam then

¹⁴ S.W.B. Part IV, 27 May 1958, 4.

summoned a man called Dib Itani who he said was aboard one of the boats. He had been remanded in custody for five days.

14. *Report on the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Lebanon, 22 May 1958*¹⁵

The Lebanese Parliamentary Committee met today under the chairmanship of Philippe Taqla and in the presence of the Minister for Foreign and Expatriate Affairs to resume discussions regarding the submission of a complaint to the UN Security Council against the United Arab Republic. At the beginning of the meeting, Dr. Charles Malik said that at the request of the Committee the Government had decided to wait a short time before submitting its complaint to the Security Council. Answering a question put to him by one of the Deputies regarding the attitude of the people of the Lebanon towards the United Arab Republic, the Foreign Minister said:

"The honourable Deputy has said that half of the Lebanese citizens harbour good feelings for the United Arab Republic, but I say that all the Lebanese people harbour profound brotherly feelings towards the United Arab Republic and hope that there will be excellent friendly relations between them. We hope that there will exist between us and our brothers in the United Arab Republic strong relations based on mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty and safety of both countries. It follows, therefore, that the United Arab Republic should not interfere in our affairs and should refrain from any action which might encourage those movements aimed at crushing the régime in the Lebanon. The United Arab Republic should also refrain from helping groups which strive to overthrow the Lebanese Government.

"The Government is fully determined to respond to your wishes and the wishes of the Lebanese people in all the measures it will take regarding its complaint to the Security Council. In resorting to the Security Council, we do not aim thereby at creating problems for the United Arab Republic. As a matter of fact, I assure my honourable colleague that the Lebanese Government will not use its complaint in the Security Council against the basic interests of the United Arab Republic. I can go even farther and say that if we felt that there was any attempt to exploit our complaint against the United Arab Republic we would immediately take sides with it in defence of its interests and thus frustrate any scheme aimed at undermining its sovereignty and independence.

¹⁵ S.W.B. Part IV, 24 May 1958, 8-9.

"I remember that the Sudan, which is a fraternal country to us and the United Arab Republic, previously registered a complaint with the Security Council against the United Arab Republic. In taking this action, we do not seek sanctions against the Republic or to complicate the case, but aim at alerting the Security Council and reaching a solution which will ensure our safety.

"I say in all sincerity that the Lebanese Government only wishes good for the United Arab Republic and does not contemplate harming the Republic or participating in any action which might harm it. The Lebanese Government will not agree, or come to any agreement with, any foreign Power on (indistinct words) our only reason for resorting to the Security Council is that we are under pressure and interference affecting our independence and freedom. We want to relieve the Lebanon of this pressure."

After the debate, the Committee adopted a resolution the text of which follows: "Since the Foreign Affairs Committee has debated in two sessions the subject of the Lebanon's complaint to the Arab League Council and to the UN Security Council, the Foreign Affairs Committee approved what the Government has done and what it intends to do in the way of submitting the complaint to those concerned. This has been approved in the light of the Foreign Minister's statements."

15. *Message from the United National Front to Maj. Gen. Fu'ād Shihāb, Commander-in-Chief of the Lebanese Army, 26 May 1958*¹⁶

The signatories of this letter have the honour to submit to you that American, Jordanian and Iraqi aircraft have not desisted, since the inception of the present Lebanese rising against the corruptness and treachery of the rulers, from unloading on Lebanese territory shipments of arms, ammunition and equipment, under the pretext of assisting the security and Army forces to carry out their duties.

As these arms are not delivered to the Army, but to the gendarmerie headquarters, which distributes them to civilians and Government followers with the object of arousing internal sedition among the Lebanese themselves—a fact which is confirmed and is well known after several incidents which admit no contradiction—as too the continuous influx of these arms threatens the country with most serious perils, and since you are the C-in-C of the Army on whom the responsibility of receiving all these arms falls, particularly in the present critical circumstances,

and you are the person who should guard against the distribution of these arms among civilians in any way: in view of all the above we submit our letter drawing your attention to this serious aspect of the development of the internal Lebanese crisis. We are fully confident that you will deal urgently with the matter and by your wisdom and in your official capacity will prevent unpleasant occurrences.

16. *Note from the United National Front to the US, British and French Ambassadors protesting against intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon, 27 May 1958*¹⁷

Ever since the beginning of the domestic dispute in the Lebanon, during the last 20 days of sorrowful and bloody crisis, indications have been received, whether from official statements expressing your Government's viewpoint or from world news agencies or news broadcasts, of the extent of your Government's support and official help to the Lebanon against the real Lebanon. This help in ammunition and weapons which is being extended either to official circle, or directly to the supporters of the rulers and certain unofficial bodies, will only help to make the danger of an internal war more acute.

In addition to pointing out that international law forbids such behaviour, the Front draws your attention to the following:

(a) There is no excuse for your Government to take a hostile stand as regards a national movement of a purely internal character.

(b) Any interference of this type in the internal affairs of the Lebanon will provoke the interference of other foreigners on the opposite side. The National Union Front protests against open intervention in the Lebanon's internal affairs and regretfully points out that your Government will bear a big part of the responsibility for such interference.

17. *Summary of statement by Mr. 'Abdullāh al-Yāfi, the opposition leader, accusing the Lebanese Government of seeking assistance from the Baghdad Pact countries, 27 May 1958*¹⁸

The leader of the Lebanese National Union Front, Abdullah al-Yafi, today commented on the sending of weapons and ammunition from the Baghdad Pact States to the Lebanese Government in an effort to help it resist the uprising of the people. He said: "Ever since the time when the Lebanese people rose and revolted against the tyranny

¹⁷ S.W.B. Part IV, 29 May 1958, 7-8.

¹⁸ S.W.B. Part IV, 29 May 1958, 8.

and corruption of the rulers, we have been sure that the Baghdad Pact States and the friends of the Baghdad Pact States would unite and take this uprising as an excuse to interfere in the Lebanon's affairs and rush to support the rulers.

"In fact weapons, ammunition and money have flowed to these rulers. The Pact States have put their Press, broadcasting and other material and diplomatic facilities at the disposal of these leaders. This help has unmasked a truth of which we had given warning and which Sham'un's Government tried to hide from the people. This truth is that the Eisenhower doctrine is nothing but another foreign pact and that it has strong links with the Baghdad Pact and other Western pacts. This help has unmasked also another truth, that the Sham'un government has been supporting the Baghdad Pact and working for the realization of its aims and objects without being openly linked with it.

"If a group of the Lebanese people still doubt this, then we say that present events on the international scene and those which will shortly take place in the Security Council, should be sufficient to open their eyes."

Abdullah al-Yafi added: "Fadil al-Jamali recently wrote an article in the newspaper 'Al-Amal,' about the Lebanese crisis, in which he called on the Lebanese to join the Iraqi-Jordanian Federation—in other words, to enter into a military alliance with Iraq. This call, if accepted, would in fact be the final phase of the official Lebanese policy which took its first step toward foreign pacts in the famous Ankara statement. The Government tried for some time to hide the truth about this. If this call does not bring any changes in this policy, which has become known to all, it will at least alert a group of the people to its dangers for their country. The Lebanon's independence, sovereignty and freedom are the last things to concern this policy. This policy has one concern, as has become clear and was proved, to tie the Lebanon to the wheel of foreign military pacts, even if this leads to the destruction of the Lebanon and the end of its existence."

18. *Prime Minister Sāmī as-Sulh's address to the Lebanese people, 28 May 1958*¹⁹

My dear Lebanese brethren: for the fourth time I speak to you to acquaint you with the true facts of the situation, so that you may be

¹⁹ *S.W.B. Part IV, 30 May 1958, 4-6.*

saved from being swept away by the current of poisonous and harmful propaganda which harbours evil for this dear homeland.

For two weeks our country has been passing through the most difficult days of its history. We have seen how a small group of individuals, who derive their strength not from their number but from the treacherous and cowardly means they employ, have tried to cast the shadow of terrorism over all the people and threaten the foundations of our structure.

These individuals say their movement is clothed in the attire of popular resistance. Does popular resistance call for killing the innocent, bombing markets and tramcars, and striking terror in women and children? Can popular resistance be based on the destruction of water pipes, electricity cables, and the means of transport and communications, thus causing work in the country to stop, medical services to halt, and the working class to fall into need and poverty?

These few individuals say they belong to the ranks of the free men in the Lebanon. But is it the habit of free men in the world to commit acts of lawlessness, looting, robbery, attacking peaceful inhabitants in their homes and threatening them with death if they refuse to pay the tax for disturbance of the peace? Is it the habit of free men in the world to attack isolated security forces posts and customs stations, and to slay the peaceful officials (word indistinct) of this people?

I remember that over 40 years ago, when I was a soldier in a liberation movement, I contacted some tribes in order to cut communication lines. I asked these bedouin: will this action of ours result in someone being killed? Their answer was that killing the innocent is not an Arab quality. Then I asked: will our action lead to lawlessness, such as looting and robbery? They said this might happen. At this point I changed my mind about what I was going to do, with a clear conscience.

By God, tell me: what is the crime of the child Ahmad as-Sa'idi, still as tender as a flower, that a bomb thrown by a cowardly criminal should explode in his hands when he is in the garden of his own house? What are the crimes of Nasib Ilias al-Qadir, Kamal Ilias Bialqin, Mahmud Ibrahim at-Tal, Amin Bishara Shamla, Ali Mirshid Awad, Joseph George Wakim, Mariam Toros Ghalakian, Lousodzine Krikor Tchakdjian, Terez Asad Halabi, Atallah Sulayman Iliyan, Sulayman Fawzi Abu Khayr, George Hamla, Salhah Mahmud Abbas, Salim Subhi, Ilias Yusuf ash-Sidiyaq, Tanius Maluf, Husayn Abbadi, Sarkis Zaydilian, Khalil Jawhar, Shakir Awn, Yusuf Hamiyah, Camille Haydar, Joseph Hajjar, and

Samir Razq, that they should fall victims to the sinister bomb in the tramcar? Are these the heroic acts of popular resistance and its masters of the freemen of the country?

Our Government is sparing no effort to put an end to these troubles. In this, as in all its actions, it is moved by the constant desire to preserve the interests of the people, and by respect for the will of the people. This task is not an easy one, because in such disturbed times the true interests of the people are clouded by immediate suspicions and fears. Under the effects of worry, a decision may be made which later is discovered to be very harmful to fundamental interests.

In the past few days the Government considered a number of proposals suggesting some political compromises. But we found that this was impossible in the present circumstances, for the difference of opinion which always arise among members of one free people must not be solved except on the basis of tranquil and quiet thinking, and within the framework of accepted constitutional procedures.

We can definitely state that there is no difference of opinion among the enlightened citizens on one point: namely, that the re-establishment of security within the framework of justice and right must be our first aim. To accomplish this aim we must not compromise with this small, fierce group which threatens public security. Such an attitude would mean that all problems affecting the country's interests would henceforth be solved not in accordance with the interests of the entire people, but in accordance with the interests of those who master the techniques of terrorism better than others. This is, indeed, the biggest danger threatening us. If we fail to prove to the world that the general questions cannot be solved by terrorism, we shall soon witness the collapse of our institutions in the Lebanon.

Later we must settle our real political disputes in the light of the realities of the Lebanon and the interests of the Lebanon. But now we are determined to decide our future as free citizens not lacking in courage, and not as prisoners who are victims of terrorism and intimidation.

In one way, our struggle is astonishing, for although the sedition-mongers have tried to sow seeds of anarchy and confusion in the country they are in fact lacking in numbers and courage. But their clamour has made us feel the effect of their aggression against us. A bomb placed secretly in a public place through an inspiration foreign to our national feelings and the purity of our souls can create panic in an entire quarter. In doing this, the sedition-mongers copied a tactic followed by sub-

versive elements and well known in history—a fighting tactic which is not impaired by its treacherous and cowardly character. They commit their terrorist actions through hired agents, including small children, and under cover of darkness. They are anxious to avoid any clash with general forces. They attack peaceful citizens, causing heavy losses in life and property and harm to the Lebanese economy.

The eradication of this criminal violence which is destroying our homeland is not the duty of the forces of security and order alone, but of all honest citizens in this country. Every citizen can play his role in bringing the country back to the stability for which the Lebanon is renowned by following these points:

1. Respond to the dictates of your conscience in commenting on political affairs, and exercise your rights as a free citizen in criticizing the government as you please. But denounce all talk favouring the idea that those opposing the present government have the right to express their opposition through acts of violence against the citizens.

2. Tell your friends and neighbours that you consider it your duty, and the duty of every Lebanese citizen, to unite in words and deeds to put an end to these sinful acts of aggression, irrespective of your political beliefs and your views on the various political leaders.

3. Inform the security centre in your area of everything you hear or see which might help in pointing out the perpetrators of these crimes.

4. Over and above all this you must not give way to fear of the terrorist agents. Continue the course of your normal life as best you can. Set the best example of a citizen who is determined to defend his rights as a free citizen. Long live the Lebanon!

19. *Lebanese Government's memorandum on UAR interference in Lebanon, 29 May 1958*²⁰

The Lebanese Government has lodged two complaints against the United Arab Republic: the first submitted to the Arab League on 21st May 1958, and the second submitted to the Security Council on 22nd May 1958, because of the United Arab Republic's interference in Lebanese domestic affairs.

1. The Lebanon is a country which believes strongly in freedom—freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of press, freedom of

²⁰ *S.W.B. Part IV*, 31 May 1958, 3-4. The Memorandum was submitted to diplomatic representatives accredited to Beirut.

assembly and freedom of political activity. In its political life the Lebanon follows a free democratic constitutional system. It is only natural that there should exist in the Lebanon some groups which oppose the policy of the present government. However, these groups have adopted methods inconsistent with the democratic life of the Lebanon. They seek to accomplish their aims and goals by means of violence, strikes and riots, and by rising against the constitutional authorities.

2. The present situation in the Lebanon is the result of plans apparently prepared a long time ago. If, in its tactics, the extremist Opposition has departed from the Lebanese tradition of free discussion and true democracy and turned to sabotage, assassination and anarchy, this is because the United Arab Republic has flooded it with all its elements and provided it with money, men, ammunition and propaganda.

3. The Government of the United Arab Republic has appointed itself a supporter of the extremist Opposition in the Lebanon, and has interfered in its internal affairs by supporting one group of Lebanese against other Lebanese, by turning them against each other through the use of its official radio stations and controlled newspapers, by inciting riots and sedition day and night, by arousing a group of Lebanese against their government, and by calling for the destruction of their constitutional life by violence and force.

4. Interference by the United Arab Republic in the domestic affairs of the Lebanon appears clearly in the continued and growing activity of the agents of the official organizations in the United Arab Republic, such as the Syrian Deuxieme Bureau and the Syrian border security forces, which led to the incidents of Dayr al-Asha'ir and Jabal al-Kanishah; to some of the Shuf incidents; to the criminal attacks on the customs post at Al-Masna and other gendarmerie posts in the North; to the entry of some Syrian conscripts into some border villages; to the bloody incidents at Baalbek, Sidon and Tripoli; to the throwing of explosives and blowing up of buildings in various parts of Beirut and other Lebanese areas; to the use of materials, arms and ammunition which poured into the Lebanon at the orders and under the protection of the responsible authorities in the United Arab Republic; to aiding the formation of armed gangs in border villages, training members of these gangs in Syrian camps, and camouflaging the entry and departure of these gangs into and out of the Lebanon; and to the participation of a number of United Arab Republic citizens and experts in all these acts.

5. The established facts which we have just mentioned clearly show that all elements in the regrettable incidents which have occurred and which will occur in the Lebanon are closely connected with the will of the authorities of the United Arab Republic, and have the purpose of infringing the Lebanon's independence and sovereignty.

6. All these acts committed by the United Arab Republic, or sponsored by it, threaten the safety of the Lebanon and the Arab States, shake the solidarity of their sons, and threaten this sensitive area of the world with dangers which are bound to have an effect on the peace of the entire world.

20. *United National Front's reply to President Eisenhower's statement of 28 May 1958, 29 May 1958*²¹

"In view of this new interpretation of the doctrine, the Front, which originally opposed the Eisenhower doctrine because of its eagerness to preserve the independence and entity of the Lebanon and avoid any foreign interference in the affairs of the Lebanon and other Arab countries, finds it necessary to explain and reaffirm its former attitude, which events have justified, and to warn Lebanese public opinion once more against the dangers involved in this doctrine. The doctrine makes the countries it covers—in particular the Arab countries, including the Lebanon—a sphere for rivalry of the great Powers and for a dangerous struggle between them over interests in these countries.

"The events taking place in the Lebanon are internal ones, in which neither the United States nor any other State is concerned. These events consist in fact in a call for a peaceful strike by the people to oppose the corruption and tyranny of the Lebanese administration, of which the people are complaining. All other interpretations of this popular move, and all attempts to show it in other than its true form, will only increase the tension in the situation and disturb the peace of our East.

"If the people hastened to take up arms in some Lebanese areas, this was in reply to the massacres and provocative campaigns carried out by the Government and its supporters, and for the sole purpose of legitimate self-defence. Tranquillity and stability would automatically return to the Lebanon if Sham'un were to resign, and with his resignation all causes of corruption and tyranny would cease to exist. In view

²¹ *S.W.B. Part IV*, 31 May 1958, 6-7. For President Eisenhower's statement see below, Section III.

of this, the Front considers that the interference of the United States and its allies in the internal affairs of the Lebanon is an illegitimate interference and a defiance of UN principles. The Front raises its voice in protest against this interference and hopes that the USA will reconsider its attitude for the sake of peace and stability in the area and world peace."

21. *Summary of press conference addressed by Mr. Sa'ib Sallam, the opposition leader, 4 June 1958*²²

Sa'ib Sallam, former Lebanese Premier and member of the National Union Front, yesterday held a press conference at his house in the Bastah quarter, Beirut, attended by foreign journalists. Sallam dealt with latest developments in the Lebanon. He said: "We are resisting Sham'un's policy. In order to implement this policy Sham'un resorted to methods such as bribery, terrorism and crime, seeking thereby to bind us to the Western camp so that he might gain support for himself. But, we shall continue to maintain our present stand until he resigns."

Speaking about the position of the army, Sallam said: "The army is here to protect the country and not to terrorize the Opposition, which represents the Lebanese people." The former Premier denied reports reiterated by the trumpets of Sham'un's Government that the United Arab Republic was supplying the Lebanese people with arms and equipment.

Asked why the Opposition was resisting Sham'un's policy, Sa'ib Sallam declared: "This is because Sham'un has mixed personal feelings with Lebanese policy. In so doing he has deviated from the Lebanon's traditional policy and sought to impose by force a policy binding us to the Western camp. By this policy Sham'un seeks to gain support for himself, quite regardless of the consequences of such policy on the Lebanon, such as the hostility of the opposing camp."

Questioned about the methods to which Sham'un had resorted in order to achieve this aim, Sallam replied: "Sham'un has resorted to bribery, terrorism, crimes and the arming of terrorist organizations such as the Syrian Nationalist and Kata'ib [Phalanges] Parties. This, of course, is in addition to his dependence upon certain foreign Ambassadors, including those of Britain, the USA, Turkey and Iraq."

Asked about steps which the Opposition would take if Sham'un did not resign, the former Premier replied: "We shall continue the peaceful

²² S.W.B. Part IV, 7 June 1958, 7-8.

strike. The country, however, is now in a general turmoil, and no one knows how the situation will develop in the future." With regard to the army he asserted: "The army is here to protect the country and not to terrorize the Opposition, which represents the Lebanese people." Asked if the army would intervene in the current crisis if ordered to do so, Sallam said: "This question should not be addressed to us."

Asked if the Opposition believed that Sham'un would leave office in September, the ex-Premier said: "Sham'un is determined to renew his term of office, and we are determined on his removal." Replying to another question about what would be done if Sham'un said that he did not wish to renew his term of office, Sallam declared: "No one has confidence in Sham'un, and therefore no one believes him."

Asked if it was true that the Opposition was financed and armed from the Syrian region of the United Arab Republic, Sallam replied: "I assure you that weapons owned by members of the popular resistance were purchased from the supporters of Camille Sham'un and Charles Malik."

Questioned as to whether the Opposition would assume power if Sham'un resigns, Sallam replied: "A President will be elected from the noble Maronite community, and there is no doubt about this in the least." He added that this was the opinion of all members of the Opposition. The new President would be elected on the basis of sound constitutional practice.

When asked about the policy to be followed by the Opposition when it came to power, he said: "In any event, it will not be a policy of terror, force and beatings, but the traditional policy which the Lebanon followed from 1943 to 1956. Such a policy preserves the Lebanon's neutrality."

Questioned as to whether the Lebanon's economy was threatened by the current situation, Sallam replied: "I believe that our very existence as an independent people is more in danger than our economy, and this in our view is even more important." To another question Sallam replied: "The current situation will continue until the end, because we cannot live with Sham'un, who has shown himself to be a little dictator."

When asked for his opinion on Sham'un's statement that he did not accept conditional aid, Sallam asserted: "Sham'un claims so, but he accepts conditional aid as he did when he accepted American aid under the Eisenhower doctrine."

Sallam concluded the conference by saying: "The Opposition, thanks to its solidarity and the attitude of His Beatitude the Maronite Patriarch, has succeeded in quashing completely the sedition and venom which Sham'un has been trying to spread among the people. It behoves all sincere people to co-operate against the forces of evil which seek to harm the Lebanon. The current battle is in the interests of the people of the Lebanon."

22. *Statement by the Shi'ī 'ulemā of Lebanon, 4 June 1958*²³

We the ulema of the Shi'īs make the following statement for the information of the Lebanese people: Last week, we had a meeting with Adil Usayran, President of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, and faced him with his responsibilities and with what he has to do in this bloody stage of the history of the homeland. Though time is counted by seconds in present conditions, Usayran said that he would take decisive action within a few days.

The days have passed, and we have seen nothing done. Seeing that innocent victims continue to fall and the situation is deteriorating and worsening, we find ourselves commanded by our religious duty to declare the following:

(1) Strong denunciation of the persistence of the President of the Chamber in his paining behaviour, for which we will ask him to account.

(2) Continuation of efforts—in co-operation with the heads of the other religions and sects—to spare bloodshed, retrieve our national charter, preserve the Lebanon's independence and structure, and realize the aspirations of the Lebanese people. Almighty God be responsible for the preservation of the Lebanon from all intrigues and plots.

Signed: Mahdi al-Ibrahim; Muhammad Taqi Sadiq; Hasan Ma'luf; Muhammad Ali al-Miqdad; Abbas Abu al-Hasan; Rida Farhat; and Ali Mahdi Ibrahim.

23. *Statement by President Sham'un at a press conference, 22 June 1958*²⁴

The situation which is now prevailing in Lebanon is far from being an internal matter. On the contrary, the matter in question jeopardizes

²³ *S.W.B. Part IV*, 6 June 1958, 8-9.

²⁴ *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, vol. 38 (Documents) 1958, 370-71 (Translated from the French).

stability and peace in the Middle East. The interferences of the United Arab Republic are only the first stage in the plans of this Republic for dominating the Arab world. A prior attempt was made in April 1957 in Transjordan (*sic*). It aimed at overthrowing the legal authority in that country.

We already knew that Lebanon would be the next victim. And thus began, in fact, the furnishing of arms on a large scale, as well as the infiltration of Syrian, Egyptian and Palestinian volunteers and terrorists. For the last three or four months, the movement has been accelerated with a view to carrying out the present armed rebellion.

We have always had in this country, as in any other democratic country, political differences and we were used to dealing with them either through Parliament or through the pressure of public opinion.

Our people had never before resorted to an armed revolt. And if now this armed revolt has broken out, its cause lies in the intervention of the United Arab Republic.

This intervention has taken various forms:

The long and venomous campaign by the Press and Radio characterized by hatred and by an appeal to rise in revolt, constitute the first form of this intervention. These campaigns have been pursued without interruption during the last three months, through a controlled Syrian and Egyptian press and through the nationalized Radio broadcasts of these countries.

A second form of interference has been, as I pointed out above, through furnishing of military equipment of every kind on a mass scale and the training of volunteers who were to operate in Lebanon. The third form of interference is the financial aid given by the Arab Republic to the rebellion.

The fourth and a new form of interference is the fact that the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut delivers Egyptian passports to the Lebanese belonging to the opposition with a view to helping them to leave Lebanon or to evacuate their families from the country.

Thus, I hope that all of you will see that the real problem lies in the fact that the United Arab Republic wants to extend its control over Lebanon's politics. And, as I have repeatedly stated we shall never accept this; I repeat, we shall never accept it.

24. *Statement by the Government of Lebanon to foreign envoys in Beirut on the developments in the country, 2 July 1958*²⁵

Dr. Victor Khuri, Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry, Muhammad Ali Hamadah, Assistant Secretary-General of the Ministry, and Edward Ghurrah, Director of International Affairs at the Foreign Ministry received today, 2nd July 1958, a group of diplomats accredited to the Lebanon and acquainted them with the facts behind the events now taking place in the Lebanon. Discussions dealt with the following points which express the point of view of the Lebanese Government.

1. The Opposition took the question of renewal [of President Sham'un's term of office] as an excuse for carrying out an armed rebellion. The Opposition then turned from the question of renewal to contest the legitimacy of the Chamber of Deputies and the Government, internal and foreign policy, the existence of the Lebanon, and various basic constitutional questions which can only be discussed through legal channels.

2. The fact is that the UAR has used the Opposition to achieve certain specific objectives. The matter, therefore, is confined to interference in the Lebanon's domestic affairs by instigating a revolution and supplying it with the various means of violence which the rebels are using in accordance with premeditated plans, which has resulted in destruction and death and the spreading of anarchy and disturbances in a peaceful and secure country.

3. The alleged causes and motives of the present revolution as announced by UAR officials seek to mislead world public opinion and to distract it from the facts.

4. We do not find it necessary to declare again that instigation of revolution and its provision with arms, men and money are matters of which the UN observers have made certain. UAR officials have been unable to refute these proofs. This is clearly evident from the UAR's replies to the accusations levelled against it by the Lebanese representatives at the Arab League Council and the UN Security Council and from the discussions which took place in both organizations. The Arab States' delegates at Benghazi were eager to express their grave concern about the events taking place in the Lebanon. They proved this by mentioning in a draft resolution laid down by them that it was necessary to take steps to stop anything that might disturb relations between

²⁵ S.W.B. Part IV, 4 July 1958, 6-7.

member States by various means, namely by suspending the spreading of confusion and radio and press campaigns in one country or another and by abstaining from dispatching military aid from one Arab country to another, particularly if there is a revolution in one of these countries. Several other things were mentioned besides because everything, small or large, may lead to disturbing relations between the Arab States. At the Security Council, the Lebanon has obtained the full support of the delegations on the resolutions adopted by the Council.

5. In addition to the events which the Lebanese Foreign Ministry referred to in its previous memoranda and statements which the Lebanese delegates made in presenting the case to the Arab League and the Security Council, new proofs of interference in the Lebanon's domestic affairs continue to arrive daily.

(a) The increased supply of military weapons which the rebels receive and use such as the destructive bombs of (? inerga) and bazooka types, 60, 81 and 120 mm. mortars and anti-aircraft guns, which cannot be secured except through a State with a modern regular army.

(b) The funds which pour in to help the continuance of the revolution and the acts of violence and which guarantee the livelihood of the armed men and their associates, supporters and families, a matter which is beyond the means of individuals and institutions unless these funds come from the treasuries of States and Governments.

(c) The Radio and Press incitement which continues to emanate from Cairo and Damascus aiming at instigating the rebellion of Lebanese citizens against the present authorities and inciting them against one another.

6. The UAR authorities try to thrust the name of certain sister Arab countries or other friendly States into the Lebanese crisis by making allegations that jet aircraft, arms and men have been sent to support the Lebanese Government. This attempt will not achieve its objective because the allegations are groundless. Diplomatic and UN observers can refute these allegations without difficulty. The Lebanese Government combats acts of violence with its own means and its national army.

7. The Lebanese Government is most eager to maintain peace and stability in this part of the world because peace is indivisible and because the people are united in preserving peace and security for all. The Lebanon has never committed any aggression or threatened others. It has never (? interfered) in the rights of its brothers, neighbours and

friends, nor has it ever sought to destroy an existing legal status or to spread confusion or to incite one group against another. It was always a factor of solidarity among Arab States and nations and has always believed and will continue to believe in international friendship and co-operation. The Lebanon considers that those responsible for causing the disturbances in the region are those who invade it with the object of dominating it.

8. The Lebanon, which believes in the message of the UN and which adheres to its Charter, is confident that this organization understands its cause and will uphold justice and right as the Lebanon seeks to do and that it will be able to spare the area the dangers of chaos which, if continued, will inevitably threaten world peace.

25. *Summary of appeal addressed by Mr. Sā'ib Salām, the opposition leader, to the Lebanese security forces, 3 July 1958²⁰*

The Commander of the popular resistance movement in the Lebanon has addressed the following appeal to members of the security and gendarmerie forces: "Brother soldiers, members of the security forces, you are our brethren in patriotism and defenders of the homeland and the people. You have emerged from the people to defend their interests, lives and honour against any oppression and domination."

The appeal adds that Sham'un and his followers are attempting to bring the foreigners back to our country. Their aims have been exposed and they have been shown to have lived in corruption in the country. They, Sham'un and his followers, are now seeking the help of the foreigner to protect them against the wrath and revolution of the people.

Addressing his appeal to members of the security and gendarmerie forces, the popular resistance commander says: "O noble soldiers, hundreds of your brethren have preceded you into the battle of honour and have joined the resistance ranks. People of all classes are contributing generously in order to secure for those soldiers joining the resistance movement all their rights and pay. They are prepared to welcome hundreds and thousands of you and to guarantee all your rights and pay. The hour of victory is near. The blood-shedder Camille Sham'un, his men, his supporters and the whole of his regime are now under the thumb of the people. Honest soldiers, the time has come for you to live in freedom and join the ranks of the popular resistance movement which

²⁰ S.W.B. Part IV, 5 July 1958, 3.

are those of the vanguard. You are this vanguard of defenders of the homeland and the people against imperialism and its collaborators. Long live the revolution and long live the Lebanon, independent, sovereign, free! Victory is for free people! Death to the slaves!"

26. *Prime Minister Sāmi as-Sulh's address to the Lebanese people, 12 July 1958*²⁷

O Lebanese people: At a time when people of good will are determined to end the crisis, and when this determination requires every guarantee afforded by justice, law, dignity, and respect to be achieved, abhorrent voices are heard making statements which take the crisis back to its starting point and misrepresent the zeal of those wishing to restore stability. It therefore becomes necessary for us, in accordance with the policy which we adopted upon our assumption of power, to inform the Lebanese people of the naked truth so that they shall not be deceived by the falsehoods which the biased insert into empty sentences composed of words which have lost their meaning because of the insincerity of those uttering them.

O Lebanese people: We have addressed you more than once and explained to your enlightened minds and pure hearts how this present armed movement was new born more than two years ago. We have not spared any effort to remind you of this. All of you have heard the campaigns over the Syrian and Egyptian radios, and read the defamatory and violent tirades in the Syrian and Egyptian press against the Lebanon and its rulers, made in a manner unknown even to countries openly hostile to each other. You have noted the behaviour of certain responsible officials in Egypt when they tried to drag you from the traditional framework of this country's policy, which calls for neutrality towards the international camps.

Do you not recall that the unanimous stand by Arab Kings and Presidents did not please the biased who had linked their political destinies with a certain definite course? Do you not recall how certain newspapers began to pursue an extremist line towards the current discord and destruction in an attempt to smear the unblemished face of this country? And how some newspapers, when nothing emerged overnight, with huge and expensive modern printing presses directed (their columns) against the breast of this homeland, shaking its pillars and undermining its

²⁷ *S.W.B. Part IV, 14 July 1958, 6-9.*

foundations? All of us know the sources from which these newspapers derive their incomes.

Do you not recall that, during the final months of 1956, explosives and bombs of those persons whom you know began to disturb your peaceful dreams, shake your sound economy, and undermine international confidence in the Lebanon? Do you not recall how arms and ammunition were generously distributed in your countryside and towns, tempting you to destroy your houses and divide your Lebanon, and how millions of pounds and Lebanese pounds poured into your country to buy the consciences of those false persons among you and guide you along a non-Lebanese path?

We have to state with pain that some biased attempts were made to use a group of our Palestinian friends who live in the heart of the Lebanon as dear brethren, against the Lebanon. However, thanks be to God, such attempts were unsuccessful. Although some disloyal persons were (enlisted), the great majority continued to appreciate the generous hospitality of the Lebanese. Do you not recall the groups of infiltrators who came to your country under various disguises to change the bright sun into dark night?

I need not repeat all this to prove that the present crisis which now afflicts the Lebanon is not internal in the least, and that the justifications being cited are merely a dazzling light incapable of blinding us to the facts. This light has itself been extinguished; the whole story was laid bare on 9th May, when sedition flared up with full fury in a desperate attempt to destroy this country, using every means of terrorism and the most violent methods, including the murder of the innocent people, to achieve a premeditated aim—namely to (? bind) the Lebanon to the bandwagon of Nasirist policy—the policy of positive neutrality which is not even understood by those who originated it.

Some rebel leaders state that the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies does not represent the will of all the Lebanese, though the elections which took place in the Lebanon had all the elements of freedom and democracy known to the world's most civilized countries and were contested by the Opposition without any restriction. I recall that I suspended all legal warrants issued as a result of the incidents of 30th June so that I should leave no opportunity for anyone to object to the soundness of the elections and the activity accompanying them.

The Opposition members contested these elections, and the results showed victory for some of them and failure for others. This was inter-

puted by the Lebanon and the world at large as a referendum on the Lebanon's foreign policy. The Opposition extremists who lost did not submit any complaint against these elections.

Some rebel leaders state that the legitimate authorities in the country have been following a dictatorial course which deviates from the traditional policy of the Lebanon in the foreign affairs field. Here we must repeat what we have already said, that the Lebanon has taken no action which would harm the policy of true neutrality. All the Lebanon is being blamed for is that it refused to align itself with the Cairo-Damascus axis, and remained faithful to the policy of conciliation among all Arabs, in accordance with the policy established ever since its (? independence).

As far as the West is concerned, the Government did not grant any privileged position, or strategic priority, to any country; on the contrary, it kept the Lebanon away from all varieties of political strife.

Some rebel leaders state that they have only pursued the policy followed by the fathers and forefathers of the Lebanese. Will those leaders excuse us when we remind them that their fathers sold the Islah Party to Turkey in return for taking Hulah for nothing. They then sold Hulah itself to Israel to torture the Arabs. Thus, as a Lebanese writer has said, they sold the Arabs twice.

While we tell this to enlighten public opinion, we recall the fate of the (two words indistinct) which Turkey granted and the money of the (word indistinct) which the USA paid to cover their travelling expenses, but which remained in certain pockets making them bulge more. We thank God, however, that (word indistinct) is no longer deceived by lies and fabrications.

Some rebel leaders state that the Government has caused the destruction of the country and killed the people. By God! Tell us who called for sedition in the country, urged crime, hurled explosives in the public markets, trams, and commercial centres, and burned houses and looted them? Who attacked the security forces, slaughtering members of the forces like sheep? Who attacked the peaceful villages, using armed men and highwaymen eager to commit all sins and crimes? Who spoiled the life of the Lebanese and turned their joy into sorrow? Who turned the peace of this country into hell, and its freedom into a prison? Who brought trade and industry to a standstill, stopped the wheels of work, and threatened the stability of the economy? Who estranged the foreigners, who found in this country an open field for their commercial

transactions, and a pastureland for prosperity and progress? Who defamed the name of this country in international circles, after it used to be said (few words indistinct)?

I do not have to answer these questions because the criminals are still lurking behind their barricades in the isolated areas and closed quarters, and using guns against the great majority of the people in their houses and quarters to prevent them by force from expressing their political views about the fate of the Lebanon and hinder them from leaving these quarters so that they shall remain a shield for themselves against the self-defensive action of the security forces? From these areas and quarters, persons who are mostly immature leave to murder the innocents. Join your hands and point to them with your fingers; let these hands and fingers stretch to their eyes: perhaps then they may awake from their sleep.

Some rebel leaders state that in the religious sphere the Government resorted to the Istanbul conference of Islamic member-States of the Baghdad Pact while at the same time arousing Christian public opinion. We have no need to prove that the call for the severance of relations with France and Britain (during the Suez crisis) was not prompted by a national motive. It is not the Government which nurtures communal feuds; at no time has the Government committed an act which could be labelled as a piece of communal fanaticism. The Lebanon is for all its children; no community has any advantage over any other except in so far as it renders services to preserve this country as a homeland for political and religious freedoms.

Some rebel leaders state that they are with the West. We record here against them that their flattery of the West is for the sake of accomplishing their premeditated aspects. We remind those who good-heartedly follow them of the anti-West propaganda they offer them daily to win them to their side.

From the above we see that the true aim of this sedition is not internal. If otherwise, are Lebanese blood, the Lebanese economy, Lebanese wealth and the Lebanese entity so cheap as to be wasted so generously for the sake of Bishara, Emile, and Ilias al-Khuri? Is it for the sake of these that we fight, kill each other, destroy our houses, trade, means of living and industry, and destroy the international nature of our homeland?

The aim of this sedition, as we have already said, does not go beyond the carrying out of promises made to hitch the Lebanon to the band-

wagon of Egyptian policy and undermine its existence as an entity. It is for the support of this policy and the undermining of this entity that all types of foreign aid were, and still are, being offered.

O Lebanese people: Fear God and know that the Lebanese Government will not be backward in regard to your rights, and that it will handle the crisis afflicting the Lebanon and yourselves with patience. Every criminal act which seeks to harm this country and its children is caused by those responsible for the armed rebellion and those behind them. We thank God who saved the country from the evils of sectarian sedition, sedition advocated in vain by (word indistinct) since the (? Suez crisis).

Cling to the virtues normally manifested by all Lebanese; be confident that God will be with the Lebanon. God is able to save the Lebanon from falling. We and you will emerge from this tribulation more confident in our homeland, and more determined to preserve it in the face of those seeking to devour it. Long live the Lebanon.

3. International Reactions

INTRODUCTION

THE events in Lebanon following Matn's murder evoked considerable international interest. Movements of the American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the British build-up in Cyprus indicated that foreign intervention on behalf of the government was not ruled out. On 14 May Ambassador Robert McClintock told a press conference in Beirut that the US was "determined to help this government."¹ Ostensibly, President Sham'un was pressing the US for help to thwart what he believed was an aggressive attempt by Cairo to subvert the lawful government.² But hopes in Beirut were dampened by the Secretary of State Mr. Dulles' statement, on 20 May, that the situation in Lebanon did not suggest that introduction of American forces was called for.³ The Soviet Union maintained that some foreign countries were attempting to use the developments in Lebanon to intervene in the internal affairs of that country.⁴ President Nasser asserted that "the rulers of Lebanon" were trying to convert a purely internal affair into an international problem and that the UAR had "nothing whatsoever to do" with those events.⁵

1: *Extract from the speech by President Nasser, Cairo, 16 May 1958*⁶

During my trip, I received reports of the events in the Lebanon which is very dear to us and whose people are very close to our hearts. We shall never accept nor can we tolerate any bloodshed in the Lebanon, for the blood of the people of the Lebanon is Arab blood and therefore very dear to us. Whenever an internal conflict took place in the Lebanon, the Lebanese rulers accused the UAR of having instigated it.

They informed the Powers. They informed the United States. They asserted that the United Arab Republic was feeding the revolution in

¹ *Mideast Mirror* (Beirut), Vol. 10, 20 (18 May 1958) 21.

² Charles W. Thayer, *Diplomat* (New York, 1959) 24-25.

³ See below.

⁴ See below.

⁵ See below.

⁶ *Nasser's Speeches and Press-Interviews, 1958* (Information Department, Cairo) 196-99.

the Lebanon, that it was feeding the unrest in that country. Sheer invention, a glaring falsehood, my fellow-countrymen, a baseless allegation, a tissue of lies.

Every wise man in the world, every wise man in the Arab world, knows the real cause of the tragedies which are now taking place in the Lebanon. The much lamented Nessib El-Matny was murdered in the Lebanon. Nessib El-Matny was a free newspaperman. We all know that he was a free newspaperman. Who murdered Nessib El-Matny? Surely we did not murder Nessib El-Matny. Who murdered him? Who shed his blood? Who assaulted him four months ago with intent to murder? Who murdered him only a few days ago?

Indeed, the conscience of the Lebanese people was shaken by this crime, for they know who are the assassins; they know who are the criminals. Indeed, the conscience of the Lebanese people was greatly shaken, and this is the direct cause of the Lebanese people's revolution and of the grave events in the Lebanon.

Indeed, the United Arab Republic has nothing whatsoever to do with these events that happened in the Lebanon. I really had no intention to make any reference to this subject, but all the world broadcasts to which I used to listen during my trip used to say that the rulers of the Lebanon assert that the United Arab Republic is the cause of all the trouble.

Actually, all that they are after, Brethren, is to convert a purely internal affair among the sons of one country into a foreign problem. This would help them create pretexts to seek the assistance of foreign powers on the assumption of interference by the United Arab Republic. Fellow-countrymen,

We respect and value the people of the Lebanon. We respect and confirm the independence of the Lebanon. I said in the speech I made on my return from Syria that a foreign personage asked me about the country we shall incorporate into the United Arab Republic. I did not then give the name of that foreign personage. And today fellow-countrymen, I say to you that this question was asked by the Ambassador of the United States. He was talking to me, and I gathered that his words were based on information given to him by the rulers of the Lebanon. The rulers of the Lebanon stabbed us in the back during our time of stress, at the time when Britain, France and Israel were attacking us. But we overlooked these deeds, and we did not return evil for evil. When I went to Damascus, everything I said in my speeches about the Lebanon was an expression of our respect for its independence, and for its unity,

and an expression of our desire that the Lebanon should not be divided by internal war and bloodshed.

This is our policy, and the people of the Lebanon are dear to our hearts. When the American Ambassador asked whether we planned to annex the Lebanon to the United Arab Republic, I answered that we did not plan to annex any country. Syria did not annex Egypt, nor did Egypt annex Syria, that their unification was the will of the two peoples. I also said that we would never accept to unite with an Arab country which does not unanimously wish for union; that we respect the will of the people, and believe that the existence of even a minority which is hostile to the idea of union, would expose the country to the danger of internal war.

And today, fellow-countrymen, I answer these allegations and falsifications. In the name of the people of the United Arab Republic I repeat what I have said before: We uphold and respect the independence of the Lebanon; that we will not allow interference in its affairs; and that the things said by those people are nothing but fabrications. They constitute, however, a clever move to transform the internal strife into an external one between the Lebanon and the United Arab Republic. It is a skilful move to deceive the Big Powers and induce them to intervene, in order to defend the Lebanon against invasion or intervention from the United Arab Republic.

We protect the independence of the Lebanon, and if anyone attacks it, if Israel attacks it, we shall support and co-operate with the Lebanon.

When I visited Damascus, I saw there the Lebanese people who had come to Damascus to greet you, and demonstrate their support to you. Not one of the Lebanese people differed from any one of the Syrian people, or from any one of you in feeling and sentiments. We will never allow any aggression or bloodshed in the Lebanon.

Fellow-countrymen,

We look at these fabrications and these intrigues, and we ignore them. The rulers of the Lebanon may accuse us, but we are confident that the Lebanese people are fully aware of the causes which drove them to rebellion and the reasons for these untruths. Free men have been killed—the much lamented Nessib El-Matny and other free people have been killed. The Syrian nationalist traitors who collaborate with the imperialist countries were provided with weapons and money and were given the opportunity to murder free men. In 1955 they assassinated Adnan El-Malky in Syria. They hatched conspiracies in Syria in an

endeavour to eliminate all free men. Today, fellow-countrymen, they are killing free men in the Lebanon, but free men always win in the end and the traitors, the imperialists and their agents will be defeated. The struggle is not over yet, my brethren, and it shall continue so long as we shall. Freedom is dear to us; its price is high, and just as we have shed our blood to achieve independence and freedom, we can preserve them only by shedding our blood again and again.

2. *Summary of Tass statement on the crisis in Lebanon, 19 May 1958*⁷

In connection with recent events in Lebanon, reports are coming in about the attempts of certain foreign powers to use these events for interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon and for new pressure on the Arab states of the Near East.

The facts show that the above powers, exploiting the events in Lebanon, are weaving a new network of intrigue against peace and security in the Near East. This time they have selected the small Arab country of Lebanon as the object of their schemes.

As reported by the foreign press, this has found expression primarily in the fact that the Beirut embassies of certain Western powers have begun to resemble not so much diplomatic representations conducting their countries' relations with the sovereign Lebanese state as headquarters for colonialists plotting with reactionary antinational elements within the country, grossly interfering in the internal affairs of this country and attempting to take charge of it as if it were a colony.

The American Sixth Fleet has been ordered to move toward the coast of Lebanon with dispatch. The number of American marines in the Mediterranean area is being rapidly increased and preparations are under way for landing American marine units on the Lebanese coast. According to the statement of a representative of the U.S. State Department, American arms are being dispatched to Lebanon for use in reprisals—a tried method of the colonialists—against the peaceful Arab population.

As is obvious from press reports and statements by responsible officials, all this is being done under the false pretext that the mass actions of the population in Lebanon against foreign interference in its affairs and in defense of the independence and constitution of the country have been inspired by the United Arab Republic.

⁷ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 10 (25 June 1958), 22.

Why is this intervention being prepared against a country whose government had bowed to foreign pressure and declared its acceptance of the notorious "Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine"?

It is not hard to find the answer to this question if the real motives are examined, rather than the fabrications circulated by official American propaganda to justify the intolerable actions of the United States and some of the other Western powers with regard to Lebanon.

It is well known that the "Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine"—this open program of colonial plunder—has been rejected by the Arab peoples, who have justly found it alien to their real national interests and to their sovereignty.

Each day shows that the initiators of this doctrine are suffering increasingly strong defeats in their attempts to strangle the national liberation movement of the peoples of the East and halt the invincible progress of the peoples toward complete liberation from the hated colonial rule. . . .

The peoples who have gained political independence wish to manage their own resources and pursue an independent policy conforming to their national interests, without looking to London or Washington.

In short, the peoples of the East wish to live as complete masters in their own houses, to live in peace and friendship with all nations, and not as the NATO, SEATO and Baghdad Pact organizers, who have firmly bound their policies to the "cold war," the arms race and to unrestrained expansion with regard to small countries and nations, would like them to live.

The actions of certain Western powers, particularly the United States, in regard to Lebanon, whose peace-loving people desire only to live in peace and friendship with their neighbors—the other Arab countries—is an expression of precisely this policy. This is just what does not fit the calculations of the colonialists, who wish to bind Lebanon hand and foot—politically and economically.

The events which have developed around Lebanon compel us to draw a further important conclusion.

One is struck by the fact that these events have occurred at a time when the dangerous hotbed of foreign interference in the internal affairs of Indonesia has not been removed, when the imperialists are trying, in the eyes of the entire world, to break the resistance of the Indonesian people, who are upholding their independence, by blackmail and pressure right up to open aggression. Now the imperialists have selected

Lebanon as a new object of their intrigues and dangerous provocations and are trying to set up a colonialist regime in Lebanon and deal a blow to the national liberation movement of the entire Arab East.

Leading circles of the Soviet Union consider that the settlement of questions pertaining to the Lebanese state is the invincible right of the Lebanese people and no other state has the right to interfere in these affairs. Any attempt to use these or other internal developments in Lebanon for outside interference creates a dangerous situation in the Near and Middle East and can result in serious consequences not only for the future of the Lebanese state and its independence, but also for peace in the Near and Middle East.

Leading circles of the Soviet Union express confidence that no power will resort to interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon in any form whatsoever, or permit a dangerous hotbed of war to be created in this area.

3. *Statement by the US Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, at a press conference, 20 May 1958⁸*

Q. Mr. Secretary, during the earlier phases of the Lebanese crisis there seemed to be some non-understanding as to whether the Eisenhower doctrine applied in this case. However, it seems that later we came to feel that we liked Lebanon, although the Eisenhower doctrine probably did not specifically apply, and therefore would aid her if requested. I wonder if you could clear up this confusion that some of us have, sir?

A. I suppose that by the Eisenhower doctrine you refer to the Middle East resolution that was adopted by the Congress. That resolution contains several provisions. It is not just one thing. It authorizes the United States to assist economically and militarily nations which want such assistance in order to preserve their independence. It says that the independence and integrity of these nations of the Middle East is vital to world peace and the national interest of the United States. It says that, if they are attacked from a country under the control of international communism, then the President is authorized, upon request, to send forces to resist that attack.

Now we do not consider under the present state of affairs that there is likely to be an attack, an armed attack, from a country which we

⁸ *Department of State Bulletin*, 38 (9 June 1958) 945.

would consider under the control of international communism. That doesn't mean, however, that there is nothing that can be done. There is the provision of the Middle East resolution which says that the independence of these countries is vital to peace and the national interest of the United States. That is certainly a mandate to do something if we think that our peace and vital interests are endangered from any quarter.

There is the basic right, and almost duty, at the request or with the consent of a government, to assist in the protection of American life and property. There is the program of military assistance which we render to many countries, including Lebanon, in terms of giving them equipment and certain measures of military training and techniques and helping them train technicians to use this equipment. So that there are a number of areas of possible action if the situation calls for it.

I would say that we are not anxious to have a situation which would be in any sense a pretext for introducing American forces into the area. We hope and believe that that will not be called for, and the situation, to date, does not suggest that it would be called for.

4. *Extract from statement by President Eisenhower on the Lebanese crisis at a press conference, 28 May 1958⁹*

Q. (James Reston of the *New York Times*): When the Eisenhower Doctrine went to the Congress, sir, it was represented to the Congress as a measure to deal primarily with overt aggression of Communist origin. Now lately in the Middle East crisis a new interpretation has been given, namely that under the Mansfield amendment to that resolution you now have power to intervene with the force of arms if you please to deal with any aggression. Do you have in your own mind a different interpretation from what it was originally?

A. I don't think it is different from what we finally felt it was after the thing was passed. There was a . . . and I had forgotten it was Senator Mansfield (Democrat of Montana) but there was an amendment passed that we had a very long study about around here, and we felt that as long as it was a friendly government, one with which we have associations like military assistance and so on, there were probably certain actions that we might be able to take that were beyond, or that were, yes, beyond just a mere overt Communist aggression, or I mean aggression from a Communist-controlled state.

⁹ *New York Times*, 29 May 1958, 12.

However, that has never been invoked in any way, and I am not sure that the lawyers—I have forgotten exactly what the lawyers said about it, but that is my own interpretation of it.

5. *Extract from an interview granted by President Nasser to the Czech Press Delegation, 16 June 1958*¹⁰

Q. What is your opinion on the recent events in Lebanon?

A. They are the result of the policy of the Lebanese Government. According to a National Charter between the Lebanese people, Lebanon should never have been implicated in foreign political or non-political conflicts. The present government has violated this agreement. It is supporting the Baghdad Pact and has accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine against the will of the great majority of the people. A direct result of this is the present conflict between the Government and the people. The Government has taken brutal measures against the people. It has placed weapons in the hands of its supporters which led to the spreading of terror and murder amongst members of the Opposition. When Shamoun wanted to renew his candidacy in the next presidential elections, the people revolted. They know that Shamoun means the continuation of the present anti-popular policy. Shamoun was, and is, encouraged in his policy by the colonialists which led to the present catastrophic consequences.

6. *Statement by the US Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, at a press conference, 17 June 1958*¹¹

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us your assessment of the situation in Lebanon, and whether or not any action seems to be required under the circumstances?

A. The situation in Lebanon is, obviously, one which causes very considerable anxiety to those who believe in the independence and integrity of the countries in the Middle East. That, as you will recall, was proclaimed as of vital interest to the United States by a Middle East resolution. I would also recall the fact that, even though at the moment the disturbance assumes, in part at least, the character of a civil distur-

¹⁰ *Nasser's Speeches and Press-Interviews, 1958* (Information Department, Cairo) 392-93.

¹¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, 39 (7 July 1958)8.

bance, it is covered by the United Nations resolution of 1949 on indirect aggression. This denounces the fomenting from without of civil strife. Therefore we watch the situation with concern.

The events are moving on a day-to-day, hour-to-hour basis, and I would not feel that it was wise, or I would be on solid ground, in discussing them in detail at this time.

Q. Can you say, sir, what our attitude is toward a larger U.N. force in the area, possibly on the Syrian-Lebanese border?

A. I believe that the representatives of the United Nations who have already arrived there have come to the conclusion that it would be necessary to have a force somewhat larger in number and somewhat different in composition than had been anticipated at first. It may have to be larger, and it may also have to have greater elements of mobility than had been originally contemplated. I believe that that is being sympathetically considered by the Secretary-General. He himself, I think, plans to go out to the area today. The United States would be disposed to support, as a member of the United Nations, any action along those lines which commended itself to the Secretary-General.

7. Tass statement on the situation in Lebanon, 24 June 1958¹²

There have been an increasing number of reports of late that ruling circles in the U.S.A. and Britain are preparing for armed interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon. Specifically, it is proposed to turn the group of U.N. observers into a U.N. police force to accomplish this end. An appreciable increase in the numbers of these observers is planned. Thus, dangerous plans for armed foreign interference in Lebanese domestic affairs are being worked out.

It is known that these plans are being openly proclaimed by leading statesmen of the U.S.A. and Britain.

In his June 17 press conference, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles announced the need to have "U.N. armed forces in somewhat larger numbers and somewhat different composition than was assumed at the beginning" in Lebanon. In addition, Dulles made an open statement about U.S. intentions to send its troops to Lebanon as U.N. forces. At this point he emphasized that American troops could land in Lebanon not only at a U.N. request but also by unilateral action. In other words, the whole world has been notified that the U.S.A. may embark on the path of armed intervention in Lebanon.

¹² *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 25 (30 July 1958) 17-18.

The following day, June 18, President Eisenhower told representatives of the press that in connection with the events in Lebanon the U.S.A. is prepared to "take military action," and that the type of action to be taken would depend "on the views of the group of observers and of the U.N. Secretary General."

French Minister Andre Malraux also stated in reference to the events in Lebanon that "if active measures were taken by the U.S.A. and Britain, France's position would probably be to participate in them."

The British press writes openly that the U.S.A. and Britain have worked out a plan for organizing armed intervention in Lebanon and are prepared to inflict a bloody reprisal on the population of this Arab country. The News Chronicle revealed some of the details of these plans and pointed out that "in their present form these plans call for the landing in Beirut of 3000 Marines from the U.S. Sixth Fleet and a joint Anglo-American parachute landing."

Before the eyes of the entire world American and British planes are continuously delivering arms and munitions to Lebanon. British and American troops are being shipped to the eastern Mediterranean. Ships of the American Sixth Fleet and British ships, including the aircraft carrier "Ark Royal," are already close to Lebanese shores.

U.S. Defence Secretary McElroy has openly threatened to use atomic weapons against the Arab peoples. On June 19 he declared that "more or less clean" atomic bombs would be used in the Middle East "without hesitation," if U.S. armed forces had to intervene in Lebanon.

In this connection it would be appropriate to remind the American Secretary that there was a fine custom in ancient Rome; before they made an important decision, the Romans took a shower. Has the U.S. Secretary made use of this experience? If not, it might be appropriate for Mr. McElroy to follow the Roman example before making such statements.

In informed Western circles the fact is not concealed that all the above-mentioned American and British military preparations are calculated so that the operation of interference in Lebanese internal affairs can be carried out in the shortest possible time and the world can thus be confronted with a *fait accompli*. To prepare public opinion in their countries for this criminal act of aggression, various versions of alleged interference in Lebanese internal affairs by the United Arab Republic are being energetically distributed in the official press of the NATO countries.

In the press of the Western countries it is openly pointed out that the preparations for intervention against Lebanon were preceded by an Anglo-American agreement and that the main subject of the recent talks between U.S. President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Macmillan was agreement on plans for aggression against Lebanon. The governments of the U.S.A. and Great Britain not only failed to deny this but actually confirmed it. It is not a matter of chance that the above statements by U.S. leaders immediately followed the meeting we have mentioned.

All this means that the ruling circles of the U.S.A. and certain other Western countries intend to land their troops in Lebanon and occupy the country either in the guise of U.N. armed forces or without any disguise. At present they are only searching for a pretext under which to intervene against the Lebanese people, a people struggling for their independence against colonialist interference in Lebanese affairs and foreign diktat.

A legitimate question arises: Do certain circles among the Western powers which still cannot give up their old policy of colonial brigandage want to take some kind of revenge for the failure of the aggression against Egypt and the ventures undertaken against Syria? Experience shows that such calculations rest on quicksand. There can be no doubt that foreign intervention against Lebanon would once again expose the aggressive and expansionist plans of the Western powers against the Arab peoples. If the actions of these states in the past have built up mountains of hate against the colonialists, there can be no doubt that each new aggression against the Arab peoples greatly intensifies this hatred, a hatred which will be felt for generations upon generations. Not only would the interventionists' bombs and mortar strike at Lebanese citizens, they would also rifle finally the faith in the West's good intentions towards the peoples of the East among those who still nourish illusions on this score.

It is no secret that certain circles in the U.S.A. have been nurturing plans for interference in Lebanon's internal affairs for a long time and that they intend to use the colonialist "Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine" to this end. Several outstanding Lebanese politicians and statesmen have expressed the will of the country's people in condemning the colonialists' plans. For instance, Osseiran, the chairman of the Lebanese Parliament, declared that the Lebanese people would not allow any foreign troops—U.N. armed forces or armed forces of some foreign state—to land

in Lebanon. In saying this he emphasized that the arrival of U.N. observers in Lebanon should not be a prelude to the landing of foreign troops.

Adnan Hakim, the leader of the Moslem Party Nadzhade, declared that "if Hammarskjold's arrival in Lebanon is preparatory to the landing of an international police force here, then we shall say to him: Return to your own country. We do not want anyone to interfere in the internal affairs of our country and will fight anyone who thinks of sending foreign troops to Lebanon."

Raymond Edde, Deputy to Parliament and leader of the Lebanese National Bloc Party, declared that any form of armed foreign interference in Lebanon's internal affairs could undermine peace in the Near and Middle East and in the entire world.

Plans for armed interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon are giving rise to profound alarm not only in Lebanon and the Arab countries but also in many other countries in both East and West. This is understandable, because armed foreign intervention in Lebanon would be a challenge not only to the Lebanese people but also to the peoples of the Arab East who are defending their independence and to the forces of peace throughout the world. Therefore it is the duty of each state and government genuinely concerned about peace to do everything possible to prevent aggression against Lebanon. One cannot allow the U.N., which was created to maintain international security, to be used in any way by the enemies of peace as a cover for aggression against Lebanon. The group of U.N. observers sent to Lebanon in accord with a decision of the Security Council cannot perform functions other than those provided for in the Security Council's decision and the function of obtaining pertinent information. It cannot and does not have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the country and its people.

The plans for intervention against Lebanon show once again that the forces which have bound their policy tightly to continuing the "cold war" and building up international tension regard the Near and Middle East as an object of constant imperialist intrigue and dangerous provocation. As soon as one hotbed of provocation disappears another, still more dangerous one, appears in its place.

In connection with the threat of armed intervention by the Western powers in Lebanon, it is considered in official circles of the Soviet Union that the attempts of certain states to carry out armed intervention against Lebanon under various pretexts are in gross violation of the principles

of the U.N. and constitute a mockery of these principles. It is the undeniable right of the Lebanese people and of them alone to settle problems pertaining to the state of Lebanon. Internal events in Lebanon should not serve as a pretext for interference in the country's internal affairs from without. Attempts at armed interference by the Western powers in the internal affairs of Lebanon would inevitably lead to a grave sharpening of the international situation and would constitute a serious threat to peace. The entire responsibility for this would rest on the organizers and participants.

As concerns the Soviet Union, it has stated repeatedly that it stands for a reign of peace in this area of the Near and Middle East, which is near the borders of the U.S.S.R. Therefore the Soviet Union cannot at this point be indifferent toward preparations for foreign intervention in Lebanon, no matter how this intervention is disguised.

8. *Statement, in reply to questions in the House of Commons, by the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, 25 June 1958*¹³

Mr. A. Henderson asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will now make a further statement on the situation on the Lebanon-Syrian border in view of his discussions on this matter with other Governments.

Mr. Stonehouse asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what requests have been received from the Government of the Lebanon for arms and military intervention; and what is the intention of Her Majesty's Government in relation to these requests.

Mr. Swingle asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement on the consultations between the United States Secretary of State and British representatives on the Lebanon situation on 15th June.

Mr. Donnelly asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will now make a statement on Her Majesty's Government's policy in the United Nations towards the Lebanon-Syria dispute in so far as it affects world peace.

Mr. Grimond asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what reports have been received from the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the situation in the Lebanon; and if he will make a statement on the situation in the Middle East.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: As a result of the submission of the matter to

¹³ House of Commons, *Debates*, vol. 590, cols. 410-14.

the Security Council, United Nations observers have been sent to the Lebanon and are attempting to operate there.

Before he left New York, the Secretary-General circulated a report, dated 11th June, on the implementation of the Security Council Resolution. A copy of this is available in the Library. I had a talk with Mr. Hammarskjöld on 18th June when he passed through London. I assured him of our full support in implementing the Security Council Resolution. We await any recommendations he may put forward as a result of his visit to the Middle East.

With regard to arms, I have nothing to add to the Answer my right hon. Friend gave to the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil (Mr. S. O. Davies) on 11th June. No request for military intervention has been received from the Government of the Lebanon.

The answer to the Question asked by the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingle) is, "No, Sir."

Mr. Henderson: Can we have an assurance that the Government will not participate in any military intervention in the Lebanon except upon the direct authority of the Security Council or the General Assembly and following conclusive reports from the United Nations observers who are at present in the Lebanon that there has been a direct attack upon the Lebanon by another country?

Mr. Lloyd: I think the right hon. and learned Gentleman asked me a similar Question on 19th May and I answered then that Her Majesty's Government would not act contrary to the Charter or to the established rules of international law. That remains our position.

Mr. Henderson: I am asking the Foreign Secretary something quite specific this afternoon. I am not asking whether his assurance refers to the legal interpretation of the Charter but whether, in fact, the Government will give an assurance that they will not participate in any military intervention without the direct authority of the United Nations. I am asking whether he will give an assurance that they will not participate in any military intervention in the Lebanon except upon the direct authority of the Security Council or the General Assembly.

Mr. Lloyd: I have given a very carefully considered Answer—[*Interruption*]. I do not believe that any Government would answer this Question differently. I do not think that it is profitable to consider various hypothetical possibilities, but what I do assure the House is that we will give full support to the United Nations operations that are going on. I think that that is the constructive way to approach the matter. And I

tell the House absolutely frankly that we will do everything we can to make the operations a success, because I think that they are the only effective way to secure peace in the Lebanon.

Mr. Bevan: Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that, following his last statement, he will have the full support of this side of the House? But in view of the statement of the Minister of Defence and the Foreign Secretary's answer this afternoon, there is now a most undesirable ambiguity about the situation. Is it not a fact that our position is that the body responsible for interpreting the obligations of members of the United Nations under the Charter is the United Nations authority itself and not individual nations? If individual nations themselves interpret what the Charter means, or what international law means, we have gone away from collective security back once more to unilateral action. Therefore, why will not the right hon. and learned Gentleman give an undertaking, so as to remove all doubts, that the Government will not act in the Lebanon except on authority given either by the Security Council or by the United Nations General Assembly?

Mr. Lloyd: The right hon. Gentleman is not correct. For example, action under Article 51 is the responsibility of the individual Government—collective self-defence. There are certain circumstances which are not covered by the formula of acting only under the authority of the United Nations. I have given a very carefully considered answer on the legal aspect of the matter. As to the reality—the practical policy of the Government—we are going to give the fullest possible support to the present United Nations operation.

Mr. Bevan: Will the Foreign Secretary give an assurance that we will not act in an armed way in the Lebanon except in self-defence?

Mr. Lloyd: Article 51 is one of the matters involved. For example, the President of the Lebanon has just said today that he would not ask for military intervention outside the framework of the United Nations. He also talked about Article 51. I maintain that no person in my position would depart from the formula which I have given.

Mr. Grimond: While welcoming the statement by the Foreign Secretary that he intends to support the United Nations up to the hilt, may I ask him to make clear that he will not countenance any intervention in the Lebanon which is contrary to the decisions of the United Nations or is due to internal causes and not external causes?

Mr. Lloyd: My formula—"contrary to the Charter or to the established rules of international law"—covers the position.

Mr. Stonehouse: Is the Foreign Secretary aware that suspicions have been aroused on this subject because apparently right hon. Gentlemen and hon. Gentlemen opposite have not yet realised the folly of Suez, and that if our troops were used, even in a successful intervention, this would invite immediate economic reprisals which would be disastrous for that small country? May I further ask what steps he can take to inform the House before our troops are used?

Mr. Lloyd: The hon. Gentleman will not draw me into a discussion of other matters. A lot of malicious people have been saying things in which there is no truth at all.

9. *President Nasser's interview with Al-Sha'b, 29 June 1958*¹⁴

President Gamal Abdel Nasser, in an exclusive interview with *Al-Shaab* on the Lebanese crisis and the unscrupulous means employed by the present rulers of the Lebanon in order to maintain their government, said:

The rulers of the Lebanon have since the beginning of the revolution in that country attempted by all means at their disposal to convert a purely internal crisis into an international issue, levelling all sorts of accusations at the United Arab Republic and deliberately avoiding all reference to the Lebanese Opposition, with no object in view other than the suppression of an internal revolution with the aid of foreign forces and the persecution of the Opposition leaders.

The Lebanese government called the Security Council to meet to consider its accusation against the United Arab Republic. Lebanon's delegate spoke and accused the United Arab Republic and forgot that the Opposition in Lebanon was composed of former presidents, religious leaders of all sects, all former premiers, all former speakers of the Chamber of Deputies and a number of former foreign ministers as well as local leaders and members of all sects.

Lebanon's delegate insisted on saying that the revolt in Lebanon was a result of infiltration from the United Arab Republic and its supplying of arms to members of the revolution. He forgot that the carrying of arms in London (*sic*) is legal, and moreover that the government had distributed arms among its supporters. Lebanon's rulers used this accusation in order to receive supplies of arms from America and Britain to distribute them among their supporters.

¹⁴ *Nasser's Speeches and Press-Interviews, 1958* (Information Department, Cairo) 394-5.

The United Arab Republic did not object to the resolution taken by the Security Council to send U.N. observers to Lebanon because this will show the truth which Lebanon's rulers are trying to hide.

Tension in the Lebanon has been going on since El-Sayed Camille Shamoun announced before parliamentary elections in May, 1957 that he would amend the constitution in order to renew his presidential term for another six years. This led to sanguinary incidents during parliamentary elections.

Tension continued in the Lebanon since its rulers distributed arms and funds among their supporters to intimidate those opposing them and to have them assassinated.

Tension continued in the Lebanon since it was tied by its rulers to foreign pacts.

Tension continued in the Lebanon since its rulers tried to instigate sedition among sects.

Tension continued in the Lebanon since the trial of the well-known cases of vice and corruption.

The direct cause for the outburst of the revolution was the assassination of the free nationalist journalist Nassib El-Matny, after he had been tried several times.

But Lebanon's rulers forgot all these causes and asked America and Britain to occupy Lebanon and take measures to put down the revolution and suppress the Lebanese people. They fabricated the story of United Arab Republic interference and infiltration of individuals from Syria and Egypt.

As to Egyptians, there is no Egyptian community in Lebanon for Lebanon's rulers to level fabricated accusations at. As to Syrians, 70,000 of them live in Lebanon and are working in various fields. Lebanon's rulers expelled 25,000 of them in order to create an appropriate atmosphere for their accusations. They also arrested three of them and referred them to trial. A medical report stated that the mental condition of one of them made him irresponsible for his actions. This is Mohamed Rabi Ammouna who was cited as witness by the Lebanese delegate at the Security Council.

And now after it has been made clear to all that the Lebanon's rulers had overreached themselves in their accusations against the United Arab Republic and that the revolution in the Lebanon was a revolution of the Lebanese people, the Lebanon's rulers have lost their reason and have begun once again to fabricate accusations against the United Arab

Republic and allegations that it continues to interfere, on a wide scale. The aim of the Lebanon's rulers is thus to seek the aid of foreign powers against the Lebanese people.

10. *Statement by the US Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, at a press conference, 1 July 1958*¹⁵

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Chamoun of Lebanon is quoted this morning as saying that, if the United Nations action fails, he would appeal to friends of Lebanon and the West for direct military assistance under article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Could you define for us under what circumstances the United States would be willing to render direct military assistance to Lebanon?

A. I will make a reply to your question, although I am not going to attempt to define in detail all the circumstances under which we might respond. I would say this: The normal way to deal with these problems is through the processes of the United Nations, and the Government of Lebanon initiated such a process when it took its case to the Security Council and obtained the resolution for observation under which the Secretary-General is now acting and under which, I believe, some results at least are being obtained.

Now we have never believed that you could only act under such processes; indeed, article 51 was put into the charter to meet the contingency that it might be impractical, because of the veto power or otherwise, to obtain appropriate action from the United Nations. Article 51, as you will recall, talks about collective defense if an armed attack occurs. Now we do not think that the words "armed attack" preclude treating as such an armed revolution which is fomented from abroad, aided and assisted from abroad. Indeed you will recall perhaps in the report on the North Atlantic Treaty that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee indicated that that kind of a civil disturbance could be treated as an armed attack. In our Japanese security treaty that is expressly spelled out. However, we believe that the best way to deal with these things is through the processes of the United Nations. We do not think it is proper yet to conclude that those processes have failed or will fail. If and when we had to reach that conclusion, then there would be a new situation which we would have to deal with in the light of the new circumstances at the time.

¹⁵ *Department of State Bulletin*, 39 (21 July 1958) 105-6.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have the United Nations observers in Lebanon any authority or power to halt, to arrest, to seize, or to otherwise physically interfere with the infiltrations?

A. No. They are there to observe and to report. It is believed that the very fact that they are there in that capacity will have a practical effect in stopping movements across the border. Of course that is somewhat diminished by the fact that the borders are not readily accessible at the present time, and it is hard to know just exactly what is going on. But to answer your precise question—it is not my understanding that the present force there is in any sense a police force where they use armed force. That may be a second stage.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Lebanese Government, through Mr. Chamoun and through its Foreign Minister, has in a variety of cases said it would be desirable for the United Nations to put enough people into Lebanon to seal off the border. What is our view toward such an operation?

A. I doubt whether it is practical to carry on an operation of that magnitude, and I think that perhaps that is not required. But I would not want to pass any final judgment on that until I saw what kind of case the Government of Lebanon could make if they were to make such a request of the Security Council. So far they haven't made it, and I would not want to prejudge our action before we knew just what kind of case they could make out.

Q. Mr. Secretary, keeping in mind the role we played in discouraging, at least, the invasion of Suez, is it realistic to think that we would participate in any kind of military intervention in Lebanon except under the most extreme circumstances?

A. I don't think that there is any analogy whatsoever between the situation in Lebanon, where the lawful Government is calling for assistance, and the Suez case, where the armed intervention was against the will of the Government concerned. There is no parallel whatever between the two cases. We do believe that the presence in Lebanon of foreign troops, however justifiable—and it is thoroughly justifiable from a legal and international law standpoint—is not as good a solution as for the Lebanese to find a solution themselves. It would be, as you put it, a sort of measure of last resort.

4. The Lebanese Question before the Security Council

INTRODUCTION

ON 21 May the government of Lebanon asked the Arab League to call an urgent meeting to discuss its complaint against interference by the UAR. A similar complaint was lodged with the Security Council on the following day. The Security Council at first decided to postpone consideration of the Lebanese complaint in order to give the Arab League time to discuss it. But as soon as it became clear that the League could not evolve any solution to the satisfaction of Lebanon the Security Council began to deal with the matter on 6 June.

Speaking on behalf of Lebanon, Foreign Minister Charles Malik told the Council that there was massive, illegal and unprovoked intervention in the affairs of Lebanon by the UAR and that it threatened the independence of Lebanon and international peace. These charges were emphatically denied by the UAR who contended that Malik's case was based on reports prepared by the Lebanese *deuxième bureau* and was not supported by irrefutable facts. The United States and Britain supported the Lebanese case. But the Soviet Union felt that Malik had not submitted "convincing evidence of intervention" and cautiously expressed the hope that "no Power will go so far as to intervene in the domestic affairs of Lebanon in any manner whatsoever".¹ It was evident from the sharp difference between the US and the USSR that the Security Council would be unable to contemplate any vigorous action on the Lebanese complaint. With British, American and French backing and Soviet abstention it, however, succeeded in adopting a mild but helpful resolution to dispatch an observation group to Lebanon to ensure against infiltration of personnel or supply of arms from across the borders.

The loyalists in Lebanon interpreted the Security Council resolution as a vindication of their stand. The government, however, reacted cautiously. Premier Sāmī as-Sulh told the Press Trust of India correspondent on 25 June that he wanted a UN force "to put a *cordon sanitaire* along the Syro-Lebanese frontier. It would also have to disarm the rebels and

¹ See below.

restore normalcy." He further warned that if the UN could not do that "we will ask any other nation friendly to us to take care of the situation."²

In the meantime, the UN Secretary-General expeditiously dispatched an observation group to Lebanon. By 25 June the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) consisted of ninety-four military officers drawn from eleven countries. There was still some confusion as to the precise functions of the group. This was dispelled to some extent by Galo Plaza, a senior member of the group who told the press that the operation was for observation purposes and not for police action. "The object," he said, "was to stop infiltration by spotting it and exposing it to world opinion, thus applying moral force."³

The UNOGIL submitted its first report to the Security Council on 3 July 1958. While admitting the difficulties of its mission the UNOGIL reported that "it was not possible to establish if any of the armed men observed had infiltrated from outside" and that "there was little doubt that the vast majority were in any case Lebanese."⁴ The report greatly displeased President Sham'un who told the *Daily Mail* correspondent that it gave "*carte blanche* to Col. Nasser to step up infiltration into Lebanon."⁵ Karim Azkoul officially conveyed the criticism of the Lebanese government to the Security Council on 8 July.⁶

1. *Lebanese complaint to the Security Council, 22 May 1958*

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request you, in your capacity as President of the Security Council, to call an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the following question:

"Complaint by Lebanon in respect of a situation arising from the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."

The said intervention consists, *inter alia*, of the following acts: the infiltration of armed bands from Syria into Lebanon, the destruction of

² *Hindustan Standard* (New Delhi) 26 June 1958.

³ *United Nations Review* (New York), 5 (July 1958): 38.

⁴ See below.

⁵ See below.

⁶ See below.

⁷ SCOR, 13th year, supplement for April, May and June 1958, 33.

Lebanese life and property by such bands, the participation of United Arab Republic nationals in acts of terrorism and rebellion against the established authorities in Lebanon, the supply of arms from Syria to individuals and bands in Lebanon rebelling against the established authorities, and the waging of a violent radio and press campaign in the United Arab Republic calling for strikes, demonstrations and the overthrow of the established authorities in Lebanon, and through other provocative acts.

(Signed) Karim Azkoul
Permanent Representative of
Lebanon to the United Nations

2. *Cablegram from the United National Front to the UN Secretary-General, 25 May 1958^a*

The United National Front of Lebanon is anxious to convey to you its condemnation of the Lebanese Government's complaint to the UN Security Council against the United Arab Republic in connection with the present dispute between the Lebanese people and its government.

The Front regards this dispute as a purely internal affair raised by the Lebanese people to protect its public freedoms and the fundamental human rights sanctified by the law of the United Nations and democratic systems. It strongly protests against any approach to the Security Council, stresses the need for immediately rejecting the complaint and emphasizes that the complaint is based on fictitious evidences and that it would impair the good-neighbourly relations which unite the two sister countries in a natural manner. The Front believes in the wisdom and vast knowledge of the Secretary-General and hopes that he will draw the attention of the Security Council and the United Nations to the dangerous attempts of the Government of Lebanon which would only enhance tension in Lebanon and the Eastern Mediterranean and revive the age-old problems known as the Eastern Question.

Signatories: 'Abdullāh al Yāfi, ex-Premier; Ḥusain al-'Uwayni, ex-Premier, Ilyās al-Khūrī, ex-Minister, Fu'ād Ammūn, former chief of the Lebanese delegation to the UN, Emile Khūrī, ex-Minister; 'Alī Bazzi, Secretary of the United National Front and ex-Deputy; Anīs Sālīh, ex-Secretary to the Ministry of Justice; Shafiq Murtada, Deputy for

^a *Al-Hayāt*, 26 May 1958, 2. (Translated from the Arabic).

Ba'albak; Fū'ād al-Khūrī, ex-Minister; Hasan al-Bahsali, Vice President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

3. *Speech by Mr. Charles Malik (Lebanon), 6 June 1958⁹*

1. Before I make my formal statement, I think I owe a word of explanation to the Security Council.

2. Lebanon placed its present complaint first before the League of Arab States. We are a member of that regional organization and we wanted its machinery to deal first with our issue. Then we brought it to the attention of the Security Council. The Security Council placed this item on its agenda on Tuesday, 27 May 1958 [818th meeting]. At that time, the Arab League had already called a meeting on this matter for Saturday, 31 May. The Government of Lebanon, therefore, requested the Council, on 27 May, only to place the item on its agenda and not to enter into a substantive examination of the issue in order that the Arab League might be given the first chance to deal with the matter. We also asked that the Council meet again on this question one week later, namely on Tuesday, 3 June. The Council was good enough to accede to both these requests.

3. On Saturday, 31 May, the Arab League began considering this matter. It became apparent on Monday, 2 June, that it needed a little more time for the various delegations to confer with one another and with their governments. We therefore asked the Security Council at its 820th meeting on 2 June to postpone for forty-eight hours the meeting scheduled for the following day. The Council again kindly acceded to our request.

4. Thus the Council was to meet yesterday to consider the question. A few minutes before the meeting we received conflicting reports about the proceedings at the Arab League, and I had at once to get in touch with Beirut by telephone. I decided, as a result, to presume once more upon the Council's forbearance and to request one last postponement of twenty-four hours. The Council for the third time granted our request. The government of Lebanon is grateful to the representatives here and to their Governments for their understanding.

5. The Arab League has been in session for six days on this question. It has taken no decision on it. Consequently, the government of Lebanon is now bound, much to its regret, to press this issue before the Security Council. We are all the more bound to do so as the infor-

⁹ SCOR, 823rd meeting, 1-22.

mation I have just received indicates that the intervention of which we complain is increasing both in scope and in intensity.

6. This is the statement I wanted to make before I proceeded to my formal statement, in order to explain the events of the last few days in the Council. I come now to the presentation of the case.

7. I have never before defended or pleaded for Lebanon directly in the United Nations. It is true that there is always a direct bearing upon one's own country in everything one does or says at the United Nations. But Lebanon has never been the central theme of my speeches here. This central theme was often human rights, often again technical assistance, more than once the problems of development, quite often cultural subjects, several times here at this Council disarmament, again and again the diverse problems of Asia and Africa, very often, indeed, the great issues of freedom and totalitarianism in the tragic world of today.

8. Concerning the Arab world, there has not been a single issue in which I did not take an active part. The Arab world is our world and it was my bounden duty, even apart from formal instructions from my Government, to try to elucidate its problems and defend its causes. Whether it was Morocco, or Algeria, or Tunisia or Libya or Egypt in the diverse phases of its problems under discussion at the United Nations, whether it was Yemen, or Saudi Arabia in its interests in the Gulf of Aqaba and elsewhere, or the other struggling Arab countries in the Arabian peninsula, whether it was that momentous theme Palestine with its infinite modulations since 1946 here at the United Nations and in world public opinion, or whether it was Jordan, or Syria—the records of the United Nations contain by now, I suppose, millions of words by me on these great Arab questions. I do not claim that this verbiage achieved much, or that in any given instance it exhausted its subject; I only hold that in all these cases Lebanon tried, through its representative, to be fair, constructive, truthful and concerned not only with the rights of the Arabs, which was indeed its absolute duty, but with the fundamental interests of the world community as a whole and of peace itself. I also suggest that perhaps no single man, Arab or non-Arab, was granted the opportunity that was cumulatively granted me—out of no virtue of my own but through a strange and fortuitous concatenation of circumstances—for massive intervention in behalf of my Arab brethren at the United Nations during the last thirteen years. I am proud of this record.

number 4774 was stopped and searched at the customs post of Aboudieh, in North Lebanon. The vehicle, which was entering Lebanese territory from Syria, was found to be carrying the following: 5 semi-automatic guns, 1949 model; 5 semi-automatic guns, 1936 model; and 1,645 bullets. The names inscribed on these guns were names of Syrian soldiers, namely, Mohammed Abdulla, Mazhar Demian, Zakaria (serial No. 121971) and Ahmed El-Sheikh (serial No. 39593).

(2) The Lebanese state police, on 9 April 1958 intercepted and attacked a group of 110 outlaws who entered Lebanon from Syria, carrying arms. The battle between the police and the outlaws lasted several hours, and resulted in the death of three Lebanese and several rebels. Brought to court, the arrested rebels declared as follows:

"Some hundred Lebanese followers of Kamal Jumblatt were convoked to a meeting in Damascus by the leadership of their party on Monday, 7 April 1958. On that day, Jumblatt followers were met in a café in Damascus by a certain officer of the Syrian army who asked them to stay overnight and return the next day. The next day two Syrian army officers presented themselves in the café, put the followers of Jumblatt on an army truck and drove them to the Lebanese frontiers. Before arriving there the truck left the main road, drove into the fields and stopped at an isolated spot. The Syrian officers told the Lebanese to leave the truck, called them up by name and distributed to every one of them a machine gun, 370 bullets and one grenade, while explaining to them how to use these weapons. Then the officers told them to walk into Lebanese territory and to disperse themselves as soon as possible in order to avoid being pursued by Lebanese security officers."

(3) In a report by the state police of North Lebanon, dated 10 April 1958, information was received that four Syrian officers, two of the rank of major and one captain, entered early in April 1958 the Lebanese border villages, Kora Hawik and Moaisra. They met with members of the Jaafar tribe, now in rebellion, and handed them twenty-five army guns. Other arms were distributed at the same period among the tribe of Arab El Oteik in the Wadi Khaled region. These men were subsequently seen carrying military weapons.

(4) In a report, dated 17 April 1958, by the General Security Department of the Begaa district, members of the Hainada, Jaafar and Haj-Hassan tribes had fired about 1,000 bullets on the state police post at El Hermel during the night of 7 April 1958. On the evening of 12

April 1958, the same rebels were met by a certain Mahdi Hamada who arrived from Syria carrying with him two cases of dynamite. During the night of the same day the same rebels threw dynamite at the headquarters of the Social-Nationalist Party at El Hermel and made an attempt to destroy the bridge at Dawra.

(5) In the early days of May 1958, it was communicated by the state police at Beqaa district that Sabri Hamada, a leader of the Opposition, was distributing arms to his followers immediately after his return from Syria in a Syrian army jeep.

(6) On 16 May 1958, according to report No. 2413/12 by the state police in the Beqaa valley, a group of armed men penetrated into Lebanon from Syria. They had with them mules carrying arms. When intercepted by the state police and attacked in the fields of the Beqaa by military planes, they fled, leaving several dead who were carrying weapons and ammunition.

(7) During the first week of the present disturbances two sailboats were captured at sea off the Lebanese coast. In the first sailboat there were eleven Palestinians of the Egyptian region of Gaza. They carried with them two machine-guns, one revolver, 740 hand grenades and 4,363 Egyptian pounds. One of them had been convicted of belonging to a terrorist group. This sailboat was captured in front of Ras as Sa'diyat in the vicinity of a private house belonging to the President of the Republic. The second sailboat, captured across from Tabarja, north of Beirut, similarly had on board eleven Palestinians of the same Gaza region. These latter had been convicted once by a military tribunal of having clandestinely entered Lebanese territory. On 21 May 1958, Lebanese naval units arrested another sailboat with six passengers aboard, all Lebanese from Tripoli, who declared that they were returning from the region of Tell Kalakh, in Syria, from which they brought arms after having received training under the direction of Syrian officers in the use of these arms.

(8) According to a report by the Lebanese Deuxième Bureau dated 26 May 1958, a meeting was held in Damascus at the office of the Syrian Deuxième Bureau. Those present were three Lebanese, namely, Ghalib Yagi (Baalbek), Mohammed Yahfufi (Nahlé), and Riad Taha, a journalist of the Opposition. At this meeting the Syrian lieutenant Bourhan Adham gave them instructions to bomb army barracks and armed forces wherever they could find them. They were also instructed to keep off American property and were promised that arms would be delivered

in Baalbek by the way of Serghaya. These arms, the Syrian lieutenant said, would be enough to make them unafraid of Lebanese armed forces.

(9) According to a report by the Lebanese General Security Department dated 19 May 1958, three men were arrested near Majdal-Anjar village. Upon being questioned, they confessed that they had been in Damascus by order of the Socialist Party to receive arms and ammunition and carry them back to Deir el Achair for the purpose of using them against Lebanese authorities. Trucks of ammunition and arms as well as members of the Syrian armed forces were seen by Security officers in the house of Khazai Aryane, a relative of a prominent Opposition leader in that district.

(10) In a report by the Lebanese Deuxième Bureau dated 28 May 1958, the following arms and ammunition, restricted to regular army use, were confiscated on Lebanese territory, on 27 and 28 May 1958: at Baalbek, 4 anti-tank grenades "Energa"; at Ain Zabdeh (Beqaa), 1 anti-aircraft gun, 4 cases of mortar shells, army wireless equipment; at Hirj Ain Zabdeh, 1 case containing 10 anti-tank grenades "Energa" and 6 bombs, as well as 1 anti-tank mine. I suggest, Mr. President, that these arms cannot be bought on the open market.

(11) A report by the Lebanese Deuxième Bureau dated 28 May 1958 lists various army weapons and ammunition coming from Syria. These were of different kinds and of various makes, and used only by regular army forces. According to a certain Hisham Naji of Tripoli who was arrested among others on 28 May 1958, these weapons were sent to Mohammed Hamzeh, a prominent Opposition leader in Tripoli. Syrian and Egyptian army marks were found inscribed on them—and I have the pictures of these arms and these marks.

(12) On 12 May 1958 the Consul-General of Belgium in Damascus, Mr. Louis de San, was arrested at the Syrian-Lebanese frontier, and the following were seized in his car: 33 machine guns, 28 revolvers with ammunition, 35 units of gun ammunition, 31 units of revolver ammunition containing 1,500 cartridges, 15,000 cartridges and 1 bomb with an automatic detonator. The Consul-General was carrying with him a letter addressed to a mysterious person in Beirut ordering the bombing of three main streets in Beirut and the Presidential Palace. It also ordered the throwing of explosives in various sectors of the city; the setting up of barricades in the streets, and the killing of Syrian persons living in Beirut as refugees. It is significant that, at the moment of his arrest, Mr. Louis de San refused to allow the search of his car and requested

to return to Syria without being searched and without continuing into Lebanon. He pretended that he had been entrusted by his driver with the suitcases containing the weapons and that he was ignorant of their contents. A few minutes later his driver presented himself at the Lebanese Customs, apparently disturbed and accompanied by the chief of the Syrian Customs to inquire about Mr. de San. It should be pointed out that the following night the Lebanese Customs post, at Mazraa that arrested Mr. de San was the subject of an armed attack by several hundred Syrians and Lebanese coming from Syria. This attack will be discussed later [see para 22(11)]. The Government of Lebanon had from the beginning expressed its firm belief that the friendly Government of Belgium had nothing whatsoever to do with the activity of Mr. de San.

(13) On 29 May 1958, several persons were arrested in the neighbourhood of Sur (Tyre) in the south of Lebanon for having taken part in subversive activities against the village of Qana. These persons had considerable quantities of arms which they confessed they had received from across the border in Syria from the villages of Al-Ghajar and Baniyas. They also gave the names of scores of people belonging to their villages who had shortly before crossed the frontiers and obtained arms from Syrian army officers. Some of these men made their contacts with the Syrian Army through the Opposition leader, Ahmed El-Assad. These men come from the villages of Saddigin and Zabigin.

(14) On 28 May 1958, a truck coming from Syria and loaded with the following arms and ammunition was seized near Tripoli: 88 "Bertha" mortars; 1 Mauser rifle; 1 machine-gun ("Energa", British make); 1 anti-tank gun ("Energa", British make); 18 bomb shells ("Energa"); 12 jute bags containing ammunition for the above-mentioned weapons; 60 cases containing hand grenades; 1 jute bag containing mortar shells; 12 cans containing dynamite; 60 rifles (French make) 1936 model, of which 22 were marked "Syrian Army"; 28 boxes containing large-size "Bertha" ammunition, inscribed "The Egyptian Army—1949—Made under the supervision of the Technical Research Department." Again, I have pictures of all these arms, and again I suggest that many of these arms cannot be bought on the open market.

(15) There are several thousand armed men engaged in subversive activities in Lebanon today. Most of these men operate near the Syrian borders in the north of Lebanon, in the Beqaa valley, and in the south. We have no doubt at all, from all the evidence that we have gathered, that all the arms that these men use were supplied them from Syria.

17. I have given above only a limited selection of the evidence in our possession that there is a considerable flow of arms coming across our borders from Syria. The Government of Lebanon therefore believes that all men engaged in subversive activities in Lebanon today are supplied with arms from the United Arab Republic.

18. I come now to the second set of facts, namely, the one that deals with the training in subversion on the territory of the United Arab Republic of elements from Lebanon and the sending back of these elements to Lebanon to subvert their Government.

(1) We know that measures have been taken in Syria for training Lebanese and non-Lebanese commandos under the direction of the Syrian officer Akram Safwa and other officers belonging to the Syrian Deuxieme Bureau. These training officers constitute in Syria a unit named the "Maghawyr Unit." It is to be noted that the majority of those arrested for espionage, distribution of pamphlets and of threatening letters, and destructive activity in Lebanon—and we have plenty of them in our prisons; I can present them to you any time you like—belong to this unit.

(2) A number of persons among the followers of Kamal Jumblatt went to Syria for training with Syrian Druses in the use of quick arms and the throwing of bombs and explosives. A number of them had been seen crossing the southern border entering into Lebanese territory. Also about 150 men from Tripoli and its vicinity had been witnessed in the Syrian town of Hadbussya, near Tell Kalakh, being trained by the Syrian army in the use of arms. We have a considerable list of persons—I have it with me here—who had been arrested and who pleaded guilty to receiving military training in Syria.

(3) On 30 May 1958, seven armed men were arrested by the police. Upon being questioned, they confessed that they, together with 150 others, had been to Syria where they were directed to Baniyas military barracks. There they were handed arms and ammunition as well as money and were ordered to return to Lebanon in army trucks to participate in the current uprising against the Government of Lebanon.

(4) A number of armed men were arrested following their participation in an armed attack in southern Lebanon. They confessed to having received arms and ammunition from Syrian military officers, who also gave them money and training.

19. During the last two days, I have received considerable further information on precisely this item, namely, on the training of Lebanese nationals on Syrian territory. I have not included it in this report, but the four facts which I have just set forth here under this item are enough to prove the charge dealing with training in subversion on the territory of the United Arab Republic of elements from Lebanon and the sending back of these elements to Lebanon to subvert their Government.

20. I come now to the third set of facts, dealing with the participation of United Arab Republic civilian nationals residing in Lebanon or passing into Lebanon in subversive and terrorist activities in Lebanon.

(1) Early in January 1958, Lebanese security authorities reported that two Syrians, Ahmed Kassim Al-Juju, and Jafar Al-Juju, of Serghaya in Syria, transmitted explosives and other accessory equipment to a certain Mohammed Mulhim Kassim, of Hortalé in Lebanon. The latter revealed that these weapons were destined to be used to blow up Government premises in Baalbek. He was also instructed to be ready for forthcoming contacts with the Syrians. Later in May, Government headquarters were in fact blown up by the rebels.

(2) During the night of 12 May 1958, the military police in Beirut arrested a certain Mohammed Katmi, a Syrian national and native of Hama, Syria, who was a student at the American University of Beirut and a resident of Al Hamra quarter in Ras Beirut. Upon searching his house, the police found ten machine guns and a huge quantity of ammunition. Four other Syrians who were found in the house were also arrested.

(3) In the course of an armed attack by rebels in Sayda (Sidon) on 25 May 1958, twenty-two Syrians were arrested among those who were attacking, thirteen of whom carried Syrian army identity cards.

(4) On 12 May 1958, the military police arrested a certain Atalla Al-Hariri of Syrian nationality while he was engaged in setting up road-blocks in Fuad Al-Awal Street in Beirut.

(5) On 9, 10 and 11 May 1958, violent demonstrations broke out in Tripoli. Among the demonstrators arrested were nine carrying Syrian identification cards.

(6) During 1958, security reports show that tens of Syrians and Palestinians from Gaza were arrested for terrorist activities. On 20 May 1958, 146 terrorists of Syrian nationality were being prosecuted by the Lebanese authorities.

(7) According to police report No. 9426, dated 17 May 1958, a certain Salahdin Mardini, of Syrian nationality, was arrested at the Claridge Hotel in Beirut for insulting the Chief of State. Another person of Syrian nationality, by the name of Abdul Kader Kayouh, was also arrested for carrying a military map. Other Syrian suspects were arrested on various similar charges.

(8) In the same report, it was stated that a Syrian by the name of Moustafa El-Sayed was arrested for threatening to close the shop of a shopkeeper in the Avenue des Français. Another Syrian, Mohamed Mir'i, was also brought to court for illegally carrying arms.

(9) On 17 May 1958, a certain Mohamed Yunis Saleh Assfari, of Idlib, Syria, was arrested for possessing and transporting dynamite shells. Evidence that he was also guilty of terrorist activities was also brought against him. On 30 May 1958, he was sentenced by the military court to life imprisonment at hard labour.

21. This listing of specific cases in which Syrian or Egyptian civilian nationals participated in subversive activities in Lebanon can be considerably extended. But the indicated set of facts is enough to prove that United Arab Republic civilian nationals residing in Lebanon or passing into Lebanon have participated in subversive and terrorist activities in Lebanon.

22. I come now to the fourth set of facts, dealing with the participation not of Lebanese civilian nationals trained in Syria, nor of Syrian or Egyptian civilian nationals, but of United Arab Republic governmental elements, in subversive and terrorist activities and in the direction of rebellion in Lebanon.

(1) On 19 February 1958, a certain Ahmed Alif Akachi, of Syrian nationality, a Syrian army draftee (21st Group. Serial No. 24560), confessed before the prosecutor of the military court that he had been sent to Lebanon by his chief, Commandant Mohammed El-Sodk, in order to meet in Beirut certain individuals who would instruct him to throw explosives at the Presidential Palace and the residence of the Prime Minister.

(2) On 13 May 1958, a certain Mohammed Abdul Rahman Jabari, of Aleppo, Syria, was arrested in Beirut. He confessed that he was a Syrian army officer (serial No. 13748) attached to the First Battalion, and that he had been sent to Lebanon by Captain Ahmed Nagib Maar-

awi, head of the Deuxième Bureau in Aleppo, to join a group of Syrian soldiers in Beirut, where they carried out terrorist activities. He also confessed that many others like him arrived in Lebanon clandestinely and separately, and then formed themselves into units of eleven members each. He said that he had received arms and money in Beirut and that he had participated in terrorist acts against public order. On 30 May 1958, he was sentenced by the Lebanese military court to serve fifteen years at hard labour.

(3) On 17 May 1958, the state police in the region of Chouf arrested two men on the bridge of Nabaa es Safa, the two men being named Turki Hassan, whose serial number in the Syrian army was 7348, and Mahmoud Abdel Ghany Saab, whose serial number was 322. The first turned out to be a student at the Syrian Military School, and the second a member of the Eleventh Group of Armed Forces in the town of Douma, Syria.

(4) A Syrian army officer was arrested on 15 May 1958 in Suq al Gharb. He was carrying maps of Lebanon and the names of the United States, British and French Ambassadors in Lebanon, and other pertinent information.

(5) On 21 May 1958, the vegetable market in Beirut was reopened. At noon on the same day, two bombs were thrown, and the explosion caused the death of two persons and injured several others. On the following day, 22 May, a bomb exploded in a main commercial street of Beirut, Suq Tawileh, which had always refused to close its stores. This resulted in the death of one person and serious injury to several others. The perpetrator of these two incidents, Mohammed Rabih Bakri, is of Syrian nationality. He confessed that he had arrived in Lebanon two weeks earlier, that he had left the Syrian armed forces on order of his chief, Captain Aliwan, and that he was to come to Lebanon and contact a certain group, which instructed him to throw three bombs in the vegetable market and the Suq Tawileh. This is all taken from the verbatim record of the military prosecutor, dated 23 May 1958.

(6) For two years now, the Syrian Deuxième Bureau has been conducting on Lebanese territory activities contrary to Lebanese policy. It has continuously increased the number of its agents and has thus provoked a number of incidents: terrorism, setting off of bombs, dynamiting, distribution of pamphlets, sending of anonymous threatening letters. The agents of this Bureau are for the most part Syrians or Palestinian refugees, although there are some Lebanese among them. The following

agents were arrested, tried and convicted for subversive activities: Abdul Rahim Saleh Abu-Hajala, Palestinian, twelve years' hard labour; Jalal Mohamed Ka'housh, Palestinian, four years' hard labour; Abdel Rahman Assad Keblawi, Palestinian, four years' hard labour; Abdul Hamid Kamel Saadeh, Palestinian, four years' hard labour; Mohamed Ali Sayyed, Syrian, fifteen years' hard labour *in absentia*; Mustafa Kassab, Syrian, fifteen years' hard labour *in absentia*. Many other agents of the Syrian Deuxième Bureau were arrested, and confessed that they were engaged in espionage in Lebanon.

(7) During 1957 and 1958 many terrorist and subversive activities were carried out by agents of the Governments of Syria and Egypt. These activities include bombings, assassinations and kidnappings. Worthy of special mention is the case of the Egyptian Military Attaché in Beirut, Hassan Khalil. Early in 1957, he was arrested carrying in his car a considerable quantity of arms. The investigations that followed his arrest led to the discovery of a terrorist gang responsible for previous acts of terrorism. This gang was responsible for the bombing of the Iraq Petroleum Company's installations in Tripoli, the British School of Chimlan, the *SS Norman Prince*, the Port of Beirut, the St. George Club, the British Bank of the Middle East and the Banque de Syrie et du Liban.

(8) On 3 May 1958 a group of about 200 Syrian Army conscripts crossed the Lebanese border and occupied the village of Kahr Shuba, in the district of Hasbayya. (Incidentally, you will notice that the importance of these things increases as I go on. I have arranged them in mounting order of importance. Those that I have left to the end of any listing are, in general, of a more serious character). These 200 Syrian Army conscripts attacked the Lebanese security forces, who answered their fire and drove them out of the village. The assailants then entrenched themselves in the neighbouring hills on Lebanese territory, at Janan, Hirj Sedama, Ain Joz, Hirj Wistani, and began to open fire day and night.

(9) On 15 May 1958, another group of several hundred Syrian Army conscripts occupied the Lebanese village of Shab'a and destroyed the roads and the telephone lines connecting the district with other Lebanese villages. On 18 May 1958, the chief of the Socialist Party at Hasbayya met with the Syrian leaders of Shab'a and later recommended to his friends at Hasbayya not to oppose any Syrian assailants that might invade the locality. During the night of 20 May 1958, the assailants

opened a continuous fire at Hasbayya, but the state police obliged them to retreat towards Shab'a.

(10) On 14 and 15 May 1958, three Syrian Army jeeps carrying troops arrived in Aboudieh from the Syrian post at Daboussieh and set fire to the documents and furniture of the General Security Officer and destroyed the posts of the state police and the Customs. On the same day the posts of the state police at Sebhel and Miziara were attacked and occupied by armed men coming from Syria. The same happened to the post at Souaqui on 13 May 1958.

(11) During the night of 12-13 May 1958, an armed band of several hundred persons, at least one hundred of whom were Syrians, attacked the Lebanese customs outpost at Mazraa—the one to which I referred in connexion with the Belgian Consul-General—destroying by dynamite the customs installations and those of the security police, and massacring six Lebanese officials. A few days later the Lebanese security forces arrested three individuals of Lebanese nationality as they were crossing the border clandestinely from Syria to Lebanon. The cross-examination of these three prisoners revealed the fact that the band which attacked Mazraa came from Deir el Achair situated exactly at the Lebanese-Syrian frontier. It gathered at the home of Shebli Aryane, who distributed arms to its members. For several days three Syrian officers, wearing respectively three stars, two stars and one or two stars, paid frequent visits to Shebli Aryane and supplied him with guns and sub-machine-guns. The same officers met with the members of the band and gave them instructions for the attack on Mazraa. It also transpired from the cross-examination of drivers who wanted to cross the frontier near Mazraa during the day of 12 May that the band of attackers had started its preparations in Syrian territory around noon that day. The Syrian authorities at the post of Judaydat Yabus, facing the post of Mazraa, interrupted the traffic to conceal from the Lebanese authorities the preparations in question. According to witnesses the majority of the attackers of Mazraa infiltrated later into the Shouf and the upper Metene, while one hundred Druses of Syrian nationality returned to Deir el Achair to await Syrian reinforcements.

(12) Already in 1957, when the terrorist group organized by the Military Attaché of Egypt in Lebanon was active in the capital and in the other towns, a serious incident took place at the Lebanese-Syrian border, in Deir el Achair. During the night of 11 and 12 September 1957, a group of 175 Lebanese state police arrived at Deir el Achair

to put an end to the smuggling of arms from Syria into Lebanon that had been going on for some time in that locality. On 12 September 1957 this group was attacked from various places situated on the neighbouring Syrian mountains, while trucks of the Syrian Army went back and forth carrying men and soldiers to the assailants. The state police returned the fire. In the course of the battle it became evident that the number of Syrians had considerably increased, thanks to the reinforcements brought in by the Syrian armed forces. Consequently, the Lebanese state police were taken prisoners by the assailants and later on declared that they had seen with Shebli Aryane, the Opposition leader, at Deir el Achair, a Syrian army officer named Rifai Amin. According to the information received by the authorities, a meeting was held at Deir el Achair before the incident took place between Shebli Aryane and other leaders of the Lebanese Opposition on the one side, and Syrian officers on the other. These were recognized to be Commandant Talaat Sadki, Assistant Chief of the Deuxième Bureau; Commandant Bourhan Adham, Chief of the Syrian Military Police; and Lieutenant Bourhan Boulos, Chief of Palestinian commandos attached to the Syrian Deuxième Bureau. At that meeting an agreement was reached to furnish arms and money to Lebanese who were ready to provoke an armed revolt against the President of the Republic and the present Lebanese authorities.

23. I apologize for having read so much detail to the members of the Council. I wish to assure you that I could have multiplied what I have read by at least twenty in order to have exhausted all the documents that we have on this subject.

24. I think that I have given enough examples under the first four sets of facts to prove my point conclusively, namely, the four things which I have maintained: that arms are flowing into Lebanon from Syria; that Lebanese nationals are trained in subversion in Syria; that Syrian civilian nationals are also infiltrating into Lebanon and taking part in subversive activities; and, finally, that United Arab Republic governmental elements direct and, in some instances, take an active part in the subversive activity that is going on in Lebanon today. I think that the first claim is adequately proved.

25. I come now to the second claim, that this intervention aims at undermining, and does in fact threaten, the independence of Lebanon.

26. In the context of this argument the term "subversion" is used

in the broad sense of any action aimed at the overthrow of the established Government by violence or by illegal means. If arms flow on a large scale from Country A to subversive elements in Country B, if subversive elements in Country B are trained in subversion in Country A and are sent back to their home country to practise their training, if civilian nationals from Country A themselves take part in subversive acts in Country B, and if officials of Country A direct and take part in subversive activities in Country B, then, I think, it is fair to conclude immediately, even without further evidence, that this massive intervention in Country B by Country A is not something beneficent or friendly, is not aimed at supporting or strengthening or upholding the government of Country B but, on the contrary, is aimed at undermining and, to the extent it succeeds, does in fact threaten the independent existence of Country B. If, then, I have proved, as I believe I have, that the United Arab Republic as Country A has in fact done all these things to Lebanon as Country B, then it appears that my second claim is already substantially proved.

27. But there is further evidence of a more formal nature. Conceivably, the material evidence which I have just adduced above could be attenuated or explained away as to its significance; conceivably, one could question the truth of this or that particular fact adduced; conceivably, even assuming the truth of all that I have so far set forth, one could still hold that these were sporadic instances which do not, even in the aggregate justify the sweeping conclusions which I have drawn from them. I, personally, do not believe that any of these "conceivably possible" attitudes is right or fair or valid, given the full impact of the material evidence. But there is further evidence of a more compelling and decisive character which I propose now to turn to. It is the evidence of the word, the printed word and the spoken word, than which there is nothing that formalizes and seals more the intent and the purpose and the state of the heart.

28. I turn now to the fifth set of facts, namely, the violent and utterly unprecedented press campaign conducted by the United Arab Republic against the Government of Lebanon.

29. It is generally considered, and I believe it to be a fact, that the Press of the United Arab Republic is a government-controlled Press. Some may deny this fact, but what no one can deny is that this Press is fairly uniform in its presentation of issues and that there is no criticism in it of the Government of the United Arab Republic or of conditions

in that country. I have been constrained to make this observation in order to show that there must be some connexion between the Government and the Press in the United Arab Republic with respect to what that Press says about Lebanon.

30. Now we have a complete file of that Press for the last two years. Great libraries—private libraries, official libraries, university libraries—in the Soviet Union, in Europe, in America and elsewhere, must also have files of the Egyptian and Syrian Press. Doubtless also the press services of chancelleries of the great Powers—and perhaps also of many other Powers—prepare at least adequate digests of the Press of the United Arab Republic. I make this last remark in order to express my belief that many around this table know very well what I am talking about here.

31. A study of this Press—and it is available to anybody for study; I know that it is here in the United Nations—will reveal at once the most violent campaign against the Government of Lebanon. Our Government is called by every conceivable and inconceivable name. There is no war between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic, and yet I doubt if, in the darkest hours of the Second World War, the Press of the belligerents used the same sort of unrestrained violence against each other as the Press of the United Arab Republic has been using lavishly against the Government of Lebanon.

32. I can quote literally thousands—tens of thousands—of articles demonstrating my point. I shall not, of course, weary the Council with that, but permit me to place before you a few samples, chosen completely at random, of statements made by the United Arab Republic Press in the last few weeks.

33. On 17 April 1958 *Al Akhbar* of Cairo stated: "The Lebanese parties are against the renewal of the presidency of Chamoun."

34. The same paper stated on 18 April: "Ultimatum to Chamoun. Lebanon is threatened by a bloody revolution. . . ." This was about three weeks before the events. ". . . The inhabitants of Lebanon are ready to carry arms for a bloody uprising. Disorders in all parts of the country." There were no disorders at all at that time.

35. The following statements appeared in the same paper on 14 May, five days after the outbreak of the disorders:

"Popular forces triumphed as proved by the fact that the security forces in most of the Lebanese localities joined them. . . ."

That is not at all true.

"... The Lebanese people have been too patient with regard to the policies followed by their rulers without consulting them and against their will. The Lebanese people have said their word against those responsible for a reactionary pro-imperialistic policy contrary to the interests of the Arabs."

36. The same paper stated on 18 May: "Definitive separation of Tripoli from Lebanon and the creation of a local government in North Lebanon." There is no truth in this. It is as though it were insinuated that this should happen.

37. On the same date the same paper said: "The Lebanese people are against Chamoun: America does not want to understand." I have no idea what America or Chamoun has to do with the matter.

38. *Al-Gumhouria* of Cairo, generally regarded as the mouth-piece of the Egyptian authorities, stated on 6 April: "Open appeal for a revolt in Beirut." This was one month before the events took place.

39. In the same paper, on 12 April, one month before the disorders began, there was an open appeal for a "holy war" against Chamoun. If this is not intervention, I would like to know what is. This paper carried out daily the most inflammatory and insulting statements against the Government of Lebanon during the past several months.

40. In *Akhbar El Yom* of Cairo, on 12 April, again one month before the outbreak of the recent disorders:

"A revolution may break out in Lebanon, the revolution of the people of Lebanon against injustice and against the tyrant, and it will end in the victory of the people and the downfall of the tyrant much sooner than people think."

41. In the same paper, on 26 April:

"The struggle continues in Lebanon." This is about two weeks before the events. "The State is at the verge of a volcano. This is the struggle of the Press against the tyrant, of liberty against tyranny, a struggle which one observes in the houses, in the streets, in the palaces, in the huts. Every day from hour to hour people expect an event."

42. In *Al Shaab* of Cairo, on 13 April: "Danger of civil war in Lebanon. Camille Chamoun cause of the division." That was one month before the events.

43. In the same paper, on 19 April: "The situation becomes more and more grave in Lebanon. The people are preparing themselves to rise against the authorities."

44. In the same paper, on 14 May: "A man whom the people raised to power sells this people, sells the State and sells his conscience."

45. In the same paper, on 18 May: "For a year we have been telling the Arabs that Camille Chamoun is a spy, a liar, a deceiver and a calumniator." The paper confesses to having done so for a year.

46. In *Al-Tarbia* of Damascus, on 20 May: "The Lebanese people continue their revolt. Forward, heroic people of Lebanon, forward to victory and liberty."

47. While I can multiply these quotations by the thousands, I think what I have given is enough to prove my point. I understand the possibility of press attacks against hostile foreign Governments; I even understand the possibility of these attacks being most violent. But what I frankly do not understand is that for months now, and perhaps even for two years, not a single kind or appreciative word—I repeat, not a single kind or appreciative word—has been said by any Egyptian or Syrian paper about the Government of Lebanon, a sister Government which is certainly not hostile. This fact alone, I submit, should arrest the attention of the Security Council.

48. The proposition that the Egyptian and Syrian Press for many months now has been waging a most unrelenting campaign of attack against and vilification of the Government of Lebanon, of open incitement of the people of Lebanon to revolt against their Government, and of open support of the subversive activities now going on in Lebanon, this proposition is absolutely indubitable. I submit that there is no instance anywhere else in the world today of a similar press campaign.

49. The sixth set of facts which prove my second claim, and also partially the first claim, concerns the radio, the violent and utterly unprecedented radio campaign conducted by the United Arab Republic, inciting the people of Lebanon to overthrow their Government.

50. The radio differs from the Press in two crucial respects. Not everybody can read, but, except for the deaf, everybody can hear; and in the East, in general, I think it is a fact that more people listen to the radio than read the newspapers, and the living voice is more effective in the dissemination and impression of opinion than the printed word. Secondly, whatever the relationship between the Press and the Government in some countries, that between the radio and the Government

is at least as close. Thus, while it is conceivably possible for some to hold that in the United Arab Republic the Press is free, no one will deny that in the United Arab Republic the radio is controlled by the Government. The evidence of the radio, then, so far as the actuality and aim of intervention are concerned, is the highest and most authentic.

51. There is in our library—and perhaps also in the libraries of other countries—a compilation of transcripts of thousands and tens of thousands of radio broadcasts from Cairo and Damascus for the last several months. I have with me about 500 of them. The following are a few samples chosen completely at random from the more recent broadcasts.

52. The United Arab Republic Broadcasting Service in Cairo, known as Cairo Radio, 9 May 1958: "The free people of Lebanon know very well how to bring about the overthrow of the Government."

53. The United Arab Republic Broadcasting Service in Damascus, or Damascus Radio, 10 May 1958:

"The object of the strike and the demonstrations in Lebanon following the assassination of Metni is the expression of discontent and wrath of the people against the policy"—the whole thing is political—"followed in Lebanon which in no way serves the interests of Lebanon." This is intervention. "Imperialism has succeeded in dragging a limited number of Lebanese into accepting the Eisenhower Doctrine"—there is the point—"and has thus created a breach which imperialist collaborators believe they can hide from the people under the camouflage of economic aid. These hopes have been dissipated."

54. Damascus Radio, 11 May 1958:

"The tyrant imperialist collaborators wanted to realize today in Lebanon some of their objectives sought by the aggression against Egypt; they wanted to divert the Arab people of Lebanon from that which is most dear to them. They wanted to make of them a centre of intrigue against liberating Arab nationalism. The Arab people of Lebanon who have decided to struggle for their liberty, for their independence and the liberation of their country from tyrants and imperialist collaborators shall persist in the struggle until they accomplish the ideals for which they are dedicating themselves, no matter what the sacrifice."

55. Damascus Radio, 11 May 1958:

"The people of Lebanon lead today the battle against imperialism. The Arab people of Lebanon want to liquidate imperialism. They were able in a few days to demolish all that imperialism built up in years. Wide horizons open before Lebanon."

56. Cairo Radio, 12 May 1958:

"The situation aggravates in Lebanon. Attempted destruction of the Presidential Palace." This never happened. This broadcast purports to be only a news summary and is a sample of the type of news summary that is heard these days from Cairo and Damascus. "News of riots in Lebanese cities. The Arab people in Tripoli are in control of the entrances of the city." This is not true. "Destruction of bridges. Rupture of communications. Insurgents dominate Zghorta." This is not true. "Three bombs are thrown at the Presidential Palace during a meeting of the Council of Ministers." This never happened. "The opposition urges the resignation of the President of the Republic."

57. Damascus Radio, 13 May 1958:

"Our people who have seized the head"—and this is significant, this is one of the more, to use a mild term, violent broadcast—"of the dragon coming from Washington, London, Paris and Tel-Aviv, have decided not to permit the tail to wag in Beirut, Amman and Baghdad. We have decided to tie the wrists and ankles of the monster, to clip its claws and extract its fangs. The band which gathers together all the agents, the traitors, the mercenaries and the rats of Nuri as-Said and el-Rifai, and the spies of the Americans and the English cannot stop the people from speaking and from being heard. Death to imperialism and to the agents of imperialism."

58. Cairo Radio, 14 May 1958:

"The Lebanese authorities together with the West know henceforth that the people are on the verge of imposing themselves. They started preparing themselves for an attempt to stop the people by sparking the fire. England speaks of its anxiety and the tales of the American Sixth Fleet continue. Come what may, victory shall be for the people and the forces of evil and tyranny shall retreat, and the fire shall devour those who lighted it."

59. Now I come to something quite interesting, namely, a broadcast with which I want to end this tale of horror. On 27 May 1958, only a few days ago, at seven o'clock in the evening, Damascus Radio broadcast a short skit, a short drama, entitled: "The Triumph of the Revolution in Lebanon." There are various actors in this skit, one representing the President of Lebanon, one representing the Prime Minister and several representing other government officials; then of course there is the mob, soldiers in the street, insurgent leaders and other characters. The action is very dramatic and swift. I have it with me; you can hear it any time you like. It is in Arabic. At one point the guards of the President's Palace join the demonstrators and desert the President. Then the insurgents rush into the Palace and find the President there. The leader of the insurgents, as soon as he sees the President, shouts "Death to the traitor". The President starts crying, begging him to spare his life. Then there is tumult and shouts and confusion and further cries of "Death to the traitor. Yield to the will of the people." At that point one hears a crisp shot and then we hear the statement "This is the reward of treason".

60. It is not pleasant to quote you this stuff. But this is what we have been living under, we and our children and our people, for months and years. I leave it to your conscience and to the conscience of your Governments to judge whether there has or has not been intervention in the affairs of Lebanon and whether the independence of Lebanon is not in deadly peril.

61. In connexion with this radio war there has lately been sprung upon us in the Near East a strange voice entitled "Radio Free Lebanon." This clandestine voice incites our people to rebellion, supports the subversion at present let loose in Lebanon, and in every way conforms to the standards and policies of the United Arab Republic. The term "Free Lebanon" is interesting. Everybody knows that if there is freedom anywhere in the Near East it exists in Lebanon, and the discerning also know that the ultimate significance of our present struggle, above and beyond every passing accident, both internal and external, is precisely to prevent whatever genuine freedom we have been enjoying from being completely submerged and extinguished. The significance of our crisis is that Lebanon as a lamp of real freedom, both personal and social, in the Near East must be preserved and strengthened, not only for the benefit of the Near East and indeed of the whole world, but as an end in itself. To speak, therefore, of freedom coming to Lebanon from out-

side our borders in the Near East is one of those perversions of language in which this confused age abounds. But we have been able to determine the direction from which Radio Free Lebanon comes, and it is a simple method of determination. That direction is unmistakably the territory of the United Arab Republic.

62. This survey of the bearing of the printed and spoken word upon our crisis appears to justify the following four conclusions:

(1) The vehemence of the attack upon the Government of Lebanon by the propaganda media of the United Arab Republic is practically unparalleled. This vehement attack has been going on for two years with mounting crescendo.

(2) In this unparalleled propaganda attack there is mounting incitement of the people of Lebanon to rebel against their Government. Thus, long before the present disturbances broke out on 9 May, there were unmistakable preparations for them in the Press and radio of the United Arab Republic, and a mood of expectancy was sedulously cultivated whereby people were made to expect that some great "event" was about to take place, that the "uprising of the people" was just around the corner, that the fall of the "tyrant" was imminent.

(3) After the outbreak of the present disturbances, the entire propaganda machinery of the United Arab Republic was geared to upholding, promoting, inflaming and even directing and guiding the subversive activities going on in Lebanon.

(4) The unmistakable aim of this propaganda campaign is to overthrow the present régime in Lebanon and to replace it with one that would be more subservient to the will of the United Arab Republic. You know what the only sin of Lebanon is: the only sin of Lebanon in the eyes of the United Arab Republic is not that it has really done or is likely to do any harm to any country, let alone any Arab country, but that it is independent and follows a policy of friendship towards and co-operation with the Western world. We plead guilty on both of these counts.

63. The second claim of my argument is now proven. The intervention of which we are complaining aims at undermining, and does in fact threaten, our independence. And since our independence is very sacred to us and since the threatened independence of any Member of the United Nations by definition endangers the maintenance of interna-

tional peace and security, which is the primary responsibility of the Security Council, we have deemed it fit to bring our case to the attention of this Council.

64. This brings me at once to the more detailed proof of the third claim. There is massive intervention in our affairs. Our internal problems—and who does not have internal problems?—are played upon; seized upon, wilfully accentuated from outside, taken advantage of; and therefore our independence is threatened. When independence is threatened by external intervention, this is automatically a situation in which the Security Council is interested.

65. No region in the whole world is more sensitive than the Near East. Interference by States in one another's affairs in that area is certain to have international repercussions. There is the most delicate balance of forces and powers there; let this balance be but slightly upset and incalculable consequences could ensue. Therefore, a situation like ours, with such possibilities of development, is exactly one with which the Security Council should be concerned. This is what we have done by calling the attention of this Council to our case.

66. Think of the equilibrium of interests in the Near East. Think of the convergence of forces upon our area from all over the globe: from the north, from the east, from the south, from the west. There are tremendous political, economic and strategic interests at stake in the Near East. For about a month now the attention of the whole world has been steadily fixed upon us. Not a single great Power, not a single permanent member of the Security Council, has not expressed intense concern about our affairs. They are all poised watching developments, eyeing one another. This is then pre-eminently a question of the maintenance of international peace and security. And nothing is more obvious than that, if this situation which inherently embodies a threat to our independence continues, then the maintenance of international peace and security is endangered.

67. We ask this Council, then, to bring its wisdom into play, to the end that the unprovoked massive intervention stop, that our independence, to which we have every right, be preserved and indeed strengthened, and that as a result the threat to international peace and security inherent in this situation be removed.

68. By way of conclusion—and I apologize to the Council for having taken so much of its time—may I say that Lebanon is a small country. Nobody can accuse it of harbouring any designs on anybody. It has

always worked for peace; it has always been a modest factor for good in the world. It never meddled with other people's business. It wished well for everybody, and above all for its sister Arab States. It deserves, therefore, a better fate at the hands of the world.

69. Every other country in the Middle East has its formal international agreements or connexions whereby it feels more or less safe, except Lebanon. Lebanon alone in the Middle East has no vast, formal, safety-conferring arrangement with other Powers outside the area, while every other country in the Middle East has some such vast arrangement. Certainly Lebanon is not without its friends, but its relations to them have not been excessively formal. It has trusted their sense of honour and justice; it has pinned its faith upon the spirit and not upon the letter.

70. Of all countries in the Middle East then, Lebanon primarily depends upon the United Nations for its safety. The Charter is our primary protection. We cannot protect ourselves alone: we are much too small and fragile for that. We require the active understanding and support of the world community.

71. Our case then is a test case. It is the case of every small country in the world. If intervention in the affairs of one small country should be allowed to work its way without let or hindrance, how can any other small country feel secure again? The great Powers can take care of themselves; the Charter is not primarily made for them. But the small nations cannot see a small nation, one of themselves, interfered in without themselves feeling the profoundest anxiety. What if the same thing one day happened to them? Are they sure that, if they do not now rally around this small nation, others will rally around them if at some future date they should, God forbid, find themselves in the same predicament? The United Nations must above all protect the small nations, and the small nations themselves must co-operate with the United Nations in the protection of any one of them.

72. What is it then that we want? We want only that the intervention in all its aspects stop. We want the press and radio campaigns to cease. We want the flow of arms to the insurgents to come to an end. We want the infiltration of subversives to terminate. We want to solve our internal problems in peace, between ourselves, and without external interference. We want the best possible relations with the United Arab Republic. We want to be given an opportunity to prove again to

our brethren in the United Arab Republic how much we love and respect them.

73. We believe all this is possible, necessary and natural. We ask this Council to help us achieve it. We leave it to the Council's wisdom to decide how it can be achieved. We have tried direct contacts with the United Arab Republic, but without avail. We resorted to the League of Arab States and we gave it all opportunity to act, but no decision was taken, and the intervention, far from abating, has actually increased in intensity in the last day or two. Now our independence, our fate, and peace in the area and perhaps even in the world, are the Council's responsibility. The Council is our last recourse. We certainly also depend upon God and ourselves.

4. *Speech by Mr. 'Umar Lutfi (UAR), 6 June 1958*¹⁰

74. It is with great regret that I take the floor today in the Security Council. This question is perhaps the most delicate and the most painful one with which I have had to deal in the course of many years at the United Nations.

75. I need not remind you that the United Arab Republic and Lebanon have always been united by many ties of brotherhood and friendship. Egypt and Syria gave Lebanon valuable assistance when that sister country was fighting for its independence at the end of the Second World War. On many occasions the peoples of the United Arab Republic have expressed their friendship for the Lebanese people and they all enthusiastically welcomed the independence of Lebanon. We are sure that any attempt to weaken those ties, from whatever quarter it might come, would be doomed to certain failure. We have always regarded an independent Lebanon as an element of security, stability and peace in that part of the world.

76. Before coming to the heart of the matter, I should like to make some comments on the circumstances surrounding the submission of the Lebanese complaint which is before you. This complaint was submitted only after the disorders occurring in Lebanon had become more serious. In an effort to cope with the situation, the present government of Lebanon has striven to give an international aspect to what is a purely domestic problem and to divert the attention of its own public opinion and that of the world from the situation now prevailing in Lebanon. It

¹⁰ SCOR, 823rd meeting, 22-32.

"Having heard the statements of the delegations of the Lebanese Republic and the United Arab Republic; having noted the wish of both parties to settle their differences in a peaceful manner within the League of Arab States; in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Pact of the League of Arab States; and desirous of removing anything which disturbs the atmosphere of calm among the brotherly Arab States:

"The Council decides:

"(1) To do all in its power to put an end to anything which may disturb the atmosphere of calm among member States;

"(2) To request the Government of Lebanon to withdraw the complaint it has placed before the Security Council;

"(3) To appeal to the various Lebanese groups to end the disturbances and to take the necessary measures to settle domestic disputes by peaceful and constitutional means;

"(4) To send a committee selected from among the members of the Council to ease the situation and to give effect to the decision of the Council."

81. This resolution, which we accepted in a spirit of conciliation, was in our view capable of settling the dispute we are discussing today. Unfortunately the Lebanese Government, for reasons of which I am unaware, opposed it.

82. I should like to draw the Council's attention today to the provisions of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the United Nations Charter, which provides that "the Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties."

83. I do not wish to dwell on this question now but I shall answer questions at another meeting and shall explain my government's position.

84. I listened very attentively to the Lebanese representative's statement. I noted with regret that it was full of allegations and accusations unsupported by any tangible evidence. The Lebanese representative based his statement on isolated facts, on individual statements the justice or merits of which it would, I think, be very difficult for the Council to assess.

85. I have already said that this question is a purely domestic concern of Lebanon. I shall try to prove that this is so, but in order to do

so I shall have to analyse the situation in Lebanon and the deplorable events occurring there.

86. Much has been said in the Press about the leaders of the Opposition to the present Lebanese Government, who have even been described in some newspapers as rebels. I find myself compelled to emphasize this point and to explain to you who these Opposition leaders are and what political role they have played in their country. All these leaders have occupied responsible posts. Mr. Bichara El-Khoury has held the high office of President of the Republic. Mr. Saeb Salaam, Mr. Abdullah El-Yafi, Mr. Hussein Oueni and Mr. Rashid Karamy have all held the office of Prime Minister. Mr. Sabri Hamada and Mr. Ahmed El Assad are former Presidents of Parliament. Mr. Hamid Frangiyeh, Kamal Jumblatt and Mr. Gamil Mekawi are former ministers, as is Mr. Hamid Faaron; Mr. Fouad Ammoun was for a long time Secretary-General of the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and many of you have had occasion to meet him.

87. I should not like to enlarge upon this point and mention the names of other eminent personalities who are members of the Opposition. I did not wish to refer to the Patriarch, Boulos El Maouchi, to Sheikh Mohammed Abu Shakreh or to Sheikh Mohammed Alaya, the Grand Mufti, who are the religious leaders of the country and who, as we shall see later, are far from supporting President Chamoun and his Government.

88. The disorders now occurring in Lebanon are due mainly to the fact that President Chamoun wishes to continue in office for a second term contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, and proposes to revise the latter so that he may again be a candidate for the presidency of the Republic in the forthcoming elections.

89. According to statements made by the members of the Opposition, elections held in Lebanon last year are another cause of these disorders: the present Lebanese Government is accused of having manipulated the elections in order to secure the return of the governmental candidates.

90. In addition to all this, the assassination of Mr. Nassib El Metni, the well-known journalist who had supported the views of the Opposition in the newspaper *The Telegraph—Beirut*, aggravated the situation.

91. All the points I have just mentioned will be found in statements repeatedly made by the members of the Opposition. With your permission I shall give you a few examples.

92. In a statement appearing in *The Telegraph—Beirut* of 18 May 1958, Mr. Bichara El-Khoury, the former President of the Lebanese Republic, recalled the events of 1952 when he, then President of the Republic, chose to resign before the expiry of his term of office in view of the opposition he had encountered and in order to avoid disorders. Mr. Camille Chamoun was a member of the Opposition at that time and in 1951 he had even signed together with other political leaders, a statement protesting against Mr. Bichara El-Khoury's tenure of the presidency. Thus, in circumstances identical to those now prevailing Mr. Bichara El-Khoury did not persist but resigned the presidency of the Republic in order to avoid bloodshed in his country.

93. In the same interview, in reply to a question the newspaper asked him, Mr. Bichara El-Khoury said that the allegation designed to convince public opinion that in the event of President Chamoun's resignation the way would be open for the United Arab Republic to seize power was quite unfounded and not borne out by any of the facts and that the statements made on several occasions by the President of the United Arab Republic denied the above charges categorically. Moreover, the Moslem and Christian leaders have declared that they would never at any cost sacrifice their independence and sovereignty. (You may care to glance at the text of this interview, which is reproduced on page 4 of the document which I have just had distributed to the Council).

94. In the same context I read in the *Washington Post* of 20 May 1958:

"Nasser is not the cause of Lebanon's troubles. President Chamoun is seeking to amend the Constitution to permit his election for a second six-year term; his predecessor experienced similar unrest when he tried the same thing six years ago. There appears to have been considerable nationalist dissatisfaction, quite irrespective of outside influences."¹¹

95. At a press conference held at Beirut on 23 May 1958 Mr. Saeb Salaam, leader of the Opposition and former Prime Minister, made the following statement:

"The present Government is trying to slander the Lebanese patriots by accusing them of receiving aid from the United Arab Republic,

¹¹ The speaker read the quotation in English.

which has no connexion whatever with the present crisis . . . The allegation that communism and the United Arab Republic are implicated in this situation is really incredible and it is obvious that President Chamoun has no respect for the Lebanese people."

96. In a memorandum submitted to the United States Ambassador at Beirut, the National Front, which consists of the Opposition parties, states that "the present national movement is in no way actuated by any doctrine of foreign origin but is strictly domestic in character." In its closing passages, the memorandum gives an assurance that "the movement is fully aware of the foreign interests in Lebanon, which it will do nothing to injure." (*Le Monde*, 17 May 1958, p. 7).

97. Moreover, I should like to recall that, when forming the National Front, the members of the Opposition issued a statement in which they proclaimed as a first principle of their political action the maintenance of Lebanon's independence, sovereignty and defence by every possible means and in whatever circumstances.

98. Under the headline: "In a letter to Pius XII the Lebanese Opposition undertakes to preserve the country's independence", *Le Monde* of 31 May states:

"Yesterday the leaders of the Lebanese Opposition sent a message to the Pope constituting a solemn undertaking to maintain the traditional status of Lebanon.

"The signatories—three former Moslem Prime Ministers and five eminent Christians—proclaim in this message 'their unfailing attachment to Lebanon, to its independence, its sovereignty, its role as a common fatherland and as a religious community united in the worship of one God, and to the sentiments of trust, tolerance and brotherhood on which their country is founded.'"

99. As a result of the events in Lebanon, two members of the Cabinet have resigned: Mr. Rashid Baydoun, the Minister of Defence, who in his letter of resignation pointed out *inter alia* that the continuance of the rebellion, riots and disorders is endangering the existence of the country, and Mr. Bashir Osman, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, who resigned on 23 May 1958, saying in his letter of resignation that he was acting as he did because he had not been able to convince his colleagues "of the need to resign in order to open the way for other leaders to take power and to take their share of responsibility in the critical circum-

stances, in which mere parliamentary support is of no value." (For the text of this letter, see page 13 of our document). I also hear that Mr. Farid Kozma, Minister of Information, has resigned.

100. Most important of all, however, is the latest statement by His Beatitude Boulos el Maouchi, the Maronite Patriarch, which appeared in *The New York Times* on 31 May 1958, only a few days ago, with an editorial comment. I am sure everyone has read this article, but I venture to read out to you the parts which I consider particularly significant.

101. *The New York Times* of 31 May contained the following passages:

"Today, however, the Patriarch said at a news conference that he feared the situation had become too grave for a compromise to work. He suggested that the time would soon come for President Chamoun to 'take a trip' so that the army commander could assume full power of government.

"... The Patriarch placed the blame for Lebanon's troubles largely on the Chamoun administration. He even took exception to Government charges that communists and supporters of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic had had a hand in the disorders here.

"He said that President Nasser had 'many times' disavowed any designs on Lebanon. The Patriarch added, 'It is not in the interest of either Egypt or Syria to force Lebanon into the United Arab Republic.'

"He said he would like 'to see what will be done' at the Arab League Conference in Benghazi, Libya, where government leaders are joining representatives of other Arab countries to discuss the Lebanese problem. But he commented that he believed the meeting was not necessary."

The Patriarch added: "What Lebanon needs, is not to wash her dirty linen in public, but a just, honest government looking after the interests of the people."

102. Thus His Beatitude the Patriarch and the leaders of the Opposition are all of the same opinion. They consider that the issue is a domestic concern of Lebanon and that the United Arab Republic has nothing to do with it. That explains why the question was so hotly dis-

puted when the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies met to decide whether or not the complaint should be submitted to the Security Council. Mr. Philippe Takla, the Chairman of the Committee, said that the Minister of Foreign Affairs had failed to prove that the complaint to the Security Council was based on true facts, the importance of which justified bringing the complaint and that in the present circumstances the submission of the complaint could only aggravate the Lebanese crisis.

103. Mr. Adib El Firzly, Vice-President of the Chamber, who participated in the discussion, stated that he had informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs that in his view the conditions required for placing a complaint on the agenda of the Security Council were not fulfilled, because there had been neither aggression nor a threat of aggression by one State against another, nor a threat to peace or to security. Other members of the Committee supported this view. (See page 15 of our document).

104. According to the Press and to information which has reached us, political parties and Lebanese organizations, including the National Front, notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations of their opposition to the submission of this complaint to the Security Council. The National Front stressed that it regarded the dispute as one of exclusively domestic concern. It protested against such recourse to the Council, urged the need for immediate rejection of the complaint and drew attention to the fallacious character of the points raised, which could not but impair the good neighbourly relations naturally linking two sister countries and dangerously increase the tension prevailing in Lebanon.

105. The conclusion which must be drawn, and which I draw from the preceding is that what we have before us is a problem which is exclusively one of Lebanese domestic policy. The Lebanese people have shown again and again that they have attained sufficient political maturity to be able to consider political questions circumspectly, that they are guided solely by the interests of their country and that they are not susceptible to foreign influences.

106. I apologize for having had to go into problems of Lebanese domestic policy; as you have observed, I was obliged to do so in order to answer the accusations made against us.

107. What is the Lebanese Government accusing us of? In the complaint which it has submitted, not even accompanied by an explanatory

note, and which Mr. Malik today tried to substantiate before the Council, we see that we are accused of "the infiltration of armed bands from Syria into Lebanon, the destruction of Lebanese life and property by such bands, the participation of United Arab Republic nationals in acts of terrorism and rebellion against the established authorities in Lebanon, the supply of arms from Syria to individuals and bands in Lebanon rebelling against the established authorities. . ." [S/4007].

108. I do not propose to reply today to the questions asked and the cases cited by Mr. Malik. I should find it difficult to do so. But I reserve the right to do so at another meeting when I have studied his long speech. I can, however, declare here and now that the allegations made by Mr. Malik are not, in my view, supported by any tangible proof. It is easy to procure arms, as you know; it is generally only a question of paying the price. Traffic in arms goes on all over the world. During revolutions, periods of disturbances and civil wars the parties always manage to obtain arms, particularly when it is small arms that are required.

109. If a Government is to be held responsible, its responsibility must be clearly established. We reject the accusations made by Mr. Malik, for he has not produced any evidence to substantiate the statement he has made.

110. Allow me to quote an extract from an article in *The Times* of London of 27 May 1958, regarding the first part of Mr. Malik's accusations:

"In addition, in spite of the Government's claim during last year's general elections, not a single Syrian agitator arrested had ever been brought to trial. It is a fact that during the past year the Government has several times claimed to have arrested Syrian nationals engaged in subversion and has also expelled many hundreds as potential trouble-makers. Last June it was officially confirmed that two members of the Syrian Deuxième Bureau had been arrested along with an officer who was believed to be a secretary of Colonel Sarraj.

"But there is no record of any of these Syrians having been brought to trial, and it is hardly surprising that the Government's latest claims to have arrested Syrian Army men and other foreign agitators, including a boatload of *fedayeen* from Gaza, are ridiculed by the Opposition and treated with some reserve by others who are waiting now for the evidence to be produced in the flesh."

111. Furthermore, Mr. Fouad Ammoun, former Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made the following statement on this point on 24 May 1958:

"Already the Lebanese courts of justice, by their acquittal of the accused, who the Lebanese described as Egyptian and Syrian agents, have given a fair and just opinion of the alleged case of the arms and explosive material which the Lebanese Government put forward as evidence in its unfounded complaint. The sad, indubitable truth is that the Lebanese Government demanded foreign arms, and distributed them among its gangs."

So it is not we who are arming the Lebanese. It is the Government which is distributing arms to its supporters and to certain organizations, and these weapons are passed from hand to hand.

112. The first of the two cases upon which Mr. Malik enlarged in his speech today concerns fishing boats which were on their way to Lebanon and, it is alleged, were carrying arms. These allegations are vague and lacking in detail. I reserve the right to go into this question at greater length on a later occasion, should the Council so desire. As regards the Belgian Consul-General in Damascus, I myself have no doubt that the Consul was unaware of the arms in his car. This matter is at present before the Lebanese courts and I should not like to discuss it here at length. The Consul's lawyer has made a statement to the Press on the subject and has refuted the charges preferred against his client. (The statement is to be found on pages 25 ff. of the document which we have distributed).

113. One question dealt with at length by the representative of Lebanon is the alleged radio and press campaign. Even if there are any grounds for this allegation we do not consider that the campaign has had any effect whatever on the development of events in Lebanon. The radio and Press generally disseminate only the news published by the Lebanese Press and, if you refer to it, you will be convinced of what I say. Moreover, a section of the Lebanese Press attacks us in Egypt and, as far as radio broadcasts are concerned, we have had to reply to transmissions attacking us. I have documents on this matter but I shall refrain from reading them out to you, in order not to impair the prestige of our Organization. I shall, however, make them available to members of the Council.

114. To tell the truth, I do not think that the Security Council should have to concern itself with this question. Indeed, if it gave its attention to all the radio transmissions and the radio campaigns going on in the world today, it would no longer be able to examine the important problems which are placed before it and which are a threat to international peace and security. If we consider even the juridical aspect of this question of the Press, we cannot but agree that these problems are not likely to threaten international peace and security and that they are consequently not within the jurisdiction of the Council. Indeed, I do not see which provision of the Charter would give the Council authority to consider radio and press campaigns.

115. Before concluding, I feel obliged to consider the attitude adopted by the Lebanese Government and the provocation it has given the United Arab Republic.

116. We ourselves could have submitted a complaint against Lebanon, but we did not consider it necessary to do so, for we felt that this kind of dispute could be settled in other ways.

117. For several months the Lebanese Government has been engaging in a mass expulsion of citizens of the United Arab Republic from its territory. This expulsion has been carried out without any explanation and without reference to juridical or administrative bodies, without even any kind of supervisory commission as prescribed by international law. The number of those expelled runs into thousands. Most of them are people who have lived in Lebanon for years and have their property and business there. Among them are many old people and children. The expulsion has been carried out without any humanity. A great many of those expelled have been molested. No explanation has been given of the accusations made against them; they have not even had any opportunity to defend themselves. The Government of the United Arab Republic has protested again and again through its Ambassador in Beirut against such unjustified action, but in vain. The Ambassador was not even given any plausible explanations.

118. You realize that the Lebanese citizens in the United Arab Republic—and there are many of them—are still being well treated and looked after by the Government as before. Our ties with the Lebanese people have prevented us bringing this matter before the Security Council.

119. *The New York Times* of 21 May 1958 published a dispatch from Beirut in which it was reported that on 19 May 1958 alone, one

thousand United Arab Republic citizens of Syrian origin had been expelled. I shall take the liberty of reading you some extracts from this article:

"Lebanon deported at least a thousand Syrian nationals today. Fifty trucks and buses filled with expelled Syrian nationals were seen rolling along the Damascus road under military escort.

"Large groups of Syrians also stood around the United Arab Republic's Consulate here, apparently waiting to leave the country."^{11a}

Not even members of our Embassy were spared and we have had to protest to the Lebanese Government against this treatment, which is not in conformity with diplomatic usage.

120. All this is very regrettable and cannot but impair the friendly relations which our countries should maintain, especially when they belong to the same part of the world.

121. Before concluding, I should like to recall a statement made by the President of the United Arab Republic on 16 May 1958:

"The United Arab Republic has nothing to do with these events, but all the broadcasts which I heard during my journey reported that the leaders of Lebanon claimed that the United Arab Republic was the cause of the disturbances. What they are trying to do is to transform a purely domestic affair concerning citizens of the same State into an international issue."

He continued as follows:

"When I went to Damascus everything I said in my speeches regarding Lebanon was an expression of our respect for its independence and unity and of our wish that Lebanon should not be divided by civil war and that bloodshed should be avoided."

The President of the United Arab Republic added:

"In the name of the people of the United Arab Republic I repeat what I have already said: we support and respect the independence of Lebanon and we shall not permit interference in its affairs."

^{11a} The Speaker read the quotation in English.

122. From all the foregoing it is clear that it has not been established that the United Arab Republic has intervened in the domestic affairs of Lebanon. As I have said again and again, the question is a purely domestic concern of Lebanon. The events in Lebanon concern only the Lebanese. It is their duty, and theirs alone, to put an end to them. The international diversion which the present government of Lebanon is seeking to create by this unjustified complaint could not be a real solution of the problems.

123. Moreover, this Lebanese domestic problem is not and could not be a threat to international peace. The present situation is the result of political differences which divide the Lebanese themselves and it is for them alone to find the solution.

124. Mr. Malik is now asking for protection for Lebanon because Lebanon is a small country. But no one is threatening Lebanon; all we want is an independent Lebanon.

125. In conclusion, we offer our most heartfelt wishes for the prosperity, well-being and peace of the Lebanese people.

5. *Speech by Mr. 'Umar Lutfi (UAR), 10 June 1958*¹²

7. Thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the opportunity to exercise my right of reply. I should like to supplement the statement I made at the 823rd meeting and to answer the charges and allegations made by the representative of Lebanon at that meeting, at the same time keeping to the question under discussion.

8. Mr. Malik contended, first of all, that the United Arab Republic was furnishing arms to subversive elements in Lebanon. In support of his contention, he cited some examples. I should like to begin by pointing out that the majority of these examples are based on reports prepared by the Lebanese police or by the Deuxième Bureau. In my view, that does not give them any probative value. No court, surely, in any of our countries takes such reports into account unless they are corroborated by conclusive evidence, and that is by no means the case here. Above all—and I stress this—nothing has come even near to involving the responsibility of the United Arab Republic, and that is the most important point in the question we are considering today.

9. Let me deal with some of the examples cited by the representative of Lebanon. To facilitate matters, I shall refer to the verbatim re-

¹² SCOR, 824th meeting, 2-13.

cord of the 823rd meeting of the Council; the first cases cited by Mr. Malik which I shall deal with appear in paragraph 16.

10. In the first case Mr. Malik states that a private vehicle with the registration number 4774 was stopped and searched at a customs post and that arms were found in the vehicle. Mr. Malik does not even tell us how he obtained that information, whether the driver of the vehicle was arrested, who the driver was, whether or not he was formally charged with an offence. In this first example, we read that the vehicle "was stopped and searched at the customs post of Aboudieh, in north Lebanon. The vehicle, which was entering Lebanese territory from Syria, was found to be carrying the following. . ." Also, it seems, the names marked on the guns were the names of Syrian soldiers, but this remains to be proved. The names cited, Mohammed Abdulla, Mazhar Demian, Zakaria, are legion in the Arab countries. Furthermore, I do not think that even in the Syrian Army the names of soldiers are marked on their guns. Again, how do we know that these arms were not stolen or purchased? Even if the truth of the accusation regarding the transport of arms were established, I do not see how the Government which I have the honour to represent here could be held responsible on the basis of such data.

11. In the second example, it is alleged that 110 outlaws entered Lebanon from Syria, carrying arms. A glance at the statement of these so-called rebels makes it clear that this story is purely imaginary. The statement begins:

"Some hundred Lebanese followers of Kamal Jumblatt were convoked to a meeting in Damascus by the leadership of their party on Monday, 7 April 1958." [823rd meeting, para. 16 (2).]

The quotation continues. We are told that all these men were driven in a single truck—I should like to see a truck which can carry 110 men at one time. And, if an officer of the Syrian Army is going to establish contact with his agents, he will surely not hold a meeting with 110 men in a café in the middle of a city like Damascus. Furthermore, we are told that this officer taught the men how to use the weapons; it would be difficult, I think, to give instruction in the use of weapons in so short a time. Finally, the fact is that we cannot in any case be held responsible on the basis of these things, which are far from proven.

12. The third and fourth examples [*ibid.*, para. 16 (3) and (4)]

are based simply on reports of the Lebanese police and the Deuxième Bureau, without supporting evidence of any kind, particularly as regards our responsibility.

13. Let us take the eighth example [*ibid.*, para. 16 (8)]: We are presented with a report by the Lebanese Deuxième Bureau concerning a meeting held at Damascus in the office of the Syrian Deuxième Bureau. It concerns events which occurred in Damascus. We cannot take into consideration reports by intelligence services, whose function, as we all know, is to supply their governments with information; the Security Council is no place for bringing up such reports.

14. In the tenth example [*ibid.*, para. 16 (10)], we find Mr. Malik telling us that among the confiscated arms there was an anti-aircraft gun. This seems to me highly improbable, because anyone using such a weapon would have to have had a good deal of training in the use of weapons. Furthermore, from the military point of view, what would be the use of having only one anti-aircraft gun? Anyway, we are not even told what make of gun it was, in support of the allegation that it was furnished by the United Arab Republic.

15. Similarly, with respect to the fourteenth example [*ibid.*, para. 16 (14)], where it is stated that the arms in question were marked "The Egyptian Army—1949—Made under the supervision of the Technical Research Department", I would observe that the United Arab Republic did not manufacture arms before 1955 and that the markings in question which Mr. Malik cites as evidence are not accurate, that is, they do not altogether tally with the markings found on the arms of the United Arab Republic. I do not wish to enter here into a discussion of the Arabic language, but I could explain to Mr. Malik or Mr. Jamali what the difference is in these markings.

16. Reference was made to two sailboats alleged to have been seized off the Lebanese coast [*ibid.*, para. 16(7)]. As regards the first sailboat, I would ask the Council to take note of a statement made by one of the accused, Mr. Itani, to the newspaper, *Al Sayad*. In it, the accused categorically denies the charges made against him. Furthermore, members of the Opposition also denied the accusation and contended that the owner of the sailboat was engaged in the drug traffic. This case is pending before the courts, and in the circumstances I do not think that it would be appropriate to go into details. As to the second sailboat, to begin with, it was not transporting arms, as is quite clear from Mr. Malik's own statement, and the eleven persons on it were, according to

reports, acquitted by the Lebanese courts because on this occasion they had committed no offence. They had been convicted a few months earlier for entering Lebanon without permission. All this shows that the example is not probative, does not in any way inculcate my Government and is tendentious propaganda aimed at giving the impression of interference by my Government in the domestic affairs of Lebanon. So far as the other (a third) sailboat is concerned, we are presented with vague statements by Lebanese nationals to the effect that they were transporting arms. We are not told what the arms were, whether or not they were confiscated, whether the persons concerned were formally charged. In any case, it is impossible to hold us responsible in this matter of sailboats.

17. I have already dealt with the question of the Belgian Consul-General at Damascus [*ibid.*, para. 16(12)]. All I would like to add now is that the charge cannot be laid at our door. As I have already said [*ibid.*, para. (112)], this diplomat was without a doubt unaware that there were weapons in his car. As to the letter allegedly found on his person—a letter, incidentally, of which we have no knowledge—his lawyer, Mr. Mohsen Selim, in a press statement which members of the Council have before them, has categorically denied the charges made against his client. (This statement is to be found on page 25 of the document we distributed to the Council at its 823rd meeting). In any case, as I have already said, I should not like to dwell on a matter concerning a member of the diplomatic corps while proceedings against him are pending.

18. I must confess that I cannot conceal my astonishment at Mr. Malik's drawing the following conclusion from what he calls his "first set of facts":

"The Government of Lebanon therefore believes that all men engaged in subversive activities in Lebanon today are supplied with arms from the United Arab Republic." [*ibid.*, para. 17].

That is what Mr. Malik said here: that the arms of all men engaged in subversive activities in Lebanon were sent by the United Arab Republic. So there was not a single rifle in Lebanon before this unrest began and it is we who have supplied all these arms.

19. This contention ignores the fact that we are talking about Lebanon, a country where, as I think it would be difficult to deny, all the

hill-folk are armed, the tribesmen are armed and there has always been and will always be clandestine crossing of the frontier between Syria and Lebanon from one side or the other.

20. I have already said that obtaining arms is not a problem. Lawful and unlawful traffic in arms is going on all the time, everywhere, in all parts of the world. In fact, we find that throughout the revolutions, unrest and civil war following the Second World War, the parties concerned have always found ways of obtaining all the arms they needed. Furthermore, in most countries it is easy to obtain arms on the open market. I even have catalogues showing that weapons are available to anyone who wishes to buy them right here in the United States.

21. Thus, I must reject the charges made by the representative of Lebanon, and I regret exceedingly Mr. Malik's statement that the United Arab Republic has armed all men at present engaged in subversive activities in Lebanon, particularly since he is aware that the Lebanese Government has distributed large quantities of arms to its partisans and to certain organizations. As always happens in a country beset by unrest or civil war, these arms have passed from hand to hand. This point has been made by several members of the Opposition, including Mr. Fouad Ammoun, former Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and by others as well; all have categorically denied that it was the United Arab Republic which supplied the arms.

22. In what he refers to as the second set of facts, the Lebanese representative maintains that elements from Lebanon are trained on the territory of the United Arab Republic and sent back to Lebanon for the purpose of overthrowing the Government. In this "set of facts" we have nothing more than statements unsupported by evidence of any sort.

23. In the first example cited, Mr. Malik tells us: "We know that measures have been taken in Syria for training Lebanese and non-Lebanese commandos" [*ibid.*, para. 18(1)]. He adds that many of them are being held in Lebanese prisons, but he gives no names and does not even tell us whether these people have been tried and convicted, or whether it has been clearly established that they were trained by the Syrian Deuxième Bureau.

24. Again, in the second case cited [*ibid.*, para. 18(2)], he tells us that about 150 men from Tripoli and its vicinity were seen receiving training by the Syrian Army in a Syrian town. By whom were they seen? Has the fact been established by a court? This is not the kind of evidence on which to submit a complaint to the United Nations against

a friendly State. It is perhaps as well that Mr. Malik did not dwell at length on this second set of charges.

25. Mr. Malik goes on to a third set of facts which he refers to as "the participation of United Arab Republic civilian nationals residing in Lebanon, or passing into Lebanon, in subversive and terrorist activities in Lebanon" [*ibid.*, para. 20]. You will appreciate that it is difficult for me to discuss these facts example by example—Mr. Malik has not supplied me with enough facts even to accept or refute. For instance, in his sixth example, Mr. Malik tells us that during 1958 security reports showed that "tens of Syrians and Palestinians from Gaza were arrested for terrorist activities". He does not tell us what was the outcome of these arrests, whether the people were convicted, whether they have even been brought to trial and what charges have been preferred against them.

26. Mr. Malik has constantly alluded to Syrians carrying Syrian military identification cards. The fact is that in Syria everyone who has completed his military service is obliged to carry such a card. Hence it does not follow at all that these persons belong to the Syrian army.

27. Frankly I see nothing in these allegations, which are essentially isolated cases, to suggest that my Government can in any way be held responsible.

28. In his fourth set of facts, Mr. Malik tells us, *inter alia*, that the Syrian Deuxième Bureau is conducting on Lebanese territory activities contrary to Lebanese policy. He cites the names of some of these alleged agents, for the most part, Palestinian refugees or Syrians but also, apparently including some Lebanese. I am repeating what Mr. Malik has stated. Some of them have been tried and convicted. Mr. Malik says that these people are agents of the Syrian Deuxième Bureau, but there is nothing to prove this in the facts which he has presented. It does not follow from the acts for which they have been convicted that they belong to the Deuxième Bureau. Nor does it follow that we bear any responsibility whatever for these activities—which, incidentally, have not been established.

29. Again referring to 200 Syrian army conscripts who allegedly crossed the frontier in the district of Hasbayya [*ibid.*, para. 22 (8)], Mr. Malik makes an assertion, but produces no evidence. How does he know that they were Syrian army conscripts? He does not tell us whether they were taken prisoner or were arrested or tried. We are still in the realm of unsupported allegations.

30. In the seventh case, Mr. Malik mentions in particular the matter of the Egyptian Military Attaché in Beirut, Mr. Hassan Khalil, who was reportedly arrested early in 1957 and found to be carrying a large quantity of arms in his car [*ibid.*, para. 22 (7)]. It so happens that only a few days ago, on 6 June, our Embassy in Beirut issued a clarifying statement on this important matter which I have had circulated among the Council members. It points out that the Lebanese Government itself issued a statement at the time, flatly denying that the Egyptian Military Attaché had been involved in gun-running. The Lebanese statement also indicated that all the rumours of gun-running by Egyptian diplomats were wholly without foundation. I am therefore astonished that Mr. Malik has raised this matter which was the subject of an official denial by the Lebanese Government.

31. Mr. Malik has also told us of an incident which occurred at Deir el Achair [*ibid.*, para. 22 (12)]. Information in our possession, as well as a statement made by Mr. Jumblatt on 13 September 1957 and circulated in Beirut, show that the cause of these events was as follows: after the elections, which produced unrest in the area, negotiations took place between the Druses and certain representatives of the Lebanese Government, along with several other political figures, for the purpose of maintaining calm; unfortunately, the Lebanese police intervened and attempted to arrest certain Druse leaders, Mr. Al Chebli and Mr. El Irian and others, even though an agreement had been reached that there should be no arrests. As a result of these events, fighting took place between the Druses and the Lebanese police; and, of course, the Druses from the mountain regions carry arms and do not hesitate to defend themselves.

32. It is apparent from the foregoing—as I stated at the last meeting—that the grave charges made against us by Mr. Malik are not supported by concrete evidence and, in any case, are not such as would render my Government responsible. Actually, Mr. Malik himself does not seem to be sure that his allegations are convincing; he says that “one could still hold that these were sporadic instances which do not, even in the aggregate, justify the sweeping conclusions which I have drawn from them” [*ibid.*, para. 27]. There is no doubt that we are dealing here with isolated cases, with statements and assertions which, in my opinion, cannot be corroborated and are not a valid basis for charges against my Government.

33. Later on, I shall illustrate the attitude of the present leaders of Lebanon toward the United Arab Republic.

34. In his speech, the Lebanese representative held forth at great length on the subject of radio and press campaigns.

35. I have already informed the Council at its 823rd meeting that on the whole the Egyptian Press had merely reported what had been published by the Lebanese Press and by the news agencies. I should like to give a few examples to support my contention, based on the statements and quotations made by Mr. Malik at the previous meeting of the Council.

36. Mr. Malik quoted the 17 April 1958 issue of the Arabic newspaper *Al Akhbar* of Cairo to the effect that the Lebanese parties were opposed to granting another term to President Chamoun [*ibid.*, para. 33]. I have this newspaper before me, and I will gladly make it available to the members of the Council and the Lebanese representative if they wish to examine it. The paper reports that the political party El Najada asserted that any attempt by President Chamoun to amend the Constitution would encounter strong opposition. That is to say, *Al Akhbar* merely reported the statement made by El Nejada; that fact is made very clear in the paper; I have the passage here and can show it to the members of the Council.

37. Then Mr. Malik said that the same paper stated, on 18 April 1958: "Ultimatum to Chamoun. Lebanon is threatened by a bloody revolution." What we have here is simply an article from Reuters, as is clear from the paper itself, which is also in my possession.

38. To take a third example, in the 14 May 1958 issue of *Al Akhbar*—which I also have—I have unfortunately failed to find the quotation given by Mr. Malik [*ibid.*, para. 35]; probably the date is wrong.

39. Mr. Malik also quoted the 6 April 1958 issue of the newspaper *Al-Gumhouria*, which stated: "Open appeal for a revolt in Beirut". But he did not tell us that the items published in this paper consisted of critical remarks directed against the Lebanese Government by Deputy Ahmed Assaad and that these remarks had also been reported by a press agency.

40. Mr. Malik referred to the 12 April 1958 issue of the newspaper *Akhbar El Yom*, quoting a passage stating that a revolution might break out in Lebanon [*ibid.*, para. 40], but he omitted to mention that the article was by a Lebanese journalist, Said Freiha.

41. Mr. Malik also quoted the words: "Danger of civil war in Lebanon" taken from the 13 April 1958 issue of the Cairo newspaper *Al-Shaab*. The fact of the matter is that the news item published in this

paper came from Beirut and was reported by the press agencies, as is apparent from the paper itself.

42. The extract which Mr. Malik quotes from the 18 May issue of *Al-Shaab* [*ibid.*, para. 45] is taken straight from an article by a Lebanese journalist, Selim Ellouzi.

43. Let me, in turn, quote some passages from Lebanese newspapers which can hardly be said to spare the leaders of the United Arab Republic.

44. On 17 May 1957, the Lebanese press agency reported that Egypt had had Tewfik Abou El Hodah, former Prime Minister of Jordan, assassinated; it did not state the fact that he had committed suicide. On 24 May 1957, the Beirut newspaper *Al Amal* published an article entitled "The Tragedy of Freedom in Egypt" which asserted that a law had been promulgated in Egypt imposing the death penalty for anyone who defamed the President of the Republic. On 27 May 1957, according to the Arab Information Office, the same paper published slanderous statements concerning Egypt and its policy, for example, that Egypt was making use of Arab nationalism in order to strengthen dictatorship; that Egypt had betrayed the cause of Arab nationalism by sending a delegation to the Moscow Youth Festival, and that the President was handing Egypt over to communism. On 30 August 1957 the newspaper *Le Jour* published a cartoon of Mr. Dulles trying to find a vaccine for Egypt. On 20 March 1958 the newspaper *An Nahar* published an article which tried to incite the inhabitants of Damascus against the Syrian-Egyptian union. On 15 March 1958 the newspaper *Al Amal* published an article describing the Syrian and Egyptian leaders as criminals.

45. The attack on the United Arab Republic has not been confined to the Lebanese press and radio; it has gone as far as the appearance of bogus issues of Egyptian dailies and weeklies, such as *Le Progrès égyptien* and *Rose El Youssef*, containing libellous statements about leading figures in the United Arab Republic. In Lebanon, every imaginable kind of propaganda against the United Arab Republic, regardless of the source from which it derives, had been and continues to be allowed.

46. As for the radio of the United Arab Republic, as I have already stated, most of the news we have broadcast has been taken from reports published by the Lebanese press agencies and newspapers. Obviously, our radio sometimes replies to the charges made against us. Mr. Malik has read us some extracts from Egyptian broadcasts. I could read

similar extracts from broadcasts by a secret radio station called "The Voice of Truth" (according to our information, one of the relay stations has been destroyed). As I promised, I shall simply forward the text of these broadcasts to the Secretary of the Council.

47. I also have in my possession a forged brochure on tourist attractions; this too will be circulated to the Councils. I shall take the liberty of reading an extract from the excursion itinerary:

"Visits to the palaces of ex-King Farouk, which have been converted into private homes for soldiers of the revolution, as well as visits to villas of the plutocrats, which have been confiscated for use by the officers. Likewise, visits to the cemetery to lay wreaths on the graves of Salah Salem and his Moslem brothers."

That is typical of the kind of thing to be found in the brochure, which will be passed round for the members of the Council to see.

48. In my last statement [823rd meeting], I referred to the question of the League of Arab States. There is no need for me to quote the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations which deal with regional organizations; they have been referred to here on numerous occasions, particularly by my colleagues from Latin America. They show the importance which the Charter attaches to international organizations, their work of conciliation and their authority to settle any disputes which may arise between members of the international community. Articles 33 and 52 of the Charter are, indeed, very clear on this point. In my last statement, I quoted Article 36, paragraph 2, which provides that the Security Council "should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties."

49. As you know, the League of Arab States has taken up the complaint made by Lebanon, although Lebanon submitted a complaint to the Security Council at the same time. You are already aware that on 21 May 1958 the representative of Lebanon wrote to the Secretary-General, informing him that on that same day the Lebanese Government had submitted a complaint to the Arab League against the Government of the United Arab Republic. On 22 May, that is, twenty-four hours later, the representative of Lebanon wrote to the President of the Security Council requesting an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the complaint before you today [S/4007]. Thus, within a

space of twenty-four hours, we are told that a complaint has been submitted to the Arab League and that another complaint, an urgent one, apparently, has been submitted to the Security Council. Three times the Lebanese Government has asked that the meetings of the Council be adjourned, although it had described the complaint submitted by it as urgent. Mr. Malik arrived in New York even before the Arab League had considered the question and immediately told newspapermen that the problem could only be solved in the Security Council.

50. Meanwhile, the Arab League has discussed the Lebanese complaint, as I stated at the 823rd meeting. Six States of the Arab League—the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Libya and Yemen—submitted a resolution, but unfortunately it did not meet with the approval of the Lebanese Government. I quoted that resolution at the last meeting and would now like just to refer to the operative part:

"The Council decides:

"1. To do all in its power to put an end to anything which may disturb the atmosphere of calm among member States;

"2. To request the Government of Lebanon to withdraw the complaint it has placed before the Security Council;

"3. To appeal to the various Lebanese groups to end the disturbances and to take the necessary measures to settle domestic disputes by peaceful and constitutional means;

"4. To send a committee selected from among the members of the Council to ease the situation and to give effect to the decision of the Council."

This resolution, to which we agreed in a spirit of conciliation, would certainly have offered a good chance of settling the dispute.

51. I am going to take the liberty of reading you a few extracts from the record of the meeting of the Arab League held on 4 June 1958:

"The representative of Libya stated that the above-named six States supported the resolution and that the two States concerned had accepted it by implication, subject to their two delegations' communicating with their Governments. . . . The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Sudan, Mr. Mahgoub, stated that the draft had been submitted by the six States which were not parties to the dispute. At the end of the meeting, the President asked: 'Gentlemen, do you

approve this draft resolution, subject to the two delegations concerned communicating with their Governments?" There was unanimous approval and the meeting was adjourned."

I think that the text speaks for itself and needs no comment.

52. An appeal to the Lebanese people to remain calm was drafted by the Council of the Arab League, with the participation of the Director of the Political Department of the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Council members making no objection; but the Lebanese delegation refused to let the Council adopt even such an appeal, although its only purpose was to put an end to the disturbances and to restore calm.

53. If the Government of Lebanon had really wanted to reach a settlement of the dispute, I feel sure that it would have approved the League's resolution; but unfortunately it insisted on having the question discussed in the Security Council, its purpose being to spread tendentious propaganda against the United Arab Republic. As I have already said, this is merely an attempt to create an international diversion to distract attention from the events now taking place in Lebanon, which are the sole concern of the Lebanese people themselves. It is also an attempt to make use of the Security Council to solve internal problems which concern only the Lebanese themselves.

54. If Lebanon had agreed to abide by the terms of the Arab League's resolution, that would certainly have helped to restore calm and stability in that part of the world; it would have prevented bloodshed, saved many lives and put an end to the distressing events which are taking place there at the present time.

55. Let us now consider the attitude adopted by Lebanon towards the United Arab Republic. I mentioned the mass expulsions of citizens of the United Arab Republic in my last statement [823rd meeting, para. 117]. In fact I told the Council that if our relationship with Lebanon was not what it is we would have had to submit a complaint to the Council; but we believe that this kind of dispute between two sister nations should be settled in some other way than by the Security Council. These expulsions were of an arbitrary nature—they were carried out without any explanation and without any action by legal or administrative bodies, as is prescribed by the rules of international law. They were quite inhuman. Many of the persons expelled were molested and even tortured; I have documents in my possession to prove it. Ac-

According to the latest reports we have received, the number of persons expelled is 13,000. Despite repeated protests, we have been unable to obtain any acceptable explanation of this strange attitude on the part of the Lebanese Government.

56. Moreover, for some time now, plotting has been going on in Lebanon against the United Arab Republic, the chief instigators being the members of a terrorist group known as the Syrian Nationalists. In 1949, they were convicted of high treason by the Lebanese courts. Under the present régime, they have been pardoned wholesale. They have been allowed to publish newspapers, and, what is even more serious, they have training centres in five places in Lebanon, including the village of Enn Nabi Osmâne, near the Syrian border, the village of Bawachi near Baalbek, Burj al Barajinah near Beirut, and elsewhere.

57. There is no doubt that the Government has been supplying them with weapons, as is clear from statements made by members of the Opposition as well as from a document in our possession which we are prepared to submit to the Council namely, the resignation of Captain Abdel Magid El-Zain, who resigned in protest against the supplying of arms to the terrorists. I should like, if you will allow me, to read you a translation of his letter of resignation:

"As a gesture of protest against certain flagrant violations of the law, such as the handing out of military weapons to civilians at police headquarters under the direction of senior officers, please accept my resignation from the police force. I have irrefutable evidence in my possession which I shall place in the hands of the proper authorities if necessary."

58. These "nationalist" outlaws engaged in plots against Syria in November 1956, August 1957 and December 1957. There were exchanges of letters on the subject between Lebanon and the Republic of Syria at the time. There was another plot against the Egyptian Government in December 1957 and those responsible for it were tried by the courts of the United Arab Republic.

59. Quite recently, again, the Government of Lebanon has subjected the diplomatic personnel of the United Arab Republic to treatment which is definitely contrary to the rules of international law. Thus, on 14 May 1958, Mr. Hefni Mohamadein, First Secretary of the Embassy, was arrested and searched, even though he produced his identi-

fication card. His car, which bore diplomatic plates, was also searched. On 15 May 1958, Mr. Moustafa Ghoneim, an official in the Embassy of the United Arab Republic in Beirut, was molested by a Lebanese officer and three soldiers, who forced him to get out of a taxi and searched him in an uncivil manner, but found nothing. On 28 May 1958, Mr. Ezzedine El Hoseini, an Embassy official, was arrested while at the Central Post Office. He was imprisoned, put in irons and treated like a criminal. He was released on 31 May. Needless to say, the Embassy of the United Arab Republic at Beirut protested vigorously against these episodes.

60. It is clear from all that I have said above that there is no connexion between the Government of the United Arab Republic and the unfortunate events now taking place in Lebanon. It has not been established that there has been any interference on our part in the internal affairs of Lebanon. As I have repeatedly said, this is a purely Lebanese matter which concerns the Lebanese people only. It is for them alone to solve it. We have, nevertheless, attempted to solve this problem within the Arab League. Unfortunately, we have come up against systematic opposition on the part of the Lebanese leaders. As I have already said, the Lebanese leaders do not appear to be taking their complaint to the Arab League seriously.

61. As the leaders of my country have stated on several occasions, we respect the independence and unity of Lebanon. We do not want Lebanon to be divided by civil war. We have always felt that an independent Lebanon would make for peace and stability in our part of the world.

6. *Speech by Mr. Charles Malik (Lebanon), 10 June 1958*¹³

62. Mr. President, I am grateful to you and to the Council for giving me this second opportunity to say a few words in reply to the statement we have just heard by the representative of the United Arab Republic.

63. But before I proceed to make a few passing comments which came to my mind as I heard him speak—reserving, of course, my right to study his remarks very carefully later on and to prepare a more reasoned, more responsible and more grounded reply to all that he has said—I wish to make a statement to the Council about something that

¹³ SCOR, 824th meeting, 13-21.

my Government communicated to me only two hours ago. At about 2 p.m. New York time (8 p.m. Beirut time) I communicated by telephone with the Government of Lebanon, and I was instructed to tell the Council that the situation is becoming more urgent, that the infiltration is increasing, that the flow of arms into Lebanon is increasing and that, therefore, there is a seriousness about the situation as of now which did not exist before. I have been asked by the Government of Lebanon to tell the Council that the situation is becoming very serious. We therefore request the Council to sit in continuous session until it comes to some decision about this important matter.

64. We would be remiss in our duty to the United Nations and to international peace and security in our area if we did not tell the Council as of this moment that the situation during the last twenty-four hours has considerably deteriorated from the point of view of the infiltration of men and the smuggling of arms into Lebanon from the United Arab Republic. I wish to strike this note of urgency because, according to the information I have received from the Government of Lebanon, the situation, as I said, has become exceedingly serious. We request you, Mr. President, and the members of the Council to meet continuously, if you so desire, until you dispose of this item.

65. I should now like to say a few words only about what we have just heard from the representative of the United Arab Republic. First of all, concerning his references to the incidents and facts I adduced at the previous meeting, it is clear from what he said that he was very selective in the facts which he tried to refute. If you study all that he told us today, you will find that he did not touch on more than, at most, 15 to 20 per cent of the facts which I mentioned in my earlier statement. Obviously that must mean that he has very little, if anything, to say about the remaining facts which I had adduced.

66. But even his manner of refuting the facts which I put before this Council at the previous meeting can easily be shown to be completely unconvincing. Obviously, a government bases itself on its own official documents; obviously it can only put forward what it knows from its own services. That is what I did before this Council. If there is any question about the veracity of any of these documents, it is always possible for me to produce them in detail for the Council and to prove their complete accuracy. I wish to assure the Council that I sifted these facts with the utmost care and that they can stand any examination by the Council at any time.

67. I repeat what I said, that the very selective procedure whereby the representative of the United Arab Republic touched only upon at most 15 to 20 per cent of these adduced facts proves that he has very little, if anything, to say against the remaining facts. For instance, with regard to the set of facts I advanced concerning "the training in subversion on the territory of the United Arab Republic of elements from Lebanon and the sending back of these elements to Lebanon to subvert their Government" [823rd meeting, para. 18], it is significant that he made passing remarks about the first and second cases but said nothing at all about the third or the fourth. I can answer his remarks very easily about the first two cases when I study them carefully and find out exactly what it is in these facts that did not seem to be convincing to him.

68. He hardly touched at all upon the third group of facts, dealing with "The participation of United Arab Republic civilian nationals, residing in or passing into Lebanon, in subversive and terrorist activities, in Lebanon." [*Ibid.*, para. 20]. He passed over these facts rather quickly, referring to only one or two of them. Yet I gave nine instances.

69. The same thing applies to the fourth group of facts. But again, as I said, to be perfectly fair, I will study his remarks and I will admit any error that I may have fallen into, although I did not hear anything he said that proves there was an error. I will study very carefully what he said and later on, at some other stage in the development of this case, I will have a few words to say about his comments.

70. I come now to his remarks on the Press and on the radio. Here I will make only three general observations that seem to me to be convincing to anybody and completely irrefutable.

71. The first is that it may well be true that in some instances where I quoted from Egyptian and Syrian newspapers those papers were themselves printing material that originated in Lebanon. That may well be true, but what is significant is that those newspapers print only that kind of material; they print no other kind. That is the most significant thing. We have a free Press which prints all sorts of things, even things against our Government. We have free correspondents and free press agencies which distribute information and give opinions as they like. It is the selectivity of the Egyptian Press regarding whatever emanates from Lebanon which is most significant. That Press can be shown to print only those news items from Lebanon that inflame, encourage and foment rebellion and anti-governmental activity in Lebanon. That seems to me to be most significant.

72. The second point is this. The representative of the United Arab Republic spoke about our Press having published certain material to which he takes exception. That may well be. We have a Press that criticizes, not only Egypt and Syria, but pre-eminently ourselves. But now—and this is the significant thing—we have a Press in Lebanon which defends the point of view of Egypt. There is no Press in Egypt which defends the point of view of Lebanon. In fact, when we want to publish an official governmental denial—which we have done many times—it is never allowed to appear in Egyptian papers. We have sent in official governmental denials to our Embassy in Cairo and asked it to have them published in the Egyptian Press, but they never appeared there; whereas every morning you can find in at least six newspapers in Beirut—and we like that and we welcome it—articles and accounts presenting and defending the Egyptian point of view.

73. We want to live in that kind of a free, varied, multiple world, and not in a world that is uniform and completely regimented. So it may well be true that there have been articles published in Lebanon attacking the Egyptian Government or certain aspects of life in the United Arab Republic, but we have other newspapers in Lebanon which we allow to appear, which can defend and present the point of view of our neighbours; whereas such a Press is completely non-existent in the United Arab Republic. In fact, I will make a fair bet with my friend Mr. Loutfi, a very fair bet: if you can produce one sentence during the last year, from any paper in Egypt or Syria, that is appreciative of or kind to the Government of Lebanon—one sentence—I will withdraw this complaint.

74. Therefore, when it comes to the Press, we in Lebanon are on the strongest possible ground because we have a free Press and we know what we are talking about when we say that the Press of the United Arab Republic has been mercilessly attacking the Government of Lebanon for the last several months.

75. Now I come to my third observation, the question of the radio. The representative of the United Arab Republic spoke about that radio answering our radio. Our radio is hardly heard in Beirut itself, let alone in Egypt. Certainly it is not heard in Tripoli, which is the biggest city in the north of Lebanon. So it makes absolutely no sense to say that the Egyptian radio, whatever the unit which is used in the description of it is, is answering anything that our inaudible radio says. Again, I am prepared to make a similar bold bet. I can assure you that our radio, al-

though it is not heard very much outside Beirut, has been most careful, most appreciative, most kind, most positive and most brotherly towards our neighbours to the south and the east. There is no comparison whatsoever between the radio stations "The Voice of the Arabs" and Damascus Radio, and the poor radio of Lebanon which tries to be as fair, as objective, as unprovocative as it is humanly possible to be.

76. I come now to the question of what really happened in the League of Arab States. I have many things to say, but I will not tire the members of the Council. I will only say that I regret that the account which the representative of the United Arab Republic gave of what happened at the meeting of the League is neither complete nor even completely in accordance with the facts. And I will prove my case.

77. In the first instance, the very report from which the representative of the United Arab Republic read and which is supposed to be the summary report of the proceedings of the Arab League was not submitted to the League itself for final approval, which is always the case in these important matters. A report is drawn up and then, in a formal final session, it is submitted for the formal approval of the Council of the League which is supposed to have deliberated in a specified manner. Actually, the report was drawn up after the Council of the Arab League had adjourned. I am also told, although I cannot be 100 per cent sure of this, that the report itself was drawn up in Cairo and not in Benghazi. But at any rate, it certainly was not submitted for the approval of the members of the Council of the League. What Mr. Jamali distributed to the members of the Security Council, as his first document, is something that was drawn up by the officials of the Secretariat of the Arab League, without the formal approval of the League in session. That is the first point.

78. The second point is that it is all very well to say that the draft was unanimously adopted, to give the names of the countries which had sponsored that draft, and then to say that only the Government of Lebanon finally rejected it; but this is not exactly what happened. The representative of the Government of Iraq can speak for his own country here and I can speak for mine. What happened exactly was that the members of the League met and discussed the problem, and bandied about all kinds of texts. Almost everybody said, with the exception of the representative of the United Arab Republic, that this was a matter which primarily belonged to Lebanon, and that therefore they would withhold their views until they really find out what Lebanon wanted.

Towards the end there was some urgency, so a text was prepared. The various members were asked whether they would sponsor it. There was actually no printed text which was signed by representatives or the heading of which read, "Proposal submitted by the representative of so and so." The Chairman of the Sudanese delegation read a certain text and asked if the other members of the Council agreed to it, and there was no reply to that question.

79. Then they put it to the representative of Lebanon, who asked important questions in order to clarify the text and received that clarification from the Chairman of the delegation of the Sudan. The clarification made it plain that in the minds of those who supposedly sponsored that text there was no doubt whatsoever that the United Arab Republic was interfering in Lebanon's internal affairs. I can read to you that part of the explanation given by the Chairman of the delegation of the Sudan which you do not find in the summary which is before you.

80. But what is more important is the fact that many of the representatives said, "Obviously we cannot be more royalist than the King or more Catholic than the Pope. We will withhold our opinion until we know what Lebanon really thinks of this text." It is therefore not true to say that these gentlemen approved this text regardless of the position of Lebanon. At least some of them, and I am told most of them, said, "Our view is withheld until we hear what Lebanon itself, which is most directly concerned, thinks of this text. There is no harm in asking Lebanon for its opinion on this text. We can send it to Lebanon."

81. The text was sent to Lebanon, and Lebanon rejected it for four reasons which are very carefully set forth in the detailed proceedings which are not completely before the Security Council. As soon as Lebanon rejected the text, the others said, "We have nothing to do with the text." It is not, therefore, true to say that this text was unanimously adopted by the Governments of these various States regardless of the position of Lebanon. It was simply a trial to find out whether Lebanon would accept that kind of wording. And since they could not be more Lebanese than the Lebanese themselves, they said, "We will wait to see what Lebanon itself says." As soon as Lebanon had rejected the text, three representatives, the representatives of Iraq, Jordan, and Libya, said "We have nothing to do with this text." This is not, therefore, a unanimously adopted text which was in the end rejected only by Lebanon.

82. But even if it were so, the regulations of the Arab League are such that a draft of this nature could not be adopted unless it were also accepted by the complaining country. I think this Council knows very well the rule of unanimity and its importance, especially when it comes to matters which touch upon the very existence of a country. At the last meeting the representative of the Soviet Union spoke about a unanimously adopted text that was rejected by Lebanon. I do not think there is a country in the world that believes more in the rule of unanimity than the Soviet Union. In fact, we have applied this rule only with respect to those matters where our very existence was at stake. But even that presupposes that there was such a fiction called a unanimously adopted text which was really sponsored by everybody as the point of view of his Government. This, as I said, was not the case at all because at least three representatives—and I am told that there were even more than three—said later on, when Lebanon had expressed its view, that their view was exactly the same as that of Lebanon. They put in their own objections to the text, and I am told that the representative of Iraq has put in those objections himself before the Council in the second document which he has transmitted.

83. That is the story of this fiction that you hear concerning what happened at the Arab League.

84. Then there is something interesting that will also throw light on this matter of what really happened at the Arab League, and this you do not find in the document which has been distributed. This can be found only in the detailed account of what really happened there, which I would like to have put before the Council. I can only summarize it briefly as follows.

85. The representative of the United Arab Republic, who was heading that delegation at the League, presented at one point in the argument certain amendments to the text that was to be tried on Lebanon. These were to be added to the draft resolution as one of the paragraphs of the preamble. I translate directly from the Arabic text before me.

“The Council of the League of Arab States,

“And after having felt in the two parties to the dispute the spirit of mutual respect and certain desire not to intervene in each other's internal affairs. . .”

There was a discussion on this text which lasted for one hour according to the internal evidence of this document, and those present rejected it. The head of the delegation of the United Arab Republic pleaded with them and asked them, "Why do you reject it? Do you not trust us? Are we not telling you the truth? Do you think we are intervening in the internal affairs of Lebanon?" And they would not answer. This can only be ascertained from this text which you do not find in the report which has been distributed to you.

86. This incident, it seems to me, is of the utmost importance. When the representative of the United Arab Republic tried to urge upon his colleagues a certain text which stated that there was no intervention on the part of his country in the affairs of my country and his colleagues completely rejected it, that seems to me to be most interesting and it should be brought out in the summary submitted to the Council. One of the phrases which the leader of the United Arab Republic delegation there uttered, again in the very paper before me, was: "I do not understand the secret behind this unanimity in rejecting my amendment." These are his own words.

87. If you read this document in detail, you will find many, many other interesting things that are not reflected in the summary put before you by the representative of Iraq. You will have a different picture of what really happened in Benghazi during those meetings.

88. That is all I want to say on that aspect of what Mr. Loutfi has been saying about what happened at Benghazi. I only want to prove that there was no unanimity; that Lebanon stood in the way of nothing; that, when we lodged the complaint there and here at the same time, we lodged it in both places in absolutely good faith. We delayed the consideration of this matter here six days. The delaying tactics were really being carried on in Benghazi, and not here. We were perfectly prepared to wait until the Arab League concluded its discussion, and we did wait, and these are the results that I have pointed out to you. It therefore seems to me that to say that Lebanon was joking when it brought its complaint before the Arab League because it had intended from the very beginning to press its complaint here is to say something that can easily be refuted by the facts.

89. I will go even further and say that we made it perfectly plain to all our friends in the Arab League and even to the representatives of the United Arab Republic themselves that at any moment in the deliberations of this Council, or prior to our deliberations here, we would

withdraw any complaint brought before anybody and not press for anything, provided that this massive intervention to which I referred in my first statement, and which I then described in full, were really stopped. And that stands true today. We are not interested in harming anybody—least of all Syria and Egypt. But we are in dead earnest about the stopping of the massive intervention which is occurring in our country today.

90. The representative of the United Arab Republic complained that Lebanon was hatching plots against the United Arab Republic through the Syrian nationalists, that we had behaved improperly toward certain United Arab Republic diplomats in Beirut, and that we had expelled nationals of the United Arab Republic from Lebanon. These are his three main points.

91. As to the expulsion of the nationals to whom he referred, the first point to make is that we have a lot to say about the conduct of the Government of the United Arab Republic toward our own nationals in that country. We did not say that, because it is not part of our complaint; we are only saying that the Government of the United Arab Republic is intervening in our internal affairs.

92. The second point to make is that, if the representative of the United Arab Republic wants to know the detailed reasons for our having had to expel some of these brothers of ours, I can produce them for him at any time. In general, it was a reaction against the subversive activities of some of them, and many of them had been suspected of having taken part in these subversive activities for a long time. Many of them, again, were people who were without identity cards in Lebanon.

93. In this connexion, I must add that there are 50,000 Syrians living happily in Lebanon—50,000—prospering, working in commerce, taking part in agriculture, and carrying on all kinds of activities. And we are most happy with them. We are brothers to them. It is only a very small minority—I doubt whether there are more than a thousand—that has had to leave our country during the last troubles, either because they did not have identity cards or because they were caught red-handed taking part in subversive activities.

94. Concerning our behaviour toward the United Arab Republic diplomats in our country, I can produce all the facts before this Council and I can show that our patience with the activity of those diplomats in Lebanon—an activity which is openly anti-Government and openly pro-Opposition, so to speak—has been more than exemplary and that, when

we had to deal with the matter in one or two instances, the situation was so flagrant that it was no longer possible for us to be patient about it.

95. As for the plots that are said to be hatched in Lebanon against Syria or Egypt, I can only say that it takes almost infinite credulity to believe that Lebanon some day is going to send an invading army to Cairo, or even an invading army to Damascus, or that Lebanon is now engaged in any subversive activity in Syria or in Egypt. It takes infinite credulity to believe that Lebanon is the most peaceful little country in the whole of the Middle East. It wants nothing except to live in peace with its neighbours and it wants nothing except to have its own internal elements live in peace with each other in a model State, in which Moslems and Christians can live like brothers and in which they can co-operate in the furtherance of the arts of civilization and of life and of peace. Therefore, to say that there are plots hatched in Lebanon seems to me to be beyond credulity.

96. I am sorry that I have taken so much of the Council's time. I want to assure the Council of the absolute goodwill of Lebanon, and of my own personal absolute goodwill, in this whole matter. Nobody is more sorry than I that I have to sit here and talk about this situation. For us, it is a very serious situation. We want to retain our independence. We want to live in peace with our neighbours. We will do anything to prove that we are peaceful country, that we want peace for ourselves and for our neighbours. But, now that the situation has been considerably aggravated during the last twenty-four hours, we want this Council to look into it as carefully as possible and to come to a decision about it, one way or the other. We trust the honesty and the conscience of the members of the Council in doing everything they can to bring out the truth about this matter and to help Lebanon stand on its feet as a peaceful little Arab country in that area, trying to co-operate with all its Arab neighbours and trying to make its own modest contribution to the cause of peace.

7. *Extracts from speech by Mr. Sobolev (USSR), 10 June 1958*¹⁴

138. At the preceding meeting of the Security Council, Mr. Malik, the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, sought in his statement to represent the situation as if the recent events in Lebanon, which testify to an important popular movement against the Government of President

¹⁴ SCOR, 824th meeting, 26-35.

Chamoun, had been brought about by intervention in Lebanon's domestic affairs by the United Arab Republic. I listened attentively to his long statement, but I must say frankly that it did not convince us of the validity of the complaint submitted by the Lebanese Government.

139. The representative of the United Arab Republic gave a detailed analysis of the so-called facts quoted in Mr. Malik's statement, showing that they were unreliable, absurd, or did not in any way concern the Government of the United Arab Republic. *A fortiori*, these so-called facts cannot serve as a basis for the serious accusation that the Government of the United Arab Republic has interfered in the domestic affairs of Lebanon. . . .

148. What has taken place in Lebanon and what are the events that have stirred the entire Lebanese people?

149. It is well known that during the last few years the imperialist circles of a number of Western countries have regarded Lebanon as one of their important bases in the Arab East. As early as the spring of 1957 the Lebanese Government hastened to subscribe to the Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine, which was rejected by the Arab peoples.

150. Entering into this deal with the United States, the Lebanese Government abandoned the policy of neutrality and non-participation in aggressive military blocs followed by the majority of Arab States. It began to pursue a policy radically opposed to the resolutions of the African-Asian Conference, held at Bandung in 1955, in which it participated. This led to Lebanon's isolation from the other Arab States, and it thus played into the hands of the ruling circles of the United States, which, as is well known, aim at undermining the unity of the Arab countries. Instead of the promised improvement in the economic situation, the so-called United States aid provided in accordance with the notorious doctrine increased the country's economic dependence upon United States monopolies and, needless to say, brought no relief to the Lebanese people.

151. Under the circumstances, profound discontent with the policy of the ruling circles increased rapidly among the popular masses in Lebanon. The patience of the Lebanese people was finally exhausted by the provocative murder of Nassib El Metni, owner and publisher of the newspaper *Telegraph-Beirut*, an outstanding patriot who fought for the independence of Lebanon. A large-scale popular movement developed in the country in support of the Constitution and national independence and in opposition to colonialism.

152. All sections of the population, irrespective of religious denomination, rallied around the Lebanese Opposition. Its leaders include such prominent figures in the Lebanon as the former President of the Republic, Bichara El-Khoury, and former Prime Ministers Saeb Salaam Abdullah El-Yafi and Rashid Karamy. Guided by the interests of the people, all these politicians have expressed themselves in favour of respect for the Constitution and the country's national independence, and against foreign pressure. It was they who protested to the United States Ambassador in Lebanon, demanding the cessation of the United States intervention in the domestic affairs of Lebanon.

153. Thus the present domestic events in Lebanon are the result of the indignation of the popular masses and represent an organized struggle by the Lebanese people for their constitutional rights.

154. On the strength of an assessment of events in Lebanon based on reliable and universally known facts, the Soviet delegation considers that there are no grounds for intervention in the domestic affairs of Lebanon by any country or by the Security Council, and that such intervention is inadmissible.

155. It is, on the contrary, the duty of the Security Council to rebuff any attempts at external interference in the domestic affairs of the Arab States. This point must be emphasized, since numerous facts show that certain Western Powers are attempting to use the events in Lebanon for the purpose of intervening in its domestic affairs and of exerting further pressure on the Arab States.

156. The facts show that these Powers are hatching a fresh plot against peace and security in the Near East, and that on this occasion they have chosen Lebanon as the object of their intrigues. The people of Lebanon are, however, resolutely defending their independence and are opposing foreign intervention.

157. These facts are universally known. They show that Lebanon is faced with the threat of open foreign intervention, not from the Arab States, but from the West. Particular activity is being shown by the ruling circles of the United States and the United Kingdom, which have agreed on joint action with regard to Lebanon, including the landing of troops.

158. Official representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom are openly referring to the possibility of intervention. On 15 May 1958, Secretary of State Dulles told leaders of both parties in the Senate that the United States was ready to land United States armed

forces on the coast of Lebanon. The fact that the United States is actually preparing to intervene in Lebanon was in fact confirmed by Secretary of State Dulles at a Press conference on 20 May.

159. The United States Press is systematically publishing reports which constitute an account of the preparations for intervention in Lebanon which, it is pointed out, may be carried out either jointly by the armed forces of the United States and the United Kingdom or without the participation of British troops.

160. Armed forces of the United States and the United Kingdom are being moved towards the Lebanese frontiers. On 16 May the United States Sixth Fleet, with twice the normal number of assault forces, received orders to proceed immediately to the eastern Mediterranean and since then it has been cruising near Lebanon. United Kingdom warships also left Malta hurriedly in the direction of the coast of Lebanon. Parachute troops are standing by and, as pointed out by the United Kingdom High Command, may be sent to the Near and Middle East at any moment.

161. The armed forces of the Western Powers are being concentrated in Cyprus as they were during the preparations for the aggression against Egypt. According to press reports, several hundred men of the United Kingdom Air Force have arrived in Cyprus. United States contingents are also expected to arrive there.

162. According to spokesmen of the United States State Department, American arms, including heavy armaments, artillery, tanks and aircraft, to be used for reprisals against the peaceful Lebanese population, are being brought into Lebanon. It has been reported that a large quantity of armaments has already been brought into Lebanon from United States arsenals in West Germany. Not only is tear-gas being used against the insurgent people; United States tanks and artillery, rockets and napalm bombs have also been brought into action.

163. It is obvious that all these military operations are clearly provocative and constitute direct preparations for armed intervention against the Lebanese people.

164. The United States Press does not conceal the fact that government circles in the United States and the United Kingdom are seeking formal "justification" for armed intervention in Lebanon's domestic affairs by claiming that their purpose is to "protect" the country. It is very difficult, however, to protect the Lebanese people when United

States "protection" and United States "aid" are exactly what the people are against.

165. There has been some discussion in the columns of the Press as to whether it would be better in the present case to apply the long-forgotten Tripartite Declaration of 1950 or the Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine. The United States State Department obviously prefers to apply this bankrupt doctrine which suits the interests of the United States better and opens the door to armed intervention against the Lebanese people.

166. The events in Lebanon have been brought about by the very fact that the Lebanese people, having experienced the consequences of the Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine, adopted against its will, has taken a resolute stand against foreign pressure and in favour of an independent state policy in keeping with its national interests and the interests of all the Arab peoples. . . .

168. These days, when the Lebanese people are engaged in a resolute struggle, have reconfirmed the Arabs in their belief that the main aim of the colonialist Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine is suppression of the growing national liberation movement in the Arab East and support of reactionary régimes for the purpose of safeguarding the position of the oil monopolies.

169. The active interest displayed by the United States and the United Kingdom is explained, first, by the fact that the most important oil pipelines in the Near East belonging to the United States and United Kingdom monopolies, through which more than 30 million tons of oil a year will be pumped, are being completed on the territory of Lebanon and, secondly, by the fact that the United States and United Kingdom High Command attach tremendous strategic importance to Lebanon as a key position on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean.

170. An important part in the preparations for intervention against Lebanon is being assigned by those who have organized it to the Baghdad bloc. As happened a year ago, troops of the States belonging to this aggressive bloc are being moved to the borders of the Syrian region of the United Arab Republic. At the meeting of the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact in Iraq on 17 May 1958 it was decided to support the Chamoun Government in its struggle against this nation-wide movement.

171. According to Arab press reports, troops of the Baghdad Pact countries are hastily being flown to Lebanon. It is reported that about

1,000 Iraqi officers and men, armed with light machine-guns and sub-machine-guns and supplied with ammunition, have already arrived in Lebanon. Jordanian and Turkish officers in civilian dress are also being sent into Lebanese territory.

172. According to a report in the Damascus newspaper *An-Nasr*, an Iraqi officer recently went over to the Lebanese rebels in the area of Tripoli. He stated that he had recently arrived in Lebanon with a large group of Iraqi and Jordanian soldiers who had been sent into Lebanon by the Governments of the Arab Union.

173. It is also reported that of late large detachments of Jordanian soldiers have appeared in Beirut for the alleged purpose of guarding the Jordanian Embassy.

174. Thus, the development of events in Lebanon shows that there is a carefully-thought-out plan for intervention against the Lebanese people by certain Western Powers and their accomplices in the Near and Middle East. It is also quite clear from all this that the aim is to establish the necessary conditions for drawing Lebanon at a later date into the Baghdad Pact, which has been rejected by the Arab peoples.

175. While making preparations for military intervention in Lebanon, the Western Powers seek to justify their actions on the pretext that the mass demonstrations of the population in Lebanon have been instigated by the United Arab Republic. Members of the Security Council are, of course, aware that these charges have been categorically denied by the Government of the United Arab Republic as slanderous, untrue and aimed at fomenting hatred between the Arab peoples.

181. It is quite clear that the settlement of the internal conflict in Lebanon should be sought not in the Security Council, but in Lebanon itself. The Lebanese Government's appeal to the Security Council can only be regarded as an attempt to gain support in its struggle against its own people from certain Western Powers represented in the Council. The Lebanese Government's desire is easily explained if we look, for example, at the fact that, when mentioning the name of Camille Chamoun or Charles Malik, the United States press never forgets to add that they are pro-Western, thereby stressing whose interests they defend.

182. Hence, the Lebanese Government's complaint against the United Arab Republic looks more like a complaint against the Lebanese people who have risen in defence of their independence.

183. What further proof of the national-liberational character of the Lebanese movement is required than the fact that the wide masses

of the people, representatives of all sections of the population and the different religions are taking part in it? . . .

185. Moreover, in order to leave no doubt as to who inspired Lebanon's appeal to the Security Council, may we refer to a statement made by Mr. Saeb Salaam, one of the Lebanese Opposition leaders mentioned above, to the effect that if the Lebanese Government appealed to the Security Council, it would do so under the influence of Mr. Dulles, Secretary of State of the United States and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

186. Nor is it a coincidence that the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs in his speech lasting one-and-a-half hours devoted only a few general remarks to the Lebanese Government's efforts to settle its differences with the Government of the United Arab Republic on a friendly, regional basis. But were there in fact any such efforts? We have every reason for doubting seriously that there were.

187. It is now more than obvious that the Lebanese Government's appeal to the League of Arab States was a manoeuvre calculated to deceive the Arab peoples. The Lebanese Government did not seriously intend, in making this appeal, to arrive at a settlement by direct negotiations with the United Arab Republic or with the assistance of the friendly Arab countries. As proof of this one need only cite Lebanon's simultaneous appeal to the Security Council. By twice postponing consideration of its complaint in the Council, the Lebanese Government attempted to bring pressure to bear upon the members of the Arab League. But when, in the course of the League's work, prospects of a compromise agreement became apparent (I mean by this the draft resolution supported by the representatives of six States—the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq and Libya), the Lebanese Government rejected the agreement and transferred discussion of the complaint to the Security Council.

188. Mr. Malik has attempted to give the impression by what he has said here that Lebanon was supported by almost all the members of the Arab League. If that is so, why has the Lebanese Government eschewed the procedure of settlement through the Arab League and brought the discussion of its complaint to the Security Council? The reason is that this is not the case.

189. It can only be concluded from all this that direct pressure is being brought to bear on the Lebanese Government by the Western Powers, which are in no way seeking to ensure the peaceful settlement

of the events in Lebanon, but rather to aggravate the situation in the Near and Middle East.

190. Nor can there be anything but surprise at the fact that the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs preferred to come to New York to a meeting of the Security Council, the initiators of which are seeking to sow dissension among the Arab peoples, rather than go to Benghazi to a meeting of the Arab League for talks with neighbouring Arab countries, his friendly feelings for which were described at such length at the last meeting.

191. Such manoeuvres, however, can no longer mislead world-public opinion. The time has passed when it was possible to divide the Arab peoples and dominate them by intrigues and threats. The peoples of the Arab countries, as those of other countries of the world, realize that Lebanon is faced with the threat of foreign interference and armed intervention by the West and that resolute measures are necessary to forestall this threat.

192. As regards the Soviet Union delegation, we consider it essential to repeat what was stated by us at the previous meeting of the Security Council, to wit, that the solution of problems concerning the Lebanese State is the inalienable right of the Lebanese people and that no other State is entitled to interfere in their affairs. Any attempts to use the domestic events in Lebanon for interference from outside create a dangerous situation in the Near East and may have grave consequences not only for the future of the Lebanese State and its independence, but also for the future of peace in the Near and Middle East.

193. The Government of the Soviet Union is convinced that no Power will intervene in Lebanon's internal affairs in any way whatsoever or permit a dangerous hotbed of war to be generated in this region.

194. In the Soviet delegation's opinion, it is the duty of all States members of the Security Council in these circumstances to prevent the plans for interference in the domestic affairs of Lebanon from being carried out or the events there from being used in a manner prejudicial to the national interests of the Arab peoples. The Security Council should reject the Lebanese Government's complaint as invalid and groundless.

8. *Extracts from speech by Mr. Jamālī (Iraq), 10 June 1958*¹⁵

196. We believe that the problem which Lebanon has raised in this

¹⁵ SCOR, 824th meeting, 35-41.

Council does not affect Lebanon alone. It affects the whole of the Middle East—nay, the whole free world. If subversion and interference in Lebanese affairs are permitted to continue and to succeed in Lebanon, no country in the Middle East can feel safe and secure.

197. Lebanon is a peace-loving country, which has done no harm to any other country. It is a meeting-place of East and West and a melting-pot of cultures and religions. Islam and Christianity, in particular, find ample opportunity in this country to develop a spirit of brotherhood and tolerance. Lebanon is a freedom-loving country, imbued with the democratic ideology of the Western world. As a matter of fact, Beirut has for long been a centre for disseminating Western culture in the Arab world and imparting to the West what it absorbed from Arab culture. It is, therefore, not strange that a Christian poet in Beirut in the second half of the last century was the first to call the Arab world to awaken and unite in Arab nationalism. Lebanon has chosen to live in peace and to act as a Switzerland for the Arab world, where friendship is shown equally to all Arab States, and a refuge for Arabs of all shades of opinion is to be found.

198. All was well and peaceful in Lebanon until Nasserism began to creep into the Arab world. Lebanon is not the first country to suffer from the advent of Nasserism. Iraq has had its taste of Nasserism, too. Jordan nearly collapsed because of Nasserism. Were it not for the high courage and great vision of His Majesty King Hussein, the Kingdom of Jordan would not be in existence today. Other Arab countries, Syria, Libya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Morocco, all have had to a greater or lesser degree a taste of Nasserism. Lebanon is the victim of the day, and her trouble is very grave indeed.

199. Now what is this Nasserism which is causing this unrest? Is it a fiction or a reality? It is a reality. It is the design of President Nasser to dominate the Arab world, or at least to turn the Arab States into satellites of Egypt by fomenting revolutions. President Nasser applies practically the same communist method of subversion from within as that used in eastern Europe, Korea and Viet-Nam. An Arab State has to choose: either it will obey Nasser's policies and dictation and accept being reduced to a satellite, or it will insist on its independence and be subjected to violent attacks and subversion from President Nasser's machinery.

200. Iraq and Jordan are States that faced the problem and have insisted on retaining their independence. Iraq, which found it necessary

for its own safety to join the defensive Baghdad Pact, acting in accordance with Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter, was attacked and is still being attacked by Cairo Radio. Why? Because Iraq, in President Nasser's view, is not entitled to follow an independent course of action. When Lebanon endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine, it was immediately subjected to attacks by the Egyptian press and radio, and subversion in Lebanon ensued. All of that because, in the view of President Nasser, no Arab country is free to co-operate with the West without his consent. According to Colonel Nasser, all Arabs must abide by the so-called policy of positive neutrality, which is the cornerstone of Nasserite foreign policy. "Positive neutrality" in practice means antagonizing the West and seeking help from the Soviet Union. This is what President Nasser and his followers want us to do. If we choose otherwise and act freely, we are agents of imperialism.

201. Those who listen to Cairo Radio night after night, as I do, often hear of the great achievements of the Soviet Union and of its desire for peace and for the abolition of nuclear weapons, and of the great injustices, the warlike tendencies and the technical failures of the Western Powers, the United States included. This is what is called "positive neutrality", the policy which President Nasser wishes to impose on all the Arab world.

202. The situation in Lebanon is not an internal question at all. It is true there may be a dissatisfied Opposition. It is true some Lebanese do not wish the President to be re-elected. But that in itself would not have caused the magnitude of disorders and bloodshed which it has were it not for the working of external forces. I submit that the trouble in Lebanon is essentially an international problem. It reflects the influences of the Soviet Union and its work through the United Arab Republic to have a foothold in the Middle East. After all, it is the Soviet Union that is inspiring President Nasser's domination over the Arab world. It is the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, who told President Nasser on 16 May 1958 (I translate from an Arabic report): "We desire the unification of the Arab peoples under your leadership and to achieve this end you will receive all necessary assistance from us to make you attain it." Mr. Khrushchev simply voiced what President Nasser and his followers are dreaming of achieving. Let us quote a well-known Egyptian writer, Fikri Ebadha, writing in *Al-Mussawar* of 2 May 1958:

"Cairo in the international political dictionary means the capital of an Arab nation which sooner or later will include 80 million people.

Cairo is the capital of oil—right, left, east and west."

This quotation simply goes to prove the modern Egyptian tendency for domination over all Arab lands as well as a design to control Middle East oil. Big lighted globes in the main avenues of Cairo carry a map showing all the Arab States from Morocco to Iraq entitled "the United Arab Republic"; a very clear evidence of a desire for domination.

203. When Mr. Khrushchev wishes President Nasser to rule the whole Arab world, we are sure he is paving the way for Soviet domination. If we grasp this global Soviet policy and its relation to Nasserism, we can understand the roots of the troubles in Lebanon today. For all the struggle in Lebanon today is to make it kneel before Nasserism.

204. President Nasser is applying the same pattern as that followed by international communism in its subversive methods. These consist in: (a) arousing and exploiting public dissatisfaction with the prevailing conditions, political, social or economic; (b) undermining the authority of the State by creating chaos; and (c) providing men and arms for a revolution. . . .

207. Mr. Loutfi wants to dispose of the Lebanese question as being entirely an internal matter. I beg to disagree with him completely. Internal ills in Lebanon, as anywhere else, will continue to persist in one form or another. It is the fanning of the embers and the machinations from without that have made these ills take this sanguinary and inflammatory form. There is no one who possesses a conscience and loyalty to his country and people who does not wish to achieve social, economic and moral reforms. But are political chaos and revolution the way to achieve them? Is not continued social, economic and moral education of the people preferable? In order to achieve reforms, should every country in the world, including the Arab countries, experience revolutions and the use of force as communism and Nasserism would have us do? Are we not entitled to choose the evolutionary process?

208. I may well be told that I have digressed from the main subject and entered into general topics. Believe me, this is the issue of Lebanon. It is a struggle between the West and the East, between freedom and subjugation, between the forces of democracy and dictatorship, between evolution and revolution, between peaceful educational methods

and the use of force and revolution in achieving change and progress.

209. I may now be asked, how does Nasserism achieve its aims? The answer was objectively and accurately given at the last meeting and also today by the Foreign Minister of Lebanon, to whose statements my delegation fully subscribes. All his statements are corroborated by our experiences in Iraq. . . .

223. In the view of my delegation it is the Egyptian-Syrian intervention fortified by an external force that has brought about the conflagration, and we hope that this Council, having found that the Arab League failed to achieve a satisfactory settlement of the trouble, will take appropriate measures to protect not only Lebanon, but other Arab States, including my own, from communism and Nasserism. Aggression and intervention with the intention of undermining legitimate Governments should be immediately stopped.

9. *Extracts from speech by Mr. Lodge (US), 10 June 1958*¹⁶

252. The United States Government has listened to and carefully examined the statements both of the Foreign Minister of Lebanon and of the representative of the United Arab Republic. The conclusion is clear that there has been outside interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Lebanon, that this interference has been designed to promote civil strife and to impede the efforts of the constituted authorities to restore order and tranquillity, and that the interference has occurred from the territory and via the facilities of the United Arab Republic.

253. This statement is made with regret. We regret it first, because this situation has fomented violence and bloodshed in the peaceful State of Lebanon, a country whose people have, by their tradition, clearly revealed their desire to live at peace with their neighbours. Secondly, we regret it because the United States desires good relations with all States in the Middle East, including the United Arab Republic, and deplors the creation of circumstances which obstruct such relations.

254. This situation, backed by the evidence presented by the representative of Lebanon, is grave indeed. The Security Council cannot ignore it. Fundamental questions concerning the responsibilities both of Members of the United Nations and of the Organization itself are involved. . . .

260. Lebanon has over the past thirteen years played a distinguished

role in working for the cause of peace in the United Nations. Its leading statesmen have devoted themselves to the Purposes and Principles of the Charter. The policies of its Government have been helpful in reducing tensions in the part of the world where tensions are only too common.

261. The people of the United States feel a particularly deep sympathy for the people of Lebanon, not only because of their country's record in international affairs, but also because of the close and intimate ties that have long existed between the two. This warm friendship has its basis in common ideals of democracy. It has found its expression in extensive cultural and social co-operation. It reflects common beliefs and objectives.

262. The representative of the United Arab Republic has quoted extensively from political sources within Lebanon who are opposed to the present Government. Political opposition in a democracy is natural, indeed essential, as a basis for the free determination of the country's destiny by its citizens. It is something of which Lebanon can be proud.

263. The fact that this opposition exists, or that it feels strongly about its ideals, is, however, no justification whatever for external attacks, whether by radio or by other controlled media, upon the Government in office, for external demands that it resign, or for external support and assistance to those not in office.

264. Lebanon has already demonstrated its ability to govern itself through modern liberal traditions. It will surely continue to do so if others do not exploit normal differences of opinion for purposes of their own.

265. The United States has noted with interest the statements made by the representative of the United Arab Republic that all his Government wants is "an independent Lebanon" and that it wishes "for the prosperity, well-being and peace of the Lebanese people" [823rd meeting, paras. 124, 125]. The United States also notes that the United Arab Republic categorically "rejects the accusations" that there has been an intervention of the United Arab Republic in the affairs of Lebanon, and that the United Arab Republic is "always ready to co-operate with the United Nations and to settle disputes under the Terms of the Charter" [*ibid.*, para. 28].

266. In view of these statements, the United States assumes that the Government of the United Arab Republic will take all possible measures to ensure that efforts to uphold the authority of the legally consti-

tuted Government of Lebanon and to re-establish law and order are not obstructed by activities based on the territory or by means of the facilities of the United Arab Republic.

267. The United States Government hopes that the Security Council will help to bring about an end to interference by the Arab Republic in Lebanon. We hope that the views of members of the Council will be received with respect and that they will produce prompt results.

268. Before I conclude, I should like to say one brief word about the statement made by the Soviet representative.

269. The Soviet strictures against the United States are so standardized that it would be a waste of time to demonstrate their absurdity—and this is one night in our history when we must not waste time. Yet, instead of joining forces with us to do something quick and helpful, the Soviet representative seems to be looking for reasons not to do something. We hope that this turns out not to be the case.

270. I say this because current reports just reaching me from Beirut show that the situation is becoming increasingly critical and that the infiltrations from Syria are growing. A press report just brought to me indicates that two major battles are in progress: one in the Ain Zhalta area, where armed bands are seeking to cut the major highway leading from Beirut, and another in the outskirts of Tripoli. In both battles, artillery is being used against the Lebanese forces. Under these circumstances, it would be preposterous and dangerous for us to sit here solemnly and, to paraphrase a well-known saying, quibble while Rome burns.

271. The need is for something practical; and that something is the Swedish draft resolution. It encroaches on nobody. It is consistent with the Charter. It could yet stop the attempts to subvert a gallant little country.

272. We urge the Council to take quick and decisive action.

10. *Extract from speech by Mr. Charles Malik (Lebanon), 11 June 1958*¹⁷

67. This whole matter which has been under consideration here can be viewed on two distinct levels. There is the level of the immediate and the urgent, and there is the level of the ultimate and the fundamental. The level of the immediate and urgent is the one with which we have all been for the most part engaged. There is trouble in Lebanon, there

¹⁷ SCOR, 825th meeting, 13-16.

is massive intervention in our affairs, and we bring this conflict to the Council here. Various Governments express their points of view. Some kind of decision is or is not arrived at by the Council, and then we all go home and await developments. That is an important level on which this question may be viewed. In fact, it is the level of action and of urgency, and it is the level with which the Council is, for the most part, concerned.

68. But, as I say, there is a more basic, a more ultimate and a more fundamental level of questions which this matter raises. That is the level, if I may so call it, of history, namely, the basic questions which history is asking through the crisis of Lebanon. The crisis of Lebanon raises fundamental questions in history and for history, and very briefly I wish to tell you what they are in my view.

69. Our crisis raises two questions for the United Nations as an organization. There is, first, the question of the small nations. What is their fate in the United Nations? Can the United Nations save the small States? Is the United Nations an arena of struggle only between the big, so that the small must be left to their fate, must be submerged, must be pushed aside to the margin of existence in the United Nations—or is there a modicum of protection that the small nations can count upon from the United Nations? The crisis of Lebanon puts this test to the United Nations.

70. The Lebanese crisis puts a second test to the United Nations, namely, whether the United Nations machinery and whole conception is fit to deal with subversion, with indirect aggression. It is easy to deal with direct, palpable and demonstrable aggression such as the crossing of frontiers by regular troops; but is the United Nations machinery capable of handling indirect aggression or subversion? This is the second test which our crisis historically puts before the United Nations.

71. These, then, are the two historic questions which our case raises before the United Nations and before the world.

72. Our case also raises two fundamental, historic questions for the Arabs. This is the second order of fundamental questions to which I wish to refer. The first of these questions is this: is there room for a small, independent, free Arab State, or must all Arab States sooner or later merge into a larger whole? This is a basic historic question which the present moment in history, through our crisis, raises with the Arabs as a whole.

73. It raises a second question, namely, whatever the answer to

this first question may be, would the new state of affairs in the Arab world, however it is going to emerge and develop, emerge and develop under the sign of what I call the universal, or under the sign of what I would call the special, the particular, the exclusive? Is the basic philosophy which is going to permeate the new shape of things in the Arab world one which has the universal man as its basis, or it is one which will be based upon special, particular and exclusive considerations? This is the second historic question which our crisis raises before the Arab world.

74. Our crisis also raises two fundamental questions for Lebanon itself. The first is this: can Lebanon stand the pressure? Does it have the political and moral wisdom and the resiliency which will enable it to survive its present trial? This, indeed, is the historic test of the stature of Lebanon. It puts before us a second question: does Lebanon have enough friends in the Middle East and in the world to enable it to stand this pressure? This is the test of the reality of the friendships of Lebanon.

75. It also puts historic questions of a fundamental character to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is today present in the Middle East. Its presence is felt, and the question that is put to it in its presence there is whether we are going to have an era of co-operation and peace, not only among ourselves in that area, but also between ourselves and the other countries of the Middle East and the rest of the world. Does the real presence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East mean not only the elevation of the masses, not only social change, not only fundamental revolution—and much of that revolution has been long awaited and is long overdue—but also, as far as peace and tranquillity and freedom are concerned, all these things not only among ourselves, but also between ourselves and the rest of the world? That question, too, is put critically, fundamentally and historically to the Soviet Union in its presence in the Middle East at the present moment.

76. There are also questions to the Western world which our crisis raises—fundamental questions. Is the Western world in its relations with the Middle East adequate to meet the fundamental changes which are arising in the Middle East at the present moment, or must it, because of certain fundamental inadequacies from which it may be suffering from, withdraw inevitably from the Middle East? By withdrawal, I do not mean political control, because we do not want political control from any corner of the earth; by withdrawal, I mean withdrawal in the matter of ideals and of influence and of interest and of presence.

77. Mr. Sobolev referred in one of his statements to certain people, including myself, being described as "pro-Western" [824th meeting, para. 181]. I have never felt it a source of dishonour for me to be called "pro-Western". I think that the Western world is not a wholly evil world. I think that it is a great thing to know, to read and to contemplate the great masters of thought and of life in the Western tradition. I think that even Russia itself owes a great deal to that Western tradition which, for the last 300 years, has been penetrating Russia. But the question that arises for the West in the Middle East today is, to what extent is being called "pro-Western" a reproach, and what is the cause of that reproach? The West has got to think about these things. It has got to save its name in the Middle East, and not only through political activity, but through much else indeed.

78. So our problem raises these basic issues with respect to the Western world.

79. Finally, so far as these ultimate historic questions are concerned, there is a problem raised by our crisis for the region from which we come, namely, for the whole of the Middle East. The question is this: would it serve peace and stability for the area, for the Middle East, if Lebanon's independence were lost, if there were a kind of *Anschluss* between Lebanon and certain parts of the Middle East? Would that be a service to peace and security, or might it not rather be the beginning of a chain of events whose end we may not now foresee? It may well be—I believe it is—a necessity for peace and stability in the area that Lebanon should retain its complete independence and its complete integrity and freedom. If that is so, then the region as a whole must be interested in that fact and must see to it that no *Anschluss* occurs because it would upset the peace in the area and its stability.

80. These are some of the ultimate questions which history is raising for all of us through our little crisis in Lebanon today. I feel proud when I realize that this little country of mine raises all these issues, because these are questions of the essence of the world situation today.

81. We are most grateful to the Security Council for having considered our problem with such sympathy, understanding and attention as we have obtained. Whatever decision you come to is yours. You are primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. You know what is best to be done in the circumstances. We only want to live in peace with our neighbours, to do our little bit in furthering the causes of freedom and prosperity and the welfare of the

peoples of the Middle East. We can do that only if we feel that we are not harassed or threatened—if we feel that we are free and independent. We cannot work in an atmosphere of threat and fear. We will be completely stifled in such an atmosphere. Therefore, to enable us to make the little contribution that we can make in that area and, through the area, to the world, we must feel absolutely secure in our freedom and independence. That is why we brought our case to you; that is why we trust your judgement; and that is why we await that judgement.

11. *Resolution of the Security Council, 11 June 1958*¹⁸

The Security Council,

Having heard the charges of the representative of Lebanon concerning interference by the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon and the reply of the representative of the United Arab Republic.

1. *Decides* to dispatch urgently an observation group to proceed to Lebanon so as to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese borders;
2. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to that end;
3. *Requests* the observation group to keep the Security Council currently informed through the Secretary-General.

12. *First report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 11 June 1958, 16 June 1958*¹⁹

1. The Security Council, in its resolution of 11 June 1958 concerning the complaint by Lebanon [S/4023], requests the Observation Group authorized by that resolution "to keep the Security Council currently informed through the Secretary-General". The Observation Group, two of whose members have not yet arrived in Lebanon, will hold its first meeting in Beirut this week, probably on 19 June. As no information may be expected from the group prior to that date, this re-

¹⁸ SCOR, 13th year, supplement for April, May and June 1958, 47. The draft resolution was presented by Sweden and was adopted by 10 votes to none with the abstention of the USSR.

¹⁹ SCOR, 13th year, supplement for April, May and June 1958, 70-74.

port is submitted as an interim measure, to inform the Security Council of the steps that have been taken to date by the Secretary-General, under the authority given to him, toward implementing its resolution.

2. The three members of the Observation Group have been appointed. They are: Mr. Galo Plaza of Ecuador, Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal of India and Major-General Odd Bull of Norway. The Observation Group will constitute itself and determine its own procedures. Military officers in the capacity of observers are assisting the Group. Major-General Bull has been designated as "executive member of the Observation Group, in charge of military observers". Major-General Bull arrived in Beirut early on the morning of the fifteenth, Mr. Galo Plaza is scheduled to arrive on the seventeenth, and Mr. Dayal is expected on the same day.

3. On 11 June, I appointed Mr. David Blickenstaff as Secretary of the Observation Group, and Mr. Shiv K. Shastri as Assistant Secretary. Mr. Blickenstaff arrived in Beirut on 12 June and Mr. Shastri on 14 June. In the days immediately following, the operation was provided with the secretariat staff required. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, from the beginning, on a emergency and temporary basis, has readily afforded all necessary administrative assistance and other co-operation. This has in no way involved an association of UNRWA with the operation. The headquarters of the Group was established in a Beirut hotel, close to its telecommunications facilities, where all of the staff members, including the observers, are housed.

4. On 11 June, I requested the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, Major-General von Horn, to afford temporary assistance toward the execution of the Security Council's action by detaching ten United Nations military observers from Truce Supervision Organization duty to the Observation Group operation in Lebanon, five of whom were to arrive on the twelfth and another five not later than the fourteenth, under the command of an officer of sufficient rank. The first five military observers arrived in Beirut on the afternoon of the twelfth and a second group of five arrived there on the afternoon of the thirteenth. They were under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel W. M. Brown. On 14 June, the Chief of Staff in Jerusalem agreed to provide another five United Nations military observers.

5. The United Nations observers, in vehicles painted white with United Nations insignia, began active reconnaissance on the morning

of 13 June in Beirut and its environs. Officials of the Group in Beirut, from the beginning, requested of the Lebanese authorities that the United Nations observer teams be accorded complete freedom of movement throughout government-held areas. Beirut Headquarters informs us that in a few initial trips "of uncertain and dangerous nature", pilot jeeps manned by Lebanese troops have been used to check roads half an hour in advance of the United Nations teams and half an hour behind them. The observer teams have in each subsequent instance proceeded without pilot vehicles. We are also advised that the initial purpose of the patrols and road reconnaissances was to have United Nations observers and vehicles appear in as many areas as possible as soon as possible. In consequence, the observer teams have covered most main road areas in government-held regions, and have reached and entered areas not held by government forces. The observer teams are now working according to a schedule, and the plan being followed is to have them probe further each day in the direction of the frontier. Their observation task in connexion with any "illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other *matériel* across the Lebanese borders" is greatly complicated by the fact that, as reported by the Observation Group headquarters in Beirut, only a small part of the total frontier appears to be controlled by government forces. The observer teams are composed of two observers, each with a radio-equipped vehicle, and one radio officer with a communication jeep. The three members of the team in their vehicles operate in a convoy at safe intervals and keep in constant communication with each other.

6. As of 15 June, the observer teams had proceeded as far as Tripoli, Baalbek, the Syrian border on the main Beirut-Damascus road, Marjayoun and Rashaya, some places having been visited several times and some twice daily. The immediate aim, we are informed, is to establish field stations: one to be at Tripoli, for the northern border areas, in the expectation that freedom of movement will be obtained in the area not under the control of government forces; one in the Baalbek area, and one at Marjayoun. From each of these places the observers are attempting to proceed into the frontier areas. In the initial and unavoidably hazardous stage, it has been of great value to have the services of the experienced observers of the Truce Supervision Organization. It is reported that so far the United Nations observers have generally met with a good reception, particularly in Beirut.

7. Communication and transportation for the immediate needs are

adequate but will have to be considerably expanded. The operation thus far has received from the Truce Supervision Organization fourteen jeeps, thirteen of which are radio-equipped, and a military observer-base radio system, which has been in operation since 13 June. For communications beyond Lebanon, Truce Supervision Organization radio facilities in Beirut are employed.

8. On the basis of a careful assessment of needs by the members of the operation now in Beirut, and in view of the planned method of operation of the observers, as described above, the number of military observers is being increased to one hundred, and an urgent request has been made of fourteen Governments to provide officers for the purpose.

9. Immediately upon arrival in Beirut, the United Nations representatives in the operation, both civilian and military, established contact with the appropriate Lebanese authorities with a view to facilitating its work. The Lebanese Government has designated a minister to be in charge of relations between the Government and the Observation Group, and has set up a five-man commission to assist in this purpose, as indicated in the letter of 15 June from the Prime Minister of Lebanon to Major-General Bull (annex I).

10. The status of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, its privileges and immunities, etc., have been defined in a letter of 13 June from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Foreign Minister of Lebanon (annex II).

11. Members of the operation have indicated from Beirut the need for a small number of light aircraft of reconnaissance type, together with helicopters. Steps have been taken to meet this need.

12. In view of the urgency of the situation in Lebanon, I considered that it would involve an unwarranted loss of time to request the three members of the Observation Group to assemble in New York prior to their arrival in Lebanon. For only one of them was it convenient to visit United Nations Headquarters en route. The other two were to proceed directly to Beirut. In view of all the circumstances and the character of the task of the Observation Group, I have decided that I should give assistance to the Group by being present when the three members assemble in Beirut and by attending the Group's first meetings there.

Annex I

LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 1958 FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF LEBANON
TO MAJOR GENERAL ODD BULL

I have the honour to inform you that the Lebanese Government, at a meeting held on 12 June 1958, has taken a decision nominating His Excellency Dr. Albert Moukheiber, Minister of Health, as Minister in charge of relations between the Government of Lebanon and the United Nations Observation Group.

A Commission has also been formed to assist Dr. Moukheiber in the fulfilment of this mission, composed of: Emir Farid Chehab, Director General of the Sûreté générale, Edward Chorra, Director of International Relations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Captain François Ginadrh, Representative of the Lebanese Army Headquarters, Mr. Raja Hamady, representative of the Ministry of Finance.

The mission of this Commission is to take all necessary measures to facilitate the task of the United Nations Observation Group, to supply said Group with all information coming to the knowledge of the Lebanese Government about the infiltration of arms and armed men and other material from across the Lebanese border, and to assure the contact between the various sections of the Lebanese administration and your Group.

The office of this Commission will be in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I would be very grateful if you would channel all communications with the various departments of the Lebanese Government through this Commission which stands ready at all times to answer your requests and to facilitate your work.

Annex II

LETTER DATED 13 JUNE 1958 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE
FOREIGN MINISTER OF LEBANON CONCERNING THE STATUS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to the resolution of 11 June 1958 [S/4023], by which the United Nations Security Council decided to dispatch urgently an "observation group to proceed to Lebanon so as to

13. *President Sham'un's press conference, 25 June 1958*¹⁰

The dispute which is now developing in Lebanon is very far from being a local or internal issue because it concerns stability and peace in the Middle East. The interference by the UAR is nothing but a link in the series which aims at the domination of the UAR over the Arab World. The first link of this series appeared in April in Jordan when an attempt was made to overthrow the legal authorities there. We learnt at that time that Lebanon would be a victim of similar attempt. For the smuggling of military equipment on a vast scale and the infiltration of troops of volunteers and terrorists from Syria, Egypt and Palestine had already started at that time; and the smuggling of arms and infiltration of the people continued to increase during the last three or four months—a fact which made the present armed revolt possible.

There have always been political differences in Lebanon as there are in other democratic countries. We were prepared to resolve them either through Parliament or through the pressure of public opinion. The people of Lebanon did not resort for a day to any kind of armed revolt. If it is happening today it is due to the interference of the UAR which has taken place in different forms.

One form of interference is revealed through poisonous and severe radio and press attacks by the UAR replete with hatred and provocation. These attacks are continuing without stop for three months by means of the Egyptian and Syrian press and the broadcasting stations owned by the Government.

The second type of interference, it appears as I pointed out earlier, is by means of smuggling, on a large scale, military equipment of various kinds and volunteers trained in Syria to be made use of in Lebanon.

The third form of interference is the financial support to assist the revolt.

A fourth form of interference, which we are discovering now, is the way in which Egyptian Embassy in Beirut gives Egyptian passports to Lebanese citizens connected with the opposition in order to help them or their family to flee from Lebanon. This is the problem as it appears to us, and would also appear to you. In fact it is an attempt made by the UAR to dominate Lebanese politics. I had opportunities earlier to say that we refused to accept this and I reaffirm that we again refuse to accept it.

¹⁰ *Al-Hayāt*, 26 June 1958, 1, 3. (Translated from the Arabic).

- Q. Mr. President, yesterday you were reported to have said that you anticipate a strong attack by the rebels within the next 48 hours. Has your Excellency any new information about this?
- A. There is nothing except that the inference is based on information which reached us and said that the rebels were building up their forces in some areas dominated by them, and all necessary measures have been taken in this respect.
- Q. Did you ask for the convening of a Security Council meeting for the second time?
- A. We have not yet asked for that. We are giving sufficient time to the International Observers' Group to do their job.
- Q. Did Mr. Hammarskjöld return from Cairo with some good news for you about the position of President 'Abdul Nasser'?
- A. Mr. Hammarskjöld did not tell me anything except that he was hopeful. He did not add anything to that.
- Q. Do you like an international police force for guarding the frontiers in place of the Observers?
- A. We wanted first to do this work ourselves and not to desist from any work to achieve this. But since we failed and since the Observers' Group also failed in its mission we believe that an international police force would be the right type of instrument to prevent interference.
- Q. In case you feel the necessity for speedy support, do you intend to resort to the United States and Britain according to Article 51 of the UN Charter?
- A. I will remind you of what I said before, that is, we want to undertake this work ourselves. We do not like to resort to any request for interference. But when the need arises we will make use of the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter and apply the principle of individual and collective self-defence.
- Q. Is it confirmed that Britain would rush to the rescue of Lebanon when asked for it?
- A. I have said that the problem is not that of Lebanon alone. It is the problem of stability, peace and security in the Middle East. It is not fair to put the whole burden on the shoulders of the Lebanese Government and her small army. We consider it a vital issue not only for the United States and Britain but for the whole free world.
- Q. Some reports indicate that the International Observers are pre-

vented from entering into some regions held by the rebels. Do you think that they would render their mission useless?

A. Not to that extent. For instance, the rebels snapped our forces at Marjayyun in the south the day before yesterday with mortar guns of 120 calibre. And that was for the second time. By good luck the International Observers happened to be there at that time. They saw the place from where the mortar came. They were able to see two bombs which had not exploded. I do not know the results of the examination of the two bombs; but the Observers clearly witnessed that the fire was coming out from a place on the Syrian border.

Q. Were any signs found on the bombs showing that they were of a kind not used by the Lebanese Army?

A. I don't know? I cannot answer this question. The Observers knew from where the attack came.

Q. Sir, was it from inside Syria?

A. I believe it was from a place on the Syrian border.

Q. From inside Syria?

A. Yes.

Q. Sir, what kind of Western intervention do you have in mind? Will the British and American troops come to secure the frontier or to fight the opposition?

A. In the event of direct or indirect aggression against any country that country could resort to the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Q. Does any foreign power dominate the Basta quarter of Beirut at the moment?

A. Yes, to a great extent.

Q. Sir, can you give us an idea of the date and the manner of the intrusion of this foreign power?

A. By infiltration. It is not possible for us to close all the roads leading to Basta.

Q. We learnt that Deputy Raymond Eddé proposed a Six Point compromise plan to end the crisis. One of these demands your resignation after the election of a new President on 24 July. Is this plan acceptable to you?

A. Not at all. In fact the opposition has rejected it.

Q. Do you think of the possibility of a solution based on the coming presidential election on 24 July?

- A. This is a purely internal matter and is to be solved by the people of Lebanon. Whatever it may be, whether there is another president or the same president, it is primarily a Lebanese question. The cause for which we are fighting now is not internal. It results from the existence of another state which has exploited the political differences and has interfered in favour of one against another.
- Q. Do you intend to become president for the second time?
- A. I have nothing to add to the statement given by the Prime Minister on behalf of the Government.
- Q. Do you think it is improper for the Observers to work with the rebel leaders?
- A. That depends on the manner of dealing with them. It is impossible for them to deal with another authority in the country since there is only one lawful authority. If they want to ask for entry in order to visit the area we have no objection.
- Q. Have you any idea of the number of armed rebels in the country?
- A. There are, in general, between 10 and 12 thousand.
- Q. Can your army face an all-out attack?
- A. Yes, If we can stop the infiltration.
- Q. Sir, can you estimate the number of Egyptians and Syrians among the rebels?
- A. About 25 to 30 per cent.
- Q. Do you think that there is some headquarters for directing the rebels? If it is so where is its centre and who is their leader?
- A. It is confirmed to an extent that they receive their instructions from outside. We have intercepted some of these orders originating from Cairo and Damascus.
- Q. Sir, don't you think that foreign interference is outside the purview of Article 51 of the UN charter?
- A. Nothing could be done except under the aegis of the UN.
- Q. Can you estimate the number of rebels in Basta?
- A. According to the information available to us there are about 700 to 800 people.
- Q. What is the number of people co-operating with them?
- A. May be, double this number.
- Q. What was the number of armed persons among the rebels on 12 May, that is, at the beginning of incidents?
- A. I don't know precisely. But certainly the number should have been much less.

vented from entering into some regions held by the rebels. Do you think that they would render their mission useless?

A. Not to that extent. For instance, the rebels snapped our forces at Marjayyun in the south the day before yesterday with mortar guns of 120 calibre. And that was for the second time. By good luck the International Observers happened to be there at that time. They saw the place from where the mortar came. They were able to see two bombs which had not exploded. I do not know the results of the examination of the two bombs; but the Observers clearly witnessed that the fire was coming out from a place on the Syrian border.

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Q. From inside Syria?

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A. Not at all. In fact the opposition has rejected it.

Q. Do you think of the possibility of a solution based on the coming presidential election on 24 July?

14. *Second report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 11 June 1958, 28 June 1958*²²

1. This progress report on the implementation of the resolution of the Security Council of 11 June 1958 [S/4023], is further to my first such report of 16 June [S/4029]. It is submitted by the Secretary-General, but is based on information received from the Beirut headquarters of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon. The Observation Group itself has in preparation a first report on findings, in discharge of its responsibilities under the Security Council resolution, and this may be expected before long.
2. With the arrival of Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal in Beirut on 18 June, the organization of the Observation Group was completed. On that date, the Group met informally and was briefed by its secretary on developments since the arrival on 12 June in Beirut of the first secretariat members and military observers. At the same time, attention was also given to administrative arrangements and the activities of the military observers.
3. On 19 June, the Group held a further informal meeting, with the Secretary-General presiding. Later the same day, it held its first formal meeting and organized its work. At this meeting, Mr. Galo Plaza was designated Chairman of the Group. The first meetings of the Group were devoted to an exchange of views on the methods and procedures which it would follow in carrying out its mandate with regard to illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other *matériel* across the Lebanese borders, under the resolution of the Security Council, and in keeping the Security Council "currently informed through the Secretary-General". The Secretary-General was in close consultation with the Group throughout his stay in Beirut.
4. As of 26 June, ninety-four officers from eleven countries were serving as military observers in Lebanon. They have established a regular patrolling system of areas accessible and, since the report of 16 June on the implementation of the resolution have advanced further into areas outside government control. Areas being regularly patrolled by the observer teams are the following: around Tripoli and south of that city; the coastal road from Nakoura to Damour, and roads branching off toward the interior; the Marjayoun area; the Chtaura area and

²² SCOR, 13th year, supplement for April, May and June 1958, 119-21.

north-east beyond Baalbek; the area north and east of Beirut and south of the city, except in the vicinity of Beit el Dine.

5. Observer outstations have been established in the following areas: Tripoli (with a sub-station at the Cedars), Chtaura, Zahle, Marjayoun, Saida, and at Saghbine south-east of Beirut. From these outstations, patrol activities are extended into the surrounding countryside. Outstations in several other places are now being established or are under consideration.

6. In visiting areas outside government control, the observers have met local leaders and have discussed with them freedom of movement in the Bekaa area north of Baalbek, the Chouf area south of Beit el Dine, and the area north of Tripoli. It was reported from the headquarters of the Group on 25 June that for the time being further efforts at moving deeper into such areas were deferred at the following main points: the area north and north-east of Tripoli (where firing is in close vicinity and the roads are mined), the Beit el Dine area, and the north Bekaa area.

7. The basic items of equipment for the observer teams are transport and communications. Arrangements have worked well for the delivery of jeeps and supporting transport at a rate compatible with the arrival in the area of the military observers. Thus, as of 26 June, there were seventy-four vehicles to ninety-four observers. A fully operating radio communication system has been installed for contact between group headquarters, observer outstations and jeeps circulating within the areas assigned for observation.

8. At the request of the Group, United Nations Headquarters has obtained two small helicopters. The helicopters arrived in Beirut on 23 June and, with Norwegian pilots, are now in operation. Four light observation planes have also been requested and will be on hand soon. These, as the helicopters, will be used solely for aerial observation in pursuance of the Group's task under the Security Council resolution. The Governments of neighbouring countries have been notified by the Secretary-General of these observation flights over Lebanese territory in the proximity of the borders.

9. Arrangements have been made by the Group for receiving from the ministry in charge of relations between the Government of Lebanon and the Group, written communications on cases which the Lebanese Government desires to bring to the attention of the Group. The Group in turn submits these to independent study through its own means

and in the light of supporting evidence provided. The Group has received information concerning prisoners, said to be Syrians, taken by Lebanese authorities. Such prisoners, when made available to the Group, are being interrogated by the Executive Member of the Group, Major-General Bull, with the assistance of qualified military observers, concerning matters covered by the Security Council resolution.

10. Since the date of the first report [S/4029], additional personnel have been added to the secretariat of the Group and the basic staffing requirements for the secretariat and administrative services to meet the needs of an operation involving one hundred military observers are about to be completed. The headquarters of the Group continues to be located in the Biarritz Hotel in Beirut, although consideration is being given to the acquisition of new quarters in that city affording more adequate physical conditions.

15. *Extracts from first report of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, 1 July 1958*²³

PROBLEMS OF OBSERVATION

4. The Observation Group, in its examination of these questions, had necessarily to take into account the particular circumstances under which its task was to be carried out, and careful study was given to a variety of factors relating to the situation.

5. It was learned that of the total land frontier with Syria, of some 324 kms. in length, only 18, lying on either side of the main Beirut-Damascus road, remained under the control of the Government forces. The Observation Group had been assured by the Lebanese Government that it would be accorded free access to the areas under Government control. No formal assurances from any quarter were offered to the Group with regard to access to territory not under Government control, nor were such assurances sought by the Group. Inasmuch as the areas to be observed by the Group in accordance with the mandate from the Security Council would necessarily include the border zones, the question immediately arose as to how the Group could fulfil its functions in these zones where its right to engage in observation activities had not been formally or implicitly recognized.

6. Another major factor which would inevitably influence the means

²³ SCOR, 13th year, supplement for July, August and September 1958, 3-13.

to be employed was the nature of the terrain in the frontier regions. The eastern frontier runs roughly from north north-east to south-west along the Anti-Lebanon and Hermon mountain formations, which attain heights of 2,400 to 2,800 metres respectively. Main roads of communication on the Lebanese side of this chain of mountains run parallel to it in the Bekaa valley, the sole exception being the Beirut-Damascus road, which crosses the Bekaa from the north-west and passes between the Hermon and the Anti-Lebanon highlands. Thus physical accessibility to the border by road is considerably restricted in the area lying between the frontier itself and the main roads running the length of the Bekaa valley. This is an area which ranges from approximately 10 to 25 kms. in width.

7. The northern frontier lies in a broad plain. However, access by land from the Lebanese side is by the coastal highway running north-east from Tripoli towards Homs. There are no roads connecting this northern border area with the north Bekaa valley. Thus, the northern border can be reached only through the area north of Tripoli, an area now under the control of the opposition forces.

8. The remaining frontier of concern to the Observation Group is the sea coast of some 220 kms. along the full length of which runs a main highway from Arida in the north to Nakoura in the south. It will be seen, therefore, that the areas of primary concern to the Observation Group are those where the problems of accessibility are the greatest, both from the standpoint of topography and of obtaining freedom and security of movement.

9. The Observation Group has given its most careful consideration to another condition which has a bearing on its observation activities within Lebanon and particularly in the border areas referred to above. The existence of a state of conflict between opposing armed forces in a territory to which an independent body of observers seeks free access throughout imposes upon that body an attitude of discretion and restraint if the express or tacit acceptance of its presence is to be obtained from those exercising authority or effective control on different sides in the conflict. The Observation Group is fully conscious of the fact that its methods of observation and its use of the information it receives must duly reflect the independent character of its status and its complete objectivity and impartiality in relation to the present conflict.

10. In this connexion it would be relevant briefly to outline the situation in regard to the present state of the conflict, in so far as it

concerns the functions of observation with which the Group is charged. In Beirut, Tripoli and Saida, sections of the city lie behind barricades, and are normally inaccessible to observation, except under previously negotiated arrangements. In all these towns, intermittent clashes have been occurring. The area to the north of Tripoli, stretching to the border, has been the scene of some hostilities, and a similar situation prevails in the region to the north of Baalbek. In the south and south-east, armed clashes are taking place, while the Chouf area, to the south-east of Beirut, is under the complete control of opposition elements.

11. An additional factor which the Observation Group feels it should take into account in its activities and in its reporting on observations concerns the nature and location of the populations which live along the border regions, particularly in the eastern zones, and the traditional freedom of association which has existed for centuries among certain peoples living in areas now lying on both sides of the frontier. Moreover, persons could move freely across the frontier merely on the presentation of identity cards and did not require passports and visas. In some areas a tribal structure of society is prevalent which creates bonds of identity within ethnic groups, the realities of which are in some cases not diminished by the existence of a political frontier which is, in some places, the subject of disagreement or uncertainty. The peoples of these areas have traditionally borne arms, and habits of mutual assistance in peaceful as well as in troubled times have been regarded as a normal expression of tribal solidarity. There are some other areas also where the border is not clearly demarcated or recognized. Furthermore, throughout the country the possession of arms is common practice, in spite of governmental efforts in the last few years to curb such habits through licensing, which has not been properly enforced. The methods employed by the Observation Group in carrying out the mandate from the Security Council must be directed towards the explicit purposes of observation and reporting for which the Observation Group was established. The Group is of the opinion that the above facts require it to pursue its activities with particular vigilance and care in order that its mandate may be fulfilled with accuracy and thoroughness.

12. All the factors described above have been carefully considered by the Group in so far as they have a bearing on its functions, and have been kept in mind in making evaluations of the observation reports received.

OBSERVATIONS

18. From the descriptive account of the nature of the observers' task and the circumstances in which it has to be performed and from the methods that have been adopted to perform it, it will be evident that the task of the Observation Group is one of considerable complexity.

19. The Group has received a large number of daily reports from its observer patrols; it has examined these reports most carefully and has made its evaluations. It would like here to record the result of this examination and evaluation.

20. The patrols of the Group have reported substantial movements of armed men within the country and concentrations at various places. For example, they have penetrated deep into the headquarters of one of the opposition leaders right up to the village of Deir el Aachayer, close to the eastern border. They were escorted by armed men and they established contact with the opposition leader and met his followers. In the area of Rachaya, the patrols have frequently come across armed groups. In Baalbek and north of it, groups of armed men have been seen. South of Baalbek land mines have been found in territory not held by the opposition. North of Baalbek, observers have established contact with the local opposition leader and seen some 200 of his men. Still further north at Zghorta, observers have been on the fringe of opposition-held territory and seen some armed and other material in use. In the Chouf region, one observation group has visited the headquarters of the opposition leader and established contact with him. In this region again, large groups amounting to several hundred armed men were seen.

21. The arms that were seen consisted mostly of a varied assortment of rifles of British, French and Italian makes. Some hand-grenades were also seen at various places. Occasionally, opposition elements have been found armed with machine-guns. Mines seen near the Baalbek area were of British and French makes. It has not been possible to establish where these arms were acquired; but, in this connexion the remarks contained in paragraph 11 of the present report should also be borne in mind. Nor was it possible to establish if any of the armed men observed had infiltrated from outside; there is little doubt, however, that the vast majority were in any case Lebanese.

16. *Report of interview granted by President Sham'un to Mr. Scott Gibbons, the Daily Mail correspondent, 6 July 1958*²⁴

In an exclusive interview of extraordinary frankness he told me: "Mr. Hammarskjold's statement and the observers' report give *carte blanche* to Col. Nasser to step up infiltration into Lebanon. I am deeply disappointed both in the Secretary-General and the Observer Group here. They have given the 'go ahead' signal to the United Arab Republic to take over the Middle East without fear of any objection by the UN."

Mr. Hammarskjold said after visiting Lebanon there was no foundation for the charge of "massive interference" by the United Arab Republic. Mr. Chamoun said: "Let us discuss the whole thing. First of all it is rather difficult for me to comment on the activities of the observers here because they appear to be doing absolutely nothing. As far as I can see they spend their time at the Aero Club in Beirut, on the beaches and up at the Cedars (Lebanese mountain resort)."

"The Observer Group have not gone about their job in the right spirit. They are on a very serious mission but they are acting like tourists. Ah! well this is a very bad tourist season for us this year. Perhaps the presence of the observers will help it a little."

The 57-year-old President told me: "If the observers have not seen the massive infiltration up to now, then they are unlikely to see it in the future. One thing they have been doing though. They have been asking in the villages throughout the country who is with and who is against the President. This is certainly not their job. Unfortunately we come to the conclusion that neither Mr. Hammarskjold nor the observers have used their eyes or their brains."

Mr. Chamoun said Mr. Hammarskjold's statement that there was no evidence of massive interference was based on a preliminary report by the observers.

"Now this group have neither been able to visit the border which they have a mission to control nor have they established any observation posts on the border.

"For practical purposes they have put themselves in a position where they have no control over infiltration. The report says they have made inquiries from the rebels. But they have taken it for granted that the information given them is true. They have not tried to think how large

²⁴ *The Statesman* (Delhi), 8 July 1958.

groups of rebels, such as exist in Tripoli, the Chouf and other areas, can fight for days and days real battles using as much ammunition as the Army itself and using weapons ranging from rifles to machine-guns, mortars, bazookas and anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons.

"These thousands of rebels need money and supplies. It has never occurred to the group to think how rebels could get all these things. But the group is inquiring everywhere to find out how many support me. This is certainly not their job.

"Our information is that there are 10,000 to 12,000 rebels of whom 25 per cent to 30 per cent are Egyptians, Syrians and Palestinians. They have received between 30,000 and 36,000 fire arms of all categories from the United Arab Republic. Compared with our armed forces of 10,000 they certainly constitute a massive infiltration.

"You know it will be very dangerous if this report is taken into consideration by the Security Council not only for Lebanon but for the Middle East and the free world. Because if it were accepted the UAR could start similar troubles in other Arab countries knowing UN is going to do nothing about it. If rebels here should win then very shortly the same type of subversion will begin in Jordan and Iraq. The whole balance and stability of the Middle East would be destroyed."

17. *Official comments of the Government of Lebanon on the first report of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, 8 July 1958*²⁵

1. The Government of Lebanon wishes to make the following formal comments on the first report of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (document S/4040, of 3 July 1958). These comments seek to establish three theses which are the headings of each one of the three sections below.

1

First thesis: The positive conclusions drawn by the Observation Group in its first report are either inconclusive, misleading or unwarranted.

2. The fundamental substantive conclusions are to be found in paragraph 21. They are three, and read as follows:

(1) "It has not been possible to establish from where these arms [namely, the arms seen by the Observation Group] were acquired".

²⁵ SCOR, 13th year, supplement for July, August and September 1958, 18-27

(2) "Nor was it possible to establish if any of the armed men observed had infiltrated from outside";

(3) "There is little doubt, however, that the vast majority were in any case Lebanese."

3. The first and second conclusions are obviously misleading. To say that "it has not been possible to establish where these arms were acquired" does not at all tell us either that the Group actually inquired into their origin and did not succeed in establishing it, or that it is sure they were not smuggled from Syria. The phrase "it has not been possible" could mean only that the Group had no time to carry out the necessary investigation to establish the origin of the arms, or that it met with insurmountable difficulties, or any number of other logical possibilities; but from none of this can any positive conclusion be drawn as to the origin of these arms. The Government of Lebanon wishes to ask: where did these arms come from, and why did the Observation Group go out of its way to state that it could not establish their origin, when we know it made no attempt to do so? Furthermore, the arms the Group saw are, from the very report itself, a very small part of the ammunition at the disposal of the rebels. Consequently, nothing can be concluded from this as to the origin of all the arms used by the rebels.

4. Concerning the second conclusion above, three remarks are to be made. First, did the Observation Group really investigate every one of the armed men they "observed" to determine whether they did or did not really infiltrate from outside? Why then this sweeping statement? It would thus seem that this negative statement of the Observation Group has no substantive, conclusive character. Secondly, as the report itself states, the Observation Group was able to "observe" a very small number of the men fighting against the Government in Lebanon. Thus, even supposing that this "observation" was most meticulous, which clearly it was not, nothing follows from this report as to the origin of all the men fighting against the Government in Lebanon. Thirdly, when the very charge of the Government of Lebanon is that there are infiltrators in Lebanon fighting with the rebels against the Government, and when the Observation Group was dispatched by the Security Council precisely "to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other *matériel* across the Lebanese borders" [S/4023], is it not certain that when the rebel leaders take the Observation Group into their territory, they will see to it precisely that the Observation Group "observe" no infiltrators? Thus, how does the Ob-

servation Group know that between its establishment by the Council and the moment it started "observing"—and this was a matter of about ten days—the rebel leaders did not "de-infiltrate" the infiltrators back into Syria or move them away from the areas to which the Observation Group was admitted? It would take about one day, not more, to send back to Syria several thousand infiltrators who had been fighting in Lebanon.

5. Concerning the third conclusion above, it is clear that this is both misleading and unwarranted. It is misleading because while it refers only to the armed men "seen" by the Observation Group—and they are a very small fraction of the total number of men fighting in the rebellion—careless readers and commentators have taken it to refer to all the armed men fighting against the Government. Thus a false impression has been created by the world Press, both the tendentious and even some of the honest Press, that one of the findings of the Observation Group has been that "the vast majority" of the men fighting the Government are Lebanese. This is of course not at all what the report says. And the third conclusion is unwarranted because the Observation Group does not tell us how it was able to establish that the "vast majority" of the armed men it "observed" "were in any case Lebanese". Did they investigate each one of them? Is it not certain that the rebel leaders only showed them Lebanese fighters? How then can the Observation Group possibly justify this sweeping statement?

6. A more careful editing of the text of this report would unmistakably have drawn attention to these most important distinctions.

7. It seems therefore that the positive conclusions drawn by the Observation Group in its report are clearly either inconclusive, misleading or unwarranted.

II

Second thesis: There are, on the other hand, warranted positive conclusions that can be drawn from this report but that have not been drawn explicitly or sufficiently by the Observation Group; all these warranted positive conclusions completely support, or at least do not at all weaken, the thesis of the Government of Lebanon concerning the existence of illegal infiltration of men and smuggling of arms.

Warranted positive conclusion No. 1: The Observation Group has not yet been able to carry out its mandate.

8. The mandate of the Observation Group is "to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other *matériel* across the Lebanese borders". But, in the first place, the report tells us that of the 324 km of the total Lebanese-Syrian land frontier only 18 km are under the control of the Government forces, the rest being under the control of the rebels. With respect to this rebel-controlled territory the report explicitly says: "No formal assurances from any quarter were offered to the Group with regard to access to territory not under government control, nor were such assurances sought by the Group" (para. 5). And the report further states (paras. 23-25) that the observer teams "have on occasion experienced difficulty in penetrating opposition-held territory", especially with respect to four areas where they "appear to have touched upon sensitive spots which are in areas claimed by government sources to be supply and infiltration routes".

9. It is clear from all this that the mandate to "observe" and "ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other *matériel* across the Lebanese borders" has not been fulfilled so far by the Observation Group. For only a small part of the frontier has to be shut off from the Observation Group to "ensure" free infiltration from Syria into Lebanon; how much more so when practically all the frontiers are, as the report says, "opposition-held"?

10. Again, the Observation Group complains that the difficult topography of the Syrian-Lebanese frontiers has impeded its task of observation, even along the Government-held short stretch of 18 km otherwise fully accessible to the Group (see especially paras. 6, 7 and 8). But the inhabitants of these areas on both sides of the frontier, are quite used to the rugged character of the topography and therefore can easily filter back and forth precisely at the points where the Observation Group would find it difficult to go and "observe". Difficulty of terrain could prevent the Observation Group from "observing" and for that reason would be an ideal condition under which the infiltration could go on "unobserved".

11. The difficulty or inability of the Group, as it is at present conceived and constituted, to carry out the mandate of the Security Council is clearly recognized by the report when it says: "It will be seen, therefore, that the areas of primary concern to the Observation Group are those where the problems of accessibility are the greatest, both from the standpoint of topography and of obtaining freedom and security of movement" (para. 8).

12. Again, the report recognizes that night observation has not yet started (paras. 14 (a) and (17) (d)). But when the infiltrators know that the observers are not watching at night, even if they are otherwise watching all the borders, then they will choose precisely the night to carry out their movements. It follows that the Observation Group has not been able so far to carry out its mandate.

13. Again, aerial reconnaissance, which the report says "will be employed in an increasing measure" with a view to patrolling "the border areas", has not yet really begun so far as this first report is concerned (paras. 14 (e) and 17 (c)). Thus, whatever information can be gathered by this device has not yet been gathered. But even if this aerial reconnaissance were fully operative, it would still have two limitations: it cannot spot all infiltration during the day, and it can hardly spot anything during the night. There is thus no substitute for on-the-spot physical land "observation" at the borders themselves.

14. Concerning the cities, the report says: "In Beirut, Tripoli and Saïda, sections of the city lie behind barricades, and are normally inaccessible to observers, except under previously negotiated arrangements" (para. 10). Such inaccessibility is also true of the Choûf area which, the report says, "is under the complete control of opposition elements" (*ibid.*). The Government of Lebanon hold that in these cities and areas the rebels have been assisted by hundreds of Syrians, Egyptians and Palestinian refugees. The observers now recognize that they were unable to cross the barricades or penetrate areas into these pockets of rebellion and search them out thoroughly for infiltrator participants in the rebellion; thus they have not been able to observe and report on a very important aspect of the situation, and therefore to that extent have not carried out the mandate of the Security Council.

15. The report says that the preparations for the final stage of operation of the Observation Group are now "virtually completed", and that therefore this "final stage—when the Group can operate at its planned strength—is about to commence" (para. 13). By stating that the preparations are "virtually completed" and that the definitive stage of operation "is about to commence", the Group clearly recognizes that it has not yet fulfilled the mandate of the Security Council.

16. It appears to the Government of Lebanon now that the interpretation given to the resolution of the Security Council of 11 June 1958 [S/4023] has been insufficient. The interpretation of the Secretary-General may have been a possible one, but it is no longer adequate

to the present situation as revealed by the report of the Observation Group. Therefore, the Government of Lebanon wishes to register its strong reservations concerning this matter.

17. The report says: "The methods employed by the Observation Group in carrying out the mandate from the Security Council must be directed toward the explicit purposes of observation and reporting for which the Observation Group was established" (para. 11). The Secretary-General in his Press releases stressed the matter of "observation" as "decisive". In all this the clear tendency is to underline, in the resolution of 11 June 1958, the observing and reporting functions of the Group. The Government of Lebanon believes that "observing" and "reporting" are subordinate to the truly decisive part of the text of the resolution: "so as to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other *matériel* across the Lebanese borders". As the third thesis [*sec. III, below*] will presently prove, "the illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other *matériel* across the Lebanese borders" still continues (not to mention the other phases of the massive intervention in Lebanon's internal affairs of which the Government of Lebanon complained to the Security Council, such as the training of Lebanese rebels on Syrian soil, the violent and utterly unprecedented Press and radio campaigns by the United Arab Republic against the Government of Lebanon and inciting the people of Lebanon to overthrow their Government by force); therefore to that extent the most important part of the Security Council resolution has not been implemented.

18. From all this, then, it appears to the Government of Lebanon that the most striking warranted positive conclusion of this report—a conclusion at the very surface of the report—is that the Observation Group has not yet been able to carry out the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council, and that the resolution of the Security Council has not really been implemented.

Warranted positive conclusion No. 2: The report of the Observation Group admits, either directly or indirectly, the existence of illegal infiltration of men and smuggling of arms.

19. We criticized above the third substantive conclusion of the report which says "a vast majority [of the armed men seen by the Group] were in any case Lebanese". We proved that this conclusion

was unwarranted. But in so far as the Observation Group holds to this conclusion, then they must know that there is at least a minority that were not Lebanese. Here then is a most clear admission by the Observation Group that there is infiltration in Lebanon, even among the small number of armed men seen by the observers. How much greater then would the number of infiltrators be among the vast bands of armed men not seen by the observers.

20. In paragraph 11 of the report there is a general sociological explanation of how, due to "bonds of identity within ethnic groups", elements of the population existing on either side of the frontier line between Lebanon and Syria move back and forth across this frontier line in support of each other. This is clearly an attempt to explain away infiltration where it occurs. The Government of Lebanon holds precisely that several thousand such infiltrators with "bonds of identity within ethnic groups" have been trained in Syria in subversive activities and brought back to the borders of Lebanon and infiltrated into our territory. Thus sociological explanations, even if correct, serve only to prove either the existence or the strong probability of infiltration.

21. A look at the map distributed as an annex to the report (annex III) will reveal that the areas of Lebanon bordering on Syria are for the most part held by rebel forces. This very fact is most significant. How do the rebels who exist there support themselves economically? Where do they get their arms? The very fact that these border areas are in the hands of the rebels proves, especially if we keep in mind that they are economically not self-supporting and that they cannot possibly manufacture arms themselves, that they are in thorough-going intercourse with the Syrian hinterland. The propinquity of these border areas to Syria is the only explanation for the fact that of all the parts of Lebanon the rebels are able to hold precisely these areas; for, due to this propinquity, at all times they can receive support—in men, money and arms—directly from Syria.

22. Again, in paragraph 26 of the report, the Observation Group describes in great detail the obstructive tactics used by the rebels to prevent the Group from reaching what the report calls "sensitive spots which are in areas claimed by Government sources to be supply and infiltration routes" (para. 25). These obstructive tactics include firing, armed persuasive methods, mining of roads, destroying of bridges, and other methods. All these obstructive tactics were used since the arrival of the Observation Group in Lebanon and were all intended to prevent

the Group from penetrating these "sensitive spots". What more decisive evidence can be given that the rebels have something to hide from the Observation Group and therefore would resort to any method to prevent them from observing and reporting on the areas they control? They not only refuse them admission into these areas but they actually destroy bridges, mine roads, etc., so as to make their physical penetration of the areas impossible even if they would admit them. The Government of Lebanon holds that it is precisely in these areas that thousands of Syrian infiltrators roam about and take part in the rebellion, and that untold quantities of smuggled arms are hidden.

23. The very last paragraph of the report is most significant both as to its contents and its location in the report. This is paragraph 4, sec. II in annex II. In this paragraph, which is put at the very tail-end not of the body of the report but of the last annex to the report, so that probably hardly anybody noticed it, the Group says:

"On 25 June United Nations military observers observed approximately one company of uniformed Syrian soldiers on both sides of the road leading from Deir el Aachâyer into Syria, in an area where the location of the border is under dispute and is not known to the local inhabitants. The opposition leader, however, proffered the information that the area concerned was generally considered Syrian."

"In the area of Deir el Aachâyer, United Nations military observers also observed approximately 1,000 armed opposition forces."

24. It is clear, then, that "approximately one company of uniformed Syrian soldiers" was observed by the Observation Group on both sides of the road leading from Deir el Aachâyer, which is the headquarters of the rebellion in that area, into Syria. It is said that the border is under dispute and the opinion of the opposition leader that the area is generally considered Syrian is recorded by the Observation Group. Why did the Group then not ask the Government about this matter? Why did they record only the opinion of the "opposition leader"? The Government of Lebanon holds that this area is Lebanese, that this "company of uniformed Syrian soldiers" had no right to be on Lebanese soil, and that therefore the presence of this company in that area is a flagrant infiltration, if not worse, by the armed forces of Syria into the territory of Lebanon. But even assuming that this area is really under dispute, the mere presence of "approximately one company of uniform-

ed Syrian soldiers" in the same area in which a rebellion is taking place against the Government of Lebanon cannot have any other explanation, especially if we keep in mind the official attitude of the Government of the United Arab Republic towards the Government of Lebanon (reflected in the radio and press of Cairo and Damascus), than that it is there in order somehow to assist the rebellion. The Government of Lebanon holds that the "1,000 armed opposition forces", concerning which the report does not tell us whether or not they were Lebanese, are at least partly composed of Syrian volunteers who had infiltrated into Lebanon. This is a most significant finding of the Observation Group which has been given little publicity and which, if thoroughly investigated by the Observation Group, would have completely vindicated the claims of the Government of Lebanon.

25. In paragraph 22 of the report, it is stated that "there has been considerable mortar-firing in the Marjaou'n area. From observations the firing came from the vicinity of Halta, 2.4 km inside the Lebanese border near the border of Syria, and was directed at Khiam and Marjaou'n", two towns in Lebanon. The report further says that the mortars used were 120 mm, that is, a type which is exclusively used by regular armies. The report also gives some details on the number of mortar rounds fired, dates of firing, etc.

26. What is interesting, however, in this paragraph is that the Observation Group does not draw any conclusions from or make any comments on that important incident except that the mortars are of a French type also used by the Lebanese army. We do not take it that the Observation Group is hinting at the possibility of the Lebanese army having fired these mortars. Therefore, it should be logically inferred that this firing could come only from the Syrian army which—the observers should know—uses also the same type, or at least from rebels who had received these mortars from the Syrian army. Furthermore, the report does not say that the observation established that the source of the firing was within Lebanese territory. What it says is only that Halta, from the vicinity of which the firing came, lies 2.4 km inside Lebanon. Therefore the report leaves us with the strong presumption that the vicinity of Halta (the term could cover several kilometres within or outside Lebanon) from which the firing came lies in Syrian territory. The Government of Lebanon holds that a thorough investigation of this incident alone would have fully substantiated our charges.

27. The listing of arms observed by the Group (annex II of the

report) together with the use of the term "armed men" throughout the report and the reference to "substantial movements of armed men within the country and concentrations at various places" (para. 20), demonstrate, by the quantity of arms in possession of the rebels and the types of these arms, which range from rifles to machine-guns to grenades to heavy mortars, that the source of these arms lies outside Lebanon and, in the case of heavy arms at least, they can only have been supplied by Governments. There is no doubt in the mind of the Government of Lebanon that this source is the Government of the United Arab Republic.

28. It appears that we have demonstrated that the report, while avoiding a direct judgement on the factual existence of illegal infiltration of armed men and smuggling of arms, has by the information it has produced fully substantiated our charge that this infiltration and smuggling of arms is a reality.

III

Third thesis: The independent position of the Government of Lebanon remains today exactly what it was when the Government of Lebanon first presented and defended its case before the Security Council, namely:

(1) *That there has been and there still is massive, illegal and unprovoked intervention in the affairs of Lebanon by the United Arab Republic;*

(2) *That this intervention aims at undermining and does in fact threaten the independence of Lebanon;*

(3) *That the situation created by this intervention is likely, if it continues, to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.*

29. The six sets of facts used in proof of the actuality of this massive intervention are as true today as they were on 6 June 1958 when they were first set forth before the Security Council [823rd meeting]. These six sets of facts are: (a) the supply of arms on a large scale from the United Arab Republic to subversive elements in Lebanon; (b) the training in subversion on the territory of the United Arab Republic of elements from Lebanon and the sending back of these elements to

Lebanon to subvert their Government; (c) the participation of United Arab Republic civilian nationals residing in or passing into Lebanon in subversive and terrorist activities in Lebanon; (d) the participation of United Arab Republic governmental elements in subversive and terrorist activities and in the direction of rebellion in Lebanon; (e) the violent and utterly unprecedented press campaign conducted by the United Arab Republic against the Government of Lebanon; (f) the violent and utterly unprecedented radio campaign conducted by the United Arab Republic inciting the people of Lebanon to overthrow their Government.

30. The illegal infiltration of men has not ceased. The Government of Lebanon estimates that there are several thousand infiltrators taking part in the rebellion in Lebanon. The illegal smuggling of arms has not ceased. The Government of Lebanon estimates that there are more than 30,000 weapons of various descriptions in the hands of the rebels and infiltrators, including heavy types of arms that can only be supplied by Governments. Where do these arms come from? In two engagements lately, in Tripoli and the Chouf, the forces fighting the Government used more fire power than the Government forces. Where does this apparently inexhaustible supply of arms and ammunition come from?

31. There are training and assembly camps in Homs and Damascus and elsewhere in Syria, for volunteers from Syria and Lebanon, and for anyone who wishes to fight against the Government of Lebanon. There are public campaigns in the streets of Damascus and elsewhere in Syria and Egypt for subscriptions to aid the rebellion against the Government of Lebanon. The Press and radio of the United Arab Republic are today as virulent against the Government and policies of Lebanon and as inciting to rebellion in Lebanon as ever before. The Press and radio and the official pronouncements of all communist countries throughout the world support the rebellion in Lebanon and attack the Government of Lebanon.

32. All this is open to all people, including the Observation Group, to observe and ascertain for themselves.

33. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, which have their own independent sources of information, appear to corroborate the view of the Government of Lebanon concerning the intervention by the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon.

34. Many Governments in the Middle East have exhibited real solidarity with the Government of Lebanon. They too know first-hand about

conditions in Lebanon and the area in general. The Governments of Turkey and the Arab Union in particular have expressed the view to the Government of Lebanon that if the subversion in Lebanon succeeds, a subversion fully fomented, supported and directed from outside, then similar subversive attempts are sure to follow in other countries in the Middle East, to the detriment of freedom and stability in the area and to the benefit only of the subversive forces throughout the world.

35. The conclusion which the Government of Lebanon wishes to place on record is that the three claims which it made on 6 June 1958 before the Security Council concerning the massive intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon by the United Arab Republic are in no way impaired or invalidated by the report of the Observation Group. On the contrary, in so far as any positive warranted conclusions can be drawn from the report, these claims have been substantiated. Therefore, the responsibility of the Security Council with respect to the complaint against the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon remains undiminished and intact.

5. United States' Intervention

INTRODUCTION

IN early July the situation in Lebanon appeared to be relatively stagnant. The Sixth Fleet had sailed away from the eastern Mediterranean. Nasser was holidaying in Yugoslavia; and President Sham'un had categorically stated for the first time, on 8 July, that he did not intend to seek re-election.

Beneath the surface, however, there was considerable activity. Already in June Iraqi Premier Nūrī as-Sa'īd had dashed to London to persuade the Foreign Office to rescue the Sham'un Government. A little later Sāmī as-Sulh held consultations with Baghdad and Ankara and subsequently, the Lebanese question was placed on the agenda of the conference of the Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact which was to be held at Istanbul on 14 July.

On the fateful day of 14 July the whole matter was abruptly brought to a head by the overthrow of the Baghdad Government and monarchy. Within hours of the *coup* in Baghdad President Sham'un called the US Ambassador and asked for immediate intervention to save his government.¹ The US government promptly responded to the call, and on 15 July the Sixth Fleet headed toward Beirut.

1. *President Eisenhower's message to the Congress, 15 July 1958*²

On July 14, 1958, I received an urgent request from the President of the Republic of Lebanon that some United States forces be stationed in Lebanon. President Chamoun stated that without an immediate showing of United States support, the Government of Lebanon would be unable to survive. This request by President Chamoun was made with the concurrence of all the members of the Lebanese Cabinet. I have replied that we would do this and a contingent of United States Marines has now arrived in Lebanon. This initial dispatch of troops will be augmented as required. United States forces will be withdrawn as rapidly as circumstances permit.

¹ Charles W. Thayer, *Diplomat* (New York, 1959), 28.

² *Department of State Bulletin*, 39 (4 August 1958) 182-83.

Simultaneously, I requested that an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council be held on July 15, 1958. At that meeting, the permanent representative of the United States reported to the Council the action which this Government has taken. He also expressed the hope that the United Nations could soon take further effective measures to meet more fully the situation in Lebanon. We will continue to support the United Nations to this end.

United States forces are being sent to Lebanon to protect American lives and by their presence to assist the Government of Lebanon in the preservation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and independence, which have been deemed vital to United States national interests and world peace.

About 2 months ago a violent insurrection broke out in Lebanon, particularly along the border with Syria which, with Egypt, forms the United Arab Republic. This revolt was encouraged and strongly backed by the official Cairo, Damascus, and Soviet radios which broadcast to Lebanon in the Arabic language. The insurrection was further supported by sizable amounts of arms, ammunition, and money and by personnel infiltrated from Syria to fight against the lawful authorities. The avowed purpose of these activities was to overthrow the legally constituted Government of Lebanon and to install by violence a government which would subordinate the independence of Lebanon to the policies of the United Arab Republic.

Lebanon referred this situation to the United Nations Security Council. In view of the international implications of what was occurring in Lebanon, the Security Council on June 11, 1958, decided to send observers into Lebanon for the purpose of insuring that further outside assistance to the insurrection would cease. The Secretary General of the United Nations subsequently undertook a mission to the area to reinforce the work of the observers.

It was our belief that the efforts of the Secretary General and of the United Nations observers were helpful in reducing further aid in terms of personnel and military equipment from across the frontiers of Lebanon. There was a basis for hope that the situation might be moving toward a peaceful solution, consonant with the continuing integrity of Lebanon, and that the aspect of indirect aggression from without was being brought under control.

The situation was radically changed, however, on July 14, when

there was a violent outbreak in Baghdad, in nearby Iraq. Elements in Iraq strongly sympathetic to the United Arab Republic seem to have murdered or driven from office individuals comprising the lawful Government of that country. We do not yet know in detail to what extent they have succeeded. We do have reliable information that important Iraqi leaders have been murdered.

We share with the Government of Lebanon the view that these events in Iraq demonstrate a ruthlessness of aggressive purpose which tiny Lebanon cannot combat without further evidence of support from other friendly nations.

After the most detailed consideration, I have concluded that, given the developments in Iraq, the measures thus far taken by the United Nations Security Council are not sufficient to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. I have considered, furthermore, the question of our responsibility to protect and safeguard American citizens in Lebanon of whom there are about 2,500. Pending the taking of adequate measures by the United Nations, the United States will be acting pursuant to what the United Nations Charter recognizes is an inherent right—the right of all nations to work together and to seek help when necessary to preserve their independence. I repeat that we wish to withdraw our forces as soon as the United Nations has taken further effective steps designed to safeguard Lebanese independence.

It is clear that events which have been occurring in Lebanon represent indirect aggression from without, and that such aggression endangers the independence and integrity of Lebanon.

It is recognized that the step now being taken may have serious consequences. I have, however, come to the considered and sober conclusion that despite the risks involved this action is required to support the principles of justice and international law upon which peace and a stable international order depend.

Our Government has acted in response to an appeal for help from a small and peaceful nation which has long had ties of closest friendship with the United States. Readiness to help a friend in need is an admirable characteristic of the American people, and I am, in this message, informing the Congress of the reasons why I believe that the United States could not in honor stand idly by in this hour of Lebanon's grave peril. As we act at the request of a friendly government to help it to preserve its independence and to preserve law and order which will protect American lives, we are acting to reaffirm and strengthen

principles upon which the safety and security of the United States depend.

THE WHITE HOUSE, July 15, 1958.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

2. *Extract from President Eisenhower's Radio-TV address, 15 July 1958^a*

Lebanon is a small country, a little less than the size of Connecticut, with a population of about 1½ million. It has always had close and friendly relations with the United States. Many of you no doubt have heard of the American University at Beirut, which has a distinguished record. Lebanon has been a prosperous, peaceful country, thriving on trade largely with the West. A little over a year ago there were general elections, held in an atmosphere of total calm, which resulted in the establishment, by an overwhelming popular vote, of the present Parliament for a period of 4 years. The term of the President, however, is of a different duration and would normally expire next September. The President, Mr. Chamoun, has made clear that he does not seek re-election.

When the attacks on the Government of Lebanon began to occur, it took the matter to the United Nations Security Council, pointing out that Lebanon was the victim of indirect aggression from without. As a result, the Security Council sent observers to Lebanon in the hope of thereby insuring that hostile intervention would cease. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld undertook a mission to the area to reinforce the work of the observers.

We believe that his efforts and those of the United Nations observers were helpful. They could not eliminate arms or ammunition or remove persons already sent into Lebanon. But we believe they did reduce such aid from across the border. It seemed, last week, that the situation was moving toward a peaceful solution which would preserve the integrity of Lebanon and end indirect aggression from without.

Those hopes were, however, dashed by the events of yesterday in Iraq and Jordan. These events demonstrate a scope of aggressive purpose which tiny Lebanon could not combat without further evidence of support. That is why Lebanon's request for troops from the United States was made. That is why we have responded to that request.

Some will ask, does the stationing of some United States troops in

^a *Department of State Bulletin*, 39 (4 August 1958) 183-86.

Lebanon involve any interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon? The clear answer is "no."

First of all, we have acted at the urgent plea of the Government of Lebanon, a Government which has been freely elected by the people only a little over a year ago. It is entitled, as are we, to join in measures of collective security for self-defense. Such action, the United Nations Charter recognizes, is an "inherent right."

In the second place what we now see in the Middle East is the same pattern of conquest with which we became familiar during the period of 1945 to 1950. This involves taking over a nation by means of indirect aggression; that is, under the cover of a fomented civil strife the purpose is to put into domestic control those whose real loyalty is to the aggressor.

It was by such means that the Communists attempted to take over Greece in 1947. That effort was thwarted by the Truman Doctrine.

It was by such means that the Communists took over Czechoslovakia in 1948.

It was by such means that the Communists took over the mainland of China in 1949.

It was by such means that the Communists attempted to take over Korea and Indochina, beginning in 1950.

You will remember at the time of the Korean war that the Soviet Government claimed that this was merely a civil war, because the only attack was by north Koreans upon south Koreans. But all the world knew that the north Koreans were armed, equipped, and directed from without for the purpose of aggression.

This means of conquest was denounced by the United Nations General Assembly when it adopted in November 1950 its resolution entitled "Peace Through Deeds." It thereby called upon every nation to refrain from "fomenting civil strife in the interest of a foreign power" and denounced such action as "the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world."

We had hoped that these threats to the peace and to the independence and integrity of small nations had come to an end. Unhappily, now they reappear. Lebanon was selected to become a victim.

Last year the Congress of the United States joined with the President to declare that "the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East."

I believe that the presence of the United States forces now being sent to Lebanon will have a stabilizing effect which will preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. It will also afford an increased measure of security to the thousands of Americans who reside in Lebanon.

We know that stability and well-being cannot be achieved purely by military measures. The economy of Lebanon has been gravely strained by civil strife. Foreign trade and tourist traffic have almost come to a standstill. The United States stands ready, under its mutual security program, to cooperate with the Government of Lebanon to find ways to restore its shattered economy. Thus we shall help to bring back to Lebanon a peace which is not merely the absence of fighting but the well-being of the people.

I am well aware of the fact that landing of United States troops in Lebanon could have some serious consequences. That is why this step was taken only after the most serious consideration and broad consultation. I have, however, come to the sober and clear conclusion that the action taken was essential to the welfare of the United States. It was required to support the principles of justice and international law upon which peace and a stable international order depend.

That, and that alone, is the purpose of the United States. We are not actuated by any hope of material gain or by any emotional hostility against any person or any government. Our dedication is to the principles of the United Nations Charter and to the preservation of the independence of every state. That is the basic pledge of the United Nations Charter.

Yet indirect aggression and violence are being promoted in the Near East in clear violation of the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

There can be no peace in the world unless there is fuller dedication to the basic principles of the United Nations Charter. If ever the United States fails to support these principles, the result would be to open the floodgates to direct and indirect aggression throughout the world.

In the 1930's the members of the League of Nations became indifferent to direct and indirect aggression in Europe, Asia, and Africa. The result was to strengthen and stimulate aggressive forces that made World War II inevitable.

The United States is determined that that history shall not now be repeated. We are hopeful that the action which we are taking will both

preserve the independence of Lebanon and check international violations which, if they succeeded, would endanger world peace.

We hope that this result will quickly be attained and that our forces can be promptly withdrawn. We must, however, be prepared to meet the situation, whatever be the consequences. We can do so, confident that we strive for a world in which nations, be they great or be they small, can preserve their independence. We are striving for an ideal which is close to the heart of every American and for which in the past many Americans have laid down their lives.

To serve these ideals is also to serve the cause of peace, security, and well-being, not only for us but for all men everywhere.

3. *President Sham'un's address to the Lebanese people on the eve of the landing of US troops in Lebanon, 15 July 1958^a*

Lebanese, brethren. In past months all the people of your sacred fatherland, the immortal and beloved Lebanon, the land of beauty, felicity, freedom, and love, enjoyed the graces and bounties of God Almighty and reaped the fruits of their good efforts, opening wide their houses and their hearts to every guest and dear Arab brother. Those who loved the Lebanon came to it, but those who hated it envied it. The haters, the greedy and the discontented, those who disavowed the grace of God and the fatherland, those hired by money and arms, the ignorant and the misled—these colluded against the Lebanon's tranquillity and stability, against its freedom and sovereignty, against its entity. They have persisted in their evil aggression, subversion, sabotage, and killing under a flimsy excuse which, when it has crumbled, is followed by a new one.

They thought the Lebanon was built on sand and would soon crumble, but they fell back in disappointment and despondency. The armed forces of the army, the gendarmerie and free fighters made an excellent showing for all their patience, tolerance and lenience. The Lebanon stood its ground like the rocks set on its mountains.

The Lebanon resorted to the Arab League. When this failed to adopt a just, frank and decisive resolution which would ward off the interference of its neighbours in its affairs and prevent them from misleading its sons and supporting them against their legislative authority by propaganda, money, arms and men, it resorted by necessity to the UN

^a S.W.B. Part IV, 17 July 1958, 11-12.

Security Council, which commissioned observers to the Lebanon. Now that these observers themselves have failed because of their small number and the lack of their (? organization), and the refusal of the mutineers to allow them access to the areas of smuggling and infiltration—apart from the fact that they could easily be deceived and were helplessly unable to achieve in a complete and proper manner the object of their presence, as reality, not to mention their own admission, has proved—there has been no alternative but to take a more availing and effective measure.

Lebanese, the continuance of the aggression against the Lebanon by fanning the present revolution there, which is directed against its entity, using propaganda, money, arms and men, makes it necessary for the legitimate Lebanese authority to resort once again to the UN Security Council and to demand implementation of the undertakings provided for by the UN Charter, particularly Article 51 of this Charter. The UN Charter was laid down to guarantee justice and equality among States big and small, strong and weak; to safeguard the sovereignty of every one of these States; and to prevent aggression against them. In view of the threat which jeopardises its sovereignty, nay, its existence, the Lebanon is entitled to make good the guarantees of the UN Charter.

The Lebanon has observed the principle of Arab fraternity to the fullest possible extent and encountered false and fabricated accusations and tendentious and hostile campaigns. It endured and acquiesced in all this for a long time. It turned a deaf ear to their framers and did not reply to them with similar or uglier campaigns, though this might have been right.

Day after day, month after month, and year after year, the Lebanon has sacrificed for the sake of Arabdom, while those who hate it and contrive to take its sovereignty and to tear apart its entity still continued to carry out their predesigned objectives, which they imposed on it to annihilate its freedom, sovereignty and right to life. Such is the great risk which every true Lebanese rejects.

The Lebanon will always continue to be true to its existence and personality and loyal to its Arab brethren. The Lebanon will not blame a brotherly people for the guilt of an ambitious ruler. It will ignore the offence and take note of the good deed. We are all mortal, but our homelands endure eternally.

Lebanese, in this serious and dreadful period the fate of the Lebanon, the sacred fatherland, will be determined. The President of your Re-

public and your Government have demanded the application of the UN Charter guarantees in order that the Lebanon, the immortal and the beloved, may return to what it has been—the land of beauty, happiness, freedom, and love, and so that all its people may enjoy these bounties of God and reap the fruits of their good work and efforts, opening wide their house and hearts to every guest and every beloved Arab brother.

May those who are standing their ground in fortitude maintain their stand for the sake of the Lebanon, and may the misled and unruly desist from their evil for the sake of the Lebanon. We are all mortal but the Lebanon will endure. Long live the Lebanon!

4. *Statement by Prime Minister Sāmī as-Sulh explaining the circumstances which led to the landing of US troops in Lebanon, 16 July 1958⁵*

Lebanese brethren: I have talked to you more than once since the outbreak of the Lebanese crisis. In every message I gave you evidence of UAR interference in the Lebanon. I also used these occasions to strengthen your determination to withstand all attempts to undermine your unity and destroy your independence. Thanks be to God, you stood firm in this tribulation, fighting the storm in accordance with your glorious past and powerful present. You answered the subversive (? elements) with constructive hands, which are determined that the Lebanon shall remain immortal in history.

Now that the free world has supported your complaint and seen the truth of your country's being threatened by danger, it has become obvious that the liquidation of this country would threaten human principles which form the basis of world peace. The rebel movement which has arisen in this country does not champion national or liberal objectives, but was prompted by elements of disturbance and anarchy nourished by the UAR by means of instigation, funds, arms, and men.

Now that friendly States have understood the truth of your situation and the justice of your cause, the upholder of freedom, the Lebanon's great friend, the USA, has responded to the appeal of the Government in accordance with the UN Charter—the Charter which was created to preserve the independence of member States, particularly the smaller States.

In this decisive moment in the history of the Lebanon, and in the

⁵ *S.W.B. Part IV*, 17 July 1958, 13-14.

name of this brave country which has never bowed its head in submission to an imperialist, I cannot but thank H.E. President Eisenhower and his honourable Government for quickly responding to the Lebanese Government's call for the preservation of the Lebanon's independence and unity. I also thank all friendly and peace-loving countries which have greatly sympathised with the Lebanon's cause, endorsed the USA's blessed move, and expressed full readiness to support this homeland so that it may continue to exist.

As for the Lebanese people, this beloved people which has remained patient and tolerant since the outbreak of the crisis proving once again their vitality and love for independence: this people which has supported the Government in its stand for the sake of preserving the Lebanon—the country of freedom, equality and fraternity, the country of peace, love and justice, the spring of good for those far and near, the resort of persecuted people from every country: this people which has suffered all defiance and paid with its blood, comfort, and wealth the cost of remaining dignified and respectable: this people which gave the world a brilliant example of solidarity with the righteous forces against hired seditious element: to the various classes of this people we today send our profound thanks, particularly to those vanguard ranks which shouldered with us the burden of this brilliant resistance.

We also send our thanks to the brave army and internal security forces which have performed the duty entrusted to them, sacrificing their dear lives for the sake of this homeland. We promise these forces that they and their families will be under the trusteeship of the Government. (Words indistinct) the Lebanese Government will spare no effort to alleviate the deprivation suffered by this country.

Now that the Lebanon's entity is safe, other events are now small as compared to this great event. Thus we call on all those who have been deceived by misleading propaganda and seduced by elements of disturbance and anarchy to stop their subversive acts. We also call upon the persons of good will who have been compelled to close down business to return to their work. Those who have received the weapons of evil from the Syrian Deuxième Bureau and its agents should hand over these weapons to the military authorities. Those who do not do so will be dealt with by justice. Those who continue the acts of violence and sabotage and the threatening of citizens will be severely punished.

Return to your work confident as to your destiny. Let the Lebanon become once again the land of felicity, comfort, and prosperity in all

walks of life. Now that the Lebanon's entity is safe and its independence protected forever by the UN, universal confidence in this world organization is once again strengthened. Small States are now safe from any aggression or illegitimate interference to which they might be subjected. We tell the Lebanon and the world that this is what we want, this is our great aspiration: our only interest in life is to protect this country which the Lebanese people have entrusted to us.

We have sacrificed everything. You have all witnessed the cheap fabrications and attacks which were levelled against us. Our houses were burnt and plundered, and our lives were more than once threatened by great danger. But God was always with us, because God is with the Lebanon and justice. The persecution and deprivation we have suffered and the sacrifices we have made are nothing compared to your own interest and comfort, O beloved Lebanese people. All this is nothing for your sake O Lebanon, beloved land. O Lebanon, to us—Moslems and Christians—you are a land of religious and political freedom, a dignified and completely independent country. You are a loyal brother to the Arab States, and a sincere friend to the UN and its sublime democratic principles. This is your bright face. For your sake we live and sacrifice ourselves. Long live the Lebanon!

5. *Letter from President Sham'un to President Eisenhower, 21 July 1958*⁶

Dear Mr. President: I wish to express to you on my own personal behalf and on behalf of Lebanon, and through you to the Government and people of the United States, our profound gratitude for responding to my call for help, based on a decision by the legitimate Government of Lebanon, through the landing of United States forces in Lebanon to help us defend our independence and integrity in conformity with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

I want to assure you, Mr. President, that we are both happy and honored to find ourselves side by side with the great American nation defending not only our independence and integrity against direct aggression, but the high principles in which the free world believes and by which it lives.

Faithfully yours,

CAMILLE CHAMOUN

⁶ *Department of State Bulletin*, 39 (11 August, 1958) 235.

6. *President Eisenhower's reply to President Sham'un's letter of 21 July 1958, 25 July 1958*

Dear Mr. President: I wish to thank you for your message of July 21 in which you express personally and on behalf of Lebanon gratitude for the United States' affirmative response to Lebanon's call for assistance. The purpose of our action was to help your country preserve its independence, in accord with the inherent right of nations to cooperate for self-defense. Our countries have long enjoyed close and friendly relations, and I look forward to further cooperation between the American people and the people of Lebanon in furthering the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

6. International Reactions to United States' Intervention

INTRODUCTION

IMMEDIATELY after the US government decided to intervene in Lebanon the Security Council held an emergency session. The US delegate told the Council that the American forces had entered Lebanon "to stabilize the situation until such time as the UN could take the steps necessary to protect the independence and political integrity of Lebanon."¹ The Soviet Union charged that the US intervention was "an act of aggression" and a defiance of the UN which was already seized of the matter.² By a curious coincidence the landing of US troops started at a time when the UNOGIL had reported "complete success" in their arrangements for inspection "all along the Lebanese frontier."³ The Secretary-General confidently told the Security Council that the UNOGIL was "fully equipped to play the part envisaged for it in the total UN effort."⁴

Both the US and the USSR introduced resolutions⁵ supporting their respective stands. Evidently neither of the two resolutions had any prospect of being adopted by the Security Council. Two compromise resolutions presented by Sweden and Japan respectively also failed to go through.⁶

Outside the United Nations, too, the US intervention created a considerable stir. Britain, France, and the Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact extended support to US action. President Nasser, on the other hand, condemned it as a grave violation of the UN Charter and a threat to the Arab countries.⁷ Prime Minister Nehru observed that foreign intervention was always dangerous and viewed the developments in Lebanon "with grave concern."⁸ The Soviet Union warned that she could not remain "indifferent to events creating a grave menace in an

¹ See below.

² See below.

³ See below.

⁴ See below.

⁵ See below.

⁶ See below.

⁷ See below.

⁸ *The Hindu* (Madras) 18 July 1958, 7.

area abutting on its frontiers⁹ and backed that warning by commencing military manoeuvres in the northern Caucasus and Black Sea.

A. SECURITY COUNCIL

1. *Statement by Mr. Lodge (US) explaining the reasons for sending the troops to Lebanon, 15 July 1958*¹⁰

32. The Council meets today to confront difficulties as serious as any in its history. The territorial integrity of Lebanon is increasingly threatened by insurrection stimulated and assisted from outside. Plots against the Kingdom of Jordan which have become evident over the past few months are another sign of serious instability in the relations between nations in the Middle East. And now comes the overthrow in an exceptionally brutal and revolting manner of the legally established Government of Iraq.

33. I have just heard this morning, before coming over here, of the murder of our esteemed and popular colleague from Iraq here in the United Nations, Mr. Mohammed Fadhil Al Jamali.¹¹ Only a few weeks ago, he was here with us. We heard his voice, we rejoiced in his humour, we were heartened by his fellowship. Now we learn that he was not only murdered, but that his body was actually dragged through the streets of Baghdad. Decent people throughout the world wherever they may be will recoil at this monstrosity.

34. In all these circumstances, the President of Lebanon has asked, with the unanimous authorization of the Lebanese Government, for the help of friendly Governments so as to preserve Lebanon's integrity and independence. The United States has responded positively and affirmatively to this request in the light of the need for immediate action, and we wish the Security Council to be officially advised hereby of this fact. In addition, the United States Government has under active consideration economic assistance to help Lebanon revive its economy.

35. Our purpose in coming to the assistance of Lebanon is perfectly clear. As President Eisenhower explained this morning, our forces

⁹ See below.

¹⁰ SCOR, 827th meeting, 6-11.

¹¹ The report of Mr. Jamali's murder was later contradicted by the Government of Iraq.

are not there to engage in hostilities of any kind, much less to fight a war. Their presence is designed for the sole purpose of helping the Government of Lebanon at its request in its efforts to stabilize the situation brought on by the threats from outside, until such time as the United Nations can take the steps necessary to protect the independence and political integrity of Lebanon. They will afford security to the several thousand Americans who reside in that country. That is the total scope and objective of the United States assistance.

36. Now I need scarcely say that we are the first to admit that the dispatch of United States forces to Lebanon is not an ideal way to solve present problems, and they will be withdrawn as soon as the United Nations can take over. In fact, the United States Government hopes that the United Nations itself will soon be able to assume these responsibilities. We intend to consult with the Secretary-General and with other delegations urgently on a resolution to achieve these objectives. Until then, the presence of United States troops in Lebanon will be a constructive contribution to the objectives the Security Council had in mind when it passed the 11 June resolution dealing with this problem [S/4023].

37. Let me now review the recent history of this situation. A little over a month ago, the Government of Lebanon presented a complaint to the Security Council involving: "a situation arising from the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" [S/4007].

38. At that time, various members of the Council drew special attention to Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations which enjoins all Members to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. . . ." This was one of the fundamental considerations behind the resolution adopted by the Council on 11 June which called for the urgent dispatch of an observation group to proceed to Lebanon so as to ensure that there was no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other matériel across the Lebanese borders.

39. The United Nations Observer Group has thus far been able to achieve limited success. We hope that it will pursue its work in the most effective and energetic way possible. Our forces are being instructed to co-operate with it and to establish liaison immediately upon arrival.

40. This United Nations Group has helped to reduce interference from across the border. We learn now, however, that with the outbreak of the revolt in Iraq, the infiltration of arms and personnel into Lebanon from the United Arab Republic in an effort to subvert the legally constituted Government has suddenly become much more alarming. This development, coupled with persistent efforts over the past months to subvert the Government of Jordan, must be a cause of grave concern to us all. They place in jeopardy both the independence of Lebanon and that of any Middle Eastern State which seeks to maintain its national integrity free from outside influences and pressures.

41. It is too early to tell what the outcome of the revolt in Iraq may be. But one thing is clear: the events in both Lebanon and Iraq present grave threats to the integrity of free and independent countries. They demonstrate a ruthlessness of aggressive purposes which tiny Lebanon cannot combat without support from friendly nations.

42. Observing the course of events in Lebanon and in Iraq, one is constrained to conclude that there are powers at work in the Middle East seeking, in total disregard for national sovereignty and independence, to substitute force or the threat of force for law. If these powers are left unchecked, free to pursue their lawless course, the people of the Middle East will have denied the solemn guarantees written into the United Nations Charter, and mankind's age-long quest for peace will have been checked and the world will have been plunged into anarchy.

43. Now we confront here a situation involving outside involvement in an internal revolt against the authorities of the legitimate Government of Lebanon. Under these conditions, the request from the Government of Lebanon to another Member of the United Nations to come to its assistance is entirely consistent with the provisions and purposes of the United Nations Charter. In this situation therefore, we are proceeding in accordance with the traditional rules of international law, none of which in any way inhibits action of a character which the United States is undertaking in Lebanon.

44. The United States is acting pursuant to what the United Nations Charter regards as an inherent right, the right of all nations to work together to preserve their independence. The Council should take note that United States forces went to Lebanon at the specific request of the duly constituted Government of Lebanon. Let me also emphasize again what I have said before, that these forces will remain there only

until the United Nations itself is able to assume the necessary responsibility for ensuring the continued independence of Lebanon.

45. There is one further fact which must be recognized: if the United Nations is to succeed in its efforts to maintain international peace and security, it should support the efforts of the legitimate and democratically elected Government to protect itself from aggression from without, even if that aggression is indirect.

46. The United Nations must be particularly alert in protecting the security of small States from interference by those whose resources and power are larger. This is a principle which has been supported here in this very hall in the past and which should be supported today regardless of who the offender may be.

47. Lebanon is a Charter Member of the United Nations and has loyally contributed to its work over the past decade. It would be unthinkable now to permit the lawfully constituted Government of Lebanon to fall prey to outside forces which seek to substitute a Government which would serve their purposes in defiance of the principles of the Charter.

48. There can be no hope for peace in the world unless the United Nations shows this dedication to the Charter's basic principles. All nations, large and small alike, are entitled to have their political independence and territorial integrity respected and maintained. If we vacillate with regard to this proposition, we will open the floodgates to direct and indirect aggression all over the world.

49. The overthrow of another State by subversion and the fomenting of internal strife is more difficult for the world to combat than is direct military aggression, because the fomenting of internal strife is harder to see with your eyes. But this is not the first time that the United Nations has faced such a problem. The United Nations faced such a problem successfully in Greece in 1946, when Soviet-sponsored insurrection threatened to overwhelm the Greek Government. The United Nations did so unsuccessfully in 1948 when the Communist coup was perpetrated in Czechoslovakia.

50. The United Nations sought to provide means for dealing with such aggressive developments in the future when, on 1 December 1949 and 17 November 1950 respectively, the General Assembly adopted the "Essentials of peace" and "Peace through deeds" resolutions [*resolutions 290 (IV) and 380 (V)*]. If the Council will forgive a personal note, I particularly recall the "Peace through deeds" resolution because

I actively worked to obtain its adoption the first time I was a member of the United States Delegation to the United Nations in 1950. I would like to quote one paragraph from the statement I made at that time on behalf of the United States:

"The eight-Power resolution not only reaffirms that whatever the weapons used, any aggression is the gravest of all crimes against peace and security in the world. It also freshens, modernizes, brings up to date, and makes more complete our concept of aggression by specifically including the latest form of aggression, to wit, fomenting civil strife."

51. Let me now quote some of the provisions of this resolution which was adopted here in the General Assembly in 1950. It is very short.

[*"The General Assembly,*]

"*Condemning* the intervention of a State in the internal affairs of another State for the purpose of changing its legally established government by the threat or use of force,

"1. *Solemnly* reaffirms that, whatever the weapons used, any aggression, whether committed openly, or by fomenting civil strife in the interest of a foreign Power, or otherwise, is the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world;

"2. *Determines* that for the realization of lasting peace and security it is indispensable:

"(1) That prompt united action be taken to meet aggression wherever it arises;"

That is the end of the quotation from the resolution of 1950 which I submit applies very definitely to the situation which confronts us today.

52. Remember that the Government of Lebanon was a co-sponsor of this resolution and that the present Foreign Minister of Lebanon was its spokesman. Remember that the first representative in the General Assembly to raise the issue of subversion and civil strife was the representative of Greece, which was just then overcoming the effects of communist subversion. Remember that the first language for a resolution was introduced on that occasion by the representative of Bolivia. Remember, too, that the draft resolution in its final form was sponsored

by France, Lebanon, Mexico, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, Bolivia and India. Remember, finally, that the text, condemning the fomenting of civil strife in the interests of a foreign power, as that is what it did, was adopted by a vote of 50 to 5, the Soviet bloc being significantly against it. Those are good things to think about today.

53. In solemnly affirming that any aggression which foments civil strife in the interests of a foreign Power was one of the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world, the General Assembly clearly had in mind just such a situation as that which we face. The integrity and independence of a nation is as precious when it is attacked from outside by subversion and erosion as when it is attacked in the field by military action.

54. I conclude now, and I do so by saying to my colleagues of the Security Council to remember this one more fact. The members of the League of Nations tolerated direct and indirect aggression in Europe, in Asia and in Africa during the 1930s, and the tragic result was to strengthen and stimulate aggressive forces in such a way that World War II became inevitable.

55. The United States, for its part, is determined that history shall not now be repeated. We hope and believe that the action which we are taking will bring stability and that United States forces now being sent into Lebanon at the request of its Government can be promptly withdrawn. We must, however, be prepared to meet the situation whatever the consequences may be.

56. We strive for a world in which nations great and small can preserve their independence. This is an ideal which is close to the heart of every American and we believe that it is close to the hearts of all free men. We believe that the action which the United States is now taking is consistent with the principles and purposes of the United Nations and will promote the cause of world peace.

2. *Statement by the UN Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 11 June 1958, 15 July 1958*¹²

58. As the Security Council today resumes the consideration of the complaint of Lebanon, I consider that I owe it to the Council, at this

¹² SCOR, 827th meeting, 11-13.

first meeting after 11 June [825th meeting], to give it an account of how I have acted under the mandate given to me in the resolution passed on that date [S/4023]. I find an added reason for doing so at this time in the references of the representative of the United States to the present efforts of the United Nations in Lebanon. I shall naturally leave aside all questions of substance and also the question of the future role and status of the observation operation.

59. Having heard the charges of the representative of Lebanon concerning interference by the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon and the reply of the representative of the United Arab Republic, we recall that the Security Council passed, on 11 June, a resolution in which it decided to "dispatch urgently an observation group to proceed to Lebanon", and authorized the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps for implementation of the resolution. In the resolution the Security Council stated that the aim of the step it was taking was "to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other matériel across the Lebanese border".

60. I have in my actions regarding the Lebanese case acted solely with that purpose in view. I have used the tool created for this purpose in the resolution. I have also relied on the authority that the Secretary-General is recognized as having under the Charter.

61. My actions have had no relation to developments which must be considered as the internal affairs of Lebanon. Nor have I, in my implementation of the resolution, or acting under the Charter, concerned myself with wider international aspects of the problem than those referred to in the resolution. The Secretary-General in this situation obviously is neither an arbiter nor a mediator. However, even with these important restrictions, there has been wide scope for action for the purposes of the resolution, strictly in keeping with United Nations principles and rules.

62. The Security Council, in deciding to dispatch to Lebanon an "observation group", defined not only the character of the operation but also its scope. It did so by linking the observation to illegal traffic in arms and infiltration, requesting the Group to keep the Council currently informed of its findings. In taking this stand, the Council defined the limits for authority delegated to the Secretary-General in this case.

63. I have, in the light of the decision, considered myself free to take all steps necessary for an operation, covering illegal traffic in arms

and infiltration, as effective as it could be made as a tool towards ensuring against such traffic or infiltration with its basic character of observation maintained. I have had a free hand as to the structure and organization of the operation but have considered myself as barred from an interpretation of the authority granted which would have implied that I changed the policy, laid down by the Council, by my decisions on the scope of the operation and the authority of the observers.

64. In fact, had I, by going beyond the reasonable limits of a "group" charged with "observation", or by deciding on terms of reference exceeding observation, changed the observation operation into some kind of police operation, not only would I have overstepped the resolution but I would also have faced a conflict with principles laid down in the Charter. In a police operation, the participants would in this case need the right, if necessary, to take the initiative in the use of force. Such use of force would, however, have belonged to the sphere of Chapter VII of the Charter and could have been granted only by the Security Council itself, directly or by explicit delegation, under conditions spelled out in that chapter.

65. As to the structure and organization of the observation group and its activities, I have at the initial stage acted in close consultation with members of the Security Council and the representative of Lebanon. My interpretation of the resolution, as presented to them before any action was taken, met with their full approval, including that of the representative of Lebanon. At later stages I have naturally, to a decisive extent, depended upon the judgement of the highly qualified military, political and diplomatic experts of the United Nations who are in the field. The present arrangements are in accordance with their suggestions and meet with their full approval.

66. I have said before that I have acted solely for the purpose mentioned in the resolution of the Security Council, using the instrument created by the resolution, but using also my authority under the Charter. This means that the efforts I have made, of a diplomatic nature, have been guided by the desire to get necessary support for the observation operation, so as to make it possible for it to succeed as a measure against any infiltration or smuggling of arms. It would be premature to give here an account of the activities to which I refer. Their value for the purpose mentioned can be judged only in the light of practical experience in the observation operation and of other developments, as registered by our observers or by other reliable means.

67. What I have to stress here is that, whatever weight might finally, in the light of the tests to which I have referred, be given to the special efforts in which I have had to engage, it has been a matter of course that I have striven to give to the observation operation the highest possible efficiency. The diplomatic efforts in support of the observation operation, or their outcome, have been in no way permitted to influence my judgement as to the size, scope or mandate of the Observation Group.

68. My stand on these last-mentioned questions has been determined exclusively by the attitude taken by the Group itself. As I have already said in public, the Observation Group has and will have as many observers as it has asked or might ask for. On the other hand, I have found it very difficult to provide them with observers before they consider themselves ready to absorb them in useful current work. If there would be any impression that restraint has been shown in the build-up of the Observation Group, the explanation of this impression is, therefore, the stand taken by the Group itself regarding its needs and possibilities, and obviously in no way any political considerations, least of all any considerations caused by anticipations of the outcome of any diplomatic efforts in support of the observation operation.

69. It has already been reported to the Council how the observers have managed to operate within areas which are now outside of government control. From previous published accounts it has appeared that the Group has been meeting with difficulties north of Tripoli and in the north of the Bekaa region. I can now report to the Council that throughout the northern border areas north of Tripoli arrangements have been made for full freedom of movement and access and that agreement has been reached on the establishment of out-stations in that area. In the region north of Bekaa the Group has this very morning, in a meeting between General Odd Bull and a leader of the opposition forces in that region, formalized its previous requests for full freedom of access.

3. *Extract from statement by Mr. Azkoul (Lebanon) commenting on the work of the UN Observation Group in Lebanon, 15 July 1958*¹³

82. Since the submission of the Lebanese Government's official comments on the observers' first report, the situation in Lebanon has consistently deteriorated. Convoys of armed men and arms have been

¹³ SCOR, 827th meeting, 13-16.

reported entering Lebanon from Syria and while the world has been pacified by press reports describing the situation as one approaching calm, clandestine preparations have been under way for the launching of a great offensive designed to overthrow the Lebanese Government. We have reason to believe that the Observation Group will shortly be reporting to the Council some, at least, of these infiltrations. The peril threatening the independence and integrity of Lebanon is today even more imminent, for the *coup d'état* in Iraq has begun to have serious repercussions in Lebanon.

83. In view of this situation, my Government would again appeal to the Security Council and urge it to take some more effective emergency measure than the one it has already taken, and one more likely to achieve the Council's purpose: to prevent any illegal infiltration of personnel or any supply of arms or other matériel across the Lebanese borders. The Lebanese Government would like to reaffirm here, today, before the Security Council, that it is always anxious to ensure that the assistance it needs to protect Lebanon's independence and integrity should be obtained through the United Nations and within the framework of the United Nations Charter.

84. It is for this reason that, while making this request of the Security Council, the Lebanese Government has decided, in view of the immediacy of the threat to Lebanon's independence and to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Middle East, and while awaiting the action it has asked the Security Council to take, to rely on Article 51 of the Charter, which recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. Consequently, the Lebanese Government has asked for direct assistance from friendly countries. It is clearly understood that this assistance is strictly temporary and will continue only until such time as the measure we have asked of the Security Council is carried into effect. As soon as such action is undertaken, the forces of friendly countries which have sent troops into Lebanon will at once be evacuated from our territory.

85. In view of the gravity of the present situation in Lebanon and the Middle East and of the seriousness of the measure to which it has had to resort, my Government implores the Security Council to respond at once to the appeal Lebanon has made to it in its great anxiety at the immediate threat to its independence and integrity and to the maintenance of peace and security in our part of the world.

4. *Statement by Mr. Sobolev (USSR) criticizing the US action in Lebanon, 15 July 1958*¹⁴

95. The Security Council has again been convened to consider the Lebanese question, but this time at the request of the United States delegation. As we all know, the Security Council has already—and not so long ago—examined the Lebanese complaint, accusing the United Arab Republic of alleged interference in Lebanese affairs.

96. As you are aware, the United Nations Observation Group which was sent to Lebanon by decision of the Security Council did not confirm these complaints against the United Arab Republic. The Chairman of the Group, Mr. Galo Plaza, former President of Ecuador, said that the Group had found no evidence of mass interference in Lebanese affairs by the United Arab Republic. He confirmed, at a press conference at Beirut, that the Group had no proof of infiltration or support of the rebels against the Lebanese Government on the part of the United Arab Republic. Mr. Galo Plaza stated that he regarded the events in Lebanon as a civil war.

97. To this it should be added that the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who was instructed by a special decision of the Council to supervise the activities of the Observation Group, has also stressed on more than one occasion that the events taking place in Lebanon are the domestic affairs of the Lebanese people.

98. What, then, is the reason for the United States request for an urgent meeting of the Security Council? Surely nothing new has happened in Lebanon. In order to answer this question, we must consider what has happened in the last few days in the countries of the Near and Middle East and what lies behind these events.

99. The facts, with which everyone is familiar, show that there is in fact a state of civil war in Lebanon. The Lebanese people, indignant at the anti-popular and reactionary policy of the Chamoun Government, has arisen in defence of its constitutional rights and the independence of the country. The fact is that the Lebanese people, in its struggle against the tyranny of the colonial yoke, has united all its forces against the regime which is trying to retain its mastery over the people, by force of arms, in order to serve the imperialistic interests of certain Western Powers.

100. The fact that, despite all his efforts, Chamoun has not succeed-

¹⁴ SCOR, 827th meeting, 18-22.

ed in achieving the so-called "stabilization of the situation in the country" is yet further proof that the Lebanese authorities are faced not with elements infiltrating from the United Arab Republic, but with a truly nation-wide movement. It is difficult to cope with a mass anti-colonial movement, if even the jet planes, tanks and guns hastily rushed to Lebanon by the Western Powers cannot help.

101. It is also known that certain Western Powers have long been trying to use the events in Lebanon as a basis for military intervention against the Lebanese people. Leaders in the United States and the United Kingdom have openly referred to their Governments' willingness to send their armed forces to Lebanon under any pretext. Suffice it to recall the press conference given by Mr. Dulles, Secretary of State of the United States, not so long ago, on 17 June, when he openly declared the United States' intention of sending its armed forces to Lebanon. At the same time, he stressed that United States troops might disembark in Lebanon not only under the flag of the United Nations, but also as a unilateral action.

102. Things have come to such a pass that Mr. McElroy, United States Secretary of Defence, went so far as to threaten the use of atomic bombs by the United States in the event of the disembarkation of troops in Lebanon.

103. Thus, there is incontrovertible factual evidence that Lebanon has been threatened and is being threatened not by fictitious intervention in its internal affairs by the United Arab Republic, but by direct military intervention by the United States and its Western partners, who are trying to maintain in power by armed force a Government whose policy and actions are vigorously rejected by the Lebanese people.

104. It is no secret that the United States and other Western Powers counted on being able to use the United Nations observers sent to Lebanon to justify their plans for intervention against the Arab peoples. But their hopes were not fulfilled. The Observation Group took an objective position and rightly appraised the events taking place in Lebanon as matters of domestic concern to the Lebanese people.

105. Yesterday, to the events in Lebanon were added those in Iraq, where King Faisal's Government was overthrown and the Republic of Iraq was proclaimed. The message of Colonel Arif, Vice Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq, to the Iraqi people contains the following statement:

"The Iraqi people, relying on their loyal sons and their national armed forces, have decided to free their country from the domination of a criminal gang, which imperialism brought into power in order that it might hold sway over the destinies of the people, their wealth and their resources in its own interests and for its own profit."

106. Colonel Arif further stated that the Government of the Republic of Iraq would strive to bring about fraternal relations with other Arab and Moslem countries, that it would act in accordance with the principles of the United Nations and that it would abide by obligations and treaties which serve the interests of the country and are in keeping with the decisions of the Bandung Conference.

107. The events in Iraq are purely the domestic affair of the Iraqi people, who have risen against foreign domination and have freed the country from the anachronistic and reactionary rule of King Faisal.

108. It is reported that the new Government of the Republic of Iraq is receiving thousands of telegrams from workers, trade unions, employees, teachers, youth and student organizations and tribal leaders, expressing support for and solidarity with the people's victory and the proclamation of the Republic.

109. All this bears witness to the fact the peoples of the Arab world have taken the path of national liberation, are determined to defend their political independence, and want to manage their own resources and to pursue a policy serving their national interests, without looking either to London or to Washington. In other words, the peoples of the East want to live like other peoples, like masters in their own house, in peace and friendship with all peoples, and not, as the organizers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the South-East Asia Treaty Organization, or the Baghdad Pact would like, with their policy closely bound to the cold war, the armaments race and unbridled expansion at the expense of small countries and peoples. But this does not enter into the calculations of these organizers, who want to bind the Arab East hand and foot politically and economically.

110. The reactions of ruling circles in the United States to the events in Iraq show that the very existence of the aggressive military blocs in the Near and Middle East and, in particular, of the Baghdad Pact, is now at stake.

111. Furthermore, the events in Iraq have created a threat to the

unchallenged domination of imperialistic States over that country's economy.

112. According to press reports, the special sensitivity of the United States and the United Kingdom towards events in Iraq can be attributed to the demands of the large American and British petroleum monopolies that decisive steps should be taken to crush the aspirations of the Iraqi people to become the real masters of their destinies, their resources and their State. The word "oil" dominates all the news in today's papers. The Near East smells of "oil". That is why ruling circles in the United States are reacting so strongly to events in Iraq.

113. We have just heard the United States representative's statement about the landing of United States armed forces in the territory of Lebanon. The fact is that the United States has decided openly, without taking cover behind any flag, to intervene with its armed forces in the internal affairs of the Arab countries and to force to their knees peoples who have risen in defence of their freedom and independence, not only in Lebanon, but also in other Arab States.

114. In an attempt to justify his country's aggressive action, the United States representative alleges that it was requested by the present rulers of Lebanon. It is no secret, however, that these rulers are simply political puppets of the United States and that their requests are inspired by the United States State Department.

115. In these circumstances, the sending of United States troops to Lebanon is an act of aggression against the peoples of the Arab world and a case of gross intervention in the domestic affairs of the countries of that area. This act is a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the use of force as a tool of foreign policy. This act is contrary to the principles and tenets of international law and constitutes a challenge to all freedom-loving people. No reference to Chamoun's requests can justify this act of armed aggression, for these requests were provoked precisely in order to justify United States intervention in the domestic affairs of the countries of the Arab world. But such justification is impossible.

116. As grounds for its intervention the United States refers to the United Nations Charter. It is true that the Charter provides for the right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. But in this case the situation is quite different. The Security Coun-

cil is taking action in Lebanon. It has taken a decision which makes possible a settlement of the situation in that country. No one has attacked Lebanon and there is no threat of an armed attack against Lebanon. It is obvious that this reference to the Charter has nothing to do with the case and that it is merely a manoeuvre designed to conceal the aggressive nature of the armed intervention of the United States against the Arab peoples. Lebanon is threatened by no one except those who have undertaken armed intervention with a view to crushing a people in revolt. Moreover, the reference to the United Nations Charter also runs counter to the report of the Observation Group sent by the Security Council, which states that there is no threat whatsoever to Lebanon, on the part of the United Arab Republic.

117. The Soviet Union delegation considers that the attempt of the United States to cover up its armed intervention against the peoples of the Near and Middle East by a reference to self-defence makes a mockery of the United Nations Charter, and of the high purposes and principles on which our Organization is based and which are reflected in the Charter.

118. The peoples of Lebanon and Iraq have the inalienable right to settle all problems relating to these States. No internal incidents occurring within a country can serve as a pretext for intervention in its domestic affairs. Any armed intervention by the Western Powers is fraught with the most serious consequences, threatens acutely to aggravate the international situation and is liable to plunge the world into the abyss of a new war.

119. The entire responsibility for these consequences falls upon the organizers of and participators in the armed intervention against the peoples of the Arab East and, first and foremost, on the Government of the United States of America.

120. So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, as we have frequently stated, we firmly believe that peace must reign in the area of the Near and Middle East, which is adjacent to the frontiers of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union cannot, therefore, remain indifferent to foreign intervention in the countries of that area, under whatever cover such intervention is perpetrated.

121. It is the duty of every State and Government which is really concerned with peace to do everything in its power to stop against the peoples of that area.

122. The Security Council, bearing in mind the responsibility

ed in it by the United Nations Charter in connexion with the maintenance of peace and security, must take decisive measures to put an end to armed interference in the affairs of the Arab States and to ensure peace and tranquillity in that part of the world.

5. *Interim report of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, 15 July 1958*¹⁵

1. The Group wishes to take the earliest opportunity to report to the Security Council that, on 15 July 1958, it completed the task of obtaining full freedom of access to all sections of the Lebanese frontier.

2. The first of these frontier areas held by the opposition—the Akkar plain—extends from Tripoli north and east to the Syrian border. On 2 July the Group was able to report that it had obtained freedom of access to this area. In the succeeding few days, some patrols penetrated into the area. From 9 July patrols began reaching the frontier at several points in the roads leading to it from south to north. On the morning of 15 July, the Group received the fullest assurances of complete freedom to patrol throughout the area north of Tripoli, and to establish permanent observation posts anywhere in the area, and in particular, at the intersections of the north-bound roads and the frontier. At the same time arrangements were made for the inspection by military observers of all vehicles and cargoes entering Lebanon across the northern frontier. Again on the same day an outstation was established at the important road junction of Halba.

3. The second of the border areas held by opposition forces is that part of the Bekaa valley north and east of Baalbek. The northern frontier is crossed by a main road leading to Homs, Syria, and a minor road running north from Hermel. Until 11 July, patrols were not able to penetrate beyond El Laboué. On that day United Nations military observers, at a meeting with the local opposition leader, obtained freedom of movement to patrol up to the border by day, but were not yet enabled to establish permanent stations. On the morning of 15 July 1958, at a further meeting, arrangements were concluded to establish permanent stations at Koussair on the border and at Baalbek with effect from 16 July.

4. The next section of the border east of the centre of the Bekaa valley consists of hilly country, through which pass two main communi-

¹⁵ SCOR, 13th year, supplement for July, August and September 1958, 33-34.

cation routes—the Beirut-Damascus railway east of Rayak and the Beirut-Damascus road of Masnaa. Further south, near Deir el Aachâyer, two subsidiary roads provide a more difficult road connexion between Lebanon and Syria. The main centres of this region are under government control, but almost all of the border is under opposition control. This region is covered by Chtaura outstation and its network of substations. This network had already been established at the time of the first report [*S/4040 and Add. I*], but consistent success has been achieved in pushing eastwards from the main roads up to the frontier. Observation posts are manned by day on a regular basis at the following points on or close to the frontier: Yahfoûfa, near the Beirut-Damascus railway, Masnaa on the Beirut-Damascus road, and Deir el Aachâyer. The remaining section of the border with Syria is covered by an outstation at Marjajoûn, from which a good road leads to Kuneitra in Syria. This section of the frontier is held by opposition forces. Observers from Marjajoûn outstation finally penetrated into Chebaa, the main opposition village in this area, on 12 July.

5. The remainder of the land frontier of Lebanon and the sea frontier continue to be accessible to the Group. Thus the Group is able to report to the Security Council that it has, as of 15 July, access to all parts of the frontier.

6. *Statement by the UN Secretary-General in the Security Council, 16 July 1958*¹⁰

I thank you, Mr. President, for granting me the floor at this stage before the adoption of the agenda.

The Members of the Council will this morning find before them an interim report from the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, which they have sent us by cable. The report sets out the complete success with which they have met in their arrangements for inspection all along the Lebanese border. The fact that this result—of which I gave a first, short indication in my statement yesterday—is reached at this stage, that is to say the day of the renewed debate in the Security Council and the landing of the United States units, is a coincidence, the results achieved by the United Nations yesterday being the logical and successful outcome of its previous efforts. It is my feeling that with the result thus achieved, the Observation Group is fully equipped to play

¹⁰ SCOR, 829th meeting, 1-2.

the part envisaged for it in the total United Nations effort, with its general purpose of ensuring against infiltration and smuggling of arms.

I hope that no later developments will cause a setback and that the Observation Group, although neither in the past nor probably in the future being the only tool used by the United Nations for the general purpose just mentioned, will retain its key position.

7. *Extract from statement by Mr. Azkoul (Lebanon) criticizing the Soviet claim that there was no foreign infiltration in Lebanon, 18 July 1958¹⁷*

5. During the last two days the Soviet Union representative has spoken a great deal about the events now taking place in Lebanon and their possible international repercussions. It seems to me that we ought to make a serious and objective examination of the real situation created by the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the domestic affairs of Lebanon, so that we may see it as a whole.

6. The argument put forward by the Soviet Union delegation, so far as I have been able to understand it, can be summarized as follows: since there is no foreign intervention in Lebanon, and the Lebanese crisis is purely domestic, the dispatch of United States troops to Lebanon is unjustified and constitutes illegal intervention only to be explained by United States imperialist aims.

7. I have no intention of dealing with that part of the argument which concerns the United States. The United States representative can do so if he wishes and, indeed, has already done so with success. But since the entire Soviet argument is based on a denial of the Lebanese complaint that there has been and still is massive intervention in Lebanon's internal affairs by the United Arab Republic, it is important that my delegation should deal with this fundamental aspect of the Soviet thesis.

8. In order to judge correctly the value and validity of this thesis, we must seek an answer to the following four basic questions:

(1) Is the present Lebanese Government the legitimate Government of the country which alone is officially responsible for protecting Lebanon's independence against any outside intervention?

(2) If such intervention is in fact taking place, has this legitimate

¹⁷ SCOR, 833rd meeting, 2-8.

Government the right to ask the United Nations for help in order to avert the danger threatening Lebanon's independence?

(3) Has this legitimate Government the right, if the threat to the country's independence becomes immediate, and if it is not possible to wait for the United Nations to reach a decision and to recruit and organize the assistance asked for, to seek assistance from friendly countries in conformity with the United Nations Charter?

(4) Finally, has there or has there not been intervention by the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon?

9. I believe that no one either here or elsewhere would hesitate to answer the first two questions in the affirmative; the Lebanese Government is the legitimate Government of the country—even the rebels who are opposing it have never disputed this—and it has the right and even the duty to seek assistance from the United Nations if Lebanon's independence is really threatened by foreign intervention.

10. As to the third question, concerning the right to appeal to friendly countries, there have been some here who have seemed to question this right, on the ground that it can only be invoked under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter if there has been a direct armed attack. In reply I would call their attention to the fact that Article 51 of the Charter speaks not of direct armed attack but of armed attack pure and simple. Article 51 is thus intended to cover all cases of attack, whether direct or indirect, provided it is armed attack. In any case, what difference is there from the point of view of their effects between direct and indirect attack if both are armed and both are directed towards the destruction of a country's independence and could, in fact, threaten it? What real difference is there between armed soldiers in uniform making a frontal attack on a certain part of a certain country and these same soldiers, armed but not in uniform, secretly infiltrating into the area to regroup there and engage in the same sort of armed attack as soldiers in uniform? It would seem obvious that this distinction between direct and indirect attack is purely verbal and wholly fictitious in this instance.

11. It only remains for me to consider the fourth question, which is the crucial one: has there or has there not been outside intervention in Lebanon, including the infiltration of armed men and the supply of arms and equipment? To this question the Soviet Union representative replies in the negative; he maintains that the intervention we are talk-

ing about is not taking place. This denial can only be explained in one of two ways. The first is that the Soviet Union representative knows that the intervention is going on but wishes it to continue and would like to prevent any assistance being provided which would bring it to an end. Should that be the case I am sure that no other member of the Council would want to follow him in that course. There is, however, another possibility. It is that the Soviet Union representative knows, by some special and perhaps magical means, that all the facts we have related to the Council and all those we have discovered subsequently, as well as all the facts collected independently by other States and reported by the world press, which prove the fact of this intervention, are completely false and unfounded. If that is the case, we should be very grateful to him if he would share his omniscience with us so that we may be able to accept his argument.

12. Before I can decide which of these two hypotheses is the correct one I must pause a moment to recall that the Lebanese delegation, in submitting its complaint to the Council [823rd meeting], set forth a great number of facts which had, with others, served to convince the Lebanese authorities of the existence of massive intervention in Lebanon's domestic affairs. These were not all the facts known to us but simply examples and illustrations of the various forms which this massive intervention was taking. But it was these facts, placed before the Council, as well as the facts known directly to certain Governments, which convinced the Security Council of the gravity of the situation in Lebanon and persuaded it, on 11 June 1958, to send an Observation Group with the task of preventing any illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other matériel across the Lebanese borders.

13. Since that date the volume of evidence of infiltration and foreign intervention has greatly increased. My delegation has not yet had an opportunity of submitting examples of these further facts to the Council, but the Lebanese Government has given most of them to the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon. It may be asked here—and, it would seem, with reason—why, if the Observation Group was cognizant of these facts, and if they were valid, it did not mention them in its first report to the Council as proof of infiltration.

14. In order to reply adequately to this question we must first of all recall that the first report of the Observation Group [S/4040 and Add. I] only covers a period of about ten days during which the Group was still in the process of installation, and had not been able to pene-

trate the rebel-controlled areas or to approach the Lebanese-Syrian frontier, across which infiltration was taking place. But the following three considerations, also, should be borne in mind:

(1) The nature of the Observation Group's function, as understood by the Group itself, namely, that it can only report to the Council cases of infiltration it has itself actually observed.

(2) The nature of the Lebanese Government's reports to the Observation Group—in other words, the fact that for the most part these reports relate incidents observed by agents of the Lebanese authorities and reach the Observation Group only after the incidents have taken place and can no longer be witnessed personally by the Observers. For instance: a report reaches the higher authorities at Beirut from one of the agents of the army or of the Lebanese intelligence service that a convoy of mules with arms and ammunition has crossed the Lebanese frontier at such and such a place on such and such a date. When this report which, for the Lebanese authorities, is indisputable proof of infiltration or of the persistence of infiltration, reaches the Observers, it becomes valueless because they have not been able themselves to observe directly the facts reported. They cannot, therefore, take account of them.

(3) The nature of the Observation Group's function as understood by the Security Council in adopting its resolution of 11 June last, the fact, that is to say, that the Council sent to Lebanon, not an investigation group with the principal or even sole task of reporting to the Council on the results of its investigations, but an Observation Group whose mission was to ensure that there was no infiltration or supply of arms to Lebanon. This means that the Group's duty is not to tell the Council whether infiltration into Lebanon is or is not taking place but to put a stop to such infiltration and to report on the results of its action. In other words, what we should expect from the Observation Group is not a report indicating whether or not infiltration has taken place or listing instances of infiltration, but a report stating simply whether or not it has been able to carry out the task of observation assigned to it, and whether, in consequence, infiltration has stopped or is still going on—for, at least according to the interpretation given to the Council's resolution, it was expected that observation alone would enable the Group to put a stop to the infiltration of armed men and the supply of arms to Lebanon. However, the Group stated in its first report that it had not yet

been able to carry out its task of observation and, accordingly, that it was not able to judge whether or not it would be able to stop the infiltration.

15. It is this conclusion in the Observation Group's report which should hold our attention and arouse our interest, and not the fact that the Group reached no clear conclusion as to whether or not infiltration was taking place.

16. The inference I would draw is that the observers' preliminary conclusions in their first report do not justify the USSR representative's affirmation that there has been no infiltration of armed men or supply of arms to Lebanon. The representative of the Soviet Union cannot claim to be basing himself on the Observation Group's report in declaring that there has been no infiltration into Lebanon. On what, then, is he basing his statement?

8. *Extracts from statement by Mr. 'Umar Lutfi (UAR) on the US note verbale to the UAR Government, 18 July 1958*¹⁸

32. I wish to inform the Council of a message I received today from Cairo:

"On 18 July, at 1.30 a.m., the United States Ambassador in Cairo asked to see Mr. Ali Sabry, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, who received him at 3 a.m. The Ambassador delivered a *note verbale*, the contents of which were as follows:

"The landing of United States forces is intended to preserve the independence of Lebanon and to protect American citizens."

"He also expressed the United States Government's intention to withdraw its forces as soon as circumstances permit:

"The troops have no hostile intentions. It was necessary to come to the assistance of Lebanon because of the change of government in Iraq. The United Arab Republic should realize that if United States forces are attacked by military units of the United Arab Republic or by elements which the United States knows to be under control of the United Arab Republic or ready to carry out its instructions, there will be a danger that the problem may be enlarged and assume major proportions."

¹⁸ SCOR, 833rd meeting, 8-9.

33. This last part of the *note verbale* is very serious. It refers to elements known to be under our control or ready to carry out our instructions. We can understand that the United States Government is not prepared to sit back and allow its troops to be attacked by the armed forces of the United Arab Republic. What is important and serious is that the United States wishes to be the judge of which elements are under our control or accept our instructions. In making such a decision, the United States will rely on the unilateral information of their intelligence service. It did so when it decided to intervene in Lebanon, discounting the report of the Observation Group.

34. As I have on several occasions explained to the Council, this note gives us some idea of the real intentions of the United States Government in regard to its general policy in the Middle East, of which I spoke at length yesterday [831st meeting]. The position taken by the United States, with the backing of the United Kingdom, is fraught with dangerous consequences. It is a sinister augury of the dangers to peace in this area. . . .

36. The representative of Lebanon spoke today of information which we do not have, and put questions which he has already answered. He drew conclusions which were not based on any premises which would enable me to reply.

37. We are a small State, we do not have an atomic bomb, and nobody has proved that we have any aggressive designs. The world bears witness to our peaceful intentions. Our policy is one of non-alignment. It may not please everyone, but we will continue to pursue it in co-operation with the United Nations and in accordance with the United Nations Charter, by which we abide. We have proved on several occasions that we are always prepared to co-operate with the United Nations in settling international problems and preserving world peace.

9. *Revised draft resolution submitted by the USSR, 17 July 1958*¹⁰

"The Security Council,

"Having heard the announcement made by the representative of the United States of America concerning the introduction of United States armed forces within the confines of Lebanon and also the announce-

¹⁰ SCOR, 831st meeting, 17. The draft resolution was rejected by 8 votes to 1 with 2 abstentions on 18 July. For the original draft of the resolution see *ibid.* 827th meeting, 22.

ment made by the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning the introduction of United Kingdom armed forces into Jordan,

"Recognizing that such action constitutes gross intervention in the domestic affairs of the peoples of the Arab countries and is consequently contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set forth in its Charter and, in particular, in Article 2, paragraph 7, which prohibits intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State,

"Considering that the actions of the United States and the United Kingdom constitute a serious threat to international peace and security,

"Calls upon the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to cease armed intervention in the domestic affairs of the Arab States and to remove their troops from the territories of Lebanon and Jordan immediately." [S/4047/Rev. 1.]

10. *Revised draft resolution submitted by the US, 17 July 1958*²⁰

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution of 11 June 1958 [S/4023] establishing an Observation Group "to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other *matériel* across the Lebanese borders",

Commending the efforts of the Secretary-General and noting with satisfaction the progress made to date and the encouraging achievements reported by the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon,

Recalling that, in its resolution 290 (IV) of 1 December 1949 entitled "Essentials of peace", the General Assembly called upon States to "refrain from any threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or integrity of any State, or at fomenting civil strife and subverting the will of the people in any State",

Recalling that, in its resolution 380 (V) of 17 November 1950 entitled "Peace through deeds", the General Assembly condemned "intervention of a State in the internal affairs of another State for the purpose of changing its legally established government by the threat or use of force" and solemnly reaffirmed that "whatever the weapons used, any

²⁰ SCOR, 13th year, supplement for July, August and September 1958, 31-32. The draft resolution was vetoed by the USSR on 18 July. For the original draft of the resolution see *ibid.* 30-31.

aggression, whether committed openly, or by fomenting civil strife in the interest of a foreign Power, or otherwise, is the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world",

Noting the statement of the representative of Lebanon that infiltration of arms and personnel is continuing and the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon are being threatened [827th meeting], that the Government of Lebanon in the exercise of the right of self-defence had temporarily requested the direct assistance of friendly countries, and that the Government of Lebanon requested further assistance from the Security Council to uphold its integrity and independence,

Noting the statement of the representative of the United States of America regarding the provision of assistance by the United States to the Government of Lebanon at its request to help maintain the territorial and political independence of Lebanon,

Noting further the statement of the United States representative [827th meeting] that United States forces will remain in Lebanon "only until the United Nations itself is able to assume the necessary responsibility to ensure the continued independence of Lebanon" or the danger is otherwise terminated,

1. *Invites* the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon to continue to develop its activities pursuant to the Security Council resolution of 11 June 1958;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General immediately to consult the Government of Lebanon and other Member States as appropriate with a view to making arrangements for additional measures, including the contribution and use of contingents, as may be necessary to protect the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon and to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other *matériel* across the Lebanese borders;

3. *Calls upon* all Governments concerned to co-operate fully in the implementation of the present resolution;

4. *Calls* for the immediate cessation of all illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other *matériel* across the Lebanese borders, as well as attacks upon the Government of Lebanon by government-controlled radio and other information media calculated to stimulate disorders;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as appropriate.

11. *Draft resolution submitted by Sweden, 17 July 1958*²¹

The Security Council,

Noting the communication from the United States Government regarding its decision to comply with a request by the Government of Lebanon for military assistance,

Noting further that United States troops have subsequently arrived in Lebanon,

Recognizing that the United Nations, according to the Charter, is not authorized to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State,

Considering that the action now taken by the United States Government has substantially altered the conditions under which the Security Council decided, on 11 June 1958, to send observers to Lebanon,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to suspend the activities of the observers in Lebanon until further notice,

2. Decides to keep the item on its agenda.

12. *Revised draft resolution submitted by Japan, 21 July 1958*²²

The Security Council,

Having further heard the charges of the representative of Lebanon concerning interference by the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon and the reply of the representative of the United Arab Republic,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to make arrangements forthwith for such measures, in addition to those envisaged by the resolution of 11 June 1958, as he may consider necessary in the light of the present circumstances, with a view to enabling the United Nations to fulfil the general purposes established in that resolution and which will, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, serve to ensure the

²¹ SCOR, 13th year, supplement for July, August and September 1958, 38. The draft resolution was rejected by 9 votes to 2 (Sweden and USSR) on 18 July.

²² SCOR, 13th year, supplement for July, August and September 1958, 38-39. The text of the original draft is identical with the present text with the exception that the operative paragraph 1 in the former inviting the UNOGIL "to continue to develop its activities" was dropped in the revised text. The draft resolution was vetoed by the USSR on 22 July.

territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon, so as to make possible the withdrawal of United States forces from Lebanon;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the arrangements made;

3. *Calls upon* the Governments concerned to co-operate fully in the implementation of this resolution.

13. *Extracts from third report of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, 12 August 1958*²³

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The second report of the Observation Group [S/4069] was adopted on 25 July 1958, but for reasons explained therein covered its activities only up to 15 July. The Group stated, however, that it had received no reports from its observers subsequent to that date, which would tend to alter the general nature of the evaluations made. The present report contains a detailed account of the activities of the Group during the period 15 July-11 August. The geographical and other relevant background information, which was set out in full in the second report, has not been repeated here. Indeed, the present report should be considered as a progress report to be read in conjunction with the previous ones.

2. The period covered by this report has been marked by two important events to which it is necessary to make some reference in order that the activities of the Observation Group may be understood in their proper context. The first of these events was the landing of United States armed forces in the Beirut area on 15 July and the second, the election on 31 July of General Fouad Chehab as the next President of Lebanon. These events have inevitably had their impact on the nature of the activities of the observers.

3. As mentioned in the second report, the effect of the landing of United States armed forces on the inhabitants of opposition-held areas where observers were operating, occasioned difficulties and caused setbacks to the task of observation. Not only was the Group prevented from carrying out its plans to establish immediately the permanent posts in opposition-held areas for which it had made arrangements on 15 July, but also its observers had to resume the difficult task of gaining the

²³ SCOR, 13th year, supplement for July, August and September 1958, 127-37.

confidence of the inhabitants of those areas in the impartiality and independence of the observers.

4. With a view to emphasizing the independent nature of its task, the Group made the following announcement on 16 July:

"The United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon wishes to clarify its position in regard to its relationship with the foreign forces on Lebanon soil. The United Nations Observation Group alone is in Lebanon in pursuance of the mandate contained in the Security Council resolution of 11 June 1958 [S/4023]. The United Nations Observation Group represents the only action taken by the Security Council. There is, therefore, no basis for establishing any contact or working relationship, formal or informal, between the United Nations Observation Group and any non-Lebanese forces in Lebanon beyond what may be strictly required for the independent fulfilment of its mandate from the United Nations Security Council, which cannot be altered without further action by the Council."

5. By dint of their perseverance and tact in dealing with difficult and often dangerous situations, the observers have won back the ground lost after 15 July. In addition, most of the permanent stations in opposition-held areas envisaged in the second interim report of the Group [S/4052], have already been established and other stations are expected to be established shortly.

6. The election of General Chehab as the next President of Lebanon took place on 31 July. Even before the election informal truces had taken effect in Saïda and Soûr; in fact, during the period immediately preceding the election there was a noticeable reduction in tension practically throughout the country and a comparative absence of armed clashes between Government and opposition forces. Since 31 July, there has been a further reduction in tension throughout the country, including the opposition-held areas. There has, in fact, been virtually a nationwide truce since then with only occasional reports of sporadic firing in some areas. . . .

IV. CONCLUSIONS

39. During the period under report, in spite of the set-back caused by the landing of United States troops on 15 July, which resulted in a

sharp reaction in the opposition-held areas, the ground lost was steadily regained through the tact, patience and perseverance of the military observers. The extension of the Observation Group's activities therefore continued and posts have been established at most of the sensitive points along the borders and in the areas immediately adjacent to them. This process is continuing and is being intensified as additional observers arrive on the scene.

40. Members of the Group have either separately or jointly toured over all parts of the country and have visited a large number of posts and acquainted themselves personally with the local conditions in each area. Their visits have had a good effect on the inhabitants of these areas and have conveyed a sense of reassurance to them. They have also given encouragement and support to the observers, who are often working in conditions of danger and difficulty. The members of the Group intend to continue these visits.

41. It should be recorded that the presence of the United Nations observers moving around in their white jeeps from village to village is welcomed both by Government supporters and by opposition elements. The independence and impartiality of the observers is universally recognized and appreciated, and they are regarded as the symbol of the United Nations presence in the area; they help to inspire feelings of calm and confidence in the areas patrolled by them. Sometimes local disputes and difficulties have been referred to them by different parties, and they have occasionally been instrumental in solving them.

42. As will be seen from the observations made in the report, the situation in regard to the possible infiltration of personnel and the smuggling of arms from across the border is that, while there may have been a limited importation of arms into some areas prior to the presidential election on 31 July, any such movement has since markedly diminished. A virtual truce has prevailed since about that time in most of the disturbed areas. However, acts of brigandage and lawlessness, unconnected with the political movement, are being increasingly reported. Many of these lawless acts are motivated by economic considerations, as normal life throughout the country has been severely disrupted by the prolonged state of civil strife.

43. It is evident that the nature and scope of the work of the observers will inevitably be conditioned by the progress made in dealing with the internal political aspects of the Lebanese problem and with the return to normal conditions both in the countryside and in the towns.

B. GENERAL

1. *Statement by the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, in the House of Commons, 15 July 1958*²⁴

Her Majesty's Government have been in close consultation with the United States Government throughout the present crisis. They were informed in advance of the United States Government's intentions. They believe that the United States action is necessary to preserve the independence and integrity of the Lebanon in this very uncertain situation. This action has Her Majesty's Government's full support.

Mr. Brockway: Shame.

Mr. Lloyd: British troops are not taking part in this operation. British forces in the area have, however, been alerted.

Mr. Bevan: The right hon. and learned Gentleman will no doubt understand that this is regarded on this side of the House as very grave news indeed. Would he be able to tell us what situation has developed in the Lebanon different from what it was to justify American intervention at this stage?

Secondly, can he give us an assurance that no British troops will, in fact, be used and that they will not be sent either to Iraq or to the Lebanon until the House of Commons has had an opportunity of considering the whole situation?

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman inform the House what the President of the United States has said to be his reasons for this intervention? Will he explain to the House why it is that, before a meeting of the Security Council, Her Majesty's Government approved the intentions of the United States?

Mr. Lloyd: I will attempt to deal with all those questions. I agree with the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) that this is a very grave situation. So far as the change in the situation is concerned, it is quite apparent, as the President of the United States has said, that, in the face of the tragic and shocking events which are occurring nearby, more will be required than the United Nations team now in the Lebanon to preserve the integrity of the Lebanon.

On the use of British troops, I have no more to say than I have already said. No British troops are being used in this operation.

On the question of the Security Council, in our view the situation

²⁴ House of Commons, *Debates*, vol. 591, cols. 1014-15.

does not admit of any delay. The United States Government told the Security Council of their decision as soon as possible after making it.

Mr. Bevan: If additional help was required in the Lebanon—all the evidence we had was to the effect that the situation was becoming easier rather than worse—[HON. MEMBERS: “No.”] I am speaking about the Lebanon—would it not rather be a matter for the Security Council to decide and not for the United States to decide unilaterally? If there was required a greater build-up of United Nations police forces in the Lebanon, was not that a matter for consideration by the Security Council? If intervention by one country unilaterally is just to take place in this way, how far could it be justifiably spread?

Mr. Lloyd: In this case there has been a clear request from the Government of the Lebanon for this assistance, to preserve the integrity and the independence of the Lebanon. If the right hon. Gentleman will study the President's statement, which I will circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT, I think that he will see the reasons given there.

2. *Cable from the Shah of Iran, the President of Pakistan, and the President of Turkey to President Eisenhower, 16 July 1958*²⁵

We have been informed by the United States Embassy in Ankara that upon the request of President Chamoun to the effect that the Eisenhower doctrine be applied to Lebanon, the United States, in order to protect the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon, has decided to act and accordingly units of the Sixth Fleet have landed in Beirut today.

This bold and appropriate decision of the United States will not only ensure the protection of the independence of Lebanon and the support of its legitimate government but will at the same time strengthen the determined position of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey and also renew and increase the faith of the free world in the leadership of the United States for the defense of the free nations.

We, meeting in Ankara, wish to convey to you, Mr. President, our appreciation and gratitude for this momentous decision in which we have deep satisfaction and relief.

MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI
ISKANDER MIRZA
CELAL BAYAR

²⁵ *Department of State Bulletin*, 39 (4 August 1958) 183.

3. *Extract from statement by President Nasser, 16 July 1958*²⁶

The occupation of the Lebanon by American forces constitutes a danger to peace in the Middle East, a grave violation of the United Nations Charter and a flagrant threat to the Arab countries that refused to bow down to imperialism and resolved to pursue an independent policy.

It is obvious that the American government has taken the Lebanese revolt, which has been going on for seven weeks now, as a pretext for the occupation of the Lebanon, and to threaten the independent countries of the Middle East, and that America's embarkation on such a grave aggression on the plea of an alleged intervention attributed to the United Arab Republic, an allegation which was officially denied by the United Nations through the first report of the Observers' Group which had been entrusted by the Council with the task of investigating the situation in Lebanon, uncovers America's intentions towards the independent Arab countries, and its attempts to subjugate as well as dominate them. This is even a farce, which, if it ever indicates anything, definitely points to America's disregard for the United Nations Charter, even for the very existence of this organization and the value of its actions, as is clearly seen from her violation of its resolutions, and her obstruction of its march.

4. *Extracts from statement by the Soviet Government, 16 July 1958*²⁷

On July 15 the whole world learned with indignation of armed intervention by the United States of America in the Lebanon. Ships of the Sixth United States Fleet entered the port of Beirut and landed marines on the territory of the Lebanon.

On the same day the White House published—in the name of the President of the U.S.A.—a statement attempting somehow to justify this gross military intervention in the Lebanon's internal affairs. The statement contends that the United States of America sent its troops to the Lebanon allegedly to demonstrate United States' concern for the Lebanon's integrity and independence which, allegedly, are being threatened from outside, and also to protect American citizens in that country.

²⁶ *Nasser's Speeches and Press-Interviews, 1958* (Information Department, Cairo) 212.

²⁷ *News and Views from the Soviet Union, 18 (19 July 1958)* 2-3.

The utter insolvency of this contention is self-evident, for no one menaces the Lebanon's integrity and independence. Abundant evidence of this is provided, for example, by the statement of the United Nations Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and by the report of the United Nations Observers on the situation in the Lebanon.

As for "concern" for the safety of American citizens, one may be permitted to ask what standards of international law allow foreign powers to send their armed forces to the territory of other States for such purposes. There are no such standards in international law. It is common knowledge, however, that references to the need to protect one's citizens have since time immemorial been a favourite device of all colonialists to justify gangster-like attacks on small countries.

The real reason for armed United States intervention in the Lebanon is the desire of the oil monopolies of the U.S.A. and other Western Powers to retain their colonial hold on the Middle East countries, and also the obvious bankruptcy of their policy in the Arab East, the collapse of the Baghdad Pact and of the notorious Dulles-Eisenhower Doctrine.

This is strikingly evidenced by the latest events in Iraq which the White House statement regards as a reason which accelerated armed intervention by the United States. However, the events in Iraq are new proof of the Arab people's unflinching determination to rid themselves of colonial dependence and to take their destiny into their own hands....

This turn in the events in the Middle East obviously does not suit the colonial powers which received the news of the establishment of the Republic of Iraq with undisguised hostility. Feverish activity began immediately in Washington, London and Ankara.

The existence of plans for large-scale intervention by the colonial powers in the internal affairs of Arab East countries is also borne out by the statement by the British Foreign Minister Lloyd that the British Government was informed in advance of the American Government's intention to land its troops in the Lebanon, that the British Government fully supports this action of the U.S.A. and that the British armed forces in the area are being kept ready.

To provide a pretext for armed intervention in the internal affairs of the Arab countries, a statement by the Lebanese President Chamoun asking the Governments of the U.S.A., Britain and France to send troops to the Lebanon, was inspired. It is well known, however, that the pre-

sent events in Lebanon are a result of purely internal causes and that only interference by Baghdad Pact countries and the U.S.A., seeking to preserve an anti-national regime at any cost, has led to a civil war and to an aggravation of the entire situation in the area.

It should be noted that the landing of the American troops in Beirut is an act of armed intervention not only against the Lebanon but against all the freedom-loving Arab countries as well. No bones are made about it in, for instance, the aforementioned White House statement which—certainly by no accident—links the dispatch of troops to the Lebanon directly to the events in Iraq....

Armed intervention by the United States in the Lebanon shows clearly that the imperialists have cast off the disguise and have started an open aggression against peace-loving Arab peoples. It becomes especially clear in this connection why the Government of the USA did not accept the Soviet Government's proposal of February 11, 1957 concerning non-interference by the great powers in the internal affairs of the countries of the area. The Government of the USA refused to undertake commitment which would have ensured peace and relaxed the tension in that part of the world.

It wanted to keep its hands free for aggression in the area. United States' armed intervention in the Lebanon creates a grave threat to peace and is fraught with far-reaching consequences. The peoples cannot remain unconcerned in face of this brazen imperialist aggression, gross encroachment on the sovereignty and national independence of the Arab countries and unceremonious violation of the United Nations principles.

The White House plea that American troops are being sent to the Lebanon for purposes of self-defence and in the national interests of the USA is open mockery of these principles. Who does not know that the USA lies thousands of kilometres from the Lebanon and that the people of the Lebanon and other Arab countries can in no way threaten either the national interests or the security of the USA. As for the Lebanon, it is precisely armed American intervention that is the main threat to the security of this small Arab country.

Having taken to the road of flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, the Government of the USA is now attempting to confront the Security Council and the whole of the United Nations with a fait accompli and to pressure the United Nations into approving its unilateral aggressive actions.

The Soviet Government holds that the situation in the Middle East.

created by open aggression on the part of the USA, supported by the other colonial powers, is alarming and dangerous to world peace. Under these circumstances, the Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly should take urgent and vigorous measures to curb aggression and to protect the national independence of Arab States which have fallen victim to an unprovoked attack.

The Soviet Government urges the Government of the USA to discontinue its armed intervention in the internal affairs of Arab countries and to withdraw its troops from the Lebanon immediately.

The Soviet Government declares that the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to events creating a grave menace in an area abutting on its frontiers, and reserve the right to take the necessary measures dictated by the interests of peace and security.

5. Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China, 16 July 1958²⁸

On July 15, the United States, in flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter, landed its armed forces in the Lebanon and began armed intervention in Lebanese internal affairs under the pretext of "protecting American lives" and "defending Lebanese sovereignty." This is an extremely grave war-like adventure on the part of the United States to suppress the national independence movements of the Arab peoples and to create world tension. The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people strongly condemn and protest against this United States act of aggression.

The United States and other Western countries long craved to carry out armed intervention against the Lebanon, but did not do so for fear of the resolute opposition of the Arab peoples and the peace-loving countries and people throughout the world. Now, with the colonial rule in the Middle East shaken by the great victory of the national independence movement of Iraq, the United States Government, in a sudden rage and panic, has brazenly launched armed intervention against the Lebanon against universal censure, and also attempts to invade Jordan to menace the Republic of Iraq. Such act of aggression on the part of the United States is not only and [sic] outrageous provocation against the peoples of the Arab states, but also seriously jeopardizes

²⁸ *China Today* (New Delhi), 2 (25 July 1958) 2.

peace in West Asia and the world. The pretexts of "protecting American lives" and "defending Lebanese sovereignty" absolutely cannot cover up this naked act of aggression on the part of the United States. All peace-loving countries and people of the world must firmly demand the immediate withdrawal of United States forces from the Lebanon and stop the United States war provocation.

The people of all countries have the right to choose their own governments, in which no intervention is allowed. The armed intervention against the Arab peoples carried out by the United States imperialists is doomed to failure. In their struggle for independence and freedom, the peoples of the Lebanon, Iraq and other Arab countries are by no means isolated! Together with the Asian and African peoples and other peace-loving countries and people the world over, the 600 million Chinese people will give all-out support to the Arab people's just struggle. Should the United States not withdraw immediately its forces of aggression from the Lebanon, it will surely eat the fruit of its own doings.

6. *Extract from statement by the British Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, in the House of Commons, 16 July 1958*²⁰.

Nobody can pretend, I will not pretend, that the arguments for or against this or that course in this crisis, or, indeed, in any other crisis, have been overwhelming on one side or the other. In my experience, there are very few matters in which there is a 100 per cent case on one side or the other. If it were so, life, and certainly politics, would be much simpler. Normally, there are considerations upon one side and the other. They have to be carefully balanced, and in the end it may be by a comparatively small margin that the scale tips finally this or that way.

What we are debating today is the decision of the United States Government, in which they have had the full support of the British Government, to send military forces to the Lebanon in response to President Chamoun's urgent appeal. This is only one of many questions in the Middle East, and, of course, we have had to consider it—and it has been right in a most interesting debate to consider it—in relation to the wider picture.

Perhaps we may examine what we are chiefly debating today from

²⁰ House of Commons, *Debates*, vol. 591, cols. 1263-70.

two main points of view, first, whether it is legally and morally justified, secondly, whether, on the whole balance of considerations it is wise and prudent.

I do not wish to dismiss the legal points quite so cursorily as the Leader of the Opposition. I think that they are of some importance. I do not think that there can be much difference of view about that. A legitimate Government has, it seems to me, the right to ask for help in its difficulties from another friendly Government. Whether that help should be forthcoming or not is, of course, a matter of judgment, but I do not think that there is anything legally improper for a nation faced either with aggression from outside, or with internal disturbances supported from outside, to ask for help. I think that this is commonly recognised.

In the case of the Lebanon, the *Manchester Guardian* says this today:

"To describe the landing of American Marines in Lebanon as an act of aggression has no justification in international law; they came in response to an appeal by the constitutional head of a sovereign state who had a perfect right to invite them."

[HON. MEMBERS: "There is more. Read on."] I quite admit, and I am coming to it, that there is the question whether they should do so, whether it is wise to do so. I was dealing, first, with the legal power, and I take some comfort from this statement because as regards the legal rights there seems to be nothing in the ordinary law of nations or in the United Nations Charter which forbids such action.

Of course, it can be argued that where there is already some severe internal struggle in a country, and where the stimulus has come from an outside power, that is one of the occasions where the United Nations should act collectively. It was our hope that they would do so successfully, but, of course, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary said, time is of the essence of this problem. In any case, it seems to me that the legitimate Government of any friendly State has the right to ask for help to assist it against dangers, and there is no doubt at all that, from the legal point of view, neither the American assistance nor any other assistance that might be given it can be regarded as illegal. Still less, in my view, at any rate, can it be regarded as immoral.

I think that the House is fairly well aware, though perhaps not wholly aware, of the facts behind the rebellion in the Lebanon and, indeed,

behind the whole pattern of subversion in many Middle Eastern States. It has been said that the internal situation of the Lebanon is simply an internal matter, a civil war between two factions, and that the Western Powers have been trying to bolster up an obsolete, unpopular and undemocratic régime. I think that that is really a false picture.

I know that it has been argued that the United Nations observers could not find any great evidence to substantiate the massive character of the intervention in their first report. But let us be fair and say that the United Nations observers, as my right hon. and learned Friend pointed out, had a very difficult job to do, although they did it to the best of their ability. They were working under very severe limitations. They were hurriedly assembled. They had not the modern apparatus necessary for the collection of intelligence and they had very limited contacts in the Lebanon. They were prevented by the rebel leaders from inspecting the frontier areas at all and, therefore, their report must be read with full regard to these facts. In other words, they were unable to ensure that there should be no intervention. How could they, when they ranged over only a few kilometres?

My right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary made it quite clear, and it cannot be seriously disputed, that there has been subversion and foreign intervention organized from outside on a large scale. This is supported by evidence in our possession for which I must ask the House to take my assurance. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] Because I am stating what I believe to be true and I have evidence to support it. But the curious thing is that it is really confirmed by Mr. Hammarskjöld's own efforts, as the Leader of the Opposition stated. For Mr. Hammarskjöld, who, very properly, was trying to reduce the tension in the Lebanese struggle, went to Cairo. He was, of course, right to do so.

But why did Mr. Hammarskjöld go there? Only, surely, because he felt that in Cairo he might be able to bring some influence upon the Egyptian Government and try to persuade them to stop what they were doing, and this would really be the most effective way, more effective perhaps than his observers, of reducing the character of the intervention. He was right to go to Cairo and he had some success. I admit that, for it was generally thought that as a result of his efforts the pressure and the threats had been somewhat reduced. But his journey to Cairo and his partial success in Cairo are really a confirmation of the close connection between the situation in the Lebanon and the efforts to foment revolution springing from a foreign country.

I think that I may perhaps just add this. Successive British Governments, and certainly we, in the last period, have had some experience of being the victims of this sort of threat. It is the pattern of subversion in many parts. There has been a striking example of it recently in the attack in Aden. Here again, we have clear evidence of intrigue and subversion through the intermediary of another Power. Here again, we know from our own experience how propaganda and plots shade into violent revolution and, indeed, open aggression. We are familiar with this pattern. Of course, it is not so easy for the smaller and weaker countries to deal with it.

There is just one other point which was made to which I should make reference in dealing with the morality of what was done. Some parallel was drawn by some hon. Members between the American action and the events of 1956 in Hungary. What is the difference, we have been asked, between the revolt in Hungary and the threat to the Lebanon? Surely there is this cardinal difference. We all know, in spite of all the efforts of some of the most skilled propagandists in the world, that no one has been able to produce a jot of evidence to show that the Hungarian rising was other than spontaneous. It had no organization from outside, it received no arms from abroad, no money and no previous propaganda preparation.

I think, therefore, that it is clear—and this is part of what I want to say—that from the legal point of view the Americans have acted correctly. I think that it is also clear that the action of the Americans and the support we have given, diplomatic and full support of them, is morally justified.

I now come to the other set of considerations which, I think, were mainly in the speeches of the Leader of the Opposition and also of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale.

It is really saying this. Is it wise? It may be legal, it may be right to do it, it may be morally correct and legally correct, but is it wise, is it prudent? Therefore, I say what I began by saying, that the arguments are, of course, very balanced. On the one side it is said—and there is considerable force in the argument—that Western intervention, even at the request of the lawful Government of any State in difficulties, will only fan the flames of Arab nationalism and xenophobia. It will only increase the gulf between Nasser and his satellite States and the West.

These troubles, it is said, and it is a powerful argument, are merely symptomatic of a deep, underlying feeling of unsatisfied aspirations of a

people slowly emerging from a medieval, perhaps a feudal system. But when one speaks of forms of government, although the régime of Iraq before this last *coup* was certainly monarchic, it was certainly one of the most progressive in the Middle East.

It is said—I think that everyone has admitted this—that it is a State which uses its oil revenues very beneficially for the public good, largely under the guidance of very distinguished colleagues and friends of ours who have helped. It has done so more than any other State in the Middle East and the successive rulers and Governments of Iraq, whatever failings they may have had, have always preferred the solid work of building up their country to the more showy forms of ostentation.

The Iraqi régime was not fully democratic in the Western sense, but it has been developing and moving forward. It is certainly a long way ahead from every point of view of the dictatorships which have tried to overthrow it, or which are trying to succeed it. In the same way, the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) said that the parliamentary and election system of the Lebanon was not altogether satisfactory by what we would call our modern standards and methods here, but at least it has a Parliament, which does not exist in the dictator countries. All the same—and I am trying to put the argument fairly—there is, as I have said, a great deal of weight and, let me be frank, a great attraction in the argument that we had better leave things alone, that these mass movements are inevitable and that we should accept them.

From the economic point of view it is, of course, true that the oil must be sold to somebody, that the buyer has a certain power as well as the proprietor, and that, even if it is sold at much higher prices and without the advantage of the great investing capacity of the companies, it is something if it continues to be sold in sterling.

Of course, there are great attractions, may I say great temptations, in allowing things to drift and hoping that, somehow or other, we shall emerge without too much damage. I think I have fairly stated this argument and I am not going to say that I have not given great weight to it. It is a matter of balance, and often of very nice balance. Yet, when I reflect upon the history of my lifetime, I cannot believe that it is always wise from the point of view of the future to think only of our convenience in the present.

I do not feel that the Leader of the Opposition was right in claiming that intervention in the Lebanon must be fatal in the long run. For if things merely drift along, what will be the end, or what may be the end

of the story? Let us assume that Iraq, Jordan, the Lebanon and later, of course, the oil-bearing countries round the Gulf—all Arabia, the Yemen and Aden—are all brought voluntarily by an upsurge of feeling, or perhaps involuntarily, within the ambit of this Pan-Arab—I will not say nationalism, but rather imperialism. Will it end there? What will be the future of the Sudan, a country which we have done a great deal to create, and where we have done the very things which the right hon. Gentlemen so praised? What are they thinking? What do they fear? We know. Where will Libya stand, and what will be the resulting impact on other parts of Africa? And if we look further north, what may be the effect on our friends in Persia, Turkey and Pakistan?

These nationalist movements, like all nationalism, however good they are—we must try to guide them of course—can also have in them something perverted. They may be the instruments of legitimate ambition, but they can also be used for personal, wrong and subversive ends, and ultimately fall into Communist hands. This form of nationalism is not the pure patriotism of sacrifice. It is the kind of nationalism which feeds upon, and can often only be sustained, by continual aggression.

While I give full weight—I am trying to balance these things—to the arguments put forward by the two right hon. Gentlemen, what we have to teach to the emerging nations of the world—and we have a fairly proud record which the right hon. Gentleman has shared, as he rightly claims, based upon a long tradition of teaching democratic principles, respect for the law and all the things we associate with the British connection—is this. I say that surely we want to teach them, so far as we can influence them, that they have not only rights but also responsibilities.

I am bound to say that the methods which are being used to promote these nationalist movements do not give one full confidence, or, indeed, much confidence, that they will be combined with respect for the legitimate interests of their own inhabitants, still less of neighbouring nations. Where short-term conditions favour inaction, long-term conditions may very well be the other way.

I have tried to balance the arguments and to put some of the considerations which must be in all our minds. We have had a debate to which we have all tried to contribute without too much party feeling on this problem. In any event, what we have to consider today, the immediate question before the House, is this: was the United States Government justified in the action which it has taken to support the

Lebanon when it was threatened with disruption caused by external aggression and subversion?

Have we been right to associate ourselves with it—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."]—and to give moral support? [HON. MEMBERS: "Yes."] Are we right to support this action in the United Nations, and shall we be right if we concert with them a broad policy which will try to avoid the obvious dangers, which we know too well, but not be content merely to avoid the dangers by ignoring them? The House as a whole, and, I think, the country, will take the view that in this difficult situation the Government reached the right decision. I think that even those who do not feel that, have approached our problem with a good deal of sympathy and understanding, and I pay my tribute of gratitude and thanks for it.

Finally, I feel that the close co-operation between Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the attempt to face these problems together is a gain to the world and it is a foundation on which we can build for the future. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton (Mr. Head) said, this is something which should be known not only to ourselves, but to the world.

The House as a whole will welcome the opportunity which Mr. Dulles's invitation will provide to my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary to have a general discussion on all these problems.

Mr. E. Fernyhough (Jarrow): To get his instructions.

The Prime Minister: Incidentally, the Leader of the Opposition referred to some remarks which I made at a meeting last night when I was talking about our close relations with the United States. I was quoted as saying—perhaps I did say something to the effect—that we would almost prefer to be wrong together than to be right separately. I did not mean that literally. Our aim must be to be right together.

To sum up, the House is conscious of the gravity of the situation. I think that there is a general understanding of the difficulties ahead of us. I think that there is a general wish that if it is possible we should not add to the problems of the nation by a divided Parliament. I say once more that we can make two claims. First, I think that we have the sympathy and the understanding, as I said, even of Members who do not altogether approve our decision—[HON. MEMBERS: "How does the right hon. Gentleman know?"] I have sensed it, and if I wish to pay a compliment I will do so; it will do hon. Members no injury, since it is only collective. Secondly, both the motives of the Government of the United States in taking the action which it has done, and the decision

of Her Majesty's Government in giving it full support, are understood and will be supported by the nation as a whole.

*7. Joint communiqué on Baghdad Pact talks in Turkey, 17 July 1958*³⁰

1. At the invitation of H.E. the President of Turkey, meetings were held in Ankara and Istanbul between 14th and 17th July with the participation of H.M. the Shahinshah of Iran and H.E. the President of Pakistan.

2. The three Heads of State considered the current situation in the Middle East and dwelt in particular on the events taking place in the Lebanon and Iraq. They noted with deep concern the latest manifestation of subversive activities, inspired from outside, in an allied country, resulting in the bloodthirsty murder of distinguished personalities whose valuable guidance in inter-allied discussions will always be remembered with gratitude.

3. In expressing their profound sorrow at the loss of their loyal and honourable friends, the Heads of State take this opportunity of expressing their most sincere condolences to the mourning families of their dead friends, and generally to the friendly nation. The Heads of State, who are determined to support in all possible ways the measures which are necessary to stop international banditry in this region, denounce this manifestation of savagery inspired from outside.

In this connection, the Heads of State declare that they welcome with satisfaction the initiative taken by the USA for upholding the integrity and the independence of free and peace-loving countries, and in particular the practical support given to the legally-constituted Government of the Lebanon. The Heads of State believe that this initiative will be extended to countries similarly threatened.

4. Being convinced that the recent events in the Middle East have proved, more than at any other time, the necessity of taking joint measures in a most practical and effective way, the Heads of State intend to strengthen their co-operation. They are sure that in their efforts in this respect they will enjoy the full support of other countries who are closely interested in the peace, security and stability of the Middle East.

³⁰ *S.W.B. Part IV*, 19 July 1958, 15.

8. *Statement by the Ministry of External Affairs (India), 18 July 1958*³¹

The Government of India are against intervention by foreign forces in any country and think they should be withdrawn.

In the Lebanon, in particular, the UN Observer Group have reported that they have access to all parts of the frontier and the Government of India feel that the Observer Group should be allowed to continue their functions. This should be a safeguard against the infiltration of foreign elements and the presence of US forces against any threat to the Lebanese Government from outside is therefore not necessary. If necessary, the Observer Group may be strengthened.

9. *Extract from statement by Prime Minister Nehru in the Lok Sabha, 14 August 1958*³²

Mr. Deputy-Speaker, Sir, I am glad of this opportunity to make a statement in regard to the situation in West Asia. A very large number of questions and notices have been addressed to me in regard to this situation, and instead of trying to answer each question separately, it would be perhaps a little better if I dealt with it by a statement.

The facts are generally known; nevertheless, I would like to give a factual account of what has happened in the past few months. The House may remember that on the 18th February last, replying to the debate on the President's Address in the course of the budget session, I indicated some of the developments which had taken place in West Asia. Since then grave and even ominous events have occurred in that part of the world. For some time, there had been rumblings in Lebanon. The Opposition there did not agree with the policy being pursued by the Government of the day under President Chamoun. The question arose—President Chamoun's continuance or not in the Presidentship. His term normally expires on the 24th September. But he let it be known that he desired to stand again, although that involved a change in the Constitution. That is, he wanted the Constitution to be changed, so that he might stand again for the Presidentship. This was not at all agreeable to the opposition there. They started a big agitation against it. Thereafter, a very prominent editor of a newspaper

³¹ *The Hindu*, 19 July 1958, 1.

³² Lok Sabha, *Debates*, vol. 18, cols. 857-69.

at Beirut, which favoured the opposition was killed and I think this was the spark that lit the fire of violence on a relatively big scale leading to this conflict between the Government and the opposition there.

This continued for some time. Behind it was really a basic difference in policy between that of President Chamoun and the opposition. But the actual matter at issue became one of President Chamoun continuing in office or not as President.

Then, on the 22nd May, 1958, the Government of Lebanon complained to the Security Council.

"in respect of a situation arising from the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."

The complaint mentioned, among other things, the infiltration of armed bands from Syria into Lebanon and the supply of arms from Syria. As a result of this complaint, the Security Council on the 11th June, 1958, adopted unanimously a Swedish resolution deciding to

"dispatch urgently an observation group to proceed to Lebanon so as to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese borders".

This resolution also authorized the Secretary General to take necessary steps for organizing the Group. Pursuant to this, the group was finally constituted in Beirut by the 19th June and was composed of Mr. Galo Plaza of Ecuador as Chairman, Major General Odd Bull of Norway as Executive Member and Shri Rajeshwar Dayal of India as member. The Group established with the help of a number of military officers several observation stations and sub-stations. The Group submitted its first report on the 3rd July. It was clear from this report that whatever might have happened in the past, the Group had found no evidence of any significant infiltration into the Lebanon from the Syrian side during its stay there.

The Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Hammarskjöld, who had been to the Lebanon shortly before stated on 3rd July that to his knowledge, there was no foundation for the statement made that there had been massive infiltration into the Lebanon.

The presence of the U.N. Observer Group had a salutary effect on the situation in Lebanon and in the second week of July, there were indications that some kind of settlement between the Government of Lebanon and the opposition there might be reached. Then something happened. That was the *coup d'état* in Iraq on the 14th July which resulted in a new Government coming into power in Baghdad. Because of this *coup d'état*, as is known, the King, the Crown Prince and the Prime Minister Nuri es-Said were killed. There were also deplorable acts of violence by the crowd. But by and large, the new Government of Iraq avoided excesses and was soon in full control of the whole of Iraq and maintained law and order. It was evident that this new Government was popular.

Immediately after this *coup d'état* at Baghdad, events moved swiftly. On the 15th July, *i.e.* the next day, 2,000 United States marines landed in Lebanon in order, it was stated, to protect American lives and to encourage defence of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity. It was said that the forces had been landed in response to an urgent plea received from President Chamoun of Lebanon. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary, stated that his Government fully supported the U.S. action in landing troops in Lebanon.

A meeting of the Security Council was immediately called to discuss the situation resulting from these developments. Since then, of course, many more troops had been sent. It might be noted that these troops were sent to the Lebanon really when the situation inside Lebanon was settling down. It was obvious that it was sent not because of the situation in Lebanon, but because of the *coup d'état* in Iraq and the possible consequences from it that were feared.

A day later, *i.e.* on the 16th July, the United Nations Observer Corps in Lebanon submitted an interim report in which the Group said that it was "able to report to the Security Council that it has as of 15th July access to all parts of the frontier". That is to say, previously it was stated that the Observation Group's report was not very helpful, because the entire frontier was not under observation. What is the good of their saying that through half the frontier nothing had happened? Something might have happened through the other half. From the 15th they were in touch with the whole frontier and therefore, they were in a fairly satisfactory position to observe any movement across the frontier.

On the 17th July, British paratroops landed at Amman from bases in Cyprus and Mr. Macmillan told the British House of Commons that

these troops had been sent in response to a request from King Hussein. On the same day, Jordan complained to the Security Council about the interference in its domestic affairs by the United Arab Republic.

I might mention that during these days, I received a large number of messages from various Heads of States and others, from Mr. Macmillan, Mr. Diefenbaker of Canada, ... President Eisenhower, President Nasser, Mr. Bandaranaike, Prime Minister U Nu, Prime Minister of Indonesia and others. These messages as well as the information supplied by our Missions abroad kept us fully and continually informed of the serious situation and also indicated the line of thinking of various Governments. It was evident that the situation was a very grave one and might lead to military operations on a large scale and indeed to a major war. During these days, occasionally one had the feeling that we were on the brink of a war.

On the 19th July, I received a message from Mr. Khrushchev suggesting that there should be an immediate meeting of the Heads of Governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., France and India, to which the Secretary General of the United Nations should also be invited and that this meeting should endeavour to find some solution. I accepted this proposal and said in reply that I would be prepared to attend such a meeting if our presence was required by all concerned and if we felt convinced that we could make any useful contribution. Some of the replies that Mr. Khrushchev received from other Heads of Governments were not wholly favourable to his proposal. But, nevertheless, it appeared that a so-called summit meeting was likely to take place at an early date.

Meanwhile, the Security Council was engaged in discussing a Japanese resolution which requested the Secretary General

"to make arrangements forthwith for such measures, in addition to those envisaged in the resolution of the 11th June, 1958, as he may consider necessary in the light of the present circumstances with a view to enabling the United Nations to fulfil the general purposes established in that resolution and which will, in accordance with the Charter, serve to ensure the territorial and political independence of Lebanon so as to make possible the withdrawal of the United States forces from the Lebanon."

There were some aspects of this Resolution which we did not like although the explanation made by the Japanese representative in the

Security Council cleared up some of our doubts. But in any event the Resolution was finally not passed by the Security Council which adjourned until the outcome of the proposal made by Mr. Khrushchev was known.

The correspondence of Mr. Khrushchev with the Heads of Governments of the USA, UK and France has already been published. The idea of summit conference gradually faded out and it became apparent by the 5th August that there was no possibility of such a high level conference in the near future. Accordingly, the Powers concerned agreed to meet immediately in the Security Council for recommending the convening of a special emergency session of the General Assembly. This session met 24 hours later on the 8th August and decided to adjourn until the 13th August, *i.e.* yesterday. India was represented there by our Permanent Representative, Shri Arthur Lall.

Now, the proceedings of this special session are going on and reports have come of the speech delivered by President Eisenhower in which he made certain proposals. Reports have come also of some proposals that are being put forward by the Soviet Government and other powers there. It is rather difficult for me at this stage to comment on this partly because we have not got full information as to what is happening there and we should like to have that information and time to consider these various proposals before we send our instructions to our representative or comment on them otherwise.

I might mention, however, that on the 8th August the United Nations Secretary-General made a statement before the General Assembly in which he suggested that the United Nations might continue to play some part in these areas and might so adopt its role both in Jordan and in Lebanon as to help in the search for a satisfactory solution. Here also, what the Secretary-General has said has to be carefully considered before we can express any firm opinion and although we have seen something about what he has said, we have not yet had the full report about it.

Here, I would like to say that our country, as the House knows very well, does not approve of military alliances and carries out a policy of non-alignment. We would welcome every country to do that, but it is quite another thing to tell a country that you must have an enforced neutrality. Anything enforced is not good. Even a good thing becomes bad if it is enforced in that particular way. Therefore any approach of compulsion that way and some kind of supervision is likely not to be accepted by the people of that area.

Now, on the 23rd July, the Government of India recognized the new Government of Iraq. Before that and since, chiefly after, a very large number of countries have recognized this new Government of Iraq, including all the great Powers. Nearly all have recognized.

The situation in the Lebanon has undergone some changes but continues to be rather obscure. A new President—General Shehab—has been elected. The old President, however, continues and has announced his intention to complete his term which ends on the 24th September although his Government is reported to have offered its resignation. This has created certain difficulty because the Opposition is not prepared to function normally under the present President—President Chamoun. Further, the Opposition is opposed to President Chamoun sending his own representative to the United Nations' special emergency session of the General Assembly because they say that he will not represent, according to them, the views of the people of Lebanon and would only represent President Chamoun. So, all these difficulties have arisen there. In fact, so far as I know nobody has yet gone to the General Assembly session from Lebanon. On the Government side they have not yet sent somebody because they have not made up their mind and on the Opposition side they wanted to send somebody but he did not get the *visa*.

Now, the American authorities have announced that they would withdraw their troops from the Lebanon as soon as the Government of Lebanon asks them to do so. Only yesterday it has been announced that they have withdrawn a small part of their troops from there, but the major part still remains. In Jordan it is not clear in what circumstances the British Government would withdraw their troops though they have announced their intention of doing so some time in the future.

Our general views in regard to this position in Western Asia have been frequently stated and are certainly well-known to this House. Our approach is not inimical to any country there. It is friendly to all countries, but inevitably our sympathies are with the Arab countries there and with Arab nationalism which represents today the urge of the people there. Also, according to our general policy and as well as our particular views on this situation in Western Asia we do not accept that foreign troops should be used in any territory in this area in the circumstances prevailing there. We are convinced that there can be no settlement and no return to normality till foreign troops are removed. We have therefore, and so far as we can, pressed and continue to press for the withdrawal of these troops at the earliest possible opportunity. We

have also made it clear that in our view the United Nations should not send any kind of Police or armed forces in Lebanon or in Jordan because that has been suggested sometimes. If it is suggested that the United Nations Observer Group should continue for some time or should even increase its personnel we would be prepared to consider such a proposal favourably, but any such proposal can only have a chance of success if it is accepted by the Arab countries concerned.

Sometimes it is stated that these countries apparently should be treated like tender infants and should be under the guardianship of bigger countries. Well, whether they are tender or they are infants I do not know, but it is quite clear that they do not like this offer of guardianship and patronage. In fact, such suggestions are resented by them.

Now, as I said, the position has been discussed in the General Assembly and I do not know what the outcome may be, but it must be remembered that there is a certain relaxation of tension because it is always better when people are talking than when they are not talking and are preparing for war. There has been that relaxation, but the whole position is full of danger and will continue to be dangerous and explosive so long as foreign forces remain there.

We can consider these events in Western Asia in isolation but that will not help us to understand them well. One has to take to some extent a historic view of developments. For hundreds of years these countries in Western Asia were under Turkish domination. They came out of it at the end of First World War in 1918.

The Western powers decided what they liked without really caring very much about the wishes of the people. Probably there was no organized way for the people to express their views and so things were made worse. New nations were created—where they were viable they were very much better—and the contacts of the Western Powers were with the rulers of their own creation or, chiefly, with the landed gentry of those areas. There were few contacts with the people. The whole period between the two World Wars was one when Arab nationalism was trying to push out this foreign domination and gradually making some way in that direction. Then came the war and the post-war period, when much has happened, as the House knows, in various countries of the Middle East.

Now the major fact is the growth of Arab nationalism in a very powerful, resurgent way. Egypt took the lead in this matter and under

the wise leadership of President Nasser has played a very important part, and Nasser, in fact, became the most prominent symbol of the Arab nationalism. And this fact, which is patent, was neither liked nor appreciated by many powers and an attempt was made to split up the Arab countries, to split, in fact, Arab Nationalism. And the House may remember various talks about building up the Northern Tier Defence and about the Baghdad Pact. Whatever the motives of the Baghdad Pact may be—the motives were supposed to be to protect these countries from any attack or invasion from the Soviet Union and to give these countries some kind of security and peace—as a matter of fact, the result was far from security. All the troubles of these countries increased. The Arab countries were divided. At any rate, the Governments were divided—some in the Baghdad Pact and some outside it. And while the Governments were divided and they carried on a cold war against each other, the people almost in every Arab country were powerfully affected by this tie of Arab nationalism. Thus, in the countries associated with the Baghdad Pact there was a divergence, a hiatus between the Government of the country and the people, the people looking more and more towards Arab nationalism and the Government looking in another direction and rather ranged against this spirit of Arab nationalism. How big this hiatus was can be seen from the *coup d'état* in Baghdad which surprised everyone. I believe it surprised even the people in Iraq and Egypt, and the surprise is not essentially that it took place but the speed with which it took place and the complete success which attended it. It shows how utterly divorced from public opinion the Government of Iraq was. When some change was made the relief was tremendous all over Iraq and people flocked to the side of the new Government. So this attempt at not recognizing the spirit of Arab nationalism, trying to come in the way and obstructing it, that really achieved the opposite effect; it encouraged nationalism as this kind of thing will do.

It was said that some kind of Arab Empire is being built up, which is dangerous. I do not know about the future, but I see no empire, much less an Arab Empire. But, certainly, all this has resulted in the Arab nations coming nearer to one another and will no doubt bring about a great deal of co-operation between them.

The theory, as I said, of vacuum was advanced, as if the removal of the influence of some great powers must necessarily be filled in by some other powers and, therefore, they should not go. It is an extraordinary

appraisal of the situation which did not recognize the effect of this Arab nationalism which had become such a dominant force.

Now, much reference has been made to indirect aggression. Well, indirect aggression is inherently, essentially and inevitably a part of the cold war technique. In fact, there is no indirect aggression if we have no cold war. The world is full of indirect aggression, full of attempts, though not in a military way in other ways, at influencing other countries, trying and sometimes creating or upsetting situations in other countries. In the same way, ever since the Baghdad Pact came in there was this tussle between the countries, the Arab and other countries of the Baghdad Pact and the Arab countries outside the Baghdad Pact. There was no doubt this tussle and each side wanted to injure the interests of the other side. But this talk of indirect aggression really shows ignorance of the basic issues there. Therefore, it is confusing.

Now, during these days we have expressed our views with moderation and have endeavoured to avoid any action or utterance which might add to the tension. We have no desire in this matter, as in any other, to be involved in the cold war. Where our services are required we shall always be prepared to offer them if we feel that they will do some good. We are convinced, however, that any effective solution must be based on the recognition of the dominant urge and force of this area, that is, Arab nationalism. Thus, any settlement must have the goodwill and co-operation of the Arab nations. The need for oil by the Western European countries is patent, and while it is vital for them there should be no difficulty in arriving at a friendly arrangement which ensures this supply of oil. The presence of foreign forces of any kind in these areas will be a constant irritant leading to trouble. If I may say so, peace in this area, as indeed anywhere else, will come if this area is removed from the orbit of the cold war and adopts the five principles of the *Panchsheel*. Everyone of these Arab countries has tremendous problems of development to face. If the threat of war is removed from them, they will apply themselves to these problems and become a source of strength to the forces of peace.

7. Opposition's Reaction to United States' Intervention

INTRODUCTION

IN Lebanon the opposition was stunned by US intervention. Sa'ib Salām, the UNF chief, bitterly commented that imperialism had "returned with its armies" and issued a call to "repel the enemy."¹ He also hinted at the possibility of forming a "parallel government" as "we would need outside help to fight foreign forces on our soil."² In practice, however, fighting in various parts of Lebanon had ceased for a while. The opposition wanted to clearly understand the motives of American intervention before making the next move.

1. *Address by Mr. Sa'ib Salām, the opposition leader, to the Lebanese people on the eve of the landing of the US troops in Lebanon, 15 July 1958*³.

Valiant youth of the people's resistance, today we turn to you while the country is passing through the most sordid period in its current history. There is grave danger, and imperialism has returned with its armies to the beloved homeland in a hideous plot hatched with the traitor agent Camille Sham'un and his criminal gang.

National duty calls upon you to comport yourselves on the field of honour as daring heroes in defence of your country, territory and freedom. You have fought and struggled to liberate your country from the atrocities and afflictions of imperialism. But here is traitor Sham'un, who has pledged loyalty to the homeland, betraying his trust and pledge and calling on the enemy to occupy the country. In this way Sham'un unmasks himself and discloses his intention. He is a traitor to his country and a plotter against those who believe in sovereignty and independence.

¹ See below.

² *Hindustan Standard*, 23 July 1958.

³ *S.W.B. Part IV*, 17 July 1958, 11.

Youth of the people's resistance, there can be no life, prestige, dignity, or continued existence so long as your country is under foreign occupation through renegade traitors and submissive slaves. Today you are living decisive moments in the history of your glorious nation. Resist with determination, defend your country by your own strength, repel the enemy, and shoot them with your bullets. Death for the sake of your freedom and dignity is better than life under foreign imperialists.

You are the heroes of the Lebanon, the land of free men. Control your nerves. Open your hearts to your brethren. There must be no selfishness or communal differences. You are all brothers in this beloved independent country. Beware! Do not permit the elements of intrigue and treason to create a gap in your ranks or undermine your unity. We are with you until victory or death. No power in this world can make us deviate from the road to freedom, the road of sovereignty, dignity and independence.

2. *Message from Mr. 'Ādil 'Usayrān, Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, to the UN Secretary-General, 16 July 1958*⁴

The only authority representing the people is the Chamber of Deputies. We have learned to our dismay that American troops have landed on Lebanese territory on the pretext of protecting American lives and safeguarding the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon. This act in itself constitutes a threat to the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon. American lives and interests have never been jeopardized during the sixty-five days of conflict in Lebanon, and no Lebanese has ever had the intention of threatening American lives or interests. The crisis convulsing Lebanon is an internal crisis and its solution is in the hands of the Chamber of Deputies. For these reasons, I protest in the name of the Chamber of Deputies against this attack on the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon and I consider that the landing of American troops is a threat to the peace and security of the Middle East; I further consider that the United States is responsible for the disastrous consequences which may provoke a world war and I demand the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces in order to maintain the good relations existing between Lebanon and the United States.

⁴ SCOR, 830th meeting, 16 July 1958, 3: The text of the message was read out by Mr. 'Umar Lutfi, the UAR delegate, in the course of his speech on 16 July.

3. *Statement by Mr. Sa'ib Salām, the opposition leader, condemning the US intervention in Lebanon, 16 July 1958⁵*

To the aggressor American forces in the Lebanon: Your presence on our sacred soil is a blatant aggression against our independence and freedom, and an infamous breach of the UN Charter which the American Government's allegation that it aims at securing the safety of nations has failed to camouflage.

Our national Lebanese liberation movement is proud of the fact that it has not threatened foreigners or their property in the two months of an all-out bloody revolution, because its only aim is to get rid of Camille Sham'un's dictatorship, tyranny, and corrupt regime, and to save the Lebanon from the foreign influence under which Camille Sham'un has placed it contrary to the highest interests of the fatherland.

Despite all attempts which the American Government has made to obtain one piece of evidence substantiating its plea that the Lebanese revolution draws inspiration or aid from outside, all irreproachable evidence has refuted the American allegations and proved that the Lebanese movement is a purely internal act which bears no relation to any foreign interference.

The UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, who represents the highest international authority, refuted this very day before the Security Council the American Government's allegations. He announced in a way which is beyond doubt that our movement is of a purely Lebanese character, and that the neutral UN observers who are deployed all over the Lebanon and along its borders deny the existence of any infiltration across these borders as Sham'un, backed by the USA and Britain, alleges.

In the name of the popular resistance which has been formed for the sake of protecting the Lebanon, its independence and its entity, and which has not failed to sacrifice lives and money for this, I address this warning to the aggressor American forces, asking them to withdraw immediately from Lebanese soil in order to preserve the Lebanon's freedom, sovereignty and independence and to maintain world peace.

We declare that we shall repel this aggression with all our strength and means, and we shall appeal for help of all sorts from all free peoples of the world without discrimination. Long live the Lebanon!

(Signed) Commander-in-Chief of the people's forces: Sa'ib Sallam.

⁵ S.W.B. Part IV, 18 July 1958, 6-7.

4. *Summary of statement by Mr. Adil Usayran, Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, 17 July 1958⁶*

Adil Usayran, President of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, held a press conference at noon today in which he dealt with the present situation in the Lebanon following the American occupation, an action which is regarded by the Lebanese Parliament as aggression against the sovereignty and independence of the Lebanon.

He said: "Article 51 of the UN Charter does not permit the interference of one foreign State in the affairs of another outside the scope of the UN." He added that the Security Council had already met and adopted a resolution in accordance with which it sent an observer group to prevent illegal infiltration or acts of military aggression across the Lebanese frontiers. The UN observers carried out their task and began to send their reports to the Security Council. They are still maintaining their survey and observation to prove if there is any infiltration of men and ammunition."

He declared: "The dispatch of American forces to the Lebanon is considered an encroachment on the authority of the UN and on the sovereignty and independence of the Lebanon."

Usayran yesterday sent a telegram to the President of the Security Council and Hammarskjöld denouncing this intervention and demanding on behalf of the Lebanese Parliament the immediate withdrawal of the American forces.

Referring to the Tripartite Declaration made by the British, US and French Governments in 1950 regarding the Middle East, Usayran said: "The Declaration was to protect Israel, the bitter enemy of the Arab peoples, and current events in the Lebanon constitute no violation of the frontiers or the armistice lines. Furthermore, the Eisenhower doctrine does not apply in this case. Eisenhower himself says that point two of his Doctrine states that the use of US armed forces is permitted for the defence of the integrity and independence of any Middle East State against any armed Communist aggression. The situation in the Lebanon does not demonstrate that there is any armed Communist aggression requiring the dispatch to the Lebanon of American armed forces. For this reason this action by the USA is unlawful, especially in view of the fact that it was taken by a State which claims friendship for the Lebanon."

⁶ S.W.B. Part IV, 19 July 1958, 5-6.

He added that the Lebanese considered this action by the USA an aggression against the sovereignty and independence of their country. He said that the American forces came to the Lebanon after the revolution in Iraq, which is also an internal matter having no relation to the Lebanon. "The occurrence of such explosions in the Arab countries should serve as a warning to the rulers to change their policy of (? violence), pressure, selfishness and arrogance which they have been persistently following because peoples (? respect) their leaders so long as they work for their well-being."

5. *Summary of statement by the Communist Party of Lebanon, 21 July 1958⁷*

The Lebanese Communist Party has issued a statement severely condemning the illegal aggression of American troops against Lebanon and calling on the people to unite and take up arms to fight for the withdrawal of the US invaders from Lebanon, according to "An-Nur"⁸ today.

The statement said that the US imperialist troops, the barbarians of the 20th century, had invaded the beloved Lebanese territory. They concentrated their fleets and planes and landed in hordes on the Lebanese coast "in order to eliminate the sacred rising of our people, suppress their independence, and support the treacherous rule of their agents Sham'un, As-Sulh and Malik. These agents, with the support of turncoats of the National Socialist Party gangs and Kata'ib humiliated the people and made their blood flow like rivers, in order to make Lebanon a servant of imperialism and a base for conspiracy and aggression against her sister countries."

The statement added: "The aim of the Americans who occupied Lebanon, the British who occupied Jordan, and the French who hastened to dispatch units of its fleet to Beirut, is to launch aggression against the people of Iraq in the second stage and attack the Syrian region of the UAR in revenge for their utter defeat in their treacherous aggression against Egypt."

The statement pointed out that the threat of a new war was menacing the whole world as a result of the Anglo-American aggression against Lebanon and Jordan. The statement said: "Let us unite today, without

⁷ *S.W.B. Part IV*, 23 July 1958, 3-4.

⁸ The daily organ of the Communist Party of Syria.

distinction of trends, communities or classes, and irrespective of our opinion in Lebanese domestic affairs. Let us unite and strengthen our national unity to dismiss the intervening enemy, smash its aggression, and exterminate its fifth column, their hirelings. The supreme interest of the homeland, the interest of Lebanon, her existence and fate, make this unity imperative."

The statement then called on men, youth, women, and children in every corner of the country "to fight the greedy invaders with every arm in your possession. Kill them wherever you find them with bullets of your guns and machine-guns. Aim your bombs at them, attack them with everything that comes to your hands, tear them with your teeth, and make their life an inferno on our free land, so that they should depart vanquished."

The statement said that the imperialists were isolated. The powers of virtue and freedom everywhere on the earth stand on the side of the Lebanese people. "Victory will inevitably be ours, and shame and disgrace that of American imperialism and its agents," it said.

The statement said that the Lebanese people would defeat the imperialists and their agents like the heroic people of Iraq.

8. Khrushchev's Call for a Summit Conference

INTRODUCTION

THE stalemate at the Security Council induced Premier Khrushchev to launch a diplomatic campaign for holding a summit conference to discuss the crisis in the Arab East. Letters to that effect were simultaneously sent to Eisenhower, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Nehru on 19 July. Invitations to the first three were accompanied by strong criticism of their policies toward the Arab East. The letter to India, on the other hand, was politely worded and apparently sought to canvass Indian support for the Soviet stand.

The fact that the Soviet Union had voluntarily excluded China from the proposed summit suggested that the proposal was not solely motivated by the desire to carry out propaganda against the US and her allies. Evidently, the Soviet Union was attempting to seize the opportunity presented by the Lebanese crisis to pressurize the West to recognize the former's rights in the area. Toward that end, Khrushchev broadly hinted that he was not opposed to the interests of the Western Powers in "the petroleum and other raw materials" and was prepared to consider "the question of putting an end to the deliveries of arms"¹ to the countries of the region. While India promptly agreed to attend the proposed conference, the rest of the correspondents entered into a lengthy argument over the purpose, the form, the venue and the desirability of holding a summit. The outcome of the voluminous correspondence was a compromise agreement to place the Lebanese dispute before the UN General Assembly.

1. *Letter from Mr. Khrushchev to Mr. Eisenhower, 19 July 1958*²

1. The recent course of events has shown that we are passing through one of the most momentous periods of history and that the world is standing on the brink of catastrophe. The people of all con-

¹ See below.

² *SCOR*, 13th year, supplement for July, August and September 1958, 42-46.

tinents are becoming excited, the popular masses are aroused, having understood that the conflagration of war, wherever it may start, is liable to spread throughout the world. We who were allies in past hostilities know, although to varying degrees, the blood and ashes of the last world war. We understand the horrors which a new outbreak of war can bring to mankind, and we have no moral right to play with fire in the powder cellar into which the armaments race has transformed the world.

2. In these circumstances, the armed intervention which the United States began in Lebanon, followed by the United Kingdom in Jordan, and the threat of intervention hanging over Iraq and all the countries of the Arab world, may lead to highly dangerous and incalculable consequences; they may initiate a chain reaction which no one will be able to stop. We address you not for purposes of intimidation but in the name of reason.

3. If there is any intimidation, indeed, it is being carried on assiduously by the irresponsible military leaders of the United States, such as the Commander of the United States Sixth Fleet. With unreasonable zeal, he is making such provocative speeches that, if he were the citizen of a country where war propaganda is banned, he would have been brought before the courts, or after a medical examination, would have been committed to an insane asylum, since such statements can be made only by a criminal or by a person who has lost his mind. The laurels of the Commander of the Fleet seem to have aroused the envy of the Secretary of Defense. We know that the United States has atomic and hydrogen bombs, an air force and a navy, but you are fully aware that the Soviet Union, too, has atomic and hydrogen bombs and an air force and a navy, and also ballistic missiles of all kinds, including inter-continental missiles. But we believe that at this critical time it would be wiser not to bring an overheated atmosphere to the boiling point—it is already sufficiently saturated with inflammable materials. The leaders of States must seek a solution, based not on the fanning of bellicose passions, but on reason and calm, in order to prevent war and to secure peace throughout the world.

4. What are the purposes of the United States and the United Kingdom in sending their troops to Lebanon and Jordan?

5. You explain your military intervention in Lebanon by saying that President Chamoun asked you for help against aggression. But internal strife is going on in Lebanon and events in that country before the dis-

embarkation of American troops can in no way be covered by the formula of direct or indirect aggression by other States; this fact was confirmed by United Nations observers and by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Internal strife was taking place in that country, as you yourself have confirmed. The principle of the non-interference of other States in internal strife in any country is a generally acknowledged tenet of international law. It is not for me to tell you the American people and its Government also at one time protested most categorically against foreign interference in the United States Civil War, the struggle between the North and the South. I need hardly say that, in the case of Lebanon, the appeal from the President of that country to the United States was not supported by the Parliament and that the President of the Chamber of Deputies made a decisive protest against United States armed intervention. Accordingly, Mr. Chamoun's "invitation" has no constitutional force. A similar situation obtained in Jordan, where British troops have been brought, not to protect the interests of the people and the country, but to save the King's throne. The rulers of Lebanon and Jordan, having lost popular support in their countries, and being unable to trust the army, which refuses to support the anti-national régime, have decided to take shelter behind Anglo-American arms to rely on the strength of the interventionists. But there has never yet been a case in history where thrones and governments could be maintained with bayonets, especially foreign bayonets. The twentieth century leaves us no illusions on this score. The military invasion of Lebanon and Jordan by the United States and the United Kingdom was undertaken at the request of irresponsible rulers, who do not enjoy the support of their peoples and who are acting against the will of those peoples. But such requests have resulted in the introduction of United States and United Kingdom troops into Lebanon and Jordan, and this in circumvention of the United Nations, which was informed of this aggressive action only after the event.

6. It is also alleged that United States and United Kingdom troops have invaded Lebanon and Jordan in order to protect the lives and property of United States and British nationals. But this is a very old colonialist pretext. It can deceive no one, especially as it is generally known that no foreigners, including United States and British nationals, have yet been caused any harm or have been threatened with any danger, either in Lebanon or in Jordan.

7. Mr. President, you often express your support of the United

Nations in public, but through their activities in Lebanon and Jordan, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have dealt a heavy blow to that Organization. At such a momentous period in the lives of the people of the world, the United Nations is being forced aside by the bayonets of the United States and British troops. The aggressors are now playing with fire. It is always easier to light a fire than to put it out. But once a fire has been started, it is better to put it out on the spot than to wait until the flames have spread and engulfed the neighbouring houses.

8. In the present circumstances, the only wise solution would be to withdraw the invading troops immediately from the Near and Middle East and to allow the peoples to decide their destinies for themselves.

9. At this threatening juncture of history, when there is not a moment to lose, the Soviet Union, which has always stood for peace throughout the world, against war and for peaceful coexistence, cannot remain indifferent to the events which are taking place in the Near and Middle East, in the immediate proximity of its frontiers. The Soviet Union cannot stand aside at a time when the question of war or peace is being decided.

10. The Government of the Soviet Union therefore proposes that a meeting should be held without delay between the Heads of the Governments of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and India, with the participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in order that immediate steps may be taken to put an end to the conflict which has broken out. The meeting could be called for any day and hour: the sooner the better. As you well understand, history has given us only a short time to ward off the threat of war, to prevent the annihilation of many millions of people and to avert the destruction of an enormous amount of material and cultural wealth. In its statements, the Government of the Soviet Union has sufficiently clearly stated its views on the peaceful settlement of the urgent problems of the Near and Middle East. The Soviet Union believes that we can and must find a solution which would meet the vital interest of the peoples of the Near and Middle East and would ensure the observance of their sovereign rights, while taking into account the interests of all the States connected with the countries of that region. The Governments of the Western Powers say that they have an interest in the use of the petroleum and other raw materials of this part of the world. But the peoples of the countries of that region are not denying the Western Powers such an

opportunity. Their only desire is to find a solution to this problem based on equal rights and mutual commercial benefit, since that is the most reasonable solution.

11. The Soviet Government considers that the meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and India might also take up the question of putting an end to deliveries of arms to the countries of the Near and Middle East, as the USSR has previously proposed.

12. We think it essential that the meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and India, having prepared practical recommendations to put an end to the armed conflict in the Near and Middle East, should submit those recommendations to the Security Council of the United Nations, in order that that organ may examine them together with the representatives of the Arab countries.

13. The question of the date and place of the meeting can be no obstacle. The Soviet Government is prepared to meet anywhere, including Washington, if for any reason Geneva or the capital of some other neutral country is not suitable for the Western Powers. The most important thing is to avoid delay, not to waste precious time, for the guns have already begun to speak. We propose a meeting at Geneva on 22 July.

14. The calling of a meeting of the Heads of the great Powers with a view to settling the military conflict which has broken out in the Near and Middle East would be the wisest step that the Governments of our countries can take in the present circumstances. It would be an invaluable contribution to the cause of the strengthening of peace and international security. It would offer incontrovertible evidence that the idea of peaceful, not warlike, solutions of problems can and must prevail throughout the world. The cessation of aggression in the Near and Middle East would be ardently welcomed by the peoples of all countries, whatever their race and religious or political convictions.

15. In conclusion, I should like to emphasize that it now depends on your Government and on you, sir, whether the conflict which has arisen in the Near and Middle East will be settled by warlike or by peaceful means.

16. The Soviet Government is confident that this appeal from the Soviet Government will be correctly understood by the United States Government and by you, that it will meet with a positive response and

that you will be willing to make a decisive turn from the course of war to that of peace.

17. I have sent a simultaneous letter on this subject to Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, to Mr. de Gaulle, President of the Council of Ministers of France and to Mr. Nehru, Prime Minister of India.

2. *Letter from Mr. Eisenhower to Mr. Khrushchev, 22 July 1958*³

1. I have received your communication of 19 July.

2. May I assure you that the establishment and maintenance of a just peace is the dominant influence in American policy. I cannot agree that the United States has acted in Lebanon in a manner calculated to disturb the peace. Rather it is motivated by the purpose of helping to stop acts of violence, fomented from without, designed to destroy the genuine independence and integrity of that small nation. Such a process, if unchecked would have grave implications for all small nations everywhere.

3. The manner in which you have chosen to express yourself is hardly calculated to promote the atmosphere of calm reasonableness which, you correctly say, should replace the presently overheated atmosphere.

4. I am not aware of any factual basis for your extravagantly expressed fear of the danger of general war.

5. What has happened in regard to Lebanon is this.

6. On Monday, 14 July, the lawful Government of Iraq was violently overthrown. On the same day a comparable plot against the Kingdom of Jordan was discovered and barely thwarted. The Government of Lebanon, which had already for some months been subjected to indirect aggression from without, appealed to the United States for instant assistance. In the light of the developments in neighboring Iraq and Jordan, it felt that nothing less than immediate help would make it possible to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. The United States responded to this appeal. We knew that the plea was based upon solid fact that showed that Lebanon was gravely menaced. Surely, it is not "aggression" thus to help a small nation maintain its independence.

7. You speak of "armed conflict in the Near and Middle East". There has been the bloody coup in Iraq, the plot to assassinate those

who compose the Government of Jordan, and the civil strife in Lebanon fomented from without. Otherwise, I know of no "armed conflict". Unless those of aggressive disposition are far gone in folly, they would not start war because Lebanon, with a population of about 1.5 million, is helped to maintain its integrity and independence. The real danger of war would come if one small nation after another were to be engulfed by expansionist and aggressive forces supported by the Soviet Union.

8. We do not want to see a repetition of the progressive destruction of the independence of small nations which occurred during the 1930s and which led to the Second World War. To be acquiescent in aggression, be it direct or indirect, is not the road to peace.

9. This does not mean that the United States is dedicated to a perpetuation of the *status quo* in the Arab world. The United States recognizes and sympathizes with the yearning of the Arab peoples for a greater nationalistic unity. For example, the United States promptly recognized the United Arab Republic, bringing together Egypt and Syria, as soon as it was apparent that the change was accepted by the people concerned and after the new Government had undertaken to meet the normally applied international standards.

10. But it is one thing to change the international *status quo* by orderly and peaceful processes, and another thing to change it by indirect aggression. Such processes cannot be reconciled with a peaceful world or with the ideals of the United Nations which recognizes the equal rights of nations large and small and the dignity and worth of the human person.

11. The action of the United States in relation to Lebanon was fully in accord with the accepted principles of international law and with the Charter of the United Nations. The government of Lebanon was one which had been chosen by freely held, peaceful, nationwide elections only a little over a year ago. The appeal to the United States was made by the President of Lebanon with the full approval of the Cabinet. When last week the Soviet Union introduced in the United Nations Security Council a resolution condemning our action in Lebanon, that resolution received only one vote—that of the Soviet Union itself. I also note that efforts were made within the Security Council to provide Lebanon with increased protection from the United Nations so as to preserve its integrity and independence, thus permitting United States forces promptly to be withdrawn. There were two such proposals, each defeated by the one vetoing vote of the Soviet Union.

12. How does the Soviet Union reconcile its allegation that United States forces in Lebanon endanger world peace with the veto of these two proposals?

13. Am I to conclude, Mr. Chairman, that the Soviet Union seeks, by imputing to others war motives and itself boasting of its nuclear and ballistic missile power, to divert attention from the steady erosion of the independence of small nations? Are we, as civilized peoples, to accept the increasing use of violence, murder and terrorism as instruments of international policy? If so, this constitutes the real danger to peace. The United States will steadfastly oppose that danger and seek to strengthen the established processes of international law and order.

14. The Soviet Union, by its constant abuse of its veto power in the Security Council—its veto of today was the eighty-fifth—would tear down, and not strengthen, the orderly processes which the nations have established for the maintenance of international peace and security.

15. Your present proposal seems further calculated to derogate from the authority and prestige of the United Nations. What you propose amounts in effect to five nations, without the sanction of the United Nations and without conformity to its Charter, reaching what you call "recommendations" regarding the Near and Middle East which would then be submitted to the United Nations Security Council. But in reality such so-called "recommendations" would be decisions and the process would in effect make the United Nations into a "rubber stamp" for a few great Powers.

16. Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, when procedures are sought to be improvised to meet what is alleged to be a situation of great urgency, this can scarcely be expected to save time. It raises a whole series of new problems which must be considered by the various nations that might consult together, and by others which might feel that they were improperly omitted and which are deeply concerned with the Near and Middle East.

17. If, indeed, the Soviet Union seriously believes that there is an imminent threat to world peace, it is bound by the United Nations Charter to take the matter to the Security Council. By Article 24 of the United Nations Charter, the Soviet Union, with other Members of the United Nations, has conferred on the Security Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security", and all the Members have agreed that, in these matters, it "acts on their behalf". It is also agreed that that Council has the responsibility

to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace" and to "decide what measures shall be taken [...] to maintain or restore international peace and security". Surely this solemn undertaking ought to be respected.

18. The Security Council is already dealing with certain phases of the problem alluded to by your note. If you or we believe that other aspects of this problem or other problems should be urgently dealt with in the interest of peace, then it lies open to any of us to enlarge the scope of the Security Council consideration. Furthermore, under the Charter, members of Governments, including Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers, may represent a Member nation at the Security Council. If such a meeting were generally desired, the United States would join in following that orderly procedure.

19. I do not, of course, exclude the discussion, outside the United Nations, of world or regional problems not posing alleged imminent threats to the peace. I cannot but deplore the persistent refusal of your Government for so many months to agree to the adequate preparation of a "summit meeting" at which we could exchange considered views on the great problems which confront the world. The Ambassadors of France, the United Kingdom and the United States were negotiating at Moscow with your Foreign Minister to develop a list of topics which might lend themselves to considered and useful discussion at a "summit meeting". These negotiations were broken off by your Government on 16 June.

20. In conclusion, I venture to express in most earnest terms my hope that the Soviet Government will unite with us for real peace. The longing of mankind for peace is too precious to be used for ulterior purposes. I hope that ways can be found to act for peace in accordance with the standards prescribed by the Charter of the United Nations. All the world, I believe, knows that peace with justice is the dedication of the American nation. We have in the past sacrificed greatly for that devotion. We have loyally complied with the pledge we made, by the United Nations declaration of 1 January 1942, to renounce any aggrandizement for ourselves. Just as we shall resist any efforts to use love of peace to mask aggression, so we shall equally never fail to take any step, at any sacrifice, which will genuinely promote the cause of peace and justice in the world.

3. *Letter from Mr. Khrushchev to Mr. Eisenhower, 23 July 1958*⁴

1. I have received your answer to my letter of 19 July. I have also received replies from Mr. Nehru, Mr. Macmillan and Mr. de Gaulle to my letters of 19 July addressed to them.

2. At the present time, we have no wish to enter into polemics about the causes of the tension and the threat to peace in the Near and Middle East. The views of the Soviet Government on all these matters were set forth in my letter of 19 July. I should only like to repudiate most emphatically the assertion in your message that the Soviet Union is encouraging expansionist and aggressive forces in the world. At this time, especially after the armed intervention of the United States in Lebanon and that of the United Kingdom in Jordan, no one can have any doubts, if doubts there ever were, as to who in actual fact is pursuing an expansionist and aggressive policy which is threatening the peace and security of the peoples.

3. The Soviet Government considers that at the present time the threat to general peace is so serious that all possible steps must be taken, and at the earliest possible date, without wasting time on polemics which can only delay the reaching of agreement, to prevent the outbreak of a world conflict. The danger of such a conflict cannot be minimized, for there are forces which are in favour of widening the area of aggression and, in particular, are fomenting plans for an armed attack on Iraq.

4. It is for this very purpose, to prevent the outbreak of a world conflict, that we proposed the immediate calling of a meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and India, with the participation of Mr. Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We note with satisfaction that the Soviet Government's proposal for a meeting of the Heads of Governments has met with a favourable response on your part. Mr. Macmillan, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. de Gaulle, the President of the Council of Ministers of France and Mr. Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, have also expressed the view that such a meeting would be desirable, and we are grateful to them for this response.

5. We take no exception to the views expressed by Mr. Macmillan, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, as regards the calling of the meeting of the Heads of Government within the framework of the

⁴ SCOR, 13th year, supplement for July, August and September 1958, 57-59.

Security Council. The Soviet Government pointed out in its message of 19 July that the Security Council should not be circumvented.

6. Bearing in mind the need for urgent solutions with a view to the maintenance of peace, we consider that the formalities of the meeting of the Heads of Government can have no decisive significance in the present case. The important thing is that the meeting should take place as soon as possible, so that we can more rapidly arrive at a correct solution calculated to promote the maintenance and strengthening of peace, to bring tranquillity to the Near and Middle East and to help bring about a relaxation of tension in relations between States.

7. We also agree with the approach proposed by Mr. Macmillan to the work of such a special meeting of the Security Council. We agree that at this special meeting of the Security Council no resolutions should be submitted unless they arise from previous agreement, and that the purpose of the meeting will be to reach agreement rather than to register differences by votes.

8. In this connexion the Soviet Government assumes that the Heads of Government, with a view to achieving as rapidly as possible constructive solutions designed to promote the maintenance and strengthening of peace, will have the opportunity to consult together not only officially, but unofficially as well.

9. In view of the fact that the Security Council will in the present instance be dealing not with ordinary current matters, but with questions of special importance for the maintenance of peace and security, we consider that it would be useful in this case to invite India, a very large Asian country which has won universal recognition as a State which strives for the strengthening of peace, to take part in the Council's proceedings. India's participation would be genuinely useful, unlike that of one of the so-called permanent members, which in fact represents no one. We consider it essential that India should be represented in the work of the Security Council through Mr. Nehru, its Prime Minister, who has agreed to participate in the meeting of Heads of Government.

10. In your message, Sir, you state that if a special meeting of the Security Council including Heads of Governments were generally desired, the United States would join in following that orderly procedure.

11. So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, since Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. de Gaulle, President of the Council of Ministers of France, Mr. Nehru, Prime Minister of India and you, Sir, as is evident from your message, are prepared to take

part personally in the work of the special meeting of the Security Council, the Soviet Union will be represented at that meeting by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

12. It is self-evident that the Governments of the interested Arab States should be brought into the discussion in the Security Council to be participated in by the Heads of the Governments of the five Powers referred to.

13. The Soviet Government would like to learn as soon as possible the United States Government's views as to the date of meeting of the Security Council with the participation of the Heads of Government. For our part, we would propose that the work should be begun in the Security Council on 28 July in New York.

4. *Letter from Mr. Eisenhower to Mr. Khrushchev, 25 July 1958*⁵

1. I have studied your letter of 23 July. I find in it apparent misunderstandings of the views expressed in my letter of 22 July [*see: I, above*], which I would request you to read again more carefully.

2. I then said that if, despite the facts established in the recent meetings of the Security Council, your Government still desires to allege that the situation in Lebanon constitutes an imminent danger to peace in the Middle East, the proper forum for appropriate discussion is the United Nations Security Council. I am glad that you now recognize the responsibility of the United Nations and have withdrawn your original proposal which would have gravely undermined the prestige and authority of the United Nations.

3. My letter pointed out that the Charter of the United Nations authorizes members of Governments, and that of course includes Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers, to represent a Member nation at the Security Council and that if such a meeting were generally desired, the United States would join in following that orderly procedure. It is, of course, not yet certain that such a meeting is in fact "generally desired", although that may prove to be the case.

4. You now make specific suggestions dealing with the composition of the Security Council and the conditions under which nations other than members of the Council may participate in discussions of the Council. My letter to you of 22 July urged that one of the advantages of proceedings in the Security Council is that there are established rules

⁵ SCOR, 13th year, supplement for July, August and September 1958, 104-6.

on these matters and it is accordingly not necessary to rely on improvising. I pointed out that when rules of this kind are sought to be improvised, there arises a whole series of new problems, notably as to the participation and non-participation of various States. The United States will adhere, in these respects, to the Charter, which lays down the conditions under which nations which are not members of the Council may participate in the discussions of the Council.

5. As to the agenda, we agree that it should be limited to a discussion of the problems of the Middle East, including the causes of those problems. I would, however, be lacking in candor if I did not make clear that to put peace and security on a more stable basis in the Middle East requires far more than merely a consideration of Lebanon and Jordan. These situations are but isolated manifestations of far broader problems. In my opinion the instability of peace and security is in large measure due to the jeopardy in which small nations are placed. It would be the purpose of the United States to deal with the specific incidents you raise within that broad context. To do otherwise would be to be blind to the teaching of history.

6. You will recall, Mr. Chairman, that the Second World War was brought about by a series of acts of direct and indirect aggression against small nations. In March 1939 the then Head of the Soviet Communist Party pointed out that the failure of non-aggressive nations, among which he named Britain and France, to check direct or indirect aggression against small countries meant "giving free rein to war and, consequently, transforming the war into a world war". That forecast unhappily proved true.

7. You will also recall the 1950 "Peace through deeds" resolution of the General Assembly [*resolution 380 (V)*] which condemns the "fomenting of civil strife in the interest of a foreign Power" as among "the gravest of all crimes".

8. It is my earnest hope that through the United Nations Security Council steps can be taken in regard to the Middle East which, by making peace more secure there, will help promote it elsewhere.

9. In conclusion, I suggest that the permanent representatives of the members of the United Nations Security Council in New York should exchange views, under arrangements made by the Secretary-General, to ascertain that a meeting of the kind and under conditions I suggest is generally acceptable. If so, they should also agree upon a

date which would be generally satisfactory. The date of 28 July would be too early for us.

10. I am today authorizing our own permanent representative to act in this sense.

5. *Letter from Mr. Khrushchev to Mr. Eisenhower, 28 July 1958*⁶

1. I have received your letter of 25 July in reply to my letter of 23 July concerning the calling of a meeting of Heads of Government.

2. To my regret, I note from your reply that the Government of the United States is retreating from the position which it took on 22 July concerning the calling of an urgent special meeting of the Security Council with the participation of the Heads of Government to consider the situation in the Near and Middle East. It is now evident that the United States Government is trying to delay the calling of a meeting of Heads of Governments, and does not want such a meeting to take urgent steps for the peaceful settlement of the hostilities which have broken out in the Near and Middle East.

3. It must be pointed out that the agreement to the calling of a meeting of Heads of Government within the framework of the Security Council which you indicated in your letter of 22 July [4074, *sec. I*] met with a favourable reception in all countries. The agreement between the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and India concerning a meeting of Heads of Government had some tranquillizing effect, and the peoples of the world believed, with every justification, that the meeting would take place in the very early future and would ensure the maintenance and strengthening of peace in the Near and Middle East.

4. The Soviet Government stated that it was in agreement with Mr. Macmillan's proposal, inasmuch as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, in suggesting that the meeting of Heads of Government should be held within the framework of the Security Council, expressly indicated that at this meeting no resolutions should be submitted unless they arose from previous agreement and that the object of our work together should be to reach fruitful agreements rather than register differences by votes [S/4071, *sec. I*].

5. Your present reply is a step backwards from the agreement reached, and will inevitably give rise to serious concern among the peo-

⁶ SCOR, 13th year, supplement for July, August and September 1958, 65-70.

ples of the world. The United States Government now proposes that the situation in the Near and Middle East, a situation which constitutes a threat to peace, should not be taken up by the Heads of the Government of the five Powers but should instead be referred again to a regular meeting of the United Nations Security Council. That proposal is now also being supported by Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. But what results can that bring? You are fully aware that the Security Council has been dealing with the situation in Lebanon and Jordan for a considerable time, but has so far reached no solution.

6. The question of putting an end to the armed aggression in the Near and Middle East has now become so acute that the Security Council, as the experience of these recent meetings has shown, is unable to take a prompt and effective decision on the matter at its regular meetings.

7. A continuous build-up of armed forces is going on in this region, which is more and more being turned into a powder-keg the smallest spark could explode, bringing about a world-wide catastrophe. In these circumstances it is essential that the Heads of the Governments of the five Powers—the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and India—should meet at the earliest possible date, with the participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, since they particularly, vested as they are with high powers, would be able to reach agreement on the immediate cessation of the military conflict in the Near and Middle East and on measures for the maintenance and strengthening of world peace.

8. Quite obviously, anyone who genuinely wishes to find a way to reduce tension must agree that in the present case it is particularly these five Powers which must first reach agreement on the measures necessary for the maintenance and strengthening of peace. There can hardly be any doubt that if these Powers were to succeed in reaching agreement on the immediate cessation of the armed conflict in the Near and Middle East all other States which are truly interested in the strengthening of peace would welcome and support such a solution.

9. Mr. Macmillan's proposal of 22 July that the Heads of Government should meet within the framework of the Security Council did in fact envisage a meeting of this kind. But as I have already pointed out, you, Mr. President, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom are now retreating from this proposal. It is self-evident that in this way steps are being taken to bury the agreement reached to hold a meeting at the

earliest possible date between the Heads of Governments of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and India.

10. We cannot accept this.

11. The Soviet Government stands steadfastly for the maintenance and strengthening of peace and for peaceful coexistence between States, irrespective of their social and economic systems. The Soviet Government has consistently stood for the settlement of conflicts by peaceful means, through negotiation. That is why we insist on the immediate ending of aggression and on the prompt withdrawal of the interventionist forces from the territories of Lebanon and Jordan.

12. We are deeply convinced that a meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the five Powers would in fact help to find ways and means to end the military conflict and to bring tranquillity to the Near and Middle East, given a genuine desire on the part of all sides to bring about those ends.

13. In this connexion, the Soviet Government expresses its satisfaction at the statements made by Mr. de Gaulle, the Head of the Government of France, in his message of 26 July [S/4075, *sec. II*], that he supports the proposal to call a meeting of the Heads of Governments of the five Powers, with the participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, without delay. As we understand it, this view does not differ from the Soviet Government's proposal on the question. We consider, as we have stated earlier, that this would be the most correct course and one which might ensure an early solution of the urgent problem of putting an end to the military conflict in the Near and Middle East.

14. In order to delay still further the holding of a meeting of Heads of Government, you state in your letter that there has apparently been some misunderstanding of the views on such a meeting expressed by the United States Government. If that is the case, it can only be wondered whether those views were not deliberately worded so as to be open to varying interpretation and to cause loss of time in correspondence to clarify their meaning. Since you agreed in your letter of 22 July [S/4074, *sec. I*] to take part in a special meeting of the Security Council with the participation of the Heads of Government, we could only, in the circumstances, interpret your statement to mean that you were in agreement that such a meeting should be held as soon as possible. Now, retreating from the idea of calling such a meeting as soon as pos-

sible, you recommend us to read your letter of 22 July again. It is difficult to interpret these words of yours otherwise than as evidence that the United States Government clearly does not want measures to be taken at the earliest possible date to put an end to armed intervention in Lebanon and Jordan.

15. I feel obliged to point out, Sir, that the position taken by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, which amounts to a refusal to call a meeting of Heads of Government, will necessarily cause concern among the peoples of the world who are impatiently awaiting an end to the armed conflict in the Near and Middle East and the initiation of measures for the maintenance and strengthening of world peace.

16. Representatives of public opinion in all countries are anxiously asking whether the Governments of the States responsible for the existing tension in the Near and Middle East are not seeking to lull the vigilance of the peoples while preparing secretly for new acts of aggression. The United States Government is fully aware that American troops are still being landed in Lebanon, where with the support and protection of United States bayonets Mr. Robert Murphy, the special emissary of the State Department, has been carrying on his suspicious activities, and high-handedly interfering in the domestic affairs of Lebanon; that United States naval forces are being concentrated in the eastern Mediterranean and that United States reinforcements are being air-lifted from Europe to the Near and Middle East, particularly to the Adana area in Turkey. In this connexion, special attention must be drawn to the extensive preparations which have recently been made in Turkey itself for armed intervention in the affairs of the countries of the Arab East. King Hussein of Jordan, who has lost the support of his people and depends on help from abroad, has the audacity to rattle his sabre and threaten a march on Baghdad. He is acting as a pliant instrument in the hand of certain Western Powers which are plotting against the peoples of the Arab East. There is a marked tendency to widen the area of aggression. The threat of armed attack hangs over the Republic of Iraq.

17. Thus, the delay in the negotiations for a meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the five Powers, accompanied as it is by the increasing concentration of armed forces in the Near and Middle East, is resulting in a further aggravation of the situation and a spread of the conflict, and is liable to plunge mankind into catastrophe.

18. Today more than ever before, urgent and energetic measures are needed to ensure the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan and to prevent the widening of the area of military conflict in the Near and Middle East. There is no time to lose.

19. It must be pointed out, however, that instead of helping to bring about a meeting of Heads of Government at an early date with a view to putting an immediate end to the armed conflict in the Near and Middle East, the United States Government has sent its Secretary of State to London for a meeting of members of the Baghdad Pact. Hasty attempts are being made to shore up that Pact, the withdrawal from which of Iraq, its only Arab member, serves to emphasize once again the failure of the Western Powers' policy of "position of strength"—a policy of building up aggressive blocs. At the same time the United States Government is trying by every means at its command to hinder the solution—a solution awaited by all mankind—of the main problem of the present day, which is to put an end to armed intervention by the United States and the United Kingdom in the Near and Middle East; it is trying to embroil the negotiations on a meeting of Heads of Government in a maze of endless discussion on the form and procedure for such a meeting.

20. The meeting in London of representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran at a time when, instead of foreign troops being withdrawn from Lebanon and Jordan, preparations are proceeding apace for armed intervention in the affairs of the Republic of Iraq, has the appearance of a plot against the Arab countries. Is not all this being done in furtherance of a conspiracy to perpetrate new acts of aggression and to confront the world, by pursuing the policy of the *fait accompli*, with an increasing expansion of military conflict?

21. But can the serious consequences of such a policy, particularly for its initiators, be ignored? For today the peoples of the world are vigilant, and will not approve acts of aggression.

22. The United States Government is doing everything possible to frustrate the possibility of a meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the five Powers, the purpose of which would be to put an end to armed aggression in Lebanon and Jordan and to take urgent steps for the maintenance and strengthening of world peace.

23. Thus, you are not pursuing a policy of bringing about a settlement of the military conflict which has begun in the Near and Middle

East, with a view to the maintenance and strengthening of peace, but are in fact widening the area of military conflict and exposing mankind to the threat of world catastrophe. In so doing, you above all are assuming a serious responsibility before mankind and history for the consequences of such a policy on the part of the United States Government. A serious responsibility also rests with Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, who, although he is trying to manoeuvre, is in fact, pursuing the same policy of frustrating the adoption of any measures for the settlement of the military conflict in Jordan and Lebanon.

24. The Soviet Government, in view of the extremely tense situation that has come about in the Near and Middle East, still considers it essential that a meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and India, with the participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, should be called without delay.

25. With regard to the place of meeting, we have noted, the statement made by Mr. de Gaulle, the Head of the Government of France, in his message of 26 July, to the effect that he would prefer the meeting to be held in Europe. The Soviet Government had even earlier expressed the view that the meeting should be held in Europe, and supports Mr. de Gaulle's proposal.

26. The possibility of holding the meeting of Heads of Government in a European city is particularly deserving of study in view of suggestions among United States diplomats and in the American Press that the authorities of the United States might find it difficult to ensure the security of the Heads of Governments if the meeting were held in that country. We have no wish to place the United States Government in a difficult position in this respect. Accordingly, the Soviet Government while it still has no objection to meeting in New York, would agree to meet at Geneva, Vienna or Paris, or in any other place acceptable to all the participants.

27. We should also be happy if agreement were reached to hold the meeting of Heads of Governments in Moscow, where the Soviet Government would guarantee delegations absolute security and the necessary conditions for fruitful work. We are confident that the Soviet people would welcome any envoys who came in order to take prompt measures to put an end to the conflict in the Near and Middle East and to strengthen world peace, thereby demonstrating its steadfast adherence to the cause of peace.

28. Your letter evades the question of the participation of the Prime Minister of India in the meeting of Heads of Governments. In this connexion, I feel obliged to stress once again that India's participation in the meeting would be highly important for the attainment of constructive decisions on a settlement of the situation in the Near and Middle East.

29. With regard to the date of the meeting of Heads of Government with the participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, we suggested 28 July. Since you have stated that this date is too early for the United States Government, we are prepared to agree to any other early date, and would appreciate a clear answer to the question when the United States would be prepared to participate in a meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the five Powers.

30. I should be grateful, sir, for a reply to my message at the earliest possible date.

6. *Letter from Mr. Eisenhower to Mr. Khrushchev, 1 August 1958*

1. For several centuries personal correspondence between Heads of Government and Heads of State has been an extremely valuable channel of communication when the normal diplomatic channels seemed unable to carry the full burden. However, it has always been recognized—not just as a matter of diplomatic form but as a requirement of efficacy—that the essential ingredient in such correspondence, whether confidential or public, was a tone of serious purpose and an absence of invective.

2. It is in this tradition that I reply to your letter of 28 July.

3. I consider it quite inaccurate for you, both implicitly and explicitly, to convey the impression that the Government of the United States has embarked on a policy of delay based on niggling procedural argument. The fact is that the differences between us are not procedural but basic.

4. Very simply, the two basic points which the United States has stated many times in the past, and which I repeat now, are: (a) Do all of us, the Charter Members of the United Nations, agree that the United Nations Security Council has the principal responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; and (b) shall small nations as well as a few so-called great Powers have a part in the making of decisions which inevitably involve them?

5. As to my first point—what of the United Nations? It was created

out of the travail of the Second World War to establish a world of order and of justice. It embodied and still embodies the hopes of mankind. At this juncture, when you claim peace is endangered, you would push it aside; we would invoke its processes.

6. This leads to my second point—what of the smaller Powers of this world? Shall they be ignored or shall the small nations be represented in the making of decisions which inevitably involve them? History has certainly given us ample proof that a nation's capacity to contribute to the advancement of mankind is not to be measured by the number of divisions it can put in the field. You must be aware, as I am, of the many very specific proposals made these last years by the so-called smaller Powers which have been of great value to all of us.

7. This stated assumption in your letter that the decisions of five great Powers will be happily accepted by all other interested Powers seems to indicate an attitude on your part which could have dangerous consequences in the future for the smaller Powers of this world.

8. Your position, which means that the desires, the dignity, in fact the security, of the smaller nations should be disregarded, is one which the United States has consistently opposed and continues to oppose today. Essentially you are proposing that we should join you in a policy reminiscent of the system of political domination you imposed in Eastern Europe. The United States cannot accept that point of view.

9. The problem of the Middle East is not one of a threat of aggression by the United States but rather the threat, by others, of further indirect aggression against independent States. This problem is clearly the responsibility of the United Nations Security Council.

10. I am therefore instructing the United States permanent representative to the Security Council to seek a special meeting of the Security Council, on or about 12 August, under Article 28, paragraph 2, of the Charter, which would permit direct discussions among Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers. I would hope that you would similarly instruct your permanent representative. Such a meeting will make it possible for the Council to discharge its responsibilities in the manner contemplated by the Charter.

11. As for the place of the meeting, the United States agrees to a meeting held elsewhere than New York City, but we could not agree to the meeting being held in Moscow. The memory of the well-organized mass demonstration and serious damage to the United States Embassy in Moscow is too fresh in the minds of the American people.

12. If such a meeting is arranged, I expect to attend and participate, and I hope that you would do likewise.

7. *Letter from Mr. Khrushchev to Mr. Eisenhower, 5 August 1958*

1. I have received your letter of 1 August. I fully agree with the views you express regarding the value of personal correspondence between Heads of Government. In the present circumstances it is essential that such personal correspondence should contribute to the fundamental objective of the peoples—the preservation of peace and peaceful co-existence between States irrespective of their social systems.

2. I also agree with you that our present correspondence is unusual. I should like to make it quite clear that this unusual correspondence is the result of the unusual steps which the United States and the United Kingdom have taken in the Near and Middle East. The United States and the United Kingdom have committed a breach of the peace in that area by invading Lebanon and Jordan with their forces.

3. You refer in your message to the need to seek the assistance of the United Nations and the Security Council in the situation which has developed in the Near and Middle East. You rightly say that the United Nations was created out of the travail of the Second World War. As we all know mankind's hopes for the maintenance of peace are bound up with the work of the United Nations and its Security Council, which bears the principal responsibility for the maintenance of peace throughout the world.

4. It was precisely because it recognized this function of the United Nations that the Soviet Government, at the very start of the aggression against the Arab countries by the United States and the United Kingdom, submitted a proposal to the Security Council that the forces of the interventionists should be withdrawn from Lebanon and Jordan and that a special session of the General Assembly should be called on this question. However, the United States, the United Kingdom and some other countries which are currently members of the Security Council prevented the Council from taking a decision designed to restore the situation in the Near and Middle East to normal.

5. Frankly, it must be recognized that the policy pursued by the United States, which is supported by the United Kingdom and, unfortunately, by certain other States, is in fact undermining the United Na-

tions and making the Security Council powerless to discharge its functions. Examples are not far to seek. Did not the United States order its forces to invade Lebanon, in disregard of the Security Council? Do you deny that the United States Government, by landing its forces, presented the Security Council with a *fait accompli*? Can such acts be said to strengthen the United Nations or the Security Council?

6. If we consider the present composition of the Security Council, we are forced to conclude that, under pressure from the United States, this organ has in effect developed into a sort of committee which is mainly composed of countries belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Baghdad Pact and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization and on which the seat of the lawful representative of the great People's Republic of China is occupied by the representative of Chiang Kai-shek, a political ghost.

7. The policy of ignoring the People's Republic of China does not make sense. This great Power exists, is growing and is developing, whether certain States recognize it or not. If common sense prevailed and the People's Republic of China took its rightful place in the United Nations, this would be duly appreciated by all peoples, for the peoples understand that without the People's Republic of China the Security Council and the United Nations cannot be the fully effective organ for preserving peace and security which the United Nations Charter requires.

8. Thus a situation has arisen in which the Security Council is virtually paralysed and is unable to take any decision which would effectively promote the preservation of peace throughout the world, independently of the will of the United States.

9. I have no wish to engage in an argument with you at this stage. Nevertheless, I cannot ignore some assertions in your letter which distort the Soviet Union's foreign policy and aims. You allege, for example, that the Soviet Union has imposed its political domination over the countries of Eastern Europe. This assertion does not of course surprise us, but it is utterly groundless. We have already heard all this more than once from Mr. Dulles, the United States Secretary of State. Such assertions, however, will gain no conviction from frequent repetition. The peoples of Eastern Europe have freely chosen their present way of life and will allow no one to change it. You have made repeated references to your support for the small nations. To be consistent, however, you should recognize in practice that peoples have the right to take inde-

pendent decisions and to establish whatever form of government best serves their interests. In practice, however, this is not the case. Whenever a change occurs anywhere which upsets the state of affairs convenient to the United States Government, you represent this change as something brought about, not by the will of the peoples, but by the will of someone else.

10. It is surely impossible to close one's eyes to the fact that we are living in an era of great revolutionary changes, an era in which the structure of society is being reorganized on new foundations. This movement, which originated in the Soviet Union, is now assuming increasingly wide proportions. It has extended to China, to the countries of Eastern Europe, to North Korea and North Viet-Nam. At the same time the peoples of many countries in Asia and Africa, who have been subjected to harsh oppression by the imperialist Powers, have won their national independence in a struggle against oppressors, both alien and indigenous. The peoples of various other countries on these continents are locked in a struggle for national liberation and there is no doubt that they will win the day; no foreign colonizers' bayonets can prevent this, for the era of colonialism is over. Such is the inevitable course of history, such is the will of the people.

11. No State which is genuinely concerned to protect the independence and security of the small countries can arrogate to itself the right to intervene in those countries' affairs and proclaim this or that "doctrine" with such an end in view. This being so, however, what is the justification for the proclamation by the United States Government of the doctrine which bears your name and for its intervention in the affairs of the countries of the Near and Middle East? For example, when the people of Lebanon, incensed at the policy of its President who had become the servant of the United States of America instead of the servant of his own people, only had to appeal to you, in violation of his country's Constitution, for the United States Government to set the United States Sixth Fleet in motion, to throw its assault units into Lebanon, and to begin re-establishing "order" there in accordance with the aforementioned doctrine. The United Kingdom Government headed by Mr. Macmillan used an appeal by the King of Jordan, who has no following whatever among his people, as a pretext for intervention by its armed forces in Jordan's domestic affairs.

12. There are still those in the United States of America who boast of the fact that the United States Government intervened in the affairs

of Guatemala and expelled the lawfully elected Government and President. Surely this is not another illustration of what you mean by concern for small countries and respect for their independence and dignity?

13. If this is so, Mr. President, our ideas evidently differ regarding the rights of the small nations. In the generally accepted language of politics, such actions on the part of the United States Government constitute a violation of the rights of the small nations and the imposition on them of its own domination, against which the peoples of all countries whose independence is infringed by the United States and the United Kingdom are waging an unrelenting struggle.

14. If we were to mention other similar instances, without going very far—the very recent landing of United States troops in Cuba is a case in point—we should have a great deal to say, and our message would be much lengthier.

15. I am compelled to refer to your assessment of events in the Near and Middle East. You assert that the problem of the Middle East is not one of aggression by the United States but rather of indirect aggression. The fact that you refer to indirect aggression of some kind, Mr. President, means that, in common with us and the overwhelming majority of other countries, you apparently regard the introduction of foreign troops into the territory of others as an act of direct aggression. This is not open to question. That is why, throughout the world, the introduction of United States troops into Lebanon and United Kingdom troops into Jordan is rightly regarded as direct aggression. With regard to the allusions in your message to some sort of indirect aggression, reference to such an imaginary danger can only be regarded as an attempt to mask the direct aggression of the United States.

16. And indeed the allegations of indirect aggression threatening Lebanon are refuted by the two well-known reports of the United Nations Observation Group specially sent to Lebanon by the Security Council.

17. In these circumstances, Mr. President, we do not understand by what right the United States Government assumes the mantle of the arbiter and judge, and maintains that there has been some kind of indirect aggression in Lebanon. It is evident from this that you do not recognize the right of the peoples of the Near and Middle East to handle their own affairs and to organize their States along lines which serve their own interests. Thus, Mr. President, you are guilty of direct contradiction

of your own assertions concerning regard for the desires, the dignity and the security of the smaller countries.

18. The whole world knows that domestic events in Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan reflect the wrath of the peoples of those countries, who have revolted against the system imposed on them by the imperialist colonizers. In Iraq the people rebelled when they could no longer endure the oppression and excesses of the lackeys of foreign States. Now the United States and other Western Powers have recognized the Republican Government of Iraq. Hence you, Mr. President, and your allies have recognized that the Iraqi people have the right to change the existing order.

19. Thus your assertions about some form of indirect aggression are wholly without foundation, and merely divert attention from the real aggression in the Near and Middle East which was committed by the United States and the United Kingdom.

20. We regret, Mr. President, that you do not agree to the holding of a meeting of Heads of Government at Moscow, and that you referred in this connexion to the angry demonstration by the inhabitants of Moscow near the United States Embassy against United States armed intervention in Lebanon. This demonstration was a completely spontaneous expression of the Soviet people's sympathy for a victim of aggression. Your reference to this occurrence is particularly unconvincing in view of the fact that the United States Government itself so far refuses to take steps to ensure normal working conditions for the Soviet mission to the United Nations and has not put a stop to the systematic acts of provocation against that mission on the part of certain elements in New York which, it stands to reason, inevitably influenced the feelings of the Soviet people who took part in the demonstration. Mr. President, it is not our people that started such demonstrations. It would be desirable to call a halt to such occurrences in the United States. Our people would attach due weight to this.

21. I should like to point out that our people assess events correctly and are well able to distinguish between the acts of hired hooligans against the Soviet mission in New York and the genuine feelings of the American people. We entertain the most friendly feelings for the people of the United States and are anxious to develop broad cultural and economic ties between our countries. We want our respective peoples to know each other better, and to join forces to preserve and strengthen peace and to end the estrangement between countries, so that all States may live with one another on a basis of genuine good-neighbourliness.

The Soviet people's attitude to the American people is well known. We might point out that, at the time when irresponsible elements, paid out of certain funds set up for the purpose of subversive activity against States that do not belong to the aggressive blocs in which the United States plays a leading part, were creating an uproar outside the building of the Soviet mission in New York, American scientists, specialists, sportsmen, tourists as well as Mr. Adlai Stevenson, a well-known public figure in the United States, were being received in the USSR with the Soviet people's usual cordiality and hospitality.

22. I wish now to return to the main point, to what at this juncture should have been the only subject of our present correspondence, namely the adoption, as speedily as possible, of effective measures to end the armed intervention of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Near and Middle East. You consider it essential that the consideration of this question should be entrusted to the United Nations Security Council. Unhappily, as I have already pointed out, the present situation of the Security Council, in which it is to all intents and purposes subordinated to United States foreign policy and where most of the representatives are not free to take any action which deviates from the United States position, prevents us from regarding your proposal as the right one. The policy of the United States in regard to the Security Council is undermining its chances of adopting effective measures to protect peace and to halt aggression. It is destroying the effectiveness of the Security Council as an instrument of peace.

23. The United Nations and its Security Council are essential international organs and should reflect the peace-loving aspirations of the peoples. However, the United States Government is using the Council for its own selfish interests, through the representatives of countries belonging to military blocs in which the United States occupies the dominant position. In reality the United States is trying to reduce the Security Council to the position of a subsidiary organ of the United States Department of State. How can we close our eyes to the true position and ignore the fact that the Security Council, as now composed, is in no position to reach objective conclusions on the situation in the Near and Middle East?

24. No, Mr. President; for the sake of preserving world peace and strengthening security, we need a sane approach which would pave the way for a positive decision and would ensure that peace prevailed.

25. Since the very start of the United States and United Kingdom in-

intervention in the Near and Middle East, the Soviet Union has advocated the adoption of immediate measures to check the aggression, to secure the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon and Jordan, to prevent the intervention from spreading, and to eliminate the dangerous tension caused by the actions of the United States and the United Kingdom. To that end, we proposed to call a meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the five Powers, the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and India, with the participation of Mr. Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We regret that you and Mr. Macmillan have not found it possible to accept this proposal and that a positive decision has not therefore been taken on calling a meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the five Powers with the participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

26. Although the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have made it impossible to convene a meeting of the five Powers and are directly responsible for this state of affairs, it is now clearly apparent that the demands of the peoples for the immediate convening of such a meeting in order to end the armed intervention in Lebanon and Jordan and the determination of peace-loving States to halt aggression in the Near and Middle East have forced those who embarked on this armed intervention to refrain at the present juncture from extending the aggression to other countries and primarily to the Republic of Iraq and the United Arab Republic. It is no accident, therefore, that the Western Powers, including the United States and the United Kingdom, have been obliged to recognize the Republic of Iraq, whose establishment the aggressors originally alleged to be a threat to peace in the Near and Middle East. This does not mean, however, that the danger of the extension and aggravation of the conflict in that area has been eliminated or that the security of the Republic of Iraq and the other Arab States has been ensured. The forces of the interventionists have not yet been withdrawn from Lebanon and Jordan. Furthermore, fresh contingents of foreign troops are arriving in that area and further military measures are being taken in the countries of the Baghdad Pact.

27. The question of the complete cessation of armed intervention in the Near and Middle East and of the establishment of conditions which would protect the peoples of that area against foreign intervention still calls for speedy settlement. The foreign forces must be withdrawn from Lebanon and Jordan without delay, as their presence constitutes a continuing threat to peace and to the independence of the peoples concerned.

and a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, which cannot be condoned by a single Member of the United Nations.

28. In these circumstances, the Soviet Government considers it essential to pursue its efforts to maintain and strengthen peace in the Near and Middle East. Since the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have abandoned the idea of calling a meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the five Powers and since, as we have already pointed out, the Security Council has shown itself unable to achieve a peaceful solution of the problem of the Near and Middle East, the Government of the Soviet Union, with a view to ensuring that the necessary steps to halt aggression are taken without delay, has instructed its representative to the United Nations to request the convening of a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations to discuss the question of the withdrawal of United States forces from Lebanon and United Kingdom forces from Jordan. The Soviet Government hopes that consideration of this question in the General Assembly, where large and small States alike are represented, will make it possible to find means of removing the military danger that has arisen in the Near and Middle East as a result of the actions of the United States and the United Kingdom and will bring tranquillity to that region.

29. I think that you will agree with me, Sir, that the events in the Near and Middle East, which have confronted the world with the threat of general war with all the untold miseries it would inflict on the peoples, lend particular urgency to the question of establishing conditions for the peaceful coexistence of States and for putting an end to the "cold war", which is contaminating the whole international atmosphere. The Soviet Union and all peace-loving countries are working for the day when no great Power will be able to commit aggression, particularly against a small country. Aggression by a small country against a great Power is quite out of the question. A small country does not possess the divisions you mention in your message. We have to take account of realities and practical possibilities. A world war can be unleashed by a great Power with large numbers of divisions and many atomic and hydrogen weapons, rockets, bombers and other means of destruction, but not by a small country. Accordingly, it is precisely the great Powers which must agree to refrain from any action that would bring the world to the brink of military catastrophe.

30. The Soviet Government considers that all possible steps should be taken to develop contacts and relations between the statesmen of

all countries. Personal meetings between the leaders of States can lessen the existing tension, promote the growth of confidence and mutual understanding among States and hasten the thawing of the ice of the "cold war".

31. We attach particular importance to such contacts and, as you know, as early as December 1957, we proposed a meeting of statesmen at the highest level. We are convinced that, given the efforts of all participants, such a meeting at the highest level with the composition we proposed earlier, would help to find ways and means to banish the "cold war" and to make impossible the outbreak of a shooting war.

32. Let us do everything within our power to see that this meeting, for which all peoples of the world are waiting, is not postponed indefinitely. We await your agreement to our proposal for meeting at the highest level and are prepared to take part in such a meeting at any time. It is in the interests of all States, great and small, that a meeting at the highest level should be convened at the earliest opportunity.

33. In conclusion, I should like to express the hope that the United States Government will support the proposal to convene a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which might be a useful step towards the relaxation of tension and would pave the way for a "summit meeting" at an early date.

8. *Letter from Mr. Khrushchev to Mr. Nehru, 19 July 1958*⁹

1. In view of the situation which has arisen in the Near and Middle East, I should like to address the following message to you.

2. As a result of United States aggression in Lebanon and British aggression in Jordan we are at present experiencing one of the most crucial moments in the history of mankind, a moment when the slightest careless step may result in the greatest possible catastrophe for the world.

3. The United States and the United Kingdom, having carried out acts of aggression in Lebanon and Jordan, assert that their actions are purely local; but history shows that any local war may rapidly develop into a world conflagration. In considering the present aggressive actions of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Near and Middle East we are in duty bound to remember the lessons of history.

4. The Soviet Government believes that at the present time, when

⁹ SCOR, 13th year, supplement for July, August and September 1958, 53-54.

a military conflict has started, the Governments which bear the principal responsibility for the preservation of peace have the duty of displaying the maximum possible degree of calmness and good sense, in order to ensure that their actions do not result in a world conflagration. We believe that these Governments must seek to solve existing problems not by inflaming warlike passions and pushing the world into a catastrophe, but by engaging in negotiation, by relying on reason and calm, in order to prevent war and ensure peaceful coexistence between countries and universal peace. The military intervention by the United States and the United Kingdom against Lebanon and Jordan is a continuation of the colonial policy of which your own country was once a victim. This policy has always ended in disaster for those who have attempted to follow it.

5. In the view of the Soviet Government the wisest solution would be to withdraw the United States and United Kingdom forces from the territories of Lebanon and Jordan immediately and enable the peoples of those countries to shape their own destinies as they desire.

6. The Soviet Government believes that at this threatening hour in history, when the balance hangs between war and peace, the Heads of the Governments of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and India, together with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, should meet without delay in order to take steps to put an end to the military conflict which has broken out. The Soviet Government proposes that the Heads of the Governments of the countries mentioned should meet on 22 July at Geneva, or any other place.

7. In making this proposal for a meeting between the Heads of Government, the Soviet Government takes the view that such a meeting, after working out practical recommendations for the termination of the conflict in the Near and Middle East, should then submit these recommendations to the Security Council of the United Nations, which should then consider them with the participation of the representatives of the Arab countries. The Soviet Government believes that a meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the great Powers for this noble purpose would be a great contribution to the cause of peace and the security of the peoples. It would be welcomed by the peoples of all countries, whatever their religion or race.

8. The situation, I think you will agree with me, is such that a single hour of delay may mean a serious danger to peace; that all peace-loving forces must be mobilized and used to avert the awful peril threatening the world; that inactivity and procrastination may result in disaster. We

cannot and must not permit the forces of aggression, the forces of war-like colonialism, to endanger peace and the security of the peoples.

9. The Soviet Union knows India as one of the most important States, a State whose voice is listened to not only by the countries of Asia, but by countries all over the world. The Soviet Government hopes that you will do everything possible to help bring to a successful conclusion the collective efforts of the peace-loving States to ward off the impending catastrophe while it is still possible to do so. We are confident that peace-loving India will bring its important influence to bear in support of a cause for which its courageous people has always fought untiringly. India's support of this proposal for an immediate meeting, and its active participation in such a meeting, would be an invaluable contribution to the cause of the preservation of peace.

10. Simultaneously with this letter we are sending corresponding messages to the Heads of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

9. Letter from Mr. Nehru to Mr. Khrushchev, 20 July 1958¹⁰

I have just received the text of the letter you have addressed to me. In view of the urgency and vital importance of the contents of your letter, I am immediately sending this reply.

I am grateful to you for the letter you have sent. I entirely agree with you that we are living through one of the most serious crises in the history of mankind and that, at this moment of peril, it is the duty of governments as well as others to approach these questions with wisdom and calmness, and not to take any action which might worsen this situation and provoke a world conflagration. Whatever the views of governments might be in regard to other matters, reason and even self-interest drive to the conclusion that the maintenance of peace is essential for all of us and that war must be avoided. This means that the approach to this and like questions must not be through military strength and pressures, but by calm negotiation and the firm determination that peace must be maintained.

You are aware, Mr. Prime Minister, of our firm conviction that armed intervention by a foreign power in any country is most undesirable and that foreign troops should be withdrawn from the countries where they have entered. This is not only in accordance with justice and the

¹⁰ *Foreign Affairs Record* (New Delhi), 4 (July 1958) 127.

freedom of the countries concerned, but also avoids international complications which may lead to a catastrophe. Therefore, we have urged the Governments of the U.S.A. and Great Britain to withdraw their forces from the Lebanon and Jordan.

We would welcome a peaceful approach by negotiation through the United Nations or its Security Council or otherwise, with a view to helping the United Nations to take steps to end the conflict in the Near and Middle Eastern region. We are always prepared to offer our services for this purpose whenever they are asked for and needed.

I am grateful to you for your kind invitation to India to join in the Conference of the Heads of Governments suggested by you. If there is agreement about the holding of such a conference, it should not be difficult to fix a suitable venue and an early date. We shall gladly offer our services to it in the cause of peace, if they are needed.

I understand that the Conference suggested by you is different and separate from the proposal for a high level or Summit Conference which has been under discussion for some time. The present proposal is made for the limited purpose of dealing with the critical situation that has arisen in the Middle Eastern region.

With warm regards,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

10. *Letter from Mr. Khrushchev to Mr. Nehru, 23 July 1958*¹¹

1. I beg to confirm receipt of the letter handed to me on 21 July by Mr. K. P. S. Menon, Ambassador of India, and on behalf of the Soviet Government wish to express to you and to the Government of India my gratitude for your speedy reply to my letter of 19 July [S/4059, sec. IV] and my satisfaction at the identity of our views regarding the situation which has arisen in the Near and Middle East during the last few days, as also regarding the need to take urgent measures to end the present international crisis by negotiation. We are happy to learn that the Government of India agrees to participate in a meeting of the Heads of Government of the USSR, India, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France.

2. I would inform you that I have received replies to my messages of 19 July from Mr. Eisenhower, Mr. Macmillan and Mr. de Gaulle.

3. We take no exception to the views expressed by Mr. Macmillan,

¹¹ SCOR, 13th year, supplement for July, August and September 1958, 62-64.

the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, as regards the calling of the meeting of the Heads of Governments within the framework of the Security Council. The Soviet Government stated in its message of 19 July that the Security Council should not in its view be circumvented. The messages of Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. de Gaulle indicate that they too agree on the desirability of a meeting of Heads of Government.

4. Bearing in mind the need for urgent solutions with a view to the maintenance of peace, we consider that the formalities of the meeting of Heads of Governments can have no decisive significance in the present case.

5. The important thing is that the meeting should take place as soon as possible, so that we can more rapidly arrive at a correct solution calculated to promote the maintenance and strengthening of peace, to bring tranquillity to the Near and Middle East and help bring about a relaxation of tension in relations between States.

6. We agree with Mr. Macmillan that no resolutions should be put forward at this special meeting of the Security Council unless they arise out of previous agreement, and that the object of the meeting should be to reach agreement, rather than to register differences by votes.

7. In this connexion, the Soviet Government assumes that the Heads of Governments, meeting with a view to achieving as rapidly as possible constructive solutions designed to promote the maintenance and strengthening of peace, will have the opportunity to consult together not only officially, but unofficially as well.

8. In view of the fact that the Security Council will in the present instance be dealing not with ordinary current matters, but with questions of special importance for the maintenance of peace and security, we consider that it will be useful in this case if India, a very large Asian country which has won universal recognition as a State which strives for the strengthening of peace, takes part in the work of the Council.

9. We express our sincere gratitude to the Government of India for its consent to take part in the meeting of Heads of Governments on the situation in the Near and Middle East, and we regard it as particularly important that India should be represented at the Security Council meeting by you personally.

10. So far as the USSR is concerned, in view of your agreement and that of Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, of Mr. de Gaulle, President of the Council of Ministers of the French Republic and of Mr. Eisenhower, President of the United States, as is evident from

his message of 22 July, the Soviet Union will be represented at this meeting by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

11. It is self-evident that the Governments of the interested Arab States should be brought into the discussion in the Security Council to be participated in by the Heads of the Government of the five Powers referred to.

12. The Soviet Government would like to learn as soon as possible the views of the Government of India as to the date of the Security Council with the participation of the Heads of Government. For our part, we would propose that the work should be begun in the Security Council on 28 July in New York.

13. We are confident that by its active participation in this work India will be helping to end the conflict in the Near and Middle East and to avert the threat to world peace.

11. *Statement by Mr. Eisenhower welcoming the agreement between the US and the USSR on placing the Lebanese problem before the United Nations, 5 August 1958*¹²

I welcome Mr. Khrushchev's agreement that the problems we have had under discussion in our recent exchange of letters should be placed again before the United Nations. I regret that he did not accept the Security Council with the Heads of Government present as the appropriate forum in view of his alleged concern over the threats to the peace. However, the General Assembly is completely acceptable, particularly since the United States previously proposed on July 18th such a procedure to the Security Council.

I am therefore instructing the United States Permanent Representative to the Security Council to move the previously presented United States resolution requesting that this matter be put before the General Assembly. This resolution has been held in abeyance in order to permit consideration of Mr. Khrushchev's proposals of July 19th, 23rd, and 28th.

¹² *Department of State Bulletin*, 39 (1 September 1958) 342.

9. General Assembly Debate

INTRODUCTION

WHILE the big Powers pondered over the proposal for a summit the build-up of American troops in Lebanon continued steadily. By 21 July there were nearly 10,000 American marines in Lebanon. In subsequent weeks their number increased to 14,000, thus outnumbering the Lebanese Army. Simultaneously, President Eisenhower's special emissary, Robert Murphy, started a frantic campaign to work out a solution acceptable to both sides. This was a clear enough hint that the US was after a *political* rather than *military* solution of the Lebanese problem; and it greatly facilitated Fu'ad Shihab's election as President on 31 July. The third report of the UNOGIL submitted on 12 August took note of these developments.¹ Yet the crisis was far from being wholly resolved. The country was still strewn with barricades, trenches and fighters-in-arms. President Sham'un refused to give up his office before the expiry of his term on 23 September. Nor did he wish to ask the US to withdraw her troops from Lebanon.

At this point the focus once again shifted to the United Nations. Addressing the General Assembly on 13 August President Eisenhower announced that the US troops would be totally withdrawn if "requested by the duly constituted government of Lebanon." He also pleaded for the creation of "a stand-by UN peace force to facilitate the withdrawal."² The Soviet Foreign Minister decried the American charge of "indirect aggression" in Lebanon as a "myth" and contended that the actions of Western Powers were governed "by their interest in the Middle East oil."³ Earlier the Soviet Union had presented a draft resolution calling for the withdrawal of US forces. Subsequently, two more draft resolutions were introduced by the US and Norway respectively; but none of them appeared to be acceptable to all the parties concerned. With the progress of the debate, however, the futility of the inflexible positions adopted by the contenders became increasingly clear. Evidently, after

¹ See above, Section 6 (A).

² See below.

³ See below.

Shihab's election and his policy statement on 4 August⁴ it was common knowledge that the US forces would be required—and according to President Eisenhower's undertaking, agree—to withdraw from Lebanon shortly after 23 September. Hence the essential ingredients of a compromise already existed; the rest was accomplished through behind-the-scene diplomatic activity. A widely acceptable draft resolution was eventually moved by Sudan on behalf of ten Arab States including the original complainant, Lebanon, on 21 August. The draft resolution, unanimously adopted by the Assembly, welcomed the renewed assurances given by the Arab States to respect each other's sovereignty and requested the Secretary-General to make immediate arrangements, in consultation with the governments concerned and in accordance with the Charter, to facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from Lebanon.⁵

1. *Extract from speech by President Eisenhower, 13 August 1958*⁶

18. Let me turn now specifically to the problem of Lebanon. When the United States military assistance began moving into Lebanon, I reported to the American people that we had immediately reacted to the plea of Lebanon because the situation was such that only prompt action would suffice.

19. I repeat to you the solemn pledge I then made. Our assistance to Lebanon has but one single purpose—that is the purpose of the Charter and of such historic resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly as the "Essentials-of-peace" resolution of 1949 [*resolution 290 (IV)*] and the "Peace-through-deeds" resolution of 1950 [*resolution 380 (V)*]. These denounce, as a form of aggression and as an international crime, the fomenting of civil strife in the interest of a foreign Power. We want to prevent that crime—or at least prevent its having fatal consequences. We have no other purpose whatsoever.

20. The United States troops will be totally withdrawn whenever this is requested by the duly constituted Government of Lebanon or whenever, through action by the United Nations or otherwise, Lebanon is no longer exposed to the original danger.

21. It is my earnest hope that this Assembly, free of the veto, will

⁴ See below, Section 10.

⁵ See below.

⁶ GAOR, Third Emergency Special Session, 733rd plenary meeting, 7-10.

consider how it can assure the continued independence and integrity of Lebanon. Thus the political destiny of the Lebanese people will continue to lie in their own hands. The United States delegation will support measures to this end.

22. Another urgent problem is Jordan. If we do not act promptly in Jordan a further dangerous crisis may result, for the method of indirect aggression discernible in Jordan may lead to conflicts endangering the peace.

23. We must recognize that peace in this area is fragile, and we must also recognize that the end of peace in Jordan could have consequences of a far-reaching nature. The United Nations has a particular responsibility in this matter, since it sponsored the Palestine Armistice Agreements upon which peace in the area rests and since it also sponsors the care of the Palestine refugees. I hope this Assembly will be able to give expression to the interest of the United Nations in preserving the peace in Jordan.

24. There is another matter which this Assembly should face in seeking to promote stability in the Near East. That is the question of inflammatory propaganda. The United Nations General Assembly has on three occasions—in 1947, 1949 and 1950—adopted resolution designed to stop the projecting of irresponsible broadcasts from one nation into the homes of citizens of other nations [*resolutions* 110 (II), 290 (IV) and 381 (V)], thereby “fomenting civil strife and subverting the will of the people in any State”. That is stated in the language of resolution 290 (IV). We all know that these resolutions have recently been violated in many directions in the Near East.

25. If we, the United States, are one of those who have been at fault, we stand ready to be corrected.

26. I believe that this Assembly should reaffirm its enunciated policy and should consider means for monitoring the radio broadcasts directed across national frontiers in the troubled Near East area. It should then examine complaints from these nations which consider their national security jeopardized by external propaganda.

27. The countries of this area should also be freed from armed pressure and infiltration coming across their borders. When such interference threatens, they should be able to get from the United Nations prompt and effective action to help safeguard their independence. This requires that adequate machinery be available to make the United Nations presence manifest in the area of trouble.

28. Therefore, I believe that this Assembly should take action looking towards the creation of a stand-by United Nations peace force. The need for such a force in being is clearly demonstrated by recent events involving imminent danger to the integrity of two Member States.

29. I understand that this general subject is to be discussed at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly and that our distinguished Secretary-General has taken an initiative in this matter. Recent events clearly demonstrate that this is a matter for urgent and positive action.

30. I have proposed four areas of action for the consideration of the Assembly—in respect to Lebanon, to Jordan, to subversive propaganda, and to a stand-by United Nations force. These measures, basically, are designed to do one thing: to preserve the right of a nation and its people to determine their own destiny, consistent with the obligation to respect the rights of others. This clearly applies to the great surge of Arab nationalism.

31. Let me state the position of my country unmistakably. The peoples of the Arab nations of the Near East clearly possess the right of determining and expressing their own destiny. Other nations should not interfere so long as this expression is found in ways compatible with international peace and security.

32. However, here as in other areas we have an opportunity to share in a great international task. That is the task of assisting the peoples of that area, under programmes which they may desire, to make further progress toward the goals of human welfare they have set for themselves. Only on the basis of progressing economies can truly independent Governments sustain themselves. This is a real challenge to the Arab people and to all of us.

33. To help the Arab countries fulfil these aspirations, here is what I propose: first, that consultations be immediately undertaken by the Secretary-General with the Arab nations of the Near East to ascertain whether an agreement can be reached to establish an Arab development institution on a regional basis; secondly, that these consultations consider the composition and the possible functions of a regional Arab development institution, whose task would be to accelerate progress in such fields as industry, agriculture, water supply, health and education, among others; thirdly, other nations and private organizations which might be prepared to support this institution should also be consulted at an appropriate time.

34. Should the Arab States agree on the usefulness of such a sound-

ly organized regional institution, and should they be prepared to support it with their own resources, the United States would also be prepared to support it. The institution would be set up to provide loans to the Arab States as well as the technical assistance required in the formulation of development projects. The institution should be governed by the Arab States themselves. This proposal for a regional Arab development institution can, I believe, be realized on a basis which would attract international capital, both public and private.

35. I also believe that the best and quickest way to achieve the most desirable result would be for the Secretary-General to make two parallel approaches: first, to consult with the Arab States of the Near East to determine an area of agreement; then to invite the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which has vast experience in this field, to make available its facilities for the planning of the organizational and operational techniques needed to establish the institution on a progressive course.

36. I hope it is clear that I am not suggesting a position of leadership for my own country in the work of creating such an institution. If this institution is to be a success, the function of leadership must belong to the Arab States themselves.

37. I would hope that high on the agenda of this institution would be action to meet one of the major challenges of the Near East, the great common shortage—water. Much scientific and engineering work is already under way in the field of water development. For instance, atomic isotopes now permit us to chart the courses of the great underground rivers. And new horizons are opening in the desalting of water. The ancient problem of water is on the threshold of solution. Energy, determination and science will carry it over that threshold.

38. Another great challenge that faces the area is disease. Already there is substantial effort among the peoples and Governments of the Near East to conquer disease and disability. But much more remains to be done. The United States is prepared to join with other Governments and the World Health Organization in an all-out, joint attack on preventable disease in the Near East.

39. But to see the desert blossom again and preventable disease conquered is only a first step. As I look into the future I see the emergence of modern Arab States that would bring to this century contributions surpassing those we cannot forget from the past. We remember that Western arithmetic and algebra owe much to Arab mathematicians

and that much of the foundation of the world's medical science and astronomy was laid by Arab scholars. Above all, we remember that three of the world's great religions were born in the Near East.

40. But a true Arab renaissance can only develop in a healthy human setting. Material progress should not be an overriding objective in itself; it is an important condition for achieving higher human, cultural and spiritual objectives.

41. But I repeat, if this vision of the modern Arab community is to come to life, the goals must be Arab goals.

42. With the assistance of the United Nations, the countries of the Near East now have a unique opportunity to advance, in freedom, their security and their political and economic interests. If a plan for peace of the kind I am proposing can be carried forward, in a few short years we may be able to look back on the Lebanon and Jordan crises as the beginning of a great new prosperous era of Arab history.

43. But there is an important consideration which must remain in mind today and in the future. If there is an end to external interference in the internal affairs of the Arab States of the Near East; if an adequate United Nations peace force is in existence; if a regional development institution exists and is at work on the basic projects and programmes designed to lift the living standards of the area; then with this good prospect, and indeed as a necessary condition for its fulfilment, I hope and believe that the nations of the area, intellectually and emotionally, will no longer feel the need to seek national security through spiralling military build-ups. These lead not only to economic impotence, but to war.

44. Perhaps the nations involved in the 1948 hostilities may, as a first step, wish to call for a United Nations study of the flow of heavy armaments to those nations. My country would be glad to support the establishment of an appropriate United Nations body to examine this problem. That body would discuss it individually with these countries and see what arms-control arrangements could be worked out, under which the security of all these nations could be maintained more effectively than under a continued wasteful, dangerous competition in armaments. I recognize that any such arrangements must reflect these countries' own views.

45. I have tried to present to you the framework of a plan for peace in the Near East. It would provide a setting of political order in response to the rights of the people in each nation; which would avoid the dangers of a regional arms race; which would permit the peoples of the

Near East to devote their energies wholeheartedly to the tasks of development and human progress in the widest sense.

46. It is important that the six elements of this programme be viewed as a whole. They are:

- (1) United Nations concern for Lebanon;
- (2) United Nations measures to preserve peace in Jordan;
- (3) An end to the fomenting from without of civil strife;
- (4) A United Nations peace force;
- (5) A regional economic development plan to assist and accelerate improvement in the living standards of the people in these Arab nations;
- (6) Steps to avoid a new arms-race spiral in the area. To have solidity, the different elements of this plan for peace and progress should be considered and acted on together, as integral elements of a single concerted effort.

47. Therefore, I hope that this Assembly will seek simultaneously to set in motion measures that would create a climate of security in the Near East consonant with the principles of the United Nations Charter, and to create the framework for a common effort to raise the standard of living of the Arab peoples.

48. But the peoples of the Near East are not alone in their ambition for independence and development. We are living in a time when the whole world has become alive to the possibilities for modernizing their societies.

49. The United States Government has been steadily enlarging its allocations to foreign economic development in response to these worldwide hopes. We have joined in partnership with such groupings as the Organization of American States and the Colombo Plan; and we are working on methods to strengthen these regional arrangements. For example, in the case of the Organization of American States, we are consulting with our sister republics of this hemisphere to strengthen its role in economic development. And the Government of the United States has not been alone in supporting development efforts. The British Commonwealth, the countries of Western Europe, and Japan have all made significant contributions.

50. But in many parts of the world both geography and wise economic planning favour national rather than regional development programmes. The United States will, of course, continue its firm support of such

national programmes. Only where the desire for a regional approach is clearly manifested and where the advantage of a regional over a national approach is evident will the United States change to regional methods.

51. The United States is proud of the scope and variety of its development activities throughout the world. Those who know our history will realize that this is no sudden, new policy of our Government. Ever since its birth, the United States has gladly shared its wealth with others. This it has done without thought of conquest or economic domination. After victory in two world wars and the expenditure of vast treasure there is no world map, either geographic or economic, on which anyone can find that the force of American arms or the power of the American Treasury has absorbed any foreign land or political or economic system. As we cherish our freedom, we believe in freedom for others.

52. The things I have talked about today are real and they await our grasp. Within the Near East and within this Assembly are the forces of good sense, of restraint, and of wisdom to make, with time and patience, a framework of political order and of peace in that region.

53. But we also know that all these possibilities are shadowed, all our hopes are dimmed, by the fact of the arms race in nuclear weapons—a contest which drains off our best talents and vast resources, straining the nerves of all our peoples.

54. As I look out on this Assembly, with so many of you representing new nations, one thought above all impresses me. The world that is being remade on our planet is going to be a world of many mature nations. As one after another of these new nations moves through the difficult transition to modernization and learns the methods of growth, from this travail new levels of prosperity and productivity will emerge.

55. This world of individual nations is not going to be controlled by any one Power or group of Powers. This world is not going to be committed to any one ideology. Please believe me when I say that the dream of world domination by one Power or of world conformity is an impossible dream.

56. The nature of today's weapons, the nature of modern communications, and the widening circle of new nations make it plain that we must, in the end, be a world community of open societies. And the concept of the open society is the ultimate key to a system of arms control we can all trust.

57. We must, then, seek with new vigour, new initiative, the path

to a peace based on the effective control of armaments, on economic advancement and on the freedom of all peoples to be ruled by governments of their choice. Only thus can we exercise the full capacity God has given us to enrich the lives of the individual human beings who are our ultimate concern, our responsibility and our strength.

58. In this memorable task there lies enough work and enough reward to satisfy the energies and ambitions of all leaders, everywhere.

2. *Extract from speech by Mr. Gromyko (USSR), 13 August 1958*

101. The United States and the United Kingdom undertook their armed intervention in Lebanon and Jordan at a time when preparations were under way for the summit conference proposed by the Soviet Union for the purpose of halting the "cold war" and the arms race, when the Soviet Union had made the historic decision to suspend unilaterally its tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The question arises whether it was not a factor in the calculations of the leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom that one result of their action in regard to Lebanon and Jordan would be to check the trend towards an improvement in the international situation, which did not suit their purposes.

102. Now that the United States' and United Kingdom's armed intervention in the Near East has placed the world in a dangerous situation, the need becomes particularly apparent to put an end to the pernicious "positions-of-strength" policy and proceed to the settlement of international problems from a position of reason. An agreement among the great Powers on non-interference in the domestic affairs of the Near and Middle Eastern countries and on strict respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity would be a major advance in this direction. Such an agreement, which was proposed by the Soviet Union a long time ago, not only would serve the cause of preserving world peace—which, of course, is what matters most—but would also, it seems to us, be advantageous from the standpoint of the interests of the Western Powers, since it would be one of the essential factors in establishing stable political and economic relations between the Western Powers and the countries of this area.

103. I should like to remind the Assembly of the proposals which the Soviet Union Government addressed to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France as early as February

1957. As we know, the Government of the USSR proposed that an agreement should be reached whereby the Governments of the great Powers would assume certain obligations with regard to ensuring a lasting peace in the Near and Middle East. The most important of these obligations are the settlement of controversial issues exclusively by peaceful means through negotiation, non-interference—I repeat: non-interference—in the domestic affairs of the Near and Middle Eastern countries, respect for the sovereignty and independence of those countries, and withdrawal of foreign troops from their territory.

104. Can anyone deny that, in the light of the events now occurring in the Near and Middle East, these proposals have acquired even greater timeliness and importance?

105. Agreement among the great Powers on non-interference in the affairs of the Near and Middle Eastern countries is an absolute prerequisite for the settlement of the problems of that region in the interest of its peoples and in the interest of peace. In order to attain these objectives, however, it is of course necessary to renounce any attempt to solve problems by force; it is necessary to desist from aggressive acts and, above all, to withdraw foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan. If peace is to be strengthened, the desire for it must be demonstrated in practice and must not be confined to declarations.

106. Why are there United States and United Kingdom troops in Lebanon and Jordan? Why is the build-up of these troops continuing and why are more and more new contingents and arms being dispatched? And how is all this to be reconciled with the peace-loving pronouncements of the United States and United Kingdom Governments?

107. Even those who were previously somewhat inclined to minimize the danger of the military intervention by the United States and United Kingdom in the Near East are having their eyes opened to the true state of affairs by the present actions of the Americans and the British. The peoples of the Arab countries are indignantly demanding the withdrawal of the interventionists' troops. An indication of this is the recent statement by the newly elected President of Lebanon, who declared that the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon was the chief aim of his country's national policy. And it must be stated bluntly that peace can be restored in the Near and Middle East only if the troops of the foreign interventionists are totally, unconditionally and immediately withdrawn from the Arab East. It is particularly necessary to bear this in mind inasmuch as some idea of keeping the foreign troops

in Lebanon and Jordan by one means or another is now in evidence. This would unquestionably constitute a mockery of the principles of the United Nations and a severe blow to its authority.

108. We now hear it said that foreign troops must remain in the Near and Middle East until, as some people put it, "order has been established" and "the situation has been stabilized". It is scarcely necessary to dwell on the dangers of the course into which an attempt is being made to impel the United Nations. After all, if every State or group of States starts arrogating to itself the right to establish the kind of order it likes in other countries and setting itself up as an arbiter in this matter, there will no longer be any place in international affairs for law or for the United Nations, and the law of the jungle, the law of the mailed fist, will prevail in relations among States.

109. I have not yet mentioned the reported intention of the United States Government to make a token withdrawal of one battalion of its occupation troops from Lebanon. Is any proof needed that such theatrical manœuvres have nothing in common with genuine measures designed to preserve peace in the Near and Middle East and to restore the independence of the occupied Arab countries? Dozens of battalions of troops are moved into the territory of a foreign country so that one battalion can later be withdrawn with pomp and ceremony; an attempt is even being made to reassure the peoples on the basis of the United States Government's plans.

110. Mention should be made of another technique which has been put to frequent use of late. In an obvious attempt to divert the attention of world public opinion from the concentration of United States and United Kingdom armed forces in the territory of Near Eastern States, the official representatives of those two Powers are making increasingly frequent statements about their desire to promote the economic development of the Near and Middle Eastern countries. We heard this very thing in today's address to the Assembly by Mr. Eisenhower, the President of the United States.

111. Assistance in the economic development of the Near and Middle Eastern countries is undeniably a fine thing. The Soviet Union has always favoured extending such assistance without imposing political or military conditions of any kind and in actual fact bases its relations with other States, including the countries of the Near and Middle East, on complete equality of rights and mutual benefit.

112. The remark of the President of the United States has

made here concerning economic assistance to the States of the Near and Middle East naturally call for appropriate study. But the very first thing to be settled is the crucial question of the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan. We cannot for one moment allow talks about economic assistance to be used to distract the General Assembly's attention from the settlement of this vital issue. That is why the Soviet Union resolutely insists that the question of the withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom troops from Lebanon and Jordan should be settled without delay and as a matter of priority.

113. Immediately after the United States and then the United Kingdom, too, undertook armed intervention in the Arab East, the Soviet Union demanded that the United Nations Security Council should take the most urgent measures to put an end to this aggression and safeguard the national independence of the Arab countries which had suffered an unprovoked attack. But the Security Council, the majority of whose members are associated with military blocs headed by those very Powers which perpetrated the aggression in the Near East, was unable to do its duty. That being so, the Soviet Government proposed that a meeting should be called of the Heads of the Governments of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and India, with the participation of Mr. Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. But the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom made it impossible to convene such a meeting.

114. In those conditions the Soviet Government considered it its duty to bring the question of the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from the Arab East and the restoration of peace in that area before the General Assembly for consideration at an emergency session.

115. In pressing for the withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom troops from Lebanon and Jordan, the Soviet Union is guided by its concern for the preservation of world peace and for the security of the peoples. The Soviet Union has no selfish purposes or concealed interests in the Near and Middle East. It has not a single soldier, not a single military base, no oil concessions and no capital investments there. The Soviet Union's sole concern in the Near and Middle East is to maintain a firm and lasting peace in this area and to ensure that the peoples living there are allowed to develop freely and independently.

116. And here I should like to stress one more point. The USSR proposed the calling of this emergency session of the General Assembly and is now, in the course of it, demanding the immediate withdrawal of

United States and United Kingdom troops from Lebanon and Jordan. It is not doing so with the idea of aggravating relations between our country and the United States and the United Kingdom, or in order to diminish the prestige of these States. Nor is it in any way our intention to bring about a deterioration of relations between these two Powers and the countries of the Arab East. We should be only too glad if these relations prospered on a basis of peaceful co-operation and full respect for the national sovereignty and independence of the Arab countries. The Soviet Government, as you know, is itself striving to establish with the United States and the United Kingdom good relations marked by complete confidence, and we are not to blame for the fact that such relations have not yet been realized.

117. We are not blind to the fact that both in the United States and in the United Kingdom there are people who consider that the Governments in Washington and London have gone too far in their actions in the Middle East to be able to withdraw their troops from Lebanon and Jordan in response to the United Nations appeal without harm to their prestige. Such an attitude is perhaps to some extent understandable, but it cannot for one moment be accepted. If the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom were truly interested in helping to find the right way out of the difficult situation which has arisen, and to strengthen peace, then, after carefully weighing all the pros and cons, they would realize the need to withdraw their troops from the Near and Middle East; so far from harming their prestige, this would, on the contrary, considerably enhance it in the eyes of the world at large.

118. The question this emergency session of the General Assembly has been convened to consider is one of immense importance. Our Organization has now, perhaps, a greater opportunity than ever before of making a valuable contribution to the preservation of world peace.

119. On behalf of the Government of the USSR the Soviet delegation has submitted for consideration at the emergency session of the General Assembly the following draft resolution on the immediate withdrawal of United States troops from Lebanon and United Kingdom troops from Jordan:

"The General Assembly,

"Recognizing the necessity of adopting urgent measures for the relaxation of tension in the area of the Near and Middle East in the interests of preserving universal peace,

"1. *Recommends* the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom to withdraw their troops from the territories of Lebanon and Jordan without delay;

"2. *Instructs* the Secretary-General to strengthen the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon in accordance with the plan presented by the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon in its second interim report (S/4052), and to send an observation group to Jordan with a view to the supervision of the withdrawal of the United States and United Kingdom troops from Lebanon and Jordan, and of the situation along the frontiers of those countries." [A/3870.]

120. In submitting this draft resolution, the Soviet delegation expresses its confidence that the General Assembly will study it with the requisite attention and a due sense of responsibility.

121. I do not think that we should be wrong in saying that the overwhelming majority of States represented in the United Nations is in favour of the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Near and Middle East. The situation is not altered by the fact that some are saying this aloud so that all can hear, others are saying it timidly, while others again are saying almost nothing.

122. It is well known that many of those taking part in this session of the General Assembly are engaged in a search for an appropriate formula in which to couch the demand for the withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom troops. Of course if there is a real desire to facilitate the adoption of such a course, which is the only correct one, then it should not be difficult to find a formula. A suitable formula, it seems to us, is offered in the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet delegation. This does not mean that we refuse to look for a mutually acceptable formula which would take into account the views of other delegations, if it serves the main purpose—the prompt withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan. We are ready today, if you wish—I repeat, today, if you wish—to enter into official or unofficial consultations with any delegation, including the United States and United Kingdom delegations, on the question of working out a constructive decision which the General Assembly might adopt for the sake of preserving peace.

123. The Soviet Government hopes that the emergency session of the General Assembly will worthily fulfil its task of restoring peace in the Near and Middle East.

124. The Soviet Union, like other peace-loving States, will continue to do all that is required for the consistent defence and maintenance of peace. This determination was clearly expressed in the recent Soviet-Chinese communiqué after the meeting between Mr. Khrushchev, Prime Minister of the USSR, and Mr. Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the People's Republic of China.

125. These are the considerations guiding the Soviet Union delegation at the present session of the General Assembly. This session can serve the cause of peace well if we are all imbued with a sense of high responsibility for the outcome of its work.

3. *Extract from speech by Mr. Arthur Lall (India), 18 August 1958⁸*

114. Those who have read their history correctly cannot but see in the recent events in Iraq a development which, in spite of the element of violence which was involved, is very much to be welcomed. May I say how happy we are to see in our midst the Foreign Minister of the new Government of Iraq, and our colleague, Ambassador Hashim Jawad, for whom many of us have long cherished admiration and the most friendly feelings.

115. And what of Lebanon and Jordan? For them too, the Government and the peoples of India have the most friendly feelings. We feel for them in their struggles and in their hardships. We consider it axiomatic that they too must decide for themselves their own future; we consider, furthermore, that they are entitled to do this without interference from any quarter, no matter what the motives.

116. I have probably said enough, and, I hope, said enough that is widely acceptable to this Assembly to indicate the basic reasons why the Government of India viewed with grave concern the landings of foreign troops in Lebanon and Jordan. We have given the most careful attention to the various reasons which were adduced for these actions. Sometimes it was difficult for us to follow those reasons, for they seemed to shift from one stand to another. But whether they were reasons based on Article 51 of the Charter, a stand which we regard as totally unacceptable and inapplicable to these cases, or whether they were reasons based on the right to protect foreign nationals or on the alleged right to assist a regime or Government, we were, may I say, not impressed. On the other hand, we could not but see very grave dangers inherent in the

⁸ GAOR, Third Emergency Special Session, 738th plenary meeting, 66-69.

situation created by the entry of relatively large numbers of foreign forces, armed and equipped in a manner which could let loose such a carnage of destruction as has never been seen in the long history of the Middle East. And moreover, these forces by their very presence—the presence of massive striking potential—cannot but interfere in the normal political and other forms of expression of the life of the people. I do not have to dilate upon this. It is expecting too much of human beings, even of the brave Arab people, to think that they can develop in freedom and in the manner which they would choose for themselves when they stand in the shadow cast by the massive presence of the armed strangers within their gates. And there is another important reason, another important aspect of this matter which must engage our attention. As the Prime Minister of India has said:

“Even if outside forces intervene with sincere and honest designs, they would have to side with one group or another in the country with consequences fraught with grave danger.”

117. In our view, the whole situation will continue to be full of danger and will continue to be explosive so long as foreign forces remain on the soil of Lebanon and Jordan. There can be no settlement, and indeed no talk of an acceptable, workable and dignified settlement, and no return to normalcy until this element of foreign troops has been removed.

118. It is not our intention in this debate to raise our voices in bitterness or in invective. That is very far from our purpose. We do not think that sort of debate would conduce to a settlement. But before we suggest some of the ideas for a settlement which might be helpful, if accepted by the countries immediately concerned—for it is they who must first tell us what is acceptable to them—we feel that an appeal to certain countries would not be amiss. We have not been able to accept the reasons for foreign forces being taken to the Middle East, and this, as I have said, has not been for lack of trying to understand these actions. To us it almost seems as if those who have thus acted had taken out a directive paper from the drawer of some misplaced archive of the eighteenth or the nineteenth century. Somehow time has lunged backwards into the past and produced actions which are totally out of date and out of step with the present. We earnestly hope that these ancient archives and these wrong drawers of history will not be opened again.

We do appeal to all countries to remember that whatever wise step may be taken in the future—and we hope that wise steps are about to be taken both in this Assembly and by national Governments unilaterally—it will unfortunately be a long time before the natural resentment, the natural feeling of violation and insecurity caused by even a temporary stay of foreign forces, can be undone in that area in which they are now stationed. We will, I hope, in the next few days find a method—find the mechanism which will lead to a very speedy withdrawal of foreign forces. But we will not, I fear in these few days be able to undo the human harm and to calm the stirring of human passions which will have resulted from this form of foreign presence in the Middle East. That result will require the protracted operations of the healing hand of time and the continued wisdom of all those concerned.

119. But in spite of the scar which will remain, and indeed so that the scar should not be too large and too painful, we cannot but act as quickly as possible. Nor can we overlook the fact, the very dangerous fact, that the presence of these troops creates the hazard that at any moment there may be set alight some incident from which could flare up such a bloody conflict as might well destroy the peace of the world. So from all points of view we must act quickly, and as wisely as we can.

120. Now if there is anything that emerges as a pointer from these brief remarks of mine, it is that we would be compounding folly and dealing a grave blow to the development of those very forces in the Arab world which should be encouraged if we were to replace the present type of foreign presence by a similar type of United Nations presence—that is, by armed forces. There could be no greater folly than this. Thus there would seem to be no question whatsoever of sending United Nations or other forces to the Middle East. And there can be no question whatsoever of sending of the United Nations devising means to arrest the development of Arab nationalism in each State in the area. Nor can there be any question of there being any other form of United Nations activity which might interfere in the internal affairs of an Arab State. It would certainly be ironical if the United Nations itself, in spite of the provisions of the Charter, were to launch some kind of interference in the affairs of an Arab State, and of course it would be interference totally incompatible with the Charter if the United Nations should seek to bolster up a particular regime or a particular Government.

121. Of course, it would be an interference if the United Nations should seek to exercise any form of police powers within the jurisdiction

of a State. We must be quite clear about these matters; otherwise we shall merely be sowing such seeds of discontent in the area as will, bidding their time, surely spring up in a harvest which will render ridiculous such devices as I am trying to suggest should be now totally ruled out.

122. There has been much talk also of indirect aggression. In fact, at one time we got the impression that this Assembly was meeting to consider indirect aggression, even though for ten years the United Nations has been unable to define aggression itself.

123. Charges of indirect aggression, Prime Minister Nehru has said, are "inherently and essentially and inevitably a part of the cold-war technique"; and he added that such talk "really ignores the basic issues there".

124. The point really is: Are we going to miss the wood for the trees? Are we going to concentrate our attention on the cheering from the sidelines, even the booing, even the caterwauling, even perhaps a certain amount of egging on, and not look at what is actually happening in the arena itself? If we do this, we shall put ourselves into a totally false, unrealistic and also somewhat ridiculous position.

125. To cut this matter short, let us beware of stifling Arab nationalism—and, as I have said, nationalism and imperialism are incompatible with one another. Let us beware of stifling, even attempting to stifle, Arab nationalism, for the simple reason that if we were to do this we would be trying to deny to others what we have made the basis of our own statehood. We would be denying our own national heritages, we would be suppressing the development of creative processes in human communities, and we would forfeit any claim to have acted wisely. Of course, it is absolutely essential that all States respect one another's independence, territorial integrity and full sovereignty, and there must be no interference whatsoever in one another's affairs. But, having said this, do not let us bring under interdict those vital, robust stirrings in the Arab countries of today which have their springs within the countries concerned themselves. And, if these robust stirrings yearn for a certain degree of co-operation among the countries of the Arab world, that is the affair of the Arab peoples, and it is not for us on the sideline to talk to them about indirect aggression. We have no doubt that the Arab States will make wise adjustments with one another. Whether a State retains in full its own separate identity or whether it enters into a particular form of relationship with its neighbours is a matter for decision in each case by the States concerned and not for us.

126. So, in searching for a solution, let us not get lost in talk about indirect aggression. If the cheering or booing, and so on, on the sidelines is regarded as too vociferous, there are friendly ways, as there are in private life, with a smile, of counselling or calling attention to neighbourliness. We all must remember these virtues for we all need to practise them, and I want to make it absolutely clear that I am not addressing these remarks specifically to the Arab countries. We all, perhaps, without exception, need to remind ourselves of these things.

127. The immediate, the foremost, the crying need is to remove the grave and present danger in the area; that is to say, we must turn our attention to the question of foreign forces in the Middle East. In doing so, I would once again repeat that we must remember the very grave dangers that are inherent in the presence of these forces; the grave dangers to international peace which concern every single country in this Assembly. We would, therefore, express the hope that United States forces will in the immediate future, and United Kingdom forces likewise in the immediate future, leave Lebanon and Jordan. We want to assure the United States and the United Kingdom again that we are not taking part in this debate for any reason but to attempt to contribute to a peaceful and speedy settlement in regard to the situation which confronts us. We have no desire to engage in invective or even in criticism. But we appeal to them to respond to the wishes of those in our part of the world who have some experience in these matters, and, may I say, to heed this appeal particularly when it comes from a very friendly country, from a country which has been able, in co-operation with the United Kingdom, to overcome some of the worst features of the past 200 years of our history, from a country which is not speaking from any personal motives, and from a country which therefore may be able to speak, we hope, not too unacceptably. We request the United States and the United Kingdom to withdraw from an action which will not, we feel we can assure them, conduce to any purpose which they themselves might have in view. We do not at this point wish to go into the economic interrelations between the Western world and the Arab Middle East. We are convinced, however, that those interrelations are a matter for discussion, as and when necessary and as agreed upon, around conference tables in a civilized and peaceful way, and that any show of force, as background moves or as direct thrusts into the economic arena, is doomed to failure and will only make relations between the West and the Arab Middle East worse in all fields, including the economic. Therefore, as a country

which has had long connexions with the West and which is a neighbour of the Arab world, and as a country which, if I may venture to say so, represents no small proportion of those peoples of the world whose experiences have in some respects been similar to those of the Arab peoples, we again ask the United States and the United Kingdom to consider and to heed our request and to accept our assurance that it is made in friendliness and in the conviction that it is in the best interests of all concerned.

128. Now, I have already said that we must not commit the folly of substituting one armed presence for another armed presence. May I say here briefly that much has been said in this debate about acting in accordance with the Charter or acting in accordance with the spirit of the Charter. We welcome the motives of such statements. However, we find nothing in the Charter which would even remotely sanction the sending of armed forces into the area in the circumstances and in the situation which exists. So far as we can see, apart from the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, the whole spirit of the wording of the Charter is that there should be no use of force whatsoever and no threats of force and no display of force. We do not, therefore, see any basis for statements invoking the Charter or the spirit of the Charter in defence of using armed force or of making a display of force in the present situation. As I have already pointed out, we exclude Article 51 of the Charter because none of the circumstances of which it speaks is applicable to the situation which confronts us. However, if either of the countries in which foreign forces have entered should ask for any strengthening of United Nations observation, then we think that it should be possible to take steps to meet its wishes.

129. Here it might be opportune, in view of other statements which have been made, to make some observations on the suggestion that if only the United Nations had had a police force at the present juncture, it could have quickly thrown it into action in Lebanon and Jordan. I wonder whether we could devise a formula which would create a kind of chameleon-like force capable of changing its colour or character so as to act, if required, as an operation of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, of the United Nations Emergency Force, or of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon. I submit that we could not do so. These operations are so different, one from another, that no single force could answer to all these widely differing requirements. To rush a standard type of force into delicate situations which cannot pos-

sibly be standardized is to court added trouble and disaster. In any event this is a matter which we should not resolve on now. If there is to be any consideration at all given to a matter like this, it must come up in the normal way and be looked at from all points of view. To slip it in, as it were, by a side door at this emergency session where we are considering a specific problem in a certain area of the world would in our view be unwise and totally unwarranted.

130. Let us then focus our attention on the matter which concerns us at this moment. Let us remove the cause of resentment in the Arab world. Let us remove the grave potential danger to world peace. Let us enjoin on all of ourselves brotherliness, non-interference, and respect for each other's sovereignty. Let us take these actions urgently lest the potential dangers should split wide open with a crash that would involve us all. Let us remember this when we talk of long-term measures: that they can be taken only in freedom and by the countries mainly concerned. Let it be those countries that will, in due time, if they wish and when they see fit, ask us to join with them in the evolving of such measures.

131. The delegation of India will welcome any constructive steps in line with the foregoing views, and, if necessary and desirable, will assist in their formulation and presentation to this Assembly. In that connection, we might find it necessary, Mr. President, once again to seek your indulgence to come to this rostrum.

4. *Speech by Mr. Charles Malik (Lebanon), 19 August 1958⁹*

2. The Middle East, in its international aspects, is a fit theme for consideration by the United Nations.

3. Firstly, its nations, since the Conference at San Francisco, have always played an active and, I should hope, constructive role in this world Organization.

4. Secondly, the problems of the Middle East have always been under review, indeed, to some extent, even decisions have been made by the United Nations; in fact, no region of the world has engaged the attention of the United Nations more than the Middle East.

5. Thirdly, the United Nations, as the Secretary-General has pointed out, has proven its relevance to the general area of the Middle East through the many and diverse engagements and activities it has undertaken there.

⁹ GAOR, Third Emergency Special Session, 740th plenary meeting, 27-29.

6. Fourthly, the material resources of the Middle East, which appear to be enormous, are critically needed by the rest of the world.

7. Fifthly, the outstanding strategic importance of the Middle East is obvious to every thinker and statesman, in fact, to everyone who just looks at the map. Any fundamental strategic world planning must include the Middle East as one of its most essential elements.

8. Sixthly, there is compacted in that general area considerable diversity of interest, race, aspiration, outlook and general valuation.

9. Seventhly, even apart from this native diversity, the very geographical location of the area makes it possible and, in fact, inevitable, for multiple influences to bear upon it from all over the world—from the north, from the east, from the south and from the west; and the Middle East has always been the centre of this world confluence, this world convergence.

10. Eighthly, if the Middle East is central in space, it is no less central in time, for, with all respect for other regions, I think it is quite clear that the world has been tremendously influenced and shaken throughout history by movements emanating from the Middle East; for, where would the world be without what was discovered, known, suffered and enacted in Egypt, in Arabia, in Palestine, in Lebanon, in Syria, in Mesopotamia, in Iran, in Asia Minor, in Greece, that great neighbour of ours which has always been in the closest interaction with the peoples of the Middle East?

11. Ninthly, the peoples of the Middle East appear to be caught today in the grip of a great historic revolution, a long-awaited revolution, a revolution long overdue, one that touches every aspect of their life—the political, social, economic, emotional and intellectual aspects. And the rest of the world is naturally profoundly interested in the roots, ideas, aims, tendencies and possible developments of this great revolution.

12. For all these reasons, I say, the Middle East constitutes, in its international aspects, a most fit theme for United Nations consideration.

13. In this complex, colourful, rich, world-significant Middle East, Lebanon has always figured as a distinct entity. There is a fascinating story of the accomplishments of navigators who sallied forth from our shores several millennia back. I shall not go into that here, nor into what the plying back and forth between east and west of these intrepid sailors did for the dissemination of ideas and the awakening of whole continents. Nor need I remind you of the great legend of Europa and her brother Cadmus. The great god Zeus, looking down upon this planet

one morning, saw the fairest sight on earth, the Phoenician Princess Europa playing with her maiden friends on the seashore meadows of Tyre. The god forthwith transformed himself into a bull, came down to where the maidens were dancing, carried away our own Europa on his back, abducted her into his dark continent beyond the seas and named that continent forever after her lovely name. Cadmus, grieved by the disappearance of his sister, journeyed far and wide in search of her, fought many dark battles on his journeys, and finally killed a dragon, and with the twelve teeth of the dragon planted what later matured into the twelve city-states of Hellas. I touch upon this dim historical-mythological past only to show that, as far as we can go back in history, we always find some distinct human entity centred in our mountains and on our shores and engaged in one of the noblest of human pursuits—the peaceful mediation of goods and ideas between race and race, culture and culture, and continent and continent.

14. Leaving the remote past aside, I wish to turn a little more closely to the last few centuries. Although from the seventh century on Lebanon became gradually a part of the new Arab world, it never lost its distinct entity. In the sixteenth century, at the time of the Ottoman conquest, the population of Lebanon exhibited pretty nearly the same communal structure with which it is characterized today. All these communities, notwithstanding their differences and quarrels, lived together in what might be termed a "peaceful symbiosis"; and under the general overlordship of the Emirs of Lebanon—that is to say, the independent national princes—who were their mediators and arbiters, they organized themselves, in fact, into a "federation of equal and free communities", each with its own particular communal laws. Thus, we see that, at a time when all the neighbouring countries formed an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon enjoyed an independent status.

15. The princes of Lebanon who ruled from 1515 to 1697 belonged at first to the Druze family of Ma'n, and until 1842, after the extinction of this family, to the allied family of Chehab. Between 1697 and 1770, the reigning members of this Chehab family were at one time Moslem-Sunni, at another time, between 1770 and 1842, Christian-Catholic. The new President-elect of Lebanon, General Fouad Chehab, is a scion of this old princely Lebanese family, and in fact he still keeps the title of "Emir".

16. In 1841, on the eve of the fall of the princely régime, a democratic assembly, called Council to the Emir, was created in which seats

were distributed among the six existing communities. After the fall of the Emirate in 1842, unrest overtook the country, resulting in a civil war in 1860. In 1861, Lebanon, reduced in its frontiers to "small Lebanon" received a special charter called "Réglement et Protocole", under which Lebanon was guaranteed by the great Powers of Europe. There was a governor with wide powers and an assembly, called the administrative council, where all the communities were represented. In this way, Lebanon, from 1861 to 1914, enjoyed an autonomous government, internationally recognized.

17. On 7 October 1918, Lebanon was occupied by the Allies. By the expressed will of its people, it was constituted on 1 September 1920 in its present frontiers into "the State of Great Lebanon". It was then placed under French mandate, which was subsequently approved by the Council of the League of Nations on 24 July 1922. After its adoption by the representative assembly, the Constitution which made Lebanon into a republic was promulgated on 23 May 1926. This Constitution, after two amendments in 1927 and 1929, acquired its definitive form which it continued to have until 1943.

18. In 1943, the mandate, which was intended from the very beginning to lead to independence, came to an end as a result of a general popular uprising, and the Government of Lebanon became solely responsible for the fate of the country. Under President Bechara El-Khoury, the first government of independence, headed by Riad Solh, amended the Constitution so as to remove from it every trace that might conflict with our sovereignty. The Ministerial Declaration of Riad Solh was unanimously endorsed by the Chamber of Deputies on 7 October 1943. Lebanon was henceforth launched as a completely independent and sovereign State by the unanimous will of its freely-elected representatives.

19. This freely-arrived-at act of independence was the happy outcome of a free understanding between all the elements of our population. This general national understanding issuing in the act of independence has since been known as the "national covenant". The national covenant flowering in the act of independence was a free agreement among all the elements of the population that they would all, from the point of view of political independence, cease to look outside and, firmly clasping hands together, they would all thenceforth trust one another and work harmoniously together as equal citizens whose only political loyalty would be to one independent and sovereign State, called Leba-

non, with clearly defined and internationally recognized boundaries. The national covenant is a free act of faith, by all communities, in Lebanon and in one another.

20. Our independence, thus constituted and thus consecrated, was quickly recognized by all our sister Arab States. In fact, without their active assistance in the decisive crisis of November 1943, it is doubtful whether our independence would have been consummated and consolidated; and Lebanon will always be grateful to them for that assistance. Lebanon then moved slowly but surely to take its modest place in the family of nations. It was soon recognized by a score of nations, great and small, with whom it exchanged diplomatic missions. The diplomatic corps in Beirut today is probably the largest in the Middle East, and certainly one of the largest in the world.

21. In the Alexandria Protocol of 1944 between the Arab States, the fourth decision was a special decision relating to Lebanon in which the Arab States reaffirmed their respect for the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon in its present boundaries, and declared that the Governments of these States had already recognized this independence and sovereignty after Lebanon had adopted a policy of independence set forth by the Government of Lebanon in its Ministerial Declaration of 7 October 1943.

22. Lebanon was a founding member of the League of Arab States in March 1945. The League, as article 1 of its charter states, was composed of independent Arab States; and its aim, according to article 2, was, among other things, to bring about closer relations between the Member States and to co-ordinate their political plans with a view to promoting closer co-operation among them and to ensuring their independence and sovereignty. Lebanon has taken an active part in the deliberations of the League during the last thirteen years, and will continue to do so, and has been faithful to the spirit and letter of its charter.

23. Lebanon was also a founding Member of the United Nations and its record in this Organization is well known. We took part in the great debates; we co-operated fully with our sister Arab States in all that appertained to Arab and Middle-Eastern problems; we served on the Security Council, on the Economic and Social Council, on the Commission on Human Rights, and on other organs of the United Nations; we spoke, expounded and published a great deal on United Nations, Middle-Eastern and international matters in general. We knew our existential limitations and we never trespassed beyond our modest place.

but that place, such as it was, we occupied firmly, confidently and always with good will.

24. We have had an honourable record at the United Nations, in world circles and at the chancelleries of the great Powers in the elucidation and defence of all Arab causes. Whatever the issues were—the question of Morocco before the Security Council in 1953 and 1954 or in the General Assembly, prior to Morocco's independence; Algeria, throughout the past decade until the present; Tunisia, until its independence and, lately, during its differences with France; Lybia, when its fate was being decided here at the United Nations in 1948, 1949 and 1950; Egypt with all its issues raised in the United Nations since the Conference at San Francisco; Yemen and the problems it faced at the United Nations; Saudi Arabia with its interests in the Gulf of Aqaba and elsewhere; the other struggling Arabs in the Arabian Peninsula; that tremendous issue, Palestine, in all the manifold phases of its development here at the United Nations and in world public opinion; Jordan and the complaints it lodged in the Security Council in 1953 and 1954; Syria with its diverse issues before the Security Council and the General Assembly—in all these matters, the record of Lebanon's service to its Arab brethren is there in the annals of the United Nations and elsewhere for the whole world to see and judge. We are proud of this record and we have always been heartened by the genuine appreciation which our Arab brethren have shown towards us on account of it. Whenever opportunity presents itself again, we shall turn whatever talents and means we have to the service of our Arab kinsmen.

25. In our general international relations we adopted a policy of friendship towards all. We had, to be sure, closer relations with some than with others, but this is part of the normal functioning of international existence; for, pray tell me, which nation has equally close relations with all nations? The important thing is that we do not harbour any hostile intentions towards any nation.

26. Concerning our internal development, I will only say that our economy has flourished during the last fifteen years as never before, and we have enjoyed a goodly measure of social and intellectual freedom. Our currency remains one of the strongest in the world, despite the recent disturbances. We are not ashamed of the economic, social and cultural standards of living of our people. Our internal political problems, real as they have been, have not in truth exceeded what was to be normally expected from a young, struggling nation under the enormous

pressures and strains of present-day conditions in one of the most sensitive regions of the world. Despite these strains and tribulations, there has developed on the whole among our people, during the last fifteen years, a mounting zest for life and a healthy confidence in ourselves and our future.

27. This is the account I have wanted to give the Assembly of the stewardship of our independence. Others may have done as well, but I doubt whether any have done better. Surely, there is much room for improvement; we know our weakness and we must attend to it.

28. I have thus shown, I believe, that, throughout the chequered history of the Middle East, there has always been a distinct entity organically related to the Lebanon mountains, and this entity, during the last fifteen years, has been internationally known as the Republic of Lebanon; that the ultimate ground which made the establishment of the Republic of Lebanon possible is most certainly the national covenant among our diverse communities; that the record of our independent existence under this covenant proves to any fair judge that we have not abused that great stewardship, and, therefore, that Lebanon fully deserves to remain free, sovereign and independent.

29. The special, delicate, balanced structure of Lebanon, brought about by the combined will of all the various elements of our people under the national covenant, makes it essential and imperative that Lebanese affairs be conducted solely and exclusively by the Lebanese people themselves. Any external interference of any kind, in any form, from any source or any side, is extremely detrimental to this state of affairs and is likely to break up that delicate structure, thus threatening the existence of the State and jeopardizing the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon. This has been amply proven by the recent events in Lebanon which have compelled the Government of Lebanon to appeal to the United Nations for help. I do not need to enter into this matter here, as we have sufficiently dwelt on it elsewhere.

30. The underlying and unchanging attitude of the Government of Lebanon is that it is always ready to settle any differences or disputes it may have with any sister Arab State, directly or through the Arab League, and that only if these two recourses fail, will it find itself compelled to turn to other remedies. It is our absolute desire to live in peace and amity, and to co-operate to the full, with all Arab States, and above all with our neighbour, the United Arab Republic.

31. A United Nations observation group was dispatched to Lebanon

with the task of ensuring that there is no illegal infiltration of armed personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese borders. It was only when experience had shown that this task, owing, among other things, to the special conditions prevailing in Lebanon, was not fulfilled, and only when the danger menacing the independence and integrity of Lebanon became imminent, that the Government of Lebanon, which is the only authority responsible for its independence and integrity, invoked Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and, using its inherent right of self-defence, requested the assistance of friendly countries. But, at the same time, we requested additional assistance from the Security Council, and we explained that the military assistance which was given us by the United States Government, was only temporary and would have to be withdrawn as soon as the United Nations gave us adequate assistance for the maintenance of our independence and integrity. Unhappily, the Security Council failed this time to provide us with the additional assistance needed, and the question, together with the whole situation in the Middle East, had to be brought before the General Assembly at its third emergency special session.

32. There are United States troops today on the soil of Lebanon. These troops are there only because the Government of Lebanon asked for them under Article 51 of the Charter, and the Government of the United States responded to that request. We are grateful to the United States Government for this response. The Government of Lebanon asked for this assistance only to help it secure the political independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon against subversion directed from without. It follows that, when the Government of Lebanon determines that the political independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon are secured by adequate United Nations action or in any other way, it will forthwith ask for the withdrawal of these troops. The Government of Lebanon is working and will continue to work hard towards bringing about that end as speedily as possible.

33. Three concepts sum up Lebanon's essence: independence, freedom and the human person. The Lebanese are a fairly independent race. This is expressed both by their firm attachment to their political independence and by the independent lines of action they take in the diverse walks of life. Freedom to us means much more than political freedom, much more than the freedom whereby the people determine their own political destiny. Freedom to us is primarily freedom of thought and conscience; it is, therefore, fundamental existential freedom. The amount

and intensity of free discussion, free criticism, free inquiry, free search, free self-determination of individual conscience and thought, is as great proportionately in Lebanon as anywhere else in the world. This atmosphere of freedom, which is quite offensive and even repulsive to the superficial observer, because it appears to him to border on anarchy, is the most striking feature of our life. We prefer freedom, even if it should border on anarchy, to regimentation, even if it should embody the most perfect exhibition of order.

34. If one studies our history, our traditions, our customs, our practices, the political system under which we live, we will find that the inviolability of the individual human person is the first principle of our existence. This principle has made it possible for diverse religious communities to live happily and symbiotically with one another in Lebanon. To us, the human person, the freedom of his own individual conscience and self-determination, come first; everything else, including the State, systems, ideas, philosophies, and ideologies, comes second. These are the three ultimate values which we try to realize in our being amidst much trial and tribulation: independence, freedom, and the sanctity of the human person.

35. There is no incompatibility whatsoever between Arab nationalism, on the one hand, and an independent Lebanon, on the other. It redounds to the glory of Arab nationalism to respect the existence of an independent Lebanon, and Lebanon can best serve the Arabs on a basis of independence. In fact, Lebanon's intellectual, social, economic, and even political contributions to Arab awakening have so far been second to none. If Lebanon feels justly secure in its independence, if it can live its life in secure freedom, then, I assure you, there is no end to the good it can do for itself, for the Arab world, and for the world at large.

36. When we are asked: Why should Lebanon cling to its independence? Is there still room today for small States? Would not Lebanon and everybody else be happy if Lebanon just let itself go? What is the justification for the continued existence of a tiny independent Lebanon? When these fair questions are put to us, we answer as follows:

37. An independent Lebanon is necessary, because, first and foremost, the independent and sovereign people of Lebanon want an independent Lebanon; second, there has always been a distinct entity in our mountains and on our shores; third, the ultimate values of independence, freedom and the sanctity of the human person in which we firmly believe, can, so far as we are concerned best be realized in an independent

Lebanon; fourth, whatever meaning we may have for the Arab world and whatever service we can render it—and we absolutely refuse to be isolated from the Arab world, because we are part of it—can best be achieved in an atmosphere of tranquillity and peace of mind of an independent Lebanon; fifth, peace and stability in the Middle East are the outcome of an exceedingly delicate equilibration of forces, and an independent Lebanon is one of the equilibrating elements; and, sixth, in this age in which the world has miraculously shrunk to a neighbourhood and in which, therefore, problems of coexistence have become most crucial, there is something inherently worth while for the whole world in the continued existence of a small country in the Middle East in which diverse outlooks and traditions can coexist together in peace in an atmosphere of freedom and of complete mutuality of respect. Lebanon, therefore, reveals itself in the end as a necessity in itself, a necessity for the Arab world, a necessity for the Middle East, and a necessity for the whole world.

38. This is the ground on which we base our appeal to everybody, far and near, to respect our independence, to help us preserve and strengthen it, to assure us the peace of mind under which we can live and create in freedom. This is not too exacting an appeal. I am sure, the resources of diplomacy, good will and sheer realism are not unequal to this task.

39. There is a deep-seated fear in Lebanon that what is really at stake is the very existence of Lebanon as an independent, sovereign, and free State. We ask that this fear be allayed. It is no use arguing that this fear is unfounded. Founded or unfounded, it is there, and those who hold it are absolutely sure that it is well founded, and they can clearly set forth the grounds on which their fear is based.

40. Is it impossible, I ask, for international wisdom and determination to give us adequate assurance that our independent existence will not be endangered, that we will really be left to solve our own problems in our own way, without any interference from outside, that nobody is going to impose upon us any other course than the one we wish to chart for ourselves? We do not believe so. Let, therefore, this wisdom and determination come forward and properly manifest themselves to the end that there be left no doubt in people's minds and, above all, in the minds of the peoples of Lebanon that Lebanon is safe and secure.

41. Until that happens, there will always be difficulties and complications, because we are a very difficult nut to crack. But when it hap-

pens, then no Lebanese will turn either to the right or to the left, then all of us will settle down to constructive and co-operative effort; then, we will all know that we have no choice but to live with one another in amity and concord.

42. We are grateful for the interest evoked in our case throughout the world and for all the real concern shown for us here at the United Nations. In the end, it is our people alone, discussing these matters freely among themselves and allowing their ideas to mature in an atmosphere of national reconciliation, who can really determine the permanent international status of Lebanon. This process of reconciliation takes some time.

43. The people of Lebanon crave for peace and understanding, for the opportunity for positive endeavour, for respectful co-operation with one another and with others, for an atmosphere, both national and international, in which all of us in the Arab world can work together in peace, for amity without recrimination, for a new relationship among ourselves and between us and others, for the moment when all will be forgiven and forgotten except friendship and love, for the joy of comradeship and communion in the great constructive tasks ahead.

44. A new and glorious day is dawning in the Near East. Men of good will everywhere are called to help in hastening that day. If the crisis of Lebanon causes the world to grapple with the deeper issues, the ultimate causes, then the anguish our people have gone through will not have been in vain.

5. *Draft resolution submitted by the USSR, 12 August 1958¹⁰*

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the necessity of adopting urgent measures for the relaxation of tension in the area of the Near and Middle East in the interests of preserving universal peace,

1. *Recommends* the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom to withdraw their troops from the territory of Lebanon and Jordan without delay;

2. *Instructs* the Secretary-General to strengthen the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon in accordance with the plan presented

¹⁰ GAOR, Third Emergency Special Session, *Annexes*, 1-2. The Soviet Union withdrew the draft resolution in favour of the Arab draft resolution presented on 21 August.

by the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon in its second interim report and to send an observation group to Jordan with a view to the supervision of the withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom troops from Lebanon and Jordan, and of the situation along the frontiers of those countries.

6. *Letter from Mr. Dulles to the UN Secretary-General on the question of withdrawal of the US forces from Lebanon, 18 August 1958*¹¹

United States forces are now in Lebanon in response to an appeal of the duly constituted Government of Lebanon for assistance in maintaining Lebanon's territorial integrity and political independence against danger from without. United States forces will be withdrawn from Lebanon whenever this is requested by the duly constituted Government of Lebanon or whenever, as a result of the further action of the United Nations or otherwise, their presence is no longer required. The United States will in any event abide by a determination of the United Nations General Assembly that action taken or assistance furnished by the United Nations makes the continued presence of United States forces in Lebanon unnecessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

I would appreciate it if you would have this letter circulated to the Members of the General Assembly for their information.

(Signed) JOHN FOSTER DULLES

7. *Draft resolution submitted by seven powers, 18 August 1958*¹²

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item "Questions discussed at the 838th meeting of the Security Council on 7 August 1958",

Noting the declarations addressed to the President of the General Assembly of 18 August 1958 by the United States regarding United States forces now in Lebanon and their withdrawal and by the United

¹¹ GAOR, Third Emergency Special Session, *Annexes*, 2.

¹² GAOR, Third Emergency Special Session, *Annexes*, 2-3. The seven powers were: Canada, Columbia, Denmark, Liberia, Norway, Panama and Paraguay. The sponsoring powers withdrew the draft resolution in favour of the Arab draft resolution presented on 21 August.

Kingdom regarding British forces now in Jordan and their withdrawal. Noting the Charter aim that States should practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours,

I

1. *Reaffirms* that all Member States should refrain from any threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or integrity of any State, or at fomenting civil strife and subverting the will of the people of any State;

2. *Calls upon* all Member States strictly to observe these obligations and to ensure that their conduct, by word and deed, in relation to the general area of the Near East, conforms to the above-mentioned policy;

II

Requests the Secretary-General, in accordance with the Charter, forthwith to make such practical arrangements as he, in consultation with the Governments concerned, may find would adequately serve to help in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordan in present circumstances, having in mind section I of the present resolution;

III

1. *Notes* that the Secretary-General has studies in preparation, for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirteenth session, of the feasibility of establishing a stand-by United Nations peace force;

2. *Invites* the Secretary-General to continue his studies now under way and in this context to consult as appropriate with the Arab countries of the Near East with a view to possible assistance regarding an Arab development institution designed to further economic growth in these countries;

IV

1. *Requests* Member States to co-operate fully in carrying out this resolution;

2. *Invites* the Secretary-General to report hereunder, as appropriate, the first such report to be made not later than 30 September 1958.

8. *Speech by Mr. Mahigoub (Sudan) introducing the Arab draft resolution, 21 August 1958*¹³

2. I am not speaking this time in the name of the delegation of the Sudan. It is my honour and privilege to speak in the name of all the Arab States represented in the General Assembly. It is a great honour and privilege because when I speak I speak in the name of ten Arab States which are related not only by a common language or a common heritage of history and culture, but also by blood.

3. In the first place, I wish to express our gratitude to all the representatives who participated in this debate of the emergency special session and who were very helpful in their speeches, which gave a good analysis of the situation, recognized Arab nationalism and, no doubt, gave us the line to follow in order to reach a solution to this problem. We are also very grateful to those who made attempts to draw up draft resolutions with a view to finding a solution to the present impasse and to lessening international tension.

4. I am sure it is the goal of the United Nations and the intention of every Member of this Organization always to reach a peaceful solution of any dispute that is brought before the Assembly. There is no doubt that it is the aim and purpose of the United Nations to establish peace and international security. The draft resolution which has just been distributed in document A/3893/Rev. 1 of 21 August 1958 is, I am proud to say, an example for peaceful solutions, and I hope it indicates the beginning of an understanding not only among the Arab States but among all the Member States assembled here.

5. This draft resolution is co-sponsored by all the ten Arab States. In our deliberations amongst ourselves we were dealing with a dispute between members of one family. Our discussions were frank, and therefore we were able to reach a happy conclusion. It is possible for us to deliberate in that manner because, as I have said, we are members of one family. We have had strong ties in the past; we have strong ties at present; and we all aspire to a glorious future for the Arab nations in order once more to contribute to the human heritage in all fields of knowledge for the promotion of human welfare.

6. The League of Arab States is a regional institution which is in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,

¹³ GAOR, Third Emergency Special Session, 746th plenary meeting, 169-70.

and the preamble of its Pact is quoted, in part, in the preamble to the draft resolution:

"Noting that the Arab States have agreed, in the Pact of the League of Arab States, to strengthen the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab States, and to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these States, and to direct their efforts toward the common good of all the Arab countries, the improvement of their status, the security of their future and the realization of their aspirations and hopes."

But the preamble of the Pact goes on to say "... and responding to the wishes of Arab public opinion in all Arab lands". This will show beyond any doubt that anything that takes place in any one of the Arab lands affects the inhabitants of the rest of the Arab lands. This is proved by the fact that when we were meeting to discuss this draft resolution not only the representatives of the independent Arab States were present but also representatives of other Arab States that are not yet fully independent and are not Members of this Organization, though we hope they will soon be amongst us.

7. This draft resolution is, in effect, the fruitful result of your wise guidance, Mr. President, and the efforts of the Secretary-General as well as the wise deliberations of the representatives who spoke with such good intentions and good will. The draft is a simple and straightforward one. In the preamble it takes note of the questions considered by the Security Council at its 838th meeting on 7 August 1958 and it notes the Charter aim that States should practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours. I am sure that every Member of this Organization upholds this aim and obeys the provisions of the Charter, which is a prerequisite for membership. Then it goes on to note the aims of the League of Arab States. I think that is so for the first time. It will, no doubt, be a source of pride to the United Nations that we are giving recognition to a regional organization which emanates from the Charter of the United Nations. The preamble also expresses the desire to relieve international tension, which is, no doubt, the hope of every member here.

8. In paragraph 1, the draft resolution welcomes the renewed assurances given the Arab States to observe the provision of article 8 of the Pact of the League of Arab States, that each member State shall

respect the systems of government established in the other member States and regard them as exclusive concerns of these States, and that each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government.

9. It is my respectful submission that the principle involved here, which has been given the renewed assurances of the Arab States, is a very high principle which should be observed not only by the members of the League of Arab States but by all the Member States of the United Nations. It is, of course, the wish of every one of us to respect the systems of government established in one State or another. And it is equally the wish of every one of us to pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government. Established systems of government can only be changed by the will of the people of the State through constitutional means and democratic ways. At this moment we pledge ourselves to this purpose.

10. Then, it is very necessary for any draft resolution at this juncture to provide for the ways and means whereby the present tension in the Middle East will be relieved. Therefore, the present draft calls upon all Member States to act strictly in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, of non-aggression, of strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs and of equal and mutual benefit, and to ensure that their conduct by word and deed conforms to these principles. It requests the Secretary-General to make forthwith, in consultation with the Governments concerned and in accordance with the Charter, and having in mind section I of the resolution, such practical arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordan in the present circumstances, and thereby facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from the two countries.

11. We have thus provided the machinery for the Secretary-General to see that tension is relieved, that international peace and security are saved, and that instability and unrest in the Middle East are eradicated forever.

12. There are two other sections of the draft resolution. One refers particularly to the long-term policy of economic development in the Middle East. I am sure the Secretary-General will consult with the League of Arab States regarding the best ways and means of providing for economic development in the Middle East. Economic development is

a necessary element for stability. We are ready to co-operate with one and all for providing economic development in our region with the hope that, when our countries are fully developed and our resources fully exploited for the benefit of the people in the area, we ourselves will be in a position to extend our hand to help other parts of the world which will perhaps be in need of our assistance.

13. When we ask for co-operation at present and for the development of our area, we do so not only in the interests of the Arabs but also in the interest of the world at large. We hope that, in turn, in the future we will be able to return the good that has been done for us here by others and, if possible, to return it with interest.

14. I asked for the Assembly's indulgence to see if the Arabs could find a solution, and this time they were able to do it and do it magnificently. At the time when the dispute came from our side, and when all the world felt the gravity of the situation, when some people lost every hope of a remedy and many thought that we were at the brink of a world war, the Arabs themselves were able to meet in a mutual and cordial atmosphere and provide the solution which I am sure will be acceptable to everyone in this Assembly. It is the aim of all of us here to see that this dispute is settled and that the way for removing instability and unrest, and laying the foundations of a permanent peace in that area, and thereafter permanent peace in the world, can be realized. I am sure that by accepting the draft resolution we will have achieved that end.

15. For us, the Arabs, this will be the beginning of a glorious future. It will be the beginning of strengthening our ties, co-operating among ourselves, and being tolerant with each other. We shall, no doubt, do all that is possible to realize our hopes and aspirations and co-operate among ourselves wholeheartedly. We hope that we will be able to contribute to the well-being of our Arab nation, whether that nation remains distributed among different independent States, in a regional organization or under any form of government to which the peoples of the Arab lands will agree, or becomes one State. We will be able to contribute also to the well-being of the international family.

16. Once more, perhaps, the light will come from our region. We may bring forward our preachings which call for peace and security for all humanity and for high principles of equality among all individuals indiscriminately.

17. Our mission henceforth will be the pursuit of human perfection, peace and security, and not the destruction and annihilation of the human

race. As this draft resolution came unanimously from the Arab States with full understanding and agreement, may I appeal to my fellow representatives here to put their approval on it and give it the unanimous support of the Assembly in order to prove to Member States and other States everywhere in the world that the men who meet here are wise men, that they have the interests of humanity at heart, and that their mission is a mission of peace and security and not of destruction and annihilation.

9. *Draft resolution submitted by the Arab Member States and unanimously adopted by the General Assembly, 21 August 1958*¹⁴.

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "Questions considered by the Security Council at its 838th meeting on 7 August 1958",

Noting the Charter aim that States should practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours,

Noting that the Arab States have agreed, in the Pact of the League of Arab States, to strengthen the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab States, and to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these States, and to direct their efforts toward the common good of all the Arab countries, the improvement of their status, the security of their future and the realization of their aspirations and hopes,

Desiring to relieve international tension,

I

1. *Welcomes* the renewed assurances given by the Arab States to observe the provision of article 8 of the Pact of the League of Arab States that each member State shall respect the systems of government established in the other member States and regard them as exclusive concerns of these States, and that each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government;

2. *Calls upon* all States Members of the United Nations to act strictly in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for each

¹⁴ GAOR, Third Emergency Special Session, *Annexes*, 3. The sponsoring States were: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yemen.

other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, of non-aggression, of strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and of equal and mutual benefit, and to ensure that their conduct by word and deed conforms to these principles;

II

Requests the Secretary-General to make forthwith, in consultation with the Governments concerned and in accordance with the Charter, and having in mind section I of this resolution, such practical arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordan in the present circumstances, and thereby facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from the two countries;

III

Invites the Secretary-General to continue his studies now under way and in this context to consult as appropriate with the Arab countries of the Near East with a view to possible assistance regarding an Arab development institution designed to further economic growth in these countries;

IV

1. *Requests* Member States to co-operate fully in carrying out this resolution;

2. *Invites* the Secretary-General to report hereunder, as appropriate, the first such report to be made not later than 30 September 1958.

10. The Final Phase

INTRODUCTION

WHILE the election of Fu'ād Shihāb as president was indicative of a common desire on the part of various sections of the Lebanese people to avert a total disaster, the General Assembly resolution reflected the common desire of rival powers to extricate themselves from the Lebanese tangle. Having registered these positive gains the parties concerned entered the last phase of the crisis. While tension gradually tended to subside Premier Sulh quietly left for Turkey and three days later, on 23 September, Fu'ād Shihāb succeeded Sham'un as President. Rashīd Karāmī formed a new cabinet which completely excluded the "loyalists." It appeared as though the five-month-long civil war had ended in a total victory of the opposition—a result which, in the Lebanese conditions, could not go unchallenged. The Phalanges, the PPS and other supporters of the previous régime posed a real threat of "counter-revolution." The general strike called by the new opposition rapidly spread over large areas; and hostilities were resumed. Lebanon was again plunged into chaos and anarchy for another three weeks until the new government realized, like Sham'un's before, that neither the "opposition" nor the "loyalists" could run the country single-handedly; and an agreement on the basis of "no victor, no vanquished" was reached between the two parties. Symbolic of the new spirit was the inclusion of the Phalangist chief, Pierre Jumayyil, in Karāmī's reconstituted cabinet. That marked the end of a national upheaval which claimed the lives of nearly three thousand Lebanese¹ immensely damaged the economy of the country, gravely disturbed the delicate equilibrium of Lebanese society and pushed the whole world to the brink of a total war.

In the meantime efforts had been made to liquidate other vestiges of the crisis. On 8 October, the Department of State announced that US forces would be completely withdrawn from Lebanon by the end of the month.² The Lebanese government in turn requested the Security Council, on 17 November, "to be good enough to delete from the list of mat-

¹ Fahim I. Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington, 1961) 175.

² See below.

ters before it" their complaint against the UAR;³ and the UN Secretary-General forthwith proceeded with the task of withdrawing the UNOGIL from Lebanon.

1. *Summary of statement by the opposition parties stipulating conditions for their participation in the Presidential election, 29 July 1958*⁴

Beirut: The Opposition parties and organizations today stipulated that, for its Deputies to attend the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies scheduled for next Thursday [31.7.58] to elect the future President of the Republic, candidates for the presidency must declare the principles they intend to follow and the programme they intend to realize, so that the Deputies may decide on their attitude before they elect them.

These parties and organizations said in a lengthy statement issued today that they consider the sound basis for the establishment of a new regime to be the immediate withdrawal of the various foreign forces and arms from Lebanese territory, the dismissal of Camille Sham'un, the formation of a government acceptable to the Opposition to take over the responsibilities of ruling, the formulation of all procedure and laws of the State on the principle of the Lebanon's independence and sovereignty and the preservation of its entity, the return of Lebanon to the policy of neutrality which it adopted at the beginning of independence, non-alignment with East or West so that no State or group of States may have a concession or an extraordinary centre or military base, and that Lebanon be kept free of all foreign military alliances and foreign interference from any side.

The Opposition parties and organizations demand the Lebanon's return to true Arab policy in order that it may carry out its liberated and progressive role in the Arab world, amendment of the Lebanese Constitution so as to enable a parliamentary democratic regime to be established to secure a true balance and correct harmony among the three authorities of the State and finally end treachery and constitutionally irresponsible individual rule, co-ordination of all State machinery on the basis of large-scale decentralization and its establishment on a sound basis, the purging of the Government from the elements of corruption, bribery, subservience and abuse of power in order that Lebanon may become a State trusted by the people and may realize social justice for

³ See below.

⁴ *S.W.B. Part IV*, 31 July 1958, 7-8.

all parties and Lebanese regions, respect for individual freedom and public freedom, primarily freedom of press, speech and assembly and immediate abolition of press censorship.

The parties and organizations also demand a final end to every terrorist movement which threatens national unity and the safety of Lebanon and its entity, realization of equality and justice among different religions and the establishment of a 50-50 ratio between Muslims and Christians in the State machinery and its utilities (Arabic: *manafi*) until the country agrees to abolish communalism, establishment of a council for the Civil Service, amendment of the Election Law so that the number of Deputies may not be less than 120, division of the constituencies on a geographical basis to secure true popular representation, and sufficient guarantees to secure the freedom of elections.

The Opposition parties and organizations demanded in their statement that none of the activities of the revolution be outlawed and that all laws and measures necessary be laid down to realize this object.

The Opposition parties and organizations said that, by the above, they explained their attitude toward the presidential elections. The candidates for the presidency should, on their part, give their opinion clearly on these principles and undertake to apply them through endeavours and work in order that the Deputies, particularly those of the Opposition, attend the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies with an awareness of the situation and of the programmes of the candidates and so that the Lebanese people may agree on the person of the next President and the other classes of people may co-operate with him to restore the situation to normal and bring reassurance and stability to Lebanon.

The parties added that to elect a new President without agreeing on what his principles should be would be an abuse of the people's rights, constitute a denial of sound democratic life and, lastly, constitute a continuance of the present revolution until it realizes its targets with the co-operation of all the good forces in the country and emerges courageously and strongly and ends the state of anxiety and disorder which prevails in the country.

2. Statement by the opposition leaders laying down conditions for cooperation with the new President, 31 July 1958⁵

The Lebanese people, who have revolted and offered their blood for the sake of preserving Lebanon's existence, freedom, and constitutional

⁵ *S.W.B. Part IV*, 1 August 1958, 7.

status, find their soil, on the eve of the election of the new President of their Republic, occupied by foreign forces, their National Convention torn up, their foreign policy deviating from its normal neutrality, and their hangmen still in office.

We, the undersigned, have therefore decided out of loyalty to our father-land and the rights of our people to demand of the new President, as a condition of our co-operation with him in the regrouping of the Lebanese ranks and in maintaining Lebanon's high standing, that he pledge himself before the people to exercise his authority as soon as he is elected, to take immediate action for the withdrawal of foreign armies from Lebanon, to restore and preserve the National Convention, and to have recourse to [the policy of] neutrality and liberation. The people will accept no substitute for these conditions. In the event of these conditions being disregarded, we shall be forced to continue the struggle to achieve these aims.

(signed) Sa'ib Sallam, Henri Far'un, Kamal Jumblatt, Rashid Karamah, Ahmad Al-Asa'd, Sabri Hamadah, Rene Mu'awwad, Shafiq Mur-tada, Fadlu Abu Haydar, Sulayman Franjiyah, Nasim Majdalani, Abd al-Karim Qaddur, and Kamil al-Asa'd.

3. *Statement by Mr. Sa'ib Salām, the opposition leader, on Shihāb's election, 31 July 1958^c*

Commenting on the election of Fu'ad Shihāb as President of the Lebanese Republic, the Opposition leader Sa'ib Sallam stated that Fu'ad Shihāb was an honourable Lebanese. His many good qualities made the Lebanese people hope he would succeed in realizing their national aspirations. The Opposition Deputies had participated in electing him in the hope he would lead Lebanon into a new regime, away from the hell which Camille Sham'un had produced.

The Opposition leader added that the men of the popular resistance movement, while welcoming the election of Fu'ad Shihāb, believed the continued presence of Sham'un and the foreign occupation forces would compel them to continue their struggle until Sham'un and the occupation forces disappeared. He added: "On behalf of all the strugglers I declare that they are more determined today than ever, since they have become confident that victory is near and the accomplishment of their two aims, the downfall of Sham'un and the withdrawal of the forces of

aggression, will pave the way for the realization of their demands. Unless these are achieved Lebanon will not live in peace and happiness."

Sa'ib Sallam commended the strugglers for their bravery, courage and understanding. He concluded by saying that the popular resistance forces would not abandon their weapons or their stand until their demands were realized and until their positions were secured.

4. *Statement of policy by the President-elect Maj. Gen. Fu'ad Shihab, 4 August 1958*⁷

In these difficult days experienced by our beloved homeland while pain overwhelms it and its people are burdened by hardships, a person cannot hesitate to take over a task entrusted to him by the country. Being used to fulfilling my duty and in appreciation of the public security, I have accepted the desire of my fellow countrymen that I assume the post of President of the Republic, praying to God Almighty to brighten our course and lead us to things which would please God and serve the good of Lebanon.

I have been deeply involved in the difficult situation suffered by our beloved country, and have lived all the tragedies with our national army. Therefore I am fully aware of the weight of the responsibilities now placed on my shoulders. However, the good souls of the Lebanese people, their spirit of love and tolerance and their adherence to the principles of independence for their country and freedom in their homeland have made me confident and greatly hopeful that the Lebanese people, thanks to their solidarity and consciousness and good will, will overcome the crisis through which the country is passing, and that the country will emerge with greater faith in itself, stronger and in a better position.

What I ask of myself and of every Lebanese citizen is that we do our level best to restore to the country its national unity, by the strength of which Lebanon achieved its independence in 1943, strengthened its leadership and firmly established its entity. It is from this unity that the National Covenant emanated. This Covenant which has outlined for us a purely national policy, a brilliant policy, and an independent foreign policy, will always remain the constitution which guarantees Lebanon's glory and the prosperity of its people. If that unity was the most effective weapon which Lebanon used for achieving independence and strengthening national sovereignty, this unity, coupled with reassurance and stabi-

⁷ S.W.B. Part IV, 6 August 1958, 5-6.

lity, is still the basis for every action we aim today and always will be. It is the basis for our national objectives, foremost of which is the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanese territory.

Equality among the Lebanese people, sincerity and frankness in our relation with brotherly Arab countries, and dignity and friendship in all our foreign relations, are bases which will bring a happier life to our Lebanese homeland. In such a life prosperity, peace, security and dignity will be secured. Furthermore, such a life will place Lebanon in a deservedly notable position among the Arab countries and in the world.

While preserving this unity, we should, for the sake of building the State, preserve the virtues of honesty, justice and impartiality, and knowledge, order and equality. We should make all these guide our society in all walks of life. We should also make the spirit of responsibility, the fulfilment of duty and the sanctity of public security guide all branches of government.

Once we have faced up to our duty with the effort requested—long, bitter, and continuous effort—we then will have followed the path which will take us to our national objectives. On this occasion I express my thanks for the precious confidence placed in me by the Lebanese people and their noble Chamber of Deputies. I also express my sincere greetings to the Lebanese people here and abroad, vowing before God Almighty that I will be just to all without discrimination and also just to this homeland, its past and future.

5. *President Sham'un's press conference, 18 August 1958*⁸

Addressing foreign correspondents at the opening of the conference, His Excellency said: "It gives me pleasure to meet you, although I have no special statement to make. But in view of the fact that more than one journalist asked for an interview with me, and since it was impossible for me to receive them individually, I found it suitable for you all to gather together. So if you have any questions to ask I shall be glad to answer them.

"As you know, the UN Assembly is now holding a special session at the request of the big Powers to discuss Middle East problems, particularly those of Lebanon and Jordan. It had earlier decided to meet at the request of the Soviet delegation, which demanded that the General Assembly should pass a resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal

⁸ S.W.B. Part IV, 21 August 1958, 2-6.

of the American forces in Lebanon and the British forces in Jordan. We are now interested in what is taking place in Lebanon at present. As regards the Soviet proposal, all that can be said is that the Soviet Union objects to the presence of American forces in Lebanon, despite the fact that it has rejected the idea of a UN police force and has even objected to the presence of the observers' groups.

"On the other hand another proposal which can be called President Eisenhower's plan has been put forward. As you know, this plan consists of two parts: the first is a constructive plan for providing prosperity and stability in the Middle East, which I personally believe is a bold and realistic programme and is actually capable of ensuring prosperity and peace in this area provided it is implemented in good faith and that someone takes the initiative in implementing it. The second part of the plan deals with the withdrawal of American forces from Lebanon. These forces, as you know, came to this country at the request of its duly constituted authorities. President Eisenhower has declared that the American forces will leave Lebanon when asked to do so by the duly constituted authorities or when the situation in Lebanon is settled, all threat to its independence has vanished, and the presence of these forces is no longer justified.

"This makes clear the case for the presence of American forces in Lebanon. This shows that it is not an occupying force or a force seeking aggression; it is a gesture by a friendly State toward another friendly State whose freedom and independence have been exposed to danger."

"The General Assembly tomorrow will discuss a draft proposal which the Norwegian delegation will put forward. It is impossible to comment on this proposal since we know nothing about it, and we do not know whether it has been submitted in its final text. However, it appears to me that the General Assembly should immediately adopt the Norwegian draft proposal, which asks the Assembly to draw up a plan which will ensure the independence of Lebanon and Jordan, provided that this plan is submitted to the Assembly at its ordinary session before 30th September. Only then will it be possible to judge whether or not the Norwegian proposal would achieve objects.

"As regard Lebanon's representative at the General Assembly, he is Dr. Charles Malik, who enjoys the full confidence of the Government and to whom I wish success in discharging his mission at the UN.

"Now I am prepared to answer all questions."

Q. Did you, Mr. President, request the withdrawal of one battalion of American marines from Lebanon? Or did you just approve it?

A. We were informed that one battalion of American marines would be withdrawn from Lebanon, to which we agreed. We were not asked for advance approval of this action, but accepted it.

Q. Did you not ask for it?

A. No.

Q. Have you any opinion on the Soviet attitude to the dispatch of British forces to Jordan?

A. No. But nobody has asked my opinion about Jordan. Besides, I am not supposed, in my official capacity, to give any opinion on this matter.

Q. What is your opinion of the Soviet proposal?

A. I do not believe it is in Lebanon's interest.

Q. Will Lebanon submit a draft proposal? Is such a proposal being drawn up?

A. It is premature to say whether Lebanon will submit any suggestions or proposals to this effect, because the problem will be discussed basically only at the General Assembly's ordinary session.

Q. We have learned that Dr. Charles Malik carried with him a special plan for the internationalization of Lebanon's neutrality and providing for international guarantees. Is this true, and do you believe that the plan will be put forward in this form?

A. We are particularly interested in a constitution or a pact which will ensure this country's independence. Neutrality or internationalization could be a good solution; but this does not mean that there is no other way. However, we have not yet adopted a definite attitude in this regard.

Q. Do you believe, Mr. President, that the situation in Lebanon will return to normal after 23rd September?

A. One must always hope for the best. I can never be pessimistic.

Q. Do you, Mr. President, believe that the situation has improved since 31st July?

A. Yes. There is no longer any regular fighting between the rebel forces and Lebanese regular forces. This, however, does not prevent some sabotage from taking place, or the exchanges of fire from time to time. This might go on for some time, for it is difficult to imagine that everything will stop at once after the revolution has continued for several months.

Q. What is your opinion on the attitude of the Japanese delegate at the UN?

A. So far I am not aware of the new Japanese attitude; but I know that the Japanese proposal put forward during the Security Council debate was made in good faith and does not involve anything harmful to Lebanon's interests.

Q. Has your previous attitude regarding your remaining in office until midnight on 23rd September changed?

A. No change.

Q. Will the Government, after your departure from office, demand the withdrawal of the American forces?

A. I do not expect so because I anticipate that the situation will calm down enough to enable us to look forward confidently to the future.

Q. Do you intend to organize a political party after you leave office?

A. Yes. I can assure you of this, because I intend to continue the struggle in the political field until we make sure that Lebanon's independence is guaranteed and that our freedom and beliefs are no longer threatened.

Q. What is your opinion of Fanfani's plan for the Middle East?

A. Mr. Fanfani drew up his plan for the Middle East on an economic basis. This does not involve any harm; on the contrary. But it remains to be seen whether the problem of the Middle East is merely an economic one, or if it is also a political one. Even if we admit that Premier Fanfani's plan is economically beneficial, I believe that it will remain incomplete if the plan does not take political problems into consideration.

Q. Do you expect any change in the Government before the expiration of your term of office?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Premier Fanfani's proposals embody economic aid on a new basis. Don't you, Mr. President, think that this constitutes the beginning of a political solution?

A. This is possible, though it is difficult for me to answer this question, precisely because I am not fully informed on Premier Fanfani's proposals. All I could say is that it is a good proposal.

Q. What is your opinion of the part of the draft proposal regarding the withdrawal of the American forces from Lebanon?

A. I believe that this is a natural thing, and that the withdrawal of the American forces must be effected either at the request of the duly

constituted authorities of this country or when the presence of these forces is no longer necessary.

Q. Do you expect that the duly constituted authorities of Lebanon would demand the withdrawal of the American forces even though peace and stability did not prevail in the country, and if so what will be your attitude in this case? Should the American forces then stay?

A. I do not believe that any wise, duly constituted person in authority would demand the withdrawal of the American forces as long as the future of this country was not secured, except in one case—the replacement of American forces by international forces.

Q. If after assuming office President Shihab demanded withdrawal of the American forces, how would you compromise between this action and your declared attitude toward it?

A. The fact is that the President-elect has declared that his most important aim is the withdrawal of the American forces from Lebanon. This however does not rule out the requirement that peace and stability must first prevail.

Q. Do you, Mr. President, mean to say that you believe that Gen. Shihab will not demand the withdrawal of the American forces unless peace and tranquillity prevail in the country?

A. Of course. The General has to say what he thinks on this question. However, I presume that when the General made his statement he meant to call on all parties to be more reasonable and quiet in order that the American forces can be withdrawn as early as possible.

Q. Does this mean that your view is identical with that of Gen. Shihab?

A. I do not believe that a difference of opinion exists.

Q. Do you believe that the UN observers have done a worthwhile job?

A. They have done as much as they could under the conditions affecting their work.

Q. In your opinion, what measures should be taken on the home front in order to secure Lebanon's independence and stability?

A. Political differences exist in every country. The existence of such differences in Lebanon does not necessarily mean a lack of stability. Matters have been complicated by interference in our domestic affairs from abroad. This interference has led to instability.

Q. Is there now foreign interference in Lebanon to the extent which prevailed when you called for American forces?

A. Interference still exists, although on a smaller scale.

Q. Do you believe that more American forces and equipment were sent than the situation warranted?

A. This is a difficult question, because when armed forces land they are accompanied by all necessary equipment. American forces are heavily and extensively equipped, and it was necessary for them to bring all their equipment.

Q. Is there a possibility that you may take a trip before the expiration of your term of office?

A. No.

Q. Do you believe that Premier as-Sulh's cabinet will resign before the end of your term of office?

A. It is natural that the Cabinet should remain in office as long as I stay. In any case, it must stay until I leave office.

Q. Do you believe that you will be able to solve certain problems before relinquishing office on 23rd September?

A. I hope so.

Q. How far have you gone with, or what progress has been made with, the Lebanese complaint to the UN against UAR interference in your affairs?

A. The complaint, which has been submitted to the Security Council, is still in the hands of the UN, which should discuss it. However, we will not press the matter because there is now a plan for guaranteeing Lebanon's independence.

Q. Do you think that Lebanon will be able to preserve its independence and sovereignty without American support?

A. Yes, if everyone behaves as he should.

Q. Do you think there is a possibility of reaching agreement with the opposition leaders?

A. There are no personal differences between the opposition leaders and me.

Q. Even in your capacity as President?

A. Yes, even in my capacity as President, if they admit that Lebanon should remain a sovereign country without foreign interference in its domestic policy and affairs.

Q. Are you maintaining direct contacts with the opposition leaders?

A. No.

Q. Are your advisers and assistants?

A. No.

Q. What action has your Government taken towards disarming?

A. No action yet, although a plan is now under consideration.

Q. Do you believe that your community, the Maronites, supports Gen. Shihāb?

A. Why don't you put this question to my community? As for myself, I am entirely with Shihab, now and in future.

Q. Has Lebanon taken steps toward making peace between Israel and the Arab countries?

A. There are no peace talks with Israel. Moreover this question is irrelevant.

Q. Do you believe that Gen. Shihāb will choose an opposition leader as Premier? Would you oppose such action?

A. Perhaps. The matter depends on the future Premier's political views. If these views are contrary to ours, we will struggle against them. If not, good will ensue.

6. *Summary of statement by Mr. Kamāl Junblāt, the opposition leader, on the presence of the US troops in Lebanon, Cairo, 16 September 1958⁹*

In a special interview with the Middle East News Agency in Cairo, the Lebanese Opposition leader, Kamal Junblat, made the following statement:

"The Opposition's attitude regarding withdrawal of American troops from Lebanon has been and will remain frank and adamant. President-elect Fuad Shihab has often declared that he will demand withdrawal of these troops the moment he takes office as President of the Republic. Then there will remain not the slightest legal justification for these troops remaining in an independent country."

The Lebanese leader continued: "The Opposition sees that Lebanese independence will be absolutely meaningless with these troops present. Added to this is the fact that these foreign troops have been used as a tool to sow and spread sedition. A number of mercenaries have attempted to exploit the presence of these troops for the purpose of diverting the honest national struggle, which the Opposition launched, into ignominious communal fighting."

Junblat also declared: "The Opposition will not abandon control of the area which it has freed, and which constitutes more than 80 per cent

⁹ *S.W.B. Part IV, 17 September 1958, 5-6.*

of Lebanese territory, unless the American forces withdraw from Lebanon. We shall go back to the battle-field as a popular force ready to fight, for this is a national duty dictated by the higher national interests and the people. We shall ask for help and assistance from all the peoples of the world. We shall bring the question before the UN, and provide plenty of proof of America's trespassing on Lebanese independence and on the rights of the Lebanese people. Moreover, we consider the presence of British forces in sisterly Jordan as constituting a danger to our independence and security."

Speaking of the tasks before the forthcoming Government, Junblat said: "It is the duty of the new regime to carry out basic reform, rebuild the State, and set up a public service system independent of politics—in other words, to reorganize the police, the Administration, the judiciary department, and the foreign diplomatic service which has been afflicted with corruption and often with treason." Junblat added: "More important still is the need to rebuild homogeneous Lebanese society on the basis of the National Charter adopted by all sects and communities, in order to eliminate the most serious rift which Sham'un's regime will leave behind, namely, communal discrimination. Sham'un fanned the fires of communalism in order to burn Lebanon, but Lebanon was saved and Sham'un himself was burned."

Asked whether Sham'un would remain in Lebanon to carry on his political career, Junblat said: "As a politician, Sham'un is finished—is finished even as an ordinary citizen. It would be for his own good to leave the country. He will not then cause further trouble among people of the same country."

Commenting on the nomination of Charles Malik for Presidency of the UN General Assembly, the Lebanese leader said: "Charles Malik does not represent the true Lebanon. The man who dared to request foreign troops to occupy his country cannot qualify for the highest international position in the world."

7. *Statement by President Shihāb upon taking the oath of office, 23 September 1958*¹⁰

Honourable deputies, the time spent in the post of army commander, where silence is a duty, until the time I ascended the rostrum of this Chamber, where speech is the master, was probably the happiest period I experienced since I took the path of military service. However, the

¹⁰ *S.W.B. Part IV*, 24 September 1958, 2-4.

people's precious confidence, which you expressed when you chose to lay upon my shoulders the duties of the President of the Republic, will always be able to help me accomplish what you seek from this Presidency and what I want to achieve in the service of Lebanon and its people.

The first thing that comes to our minds, while our hearts are full of the knowledge of our responsibilities before God and the homeland, are those Lebanese who fell during the bloody days in the life of Lebanon. We stand respectfully before their souls to declare that the victims which Lebanon gave during the crisis, the troubles and hardships it endured, and the losses it suffered should not go for nothing. On the contrary, Lebanon should derive the greatest benefits from these things. It is the duty of every Lebanese to see that from the soil of misery, blood and pain, there spring the flowers of glory, happiness and prosperity.

Stabilization of conditions and the establishment of Government control throughout Lebanese territory; the complete disarming of all Lebanese, without discrimination; the return of life and activity to the Lebanese economy; the reconstruction of the destroyed services and landmarks of the country; the elimination of the tension in the relations between Lebanon and some of its Arab sisters; and, above all, the realization of the speedy evacuation of foreign forces from the homeland—are the principal problems which demand solutions from responsible officials, requiring them to show determination, a firm will and very careful attention. But there is another aspect of the crisis, namely those things left behind after those events and days—estrangement and alienation between members of the Lebanese family. I have no doubt that all the Lebanese feel sorrow over this sad situation and are eager to purify the souls and hearts from what may have remained in them.

The object behind our aims to eliminate all traces of the crisis, solve the problems arising from it and build up a free and progressive homeland and a glorious and stable future, is the upholding of national unity. I call upon all Lebanese to revive and uphold this national unity, and to live in stability under its shadow. There is no demand or claim, whether personal or partisan, for which this unity is worth risking. No right of any individual or group is equal to the smallest part of this unity. There is, in fact, no duty more binding on the Lebanese than the duty of protecting this unity and of working to bolster it. There is no more serious or abominable crime against the homeland than working to destroy this unity or being negligent towards it.

Honourable deputies, at this moment when I take the oath to preserve the Lebanese Constitution, I promise loyalty, and ask you to honour your promise of loyalty, to the unwritten Constitution, our National Charter, because this is what has bound us and still binds us in the belief that Lebanon will be a cherished, independent, sovereign and free homeland which sincerely and frankly co-operates to the maximum with its sister Arab States, for its good and the good of all of them, and bases its relations with the entire world on the bases of friendship, dignity and free and equal treatment.

If the Charters of the Arab League, at whose resumption of activity we all rejoice, and of the UN are the strong bastions of Lebanon's independence, then the greatest bastion remains in our National Charter—in the unity of our ranks, the meeting of our hearts, the reliance on ourselves and our arms, and our complete, undivided and uncorrupted loyalty toward our homeland, Lebanon. Honourable deputies, the constant need for the sound building of the State has never been so well manifested as during this recent bloody period. There is no running away from the building of the State on bases and criteria derived from the determination of (word indistinct), the interests of the people and the goals of the homeland.

In order that the citizen may have confidence in the State, he should govern and be governed by a spirit of seriousness, seriousness in his responsibility toward his duties and struggle, seriousness in ensuring that the State works for all citizens on equal bases, and seriousness in looking towards and planning the future. The citizen must rest assured of the lack of bias of the ruler, the justice of the judges and the honesty of the officials. The Government must have full respect and the law all power, and the rights of the individual and the groups must be observed.

The State must go beyond the task of ensuring justice, equality and order to the bolstering of virtue, the promotion of progress and education, and the creation of adequate conditions for economic development. While promising my citizens before your Chamber that I will devote all my efforts toward building the State, I ask every citizen to pledge himself to fulfil his responsibilities and perform his full duty.

The elevation of the State, which is the thing we seek today, demands the co-operation of all citizens, the individual feeling with the whole, the realization of the limits of personal rights and the rights of others, the differentiation between freedom and anarchy, and the manifestation of the spirit of order and voluntary observance of law.

The Arab revival in all aspects of life must be matched by a new spirit of liberation, aspiration and courage in this homeland which has always held the initiative in every Arab renaissance. Any slackening in Lebanon will divert it from this leading role which has been Lebanon's, and will strip it of the power to continue its enlightening progressive mission. Today, while I look forward to a prominent Lebanese upsurge motivated by this new spirit, I look in particular to the youthful elements, whose eagerness for glory and progress I feel and whose readiness to give and to sacrifice generously I know.

Honourable deputies, from this rostrum which transmits to the world the feelings of the people, allow me to convey greetings of thanks to you and of loyalty and gratitude to the people, in whose name you bestowed the Presidency on me. I convey greetings of love and loyalty to the expatriates who have established its glory throughout the world. From this rostrum, allow me to express the ambitions of this homeland, which contains abundant wealth of magnificent potential power—not for a future in which Lebanon will concern the world with a political crisis threatening a certain area or world peace—but for a glorious future in which Lebanon will be praised by all the world, a future which will shine with knowledge and be illuminated by a great spirit.

I must, finally, say a word to our beloved army. I joined it when it was growing and flourishing and I did all I could for its sake. I owe it now, at this serious moment, an expression of sympathy and full compassion. I saw it living in the events through which Lebanon lived. Those events did not decrease its determination. It continued to enjoy its nationalism and understanding of duty. It takes great credit for the continuance of entity, the preservation of the State, and the perpetuation of a life of democracy, freedom and amity. I must thank and applaud it. Let it know that it will ever have my confidence and my belief that it is capable of facing all events with a spirit of unity and self-control. Long live Lebanon!

8. *Address by Prime Minister Rashid Karāmī to the Lebanese people, 25 September 1958*¹¹

Citizens, Lebanon is now passing through one of the most critical and difficult periods of its history. After the ordeal which was forced on us and has pained our hearts, caused our blood to be shed and harmed our

¹¹ *S.W.B. Part IV*, 27 September 1958, 2.

country, villages and establishments, we find ourselves faced with a great national responsibility, namely to bandage the wounds, wash away the bloodstains from the face of Lebanon, and build a new State and society based upon our painful experiences and inspired by our brightest hopes.

Citizens, the bloody ordeal which befell us has revealed many facts, the price of which was dear. It has proved that the danger to Lebanon, its existence and its independence comes from within when the people of a country are divided by biased propaganda, lies, doubts, fear and suspicion. The bloody ordeal has also proved that there is no way of rebuilding Lebanon as a free, sovereign and independent homeland except by once again uniting our hearts, joining our hands and embracing the aims of the National Covenant which was, is and will continue to be the pillar of Lebanon's structure and its cornerstone. Any defection or attempt to deviate from the principles on which the Lebanese entity has been built will expose Lebanon's existence to destruction and threaten our national unity with disintegration and collapse.

The bloody ordeal has proved that adherence to anything other than national unity and dependence on anything other than the Arab League and UN Charters is like building castles of sand. These facts and others, which have been revealed by the bloody ordeal, will define the future for us and place every Lebanese before his (word indistinct) and responsibility.

When the President Maj.Gen. Fu'ad Shihab honoured me with the responsibility of office, the first thing I did was to read his historic statement which he delivered in Parliament on 23rd September. I read it once, twice, three and four times. Each time my conviction grew stronger that our leader has done well in defining our future course, which is desired and aspired to by every (word indistinct) patriotic Lebanese.

Since my sense of duty has prompted me to speak to you and sound the call for us to march together on the long and difficult path, I find nothing to say to you but the word "love". Yes, our road is long and arduous. In order to overcome all the crises before us we shall find that only love will open the way to us.

On this particular holy night, the eve of the Prophet's birthday, the hearts of the faithful, more than at any other time, overflow with love, amity and peace. Citizens, put forth your hands to bandage wounds, to wash away bloodstains, and to rebuild. Tear down your barricades, citizens, for the era which will yield the fruits of the revolution has begun. Open the roads, citizens. The ordeal and the revolution have ended.

9. *Extract from interview given by President Nasser to Mr. R. K. Karanjia, Editor of Blitz (Bombay), 28 September 1958*¹²

Q. Are you satisfied with the latest developments in the Lebanon?

A. It seems that the trouble in the Lebanon has now almost come to an end. I am glad. I was deeply concerned over the fact that the Lebanese people were divided among themselves and because of the innocent blood that was being shed. This was what led me to talk to the US Ambassador in Cairo on the subject of a joint approach by the UAR and the USA to reach a solution to the problem through finding a President who enjoyed the confidence of all sides. I remember suggesting the name of General Fouad Shehab.

Unfortunately, these attempts met with no response from the US government but fortunately again the turn of events in Lebanon has permitted General Shehab to become President of the Republic of Lebanon. I wish him all possible success in his task to restore peace to and confirm the independence of our dear sister country.

10. *Statement by the US Department of State on the withdrawal of troops from Lebanon, 8 October 1958*¹³

The Government of the United States announces that by agreement with the Government of the Republic of Lebanon it has now been decided to complete withdrawal of US forces from Lebanon. It is expected that, barring unforeseen developments, the forces will all be withdrawn by the end of October.

The United States sent forces to Lebanon in response to the urgent appeal of the then government of that country for assistance in maintaining Lebanese independence and integrity. At the same time the United States took steps in the United Nations with a view to having it take measures to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon and thus facilitate the withdrawal of the US forces. Subsequently the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution developed by the Arab states and designed to insure respect by states for the freedom, independence, and integrity of other states and to

¹² *Nasser's Speeches and Press-Interviews, 1958* (Information Department, Cairo) 399.

¹³ *Department of State Bulletin, 39* (27 October 1958) 650-51.

establish practical arrangements to uphold the purposes and principles of the charter in relation to Lebanon.

The steps which have been taken with respect to the situation in Lebanon have led to a substantial improvement in the international aspects of the Lebanese security situation. The current unrest appears to have essentially domestic origins. In view of the progress made toward more stable international conditions in the area, it has been concluded that US forces can now be totally withdrawn from Lebanon. It is the confident hope of the US Government that the Republic of Lebanon, its sovereignty and independence strengthened, will move forward in unity, peace, and prosperity.

11. *Letter from the US representative to the United Nations to the Secretary-General concerning the withdrawal of troops from Lebanon, 6 November 1958*¹⁴

I have the honour to inform you that on 27 September the United States Government made known its intention to complete the withdrawal of United States troops from Lebanon by the end of October, if possible, provided the international security situation with respect to Lebanon continued to improve in the framework of successful implementation of part I of the General Assembly resolution of 21 August 1958. There has been continued improvement. The United States Government has therefore been able to complete the withdrawal of its troops. The last United States troops left Lebanon on 25 October, ahead of schedule.

The United States wishes to express its appreciation for the untiring efforts of the Secretary-General which have contributed to the establishment of conditions making possible the withdrawal of United States forces.

(Signed) HENRY CABOT LODGE

12. *Letter from the Foreign Minister of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council requesting for deletion of the complaint against the UAR, 16 November 1958*¹⁵

1. I have the honour to inform you as follows:

2. The Security Council, whose function in relation to the main-

¹⁴ GAOR, A/3986, Annex 1.

¹⁵ SCOR, 13th year, supplement for October, November and December 1958, 6-7.

tenance of international peace and security may consist principally of calling upon the parties to settle their disputes by peaceful and direct means of their own choice, will be pleased to learn that cordial and close relations between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic have resumed their normal course on the basis both of a long-standing tradition of brotherhood, friendship and mutual understanding and of respect for the provisions of the Pact of the League of Arab States and the Charter of the United Nations.

3. The Lebanese Government, conscious of the higher interests of the Lebanese people and the need to safeguard peace and security in the area, and in the spirit which led to the unanimous adoption of the decision taken by the United Nations General Assembly at its third emergency special session on 21 August 1958 [*resolution 1237 (ES-III)*], intends in the future to strengthen its co-operation with the United Arab Republic and other Arab States still further.

4. For this reason, and in order to dispel any mis-understanding which might hamper the development of such relations, the Lebanese Government requests the Security Council to be good enough to delete from the list of matters before it the Lebanese complaint submitted to it on 22 May 1958 which reads as follows:

“Complaint by Lebanon in respect of a situation arising from the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.”

5. The Lebanese Government requests the Security Council to ask the Secretary-General to communicate its decision to the General Assembly.

6. The Lebanese Government takes this opportunity to acknowledge once again the important part played by the United Nations in relations between nations and the efforts made by its organs to bring about the harmony and co-operation necessary to the attainment of a better world. The Lebanese Government wishes to express its gratitude to all friendly nations, and in particular to its fellows of the Arab world, for the spirit of understanding and sympathy they have displayed towards Lebanon in this difficult period of its history.

(Signed) HUSSEIN EL OUEINI
Minister of Foreign Affairs

13. *Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council concerning the withdrawal of the UN Observation Group from Lebanon, 17 November 1958*¹⁶

1. In its letter to you dated 16 November 1958 [S/4113], the Government of Lebanon has asked for the deletion from the list of items of which the Security Council is seized of the Lebanese complaint presented to the Council on 22 May 1958. In its fifth report dated 14 November 1958, the United Nations Observations Group in Lebanon, by way of a conclusion, has stated that since the task assigned to the Group "may now be regarded as completed, the Group is of the opinion that the withdrawal of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon should now be undertaken" [S/4114, *para.* 22]. The Group accordingly submits a recommendation to that effect. Both documents are today circulated to the Security Council.

2. In view of the statement of the Government of Lebanon and the recommendation of the Observation Group, I have immediately instructed the Group to present, in consultation with the Government of Lebanon, a detailed plan for the withdrawal. I have taken this step under the authorization given to the Secretary-General in the Security Council resolution of 11 June 1958 [S/4023] to take the necessary steps for implementation of the Security Council's decision. The instruction given to the Observation Group implies that I consider the task of the Group as completed and that my remaining duty under the resolution thus covers only the necessary measures for the liquidation of the operation.

(Signed) DAG HAMMARSKJOLD
Secretary-General of the United Nations

¹⁶ SCOR, 13th year, supplement for October, November and December 1958, 13-14.

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